Gauteng Refinery (PTY) Ltd v Eloff (A3005/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 739; 2023 (2) SA 223 (GJ) (2 September 2022)

80 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Summary Judgment — Counterclaim — Plaintiff's failure to explain why counterclaim does not raise issue for trial — Affidavit not rendered invalid — Consideration of counterclaim permissible in assessing merits of summary judgment application. Respondent, a former employee, sought to recover unpaid salary and expenses, obtaining summary judgment in the District Court. Appellant's appeal centered on the alleged failure of the respondent to address the counterclaim in the summary judgment affidavit. Court held that such failure does not invalidate the affidavit and should be evaluated during the merits assessment of the application. Appeal dismissed with costs.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings were an appeal to the Gauteng Local Division, Johannesburg, against a magistrates’ court summary judgment granted in favour of a former employee for unpaid remuneration and expenses.


The appellant was Gauteng Refinery (Pty) Ltd, the employer and defendant in the court a quo. The respondent was Paul Daniel Eloff, the former employee and plaintiff in the court a quo.


The procedural history was that the respondent instituted action in the District Court to recover amounts allegedly owed to him. The appellant defended the action and delivered a counterclaim for substantial damages. The respondent applied for summary judgment and was granted summary judgment in the amount of R101 583.72. The appellant then appealed that order to the High Court. In the appeal, the appellant relied only on grounds advanced in a supplementary notice of appeal delivered after the magistrate furnished reasons.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned summary judgment procedure, specifically whether the respondent’s founding affidavit in support of summary judgment was defective because it did not explain why the appellant’s counterclaim did not raise an issue for trial as contemplated by Rule 14(2)(b) of the Magistrates’ Courts Rules.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that the respondent was formerly employed by the appellant and that he resigned after the appellant failed to pay his salary for two months, namely April and May 2020, and also failed to pay a travel expenses claim. The respondent’s action in the magistrates’ court was directed at recovering the amounts he alleged were due arising from those failures.


It was also undisputed that, in the magistrates’ court, the appellant initially raised a defence of impossibility of performance, attributed to the level 5 Covid-19 lockdown, and that the appellant also instituted a counterclaim for damages of over R18 million against the respondent, said to arise from an alleged breach of the employment agreement linked to the respondent’s performance.


On appeal, the appellant abandoned both its initial defence of impossibility and an earlier appeal contention that the magistrate ignored prima facie evidence of a bona fide counterclaim exceeding the main claim. The appeal was confined to a narrow procedural complaint: that the respondent’s summary judgment affidavit did not comply with Rule 14(2)(b) because it did not address the counterclaim, and that this omission should have been fatal to the summary judgment application.


As reflected in the High Court’s summary of the record, the appellant’s affidavit opposing summary judgment did not set out factual material supporting a triable defence and contained only an allusion to the existence of the counterclaim, rather than detailed facts underpinning it. The magistrate, in the reasons later furnished, described the counterclaim as appearing to be the primary reason for the opposition and expressed the view that it was an attempt to stymie the respondent’s claim and was not bona fide.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether, under Rule 14(2)(b) of the Magistrates’ Courts Rules, a plaintiff seeking summary judgment must, as a matter of formal compliance, explain briefly why a counterclaim does not raise any issue for trial, and whether failure to do so renders the summary judgment affidavit fatally defective such that summary judgment could not competently be granted.


This dispute primarily concerned a question of procedural law and the characterisation of non-compliance: whether the omission complained of went to the validity of the summary judgment application (a formal defect precluding consideration of merits), or whether it was a matter relevant to the merits (to be weighed when determining whether a triable issue exists).


The High Court expressly framed the issue as not being whether the counterclaim ought to have been treated as a bona fide defence on the merits, but whether the respondent’s omission to deal with it was the kind of failure that precluded summary judgment as a matter of form.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter from the accepted premise that summary judgment is an extraordinary remedy because it can prevent a defendant from ventilating a defence at trial. For that reason, the plaintiff is ordinarily required to comply with the formal requirements of the summary judgment procedure before the court turns to the merits.


At the same time, the court emphasised that modern authority requires a balanced approach to technical non-compliance. The purpose of summary judgment procedure is not to permit purely technical objections to delay payment, but to ensure that a defendant with a triable defence is not shut out. The court identified this balance as central to deciding whether the omission complained of should be treated as fatal.


In considering the appellant’s argument, the court noted that the appellant could point to no authority establishing that failure to address a counterclaim in the plaintiff’s affidavit results in invalidity of the affidavit in the sense that the court is precluded from considering the merits. The court considered that this absence of authority may be explained by historical procedural context, namely that earlier formulations of the rule required summary judgment to be sought before plea (and thus before a counterclaim) was delivered.


The court accepted that authority permits a counterclaim to be considered in a similar way to a plea when assessing whether the opposition to summary judgment is frivolous, unsubstantial, or intended only to delay. However, it rejected the proposition that Rule 14(2)(b) should be interpreted to impose, as a formal prerequisite, an obligatory explanation addressing a counterclaim in order for the affidavit to be valid. The court reasoned that requiring such an explanation as a strict formal requirement would be inconsistent with the purpose of the summary judgment mechanism and would over-emphasise technicality.


Instead, the court drew a distinction between (a) defects that go to the validity of the application—such as whether the affidavit contains the required allegations and whether it is clear the deponent has the necessary knowledge—and (b) the requirement to “explain briefly” why the defence does not raise an issue for trial. The court characterised the latter as being of a different nature: it forms part of what must be evaluated when determining whether there is a triable issue, rather than a formal ingredient whose absence automatically invalidates the application.


The court further reasoned that this approach is especially important where a counterclaim may rest on facts distinct from the plaintiff’s main claim, meaning the plaintiff may not necessarily have comprehensive knowledge equivalent to the defendant’s. To preclude the court from considering whether the counterclaim constitutes a bona fide defence solely because the plaintiff did not explain why it does not raise a triable issue was viewed as inequitable and unnecessarily technical.


Having located the respondent’s omission within the sphere of the merits rather than formal validity, the court noted that the appellant did not challenge the magistrate’s determination of the merits. The court also indicated that it could see no basis on which the appellant could do so in the circumstances described.


5. Outcome and Relief


The High Court dismissed the appeal and thereby left intact the magistrates’ court order granting summary judgment to the respondent in the amount of R101 583.72.


The court ordered that the appeal was dismissed with costs.


Cases Cited


Mowchenson and Mowchenson v Mercantile Acceptance Corporation of SA Ltd 1959 (3) SA 362 (W)


Shackleton Credit Management (Pty) Ltd v Microzone Trading 88 CC and Another 2010 (5) SA 112 (KZP)


Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture 2009 (5) SA 1 (SCA)


Maharaj v Barclays National Bank Ltd 1976 (1) SA 418 (A)


Du Toit v de Beer 1955 (1) SA 469 (T)


HI Lockhat (Pty) Ltd v Domingo 1979 (3) SA 696 (T)


Muller and Others v Botswana Development Corporation Ltd 2003 (1) SA 651 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment.


Rules of Court Cited


Magistrates’ Courts Rules, Rule 14(2)(b)


Magistrates’ Courts Rules, Rule 14(3)(b)


Held


The court held that the respondent’s failure, in the summary judgment affidavit, to explain why the appellant’s counterclaim did not raise an issue for trial did not render the affidavit invalid or the summary judgment application fatally defective as a matter of form.


The court held further that, while a counterclaim may be relevant when assessing whether there is a triable issue, the plaintiff’s omission to address it is properly considered in evaluating the merits of the summary judgment application, rather than constituting a formal bar that prevents a court from determining the application.


On the facts and the manner in which the appeal was pursued, the appeal failed and was dismissed with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The summary judgment procedure is a stringent remedy that can prevent a defendant from advancing a defence at trial, and for that reason the plaintiff must generally comply with the formal requirements of the rule before the merits are considered.


Compliance assessments should reflect a balanced approach consistent with the purpose of the summary judgment mechanism, which is to prevent delay where no bona fide defence exists while ensuring that defendants with triable defences are not shut out by undue technicality.


A counterclaim may be taken into account in assessing whether opposition to summary judgment is frivolous, unsubstantial, or intended only to delay, but a plaintiff’s failure to explain in the founding affidavit why a counterclaim does not raise an issue for trial does not, without more, invalidate the affidavit or preclude consideration of the merits.


The requirement in Rule 14(2)(b) that the plaintiff “explain briefly” why the defence does not raise an issue for trial is not necessarily of the same character as core formal validity requirements (such as appropriate allegations and the deponent’s knowledge), and may operate within the merits enquiry into whether a triable issue exists.

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[2022] ZAGPJHC 739
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Gauteng Refinery (PTY) Ltd v Eloff (A3005/2021) [2022] ZAGPJHC 739; 2023 (2) SA 223 (GJ) (2 September 2022)

FLYNOTES:
SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND COUNTER-CLAIM
Civil
procedure – Summary judgment – Failure of plaintiff to
explain in affidavit why counterclaim does not raise
issue for
trial not resulting in invalid affidavit – May be considered
in determining merits of application
.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
CASE
NO: A3005/2021
REPORTABLE:
Yes
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: Yes
REVISED:
NO
02/09/2022
In
the matter between:
GAUTENG
REFINERY (PTY)
LTD

Appellant
and
PAUL
DANIEL
ELOFF

Respondent
Summary
Judgment:
Failure
of plaintiff to explain in affidavit why counterclaim does not raise
issue for trial not resulting in invalid affidavit
– may be
considered in determining merits of application.
JUDGMENT
YACOOB
J
:
1.
The
respondent is a former employee of the appellant. He resigned his
employment after the appellant failed to pay him his salary
for two
months, in April and May 2020, and failed to pay a claim for travel
expenses. The respondent instituted proceedings to
recover the amount
due and was granted summary judgment in the District Court for
R101 583.72. The appellant appeals this
judgment.
2.
The
appellant had defended the action, and relied on impossibility of
performance due to the level 5 Covid-19 lockdown as its defence.
The
appellant had also brought a counterclaim for damages of over R18
million against the respondent for breaching his employment

agreement. The claim was based on the respondent’s performance.
3.
The
appellant relies only on grounds of appeal set out in its
supplementary notice of appeal, which was filed after the Magistrate

provided reasons for the judgment:
3.1.
the
Magistrate ought to have found that the respondent failed to comply
with Rule 14(2)(b), and
3.2.
the
Magistrate erred by failing to find the respondent’s failure to
respond to the counterclaim was fatal to the summary judgment

application.
4.
As can be
seen the appellant has abandoned the initial defence of
impossibility. It has also abandoned the ground contained in its

initial notice of appeal, that the Magistrate ignored
prima
facie
evidence
of a
bona
fide
counterclaim which exceeded the main claim, which ought to have been
found to constitute an answer to the main claim for the purpose
of
summary judgment. It must be noted that no evidence at all was
adduced regarding the counterclaim, simply an allusion to its

existence was contained in the affidavit opposing summary judgment.
5.
Mr
D’Oliveira, in his heads of argument, casts these grounds as
one ground, and the second ground as merely an expansion of
the
first. They are clearly related and can be considered together.
6.
Rule
14(2)(b) of the Magistrates’ Court Rules
inter
alia
requires
the plaintiff to, in its affidavit, “explain briefly why the
defence as pleaded, does not raise any issue for trial”.

According to the appellant this required the plaintiff to deal also
with the counterclaim, which the plaintiff has not done, resulting
in
non-compliance with the Rule.
7.
The only
issue then, as articulated in the supplementary notice of appeal, is
whether the respondent’s failure to deal with
the counterclaim
prevented the grant of summary judgment. The question is not whether
the counterclaim ought to have been considered
a
bona
fide
defence
and the summary judgment therefore dismissed.
8.
In his
application for summary judgment, the respondent dealt only with the
contents of the plea. The appellant, in its affidavit
opposing
summary judgment, criticised the respondent’s affidavit, but
did not provide any facts in support of its opposition.
The affidavit
is remarkable in its vacuity. It must be noted that Rule 14(3)(b) of
the Magistrates’ Court Rules requires
the defendant to satisfy
the court, either by way of affidavit or oral evidence, that it has a
bona
fide
defence, by disclosing fully the nature and grounds of the defence
and the facts on which the defence relies. The appellant’s

affidavit contains almost no facts. However, if the respondent’s
application was fatally defective, this becomes irrelevant.
[1]
9.
The
magistrate in his reasons for judgment comments that the counterclaim
appears to be the primary reason for opposition, that
the
counterclaim appears clearly to be an attempt to stymie the
respondent’s claim, and was not
bona
fide
.
10.
The
appellant however does not rely on any substantive grounds for the
appeal. Nor is it required to. It is well established that,
because
summary judgment is a remedy which prevents a defendant from running
a defence, although it is one which is not
bona
fide
and is only intended to delay, the plaintiff must fulfil all formal
requirements. This is before the merits are considered.
[2]
11.
The
question is, therefore, whether the respondent’s failure to
deal with the counterclaim is the sort of failure which is
fatal to a
summary judgment application.
12.
It is now
equally well established that, in determining whether a failure to
comply is fatal, the court must take a more balanced
approach. The
purpose of the rule and the need for care is to ensure that a
defendant with a triable defence is not shut out, and
not to simply
allow technical issues to delay payment.
[3]
13.
The
appellant was unable to point to any authority for the proposition
that a failure to deal with a counterclaim results in the
invalidity
of an affidavit to the extent that a court is precluded from dealing
with the merits of the summary judgment application.
This may well be
because the bulk of authority precedes the amendment of the Rule and
required the application to be brought before
the plea, and therefore
the counterclaim, was filed.
14.
The
existing authority allows a counterclaim to be considered in the same
way as a plea, for the court to consider whether the counterclaim
is
frivolous, unsubstantial, and intended only to delay.
[4]
To require as a formal requirement an explanation why the
counterclaim does not raise an issue for trial is inconsistent with
the purpose of the summary judgment rule. The counterclaim ought
rather to be considered when the merits of the summary judgment

application are considered, and a plaintiff who does not include an
explanation of why the counterclaim does not raise a triable
issue
and therefore is a bar to summary judgment, runs the risk of failing
on the merits.
15.
In all the
authorities to which we have been referred, the fatal non-compliance
have been along the lines of whether the correct
allegations are
contained, whether it is clear that the deponent has knowledge and so
on. These are formal requirements which go
directly to validity and
compliance. An explanation, as required by the new rule, is of a
different character, and falls into the
elements that must be
considered when the decision maker is determining whether there is a
triable issue.
16.
This is
particularly the case where a counterclaim is based on facts other
than those on which the main claim is based, and a plaintiff’s

knowledge may not be as comprehensive as that of the defendant. To
prevent a court from even considering whether the counterclaim

constitutes a
bona
fide
defence
simply because a plaintiff has not explained why it does not seems to
me highly inequitable, and errs on the side of the
highly, and
unnecessarily, technical. The proper place for the consideration of
the plaintiff’s failure is in the consideration
of the merits
of the summary judgment application.
17.
The
appellant does not take issue with the magistrate’s
consideration and determination of the merits. Nor, in my view is

there any basis on which it can do so.
18.
For these
reasons we make the following order:
The appeal is dismissed
with costs.
S.
YACOOB
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
I
agree.
T.
MODISE
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
GAUTENG
LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
Appearances
Counsel
for the Appellant:

A D’Oliveira
Instructed
by:

Wright Rose-Innes Inc
Counsel
for the Respondent:

RA Arcangeli
Instructed
by:

Arcangeli Attorneys
Date
of hearing:

26 October 2021
Date
of judgment:

02 September 2022
[1]
Mowchenson and Mowchenson v
Mercantile Acceptance Corporation of SA Ltd
1959
(3) SA 362
(W) 366C-H.
[2]
Shackleton Credit Management (Pty)
Ltd v Microzone Trading 88 CC and Another
2010
(5) SA 112
(KZP) at [26].
[3]
Joob Joob Investments (Pty) Ltd v
Stocks Mavundla Zek Joint Venture
2009
(5) SA 1
(SCA) at [31]-[33];
Maharaj
v Barclays National Bank Ltd
1976
(1) SA 418
(A) at 423E
[4]
Du Toit v de Beer
1955
(1) SA 469
(T) at 473;
HI
Lockhat (Pty) Ltd v Domingo
1979
(3) SA 696
(T) at 698;
Muller
and Others v Botswana Development Corporation Ltd
2003
(1) SA 651
(SCA)