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[2011] ZASCA 42
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Minister of Safety and Security v Venter and Others (570/2009) [2011] ZASCA 42; 2011 (2) SACR 67 (SCA) (29 March 2011)
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THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF
SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case No 570/2009
In the matter between:
THE
MINISTER OF SAFETY AND SECURITY
............................................
Appellant
and
PAUL
JOHANNES VENTER
...........................................................
First
Respondent
CHRISTA
VAN WYNGAARDT
...................................................
Second
Respondent
CHRISTA
VAN WYNGAARDT NO
.................................................
Third
Respondent
Neutral citation:
Minister of Safety and
Security v Venter
(570/09)
[2011] ZASCA 42
(29 March 2011)
Coram
: Mpati P, Cachalia and Majiedt JJA
Heard
: 23 February 2011
Delivered
: 29 March 2011
Summary
: Delict ─ action for damages ─
failure of police to inform complainants of the provisions in the
Domestic Violence
Act ─ constituting negligence which caused
complainants harm when they suffered an unlawful attack on them ─
complainants
found to be contributorily negligent.
ORDER
______________________________________________________________
On appeal from:
North Gauteng High Court,
Pretoria (Mynhardt J sitting as court of first instance).
(1) The appeal is dismissed except to the extent
indicated in this order.
(2) The appellant is to pay the costs of the appeal
including the costs of two counsel.
(3) The order of the court below is set aside and is
replaced by the following:
'(a) It is declared that the defendant is liable to pay
to the first and second plaintiffs 75 per cent of such damages as
they are
able to prove or as may be agreed upon.
(b) The defendant is ordered to pay the first and second
plaintiffs' costs, including the costs consequent upon the employment
of
two counsel.
(c) The third plaintiff's claim is dismissed with
costs.'
______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
MAJIEDT JA (MPATI P, CACHALIA JA concur):
[1] This is an appeal against a judgment of Mynhardt J
in the North Gauteng High Court holding the Minister of Safety and
Security
liable for damages suffered by the respondents because of
the negligent failure by members of the South African Police Service
(SAPS) to perform their statutory duties under the Domestic Violence
Act 116 of 1998 (the Act). The appeal is with the leave of
the court
below.
[2] The incident giving rise to the cause of action
occurred on 21 October 2002, when Mr Cornelius Whitey van Wyngaardt
(Whitey)
raped his erstwhile wife, Ms Christa van Wyngaardt, the
second respondent, (Christa) and then shot and injured Mr Paul
Johannes
Venter, the first respondent (Venter). Whitey was later
arrested by the SAPS. He committed suicide whilst in police custody.
[3] The events preceding the incident are largely common
cause. The second respondent was married to Whitey. Two children were
born
of their marriage. The first respondent and his wife were
friends and frequent visitors to the Van Wyngaardt home. Both
marriages
ended and after Venter’s wife left him, Christa moved
into Venter’s home with her children.
[4] Whitey initially had no difficulty with this
arrangement; in fact he encouraged it. There was no suggestion at the
time of any
romantic connection between Christa and Venter. However,
the nature of their relationship changed and became more intimate
after
she moved in with him. This caused Whitey to become jealous.
Later his behaviour became compulsive. He made incessant telephone
calls, sent abusive text messages to her and threatened to set their
house on fire and kill them.
[5] As a result of Whitey's increasingly erratic and
threatening behaviour Venter approached the Brakpan police station
during June
2002 to seek advice on how he could deter Whitey from
coming to his house. They told him that they could only act if Whitey
physically
tried to enter the house.
[6] At about the same time Venter, accompanied by
Christa, also approached the Brakpan Magistrate’s Court to find
out how
he could obtain an interdict to prevent Whitey from entering
his property. He was informed that he had to obtain a case number
from the police before he could take the matter further. The
respondents did not, however, pursue this course. As will become
apparent
later in this judgment, the appellant contends that even had
the SAPS advised the respondents of their remedies under the Act they
would probably not have pursued any of these remedies – just as
they had not done with the interdict.
[7] On 27 July 2002 Whitey arrived at the respondents’
house. Venter telephoned the police for assistance. They arrived
promptly.
However, Whitey persuaded them that he had merely come to
fetch his children, which he was entitled to do in terms of the
divorce
decree that granted him access to them. In these
circumstances the police were constrained to permit him to take the
children with
him. This distressed the respondents. They felt that
Whitey had manipulated the situation to his advantage.
[8] Whitey's conduct became even more threatening after
this incident prompting Venter to approach the Brakpan police again
on 20
August 2002. This time he had prepared a statement in Afrikaans
with details of Whitey’s threatening behaviour against Christa,
the children and him personally. The statement contained a paragraph
which, translated loosely, said that he did not wish the police
to
conduct any investigation against Whitey, but to prevent him from
entering their property. However, the police officer who was
on duty
told him that the police could not assist him, and nothing came of
this complaint.
[9] Whitey’s conduct continued unabated. On 11
October 2002 he collected the children from the respondents' house
and, shortly
afterwards, he telephoned Christa. This time he
threatened to kill the children and himself should she go to the
police. He wanted
her to return to him.
[10] In response to this threat the respondents hurried
to the police for assistance. They reported to an Inspector de Koker
who
was sceptical that they had a case. He initially would not take a
statement from them and relented only after Venter telephoned
his
attorney who spoke to De Koker and tried to persuade him to act on
the complaint. This intervention, and that of a Captain
Abrahams,
caused De Koker to open a case docket. De Koker, however, remained
reticent and only took down a brief unattested statement
from
Christa.
[11] It appears from the evidence that, pursuant to the
complaint, Christa had a telephonic conversation with a Sergeant
Naude the
following day and requested the latter not to contact
Whitey on his telephone because the children were still with him. The
following
day, on 13 October, Whitey allowed the respondents to
collect the children. They did so and later informed Naude that the
children
were home. In the days immediately following this incident
nothing came of their complaint, despite Christa’s request in
her statement that the matter be investigated.
[12] This brings me to the events of 21 October 2001.
Whitey arrived at the repondents’ house unexpectedly. He had
telephoned
Christa the previous day and requested that they meet, but
no date was set for this meeting. Christa was alone at home with
their
four year old child. She was hesitant to let him in but decided
to open the door for him because she realised that he would have
seen
his daughter through the open windows and curtains. He entered and
said ominously that it was 'elimination day'. She asked
what he
meant. He replied that she would soon find out. He told her to
accompany him to his car. She did. He then took out a crossbow
and a
set of handcuffs from the boot. He told her that he was going to kill
Venter with the crossbow when he returned and that
he would use the
handcuffs to handcuff her to the bed.
[13] They entered the house and he proceeded to use the
crossbow to shoot at and damage several items in the house. While
doing
this he told her to go to the bedroom and undress. He
threatened to cause even further damage if she did not obey. She
complied.
He followed her and began scratching around one of her
wardrobes. He found Venter’s firearm which is usually hidden in
a
safe but had been kept in the bedroom so that Christa could protect
herself from her erstwhile husband. The discovery of the firearm
seemed to spur on the intruder. He then raped her.
[14] Some time later they collected the other child from
school on Whitey’s insistence. They took both children to
Christa’s
sister’s home. Whitey did not want the children
to be at home when Venter returned from work.
[15] They returned to the respondents’ home and
waited for Venter to return. According to Venter, he had received a
telephone
call from Christa’s mother earlier. She told him that
she had phoned Christa and feared that something was wrong. He also
tried to telephone Christa but there was no response. He then decided
to go home to investigate. He arrived home at about 15h00
and saw
Whitey’s car parked outside. This heightened his anxiety. He
walked to the front door and tried to open it, but was
not able to
because it was locked. He then walked to one of the side windows
where he saw Christa. She began screaming while trying
to warn him to
run away.
[16] Fearing that both children were inside with Christa
and Whitey he instinctively tried to gain entry through the front
door
by force. Whitey fired a shot through the door. The bullet
struck him on his arm. He then tried to flee but Whitey pursued him
by car and fired more shots at him. Fortunately he found a place to
hide. The police arrived shortly afterwards and arrested Whitey.
Two
days later he apparently committed suicide in the police cells.
[17] The respondents sued the Minister of Safety and
Security for damages based on the failure of the police to perform
their legal
duty to assist the respondents to take steps to protect
themselves under the Act. The appellant does not dispute that the Act
imposes
a legal duty to take steps to protect the respondents in the
circumstances of this case. Nor does he dispute that the police were
negligent in failing to assist the respondents in accordance with the
Act’s provisions. It is however contended that the
respondents
failed to prove that such negligence caused their damages, because
they would probably not have taken steps to protect
themselves even
if the police had assisted them or, at the very least, that their own
negligence contributed to what happened.
[18] It is important to understand
the ambit of the legal duty that the police owed to the respondents.
The Act and the National
Instructions on Domestic Violence
1
(the Instructions) require the police
to advise persons of their rights and to assist them in asserting
these rights, where necessary.
[19] The Act contains a panoply of
rights and remedies available to victims of domestic violence that is
derived from the constitutional
duty imposed on the State by s 12(1)
of the Constitution to protect the right of everyone to be free from
private or domestic violence.
2
The preamble to the Act declares that
its objective is to 'afford the victims of domestic violence the
maximum protection
from domestic abuse that the law can provide'
(italics added). To this end
Parliament introduced measures to ensure that the relevant organs of
State (including the SAPS) give
full effect to the provisions of the
Act.
[20] Section 2 imposes a duty to assist and inform
complainants of their rights under the Act. It reads as follows:
'2. Duty to assist and inform complainant of rights –
Any member of the South African Police Service must, at the scene of
an incident of domestic violence or as soon thereafter as is
reasonably possible, or when the incident of domestic violence is
reported─
(a) render such assistance to the complainant as may be
required in the circumstances, including assisting or making
arrangements
for the complainant to find a suitable shelter and to
obtain medical treatment;
(b) if it is reasonably possible to do so, hand a notice
containing information as prescribed to the complainant in the
official
language of the complainant's choice; and
(c) if it is reasonably possible to do so, explain to
the complainant the content of such notice in the prescribed manner,
including
the remedies at his or her disposal in terms of this Act
and the right to lodge a criminal complaint, if applicable.'
[21] Section 7 sets out the procedure
for obtaining a protection order and the wide-ranging powers that a
court has to issue one.
Of relevance to this case is the power to
restrain a respondent from entering a complainant's place of
residence,
3
or prohibit any emotional, verbal and
psychological abuse, intimidation, harassment and stalking.
4
A court may also refuse a respondent
contact with a child or permit it subject to suitable conditions.
5
[22] A breach of a protection order
is an offence, which carries a penalty of a fine or period of
imprisonment for a period not
exceeding five years or both such fine
and imprisonment.
6
Where threats of death or injury have
been made and where a respondent's state of mind or mental condition
warrants it, a court
must
order seizure of any arm or dangerous
weapon in the possession of or under the control of a respondent.
7
[23] The Instructions provide
guidelines to members of the SAPS on how to respond to complaints.
Paragraph 3(5) requires station
commissioners to ensure that copies
of the Act, the Regulations, the Instructions, station orders issued
by the station commissioner
8
and a list of relevant role players
9
are available at all times at a
police station. Paragraph 3(6) requires a station commissioner to
issue orders to members on how
to assist complainants to access
services provided by these role players or any other aspect
concerning domestic violence.
[24] On receipt of a domestic
violence complaint wide-ranging duties are imposed on both the
station commander
10
and the member receiving the
complaint.
11
These include the duty to investigate
a complaint and to collate all information in connection with it.
12
Paragraph 7 sets out the various
duties imposed on members. There is also a duty to render general
assistance to a complainant.
Specific assistance that must be
provided includes, inter alia, the responsibility imposed on a member
to open a docket and to
register it for investigation where a
complaint is made and, where no complaint is made, to assist a
complainant to make such a
complaint. This assistance must be
recorded in the occurrence book and in the member's pocketbook. A
Notice, attached as Form 1
to the Regulations, must be handed to a
complainant in the language of his or her choice.
13
That Notice details a complainant's
right to lay a charge or to apply for a protection order or to do
both. The complainant must
be informed that it is not necessary to
lay a charge before applying for a protection order. The difference
between the remedies
must be explained. A charge is aimed at securing
a conviction of an accused whereas the purpose of a protection order
is to prevent
future misconduct.
[25] The respondents contend that had they been aware of
and understood their rights under the Act – in particular their
right
to apply for a protection order – they would have taken
the appropriate steps to protect themselves. As I have mentioned
earlier the appellant’s response is that they have not
established that they would have. This is the nub of the dispute.
[26] In support of its contention the appellant points
to the respondents’ failure to pursue their remedy to obtain a
common
law interdict against Whitey in the magistrate's court. It
will be recalled that Venter was advised that he needed to obtain a
case number before he could get the interdict. But he and Christa did
not do anything further. In this regard what also counts against
them
is that in their further particulars they denied that they had
approached any court to obtain a common law interdict and had
to
recant during cross-examination. They were subjected to extensive
cross-examination on this issue. One of the reasons that they
did not
pursue the common law remedy was because they were afraid that this
could ‘push him over the edge’ as Christa
put it. Another
reason advanced was that their subsequent visits to the police –
particularly their encounter with De Koker
– led them to
believe that it was futile to try to do anything about Whitey’s
conduct. They were however driven to
concede that they could have
applied for an interdict. To this I should add that Venter had
previously relied on the services of
an attorney when he had problems
in trying to convince De Koker to act on his complaint. If he had
consulted his attorney he may
well have been advised that he could
obtain a protection order under the Act. A common law interdict would
conceivably have afforded
them some relief, namely to prohibit Whitey
from access to their property. A protection order would, as set out
above, have afforded
them more wide ranging relief.
[27] It is abundantly evident that
the Act and Instructions afford complainants wide ranging remedies
and impose extensive duties
on SAPS members to assist complainants in
accessing these remedies. The Act and its predecessor, the Prevention
of Family Violence
Act,
14
were specifically enacted to deal
effectively with family violence, since the criminal justice system
was palpably unable to do
so.
15
This legislation is similar to that
in other parts of the world.
16
The extensive protection available
under the Act would be meaningless if those responsible for enforcing
it, namely SAPS members,
fail to render the assistance required of
them under the Act and the Instructions. The legislature clearly
identified the need
for a bold, new strategy to meet the rampant
threat of ever increasing incidences of domestic violence. Its
efforts would come
to nought if the police, as first point of contact
in giving effect to these rights and remedies, remain distant and
aloof to them,
as the facts of this case appear to suggest.
[28] This court has in a long line of
cases laid down the test for causation in delict, which consists of
two legs, namely factual
and legal causation.
17
Factual causation is to be determined
by application of the 'but for' test. The evidential hurdle to be
crossed by a plaintiff is
not required to be established with
certainty ─ a plaintiff need only establish that the wrongful
conduct was probably a
cause of the loss. This, said Nugent JA in
Minister of Safety
and Security v Van Duivenboden
,
'calls for a sensible retrospective analysis of, what would probably
have occurred, based upon the evidence and what can be expected
to
occur in the ordinary course of human affairs rather than an exercise
in metaphysics'.
18
[29] In the high court the learned judge found that the
evidence had established that the police’s failure to advise
the respondents
of their remedies under the Act was the critical
cause for why they had not pursued this course. He reasoned thus:
‘
Ek is
daarvan oortuig op die getuienis dat die gebrek aan inligting ‘n
wesenlike, indien nie ‘n deurslaggewende, rol
gespeel het in
die besluit om nie hierdie aangeleentheid verder te voer nie. Ek het
pertinent verwys na die wye bevoegdhede wat
die Wet verleen aan ‘n
hof om ‘n gesinsinterdik te verleen en wat die inhoud daarvan
kan wees. Veral na die gebeure
van 11 Oktober 2002, meen ek dat op
die waarskynlikhede, as die eisers geweet het dat Whitey se regte
miskien ingekort kan word,
wat kontak met die kinders betref, dat dit
vir hulle moontlik ‘n uitkoms ook sou kon daargestel het en dat
hulle dan positiewe
optrede sou geneem het in ‘n poging om
daardie hulpmiddel te bekom.
Ek meen dat op die getuienis en
die waarskynlikhede, die feit dat hulle nie daardie inligting gehad
het nie, ‘n belangrike,
indien nie deurslaggewende, rol gespeel
het dat hulle dit nie weer verder self opgevolg het nie.
Mnr Van der Merwe se betoog was
dat vir die redes deur hulle aangevoer hulle besluit het om nie
daardie hulpmiddel te probeer bekom
nie. Met verwysing na die
onvoorspelbaarheid van Whitey se optrede het hy aangevoer dat niks
eintlik daarom draai dat die polisie
nooit die eisers ingelig het van
wat tot hulle beskikking is ingevolge die Wet op Gesinsgeweld nie.
Ek stem nie daarmee saam nie. ‘n
Mens hoef slegs die Wet te lees, en die nasionale instruksies, om te
sien dat daar ‘n
hele infrastruktuur volgens die bedoeling van
die wetgewer daargestel moes word om mense soos veral die tweede
eiseres in die onderhawige
geval, by te staan in omstandighede soos
waarin sy haar bevind het.
Die vrees wat hulle gehad het,
of die gedagte wat hulle gehad het dat Whitey dalk oor die afgrond
gestoot kon gewees het, kon bes
moontlik besweer gewees het indien
daar kontak was tussen die eisers en professionele persone wat
berading aan hulle kon verskaf
en leiding aan hulle kon verskaf.
Die feit dat
dit nie gedoen is nie, is na my oordeel feitlik alleenstaande
daarvoor verantwoordelik en dien as regverdiging dat
bevind behoort
te word op die feite van die onderhawige saak dat die nalate van die
Polisiediens onregmatig was.’
[30] In my view, the learned judge's
reasoning cannot be faulted. It follows that the respondents
established factual causation.
Concerning legal causation the
appellant did not advance any grounds to suggest that there were any
policy considerations that
stood in the way of a finding against the
appellant. Our courts have in the recent past consistently held the
police liable for
failure to perform their statutory duty to protect
citizens resulting in harm being suffered through such failure.
19
Legal causation was clearly
established in this case.
[31] What remains is the question whether the
respondents were contributorily negligent. The appellant’s main
contention is
that they were negligent in two main respects. First,
by failing to obtain the common law interdict. Second, that Venter
acted
unreasonably by leaving his firearm in the wardrobe instead of
in a locked safe and also by attempting to gain entry to the house
when contacting the police would have been the more prudent course of
action. In Christa’s case it is contended that she
was
additionally negligent in permitting Whitey to enter the house. The
second ground can be disposed of immediately. I do not
think it was
unreasonable for Venter to have left his firearm in the bedroom for
Christa’s protection, or to have attempted
to gain entry to the
house when he perceived that Christa and, possibly the children, who
he thought were at home, were in danger.
Christa explained that she
let Whitey into the house because she believed that it would
antagonise him if she did not. Her conduct
in this regard was in my
view not unreasonable.
[32] Before considering whether they
were negligent in failing to obtain the common law interdict it is
well to remind oneself of
two well-known important considerations in
assessing contributory negligence. The first is that reasonable
conduct cannot be judged
with the benefit of hindsight and one must
guard against the drawing of conclusions from
ex
post facto
knowledge.
20
Secondly, care must be taken not to
conflate separate elements of a delictual action such as causation
and negligence. I say this
because, having found earlier that the
police's failure to inform Venter and Christa of their rights and
remedies under the Act
constituted a delictual omission which was
causally linked to the harm they suffered, it does not follow that
the respondents'
failure to obtain a common law interdict cannot in
law constitute a degree of negligence on their part. There are no
degrees of
causation in our law, but there are degrees of negligence.
[33] After careful consideration I have come to the
conclusion that the respondents were negligent in failing to obtain
the interdict
and that this contributed to the harm. Venter, an
ex-policeman, was on his own version knowledgeable about this type of
remedy,
albeit only in broad detail. He explained to Christa its
existence and how it operates. They approached the Brakpan
Magistrate's
Court and sought to obtain an interdict. They were told
they need a case number. They conceded in cross-examination that they
were
able to obtain one by laying a criminal charge of trespassing or
intimidation against the deceased. Moreover, they had access to
a
case number on the case docket opened on 11 October 2002. A common
law interdict may well have stopped Whitey from embarking
on his
destructive course of action.
[34] In determining which party
should bear what portion of the damages, their respective degrees of
negligence must be compared.
This is determined by their respective
deviation from the norm of the reasonable person expressed as a
percentage. It is plain
that the negligence of the appellant is far
greater than that of the respondents. The SAPS had clear guidelines
in the Act and
the Instructions which they failed to adhere to. Over
and above this they have a constitutional duty to protect citizens.
21
The respondents' degree of
culpability is much less ─ I would put it at 25 per cent, which
would be fair and equitable in
the circumstances. The repeated
rebuffs, inaction and slothfulness to do what the Constitution, the
Act and the Instructions unequivocally
demand of SAPS members
warrants a far larger apportionment of blame.
[35] A finding of an apportionment of 25 per cent
against the respondents requires next an evaluation of the degree of
negligence
on the part of the appellant. It does not follow
automatically that the percentage is 75 per cent
─
a determination of the degree
of deviation of the appellant's omission from the reasonable man
standard is required.
22
In my assessment the
appellant's degree of fault is indeed three times that of the
respondents, ie 75 per cent.
[36] The last aspect for consideration on the merits is
the claim on behalf of the dependants, the two minor children,
brought by
Christa in her representative capacity as the third
plaintiff. In the particulars of claim it was alleged that Whitey had
traumatised
the little girl (without specifying any detail of such
traumatisation) and it was alleged further that Venter arrived home
while
the deceased was still detaining Christa and the little girl.
These allegations were denied in the plea. No mention at all was made
of any trauma suffered by the boy. Christa's evidence was that the
girl was present when Whitey fetched the crossbow from his car.
She
testified further that at some stage Whitey handed the handcuffs to
the girl to play with in the lounge which she did. There
was no
evidence that the girl was present when Whitey damaged items in the
house with the crossbow. The evidence is clear that
the girl was not
present in the bedroom when her mother was raped. The evidence
further indicated that the boy was at school during
these events. He
was later fetched from school by Whitey and Christa and he and his
sister were dropped off at their aunt's house
in Germiston. There is
thus no evidence of any trauma suffered by the children. The court
below did not deal with this aspect al
all. When questioned on this,
counsel for the respondents submitted that this was a matter to be
left for the trial court when
the matter is remitted on the issue of
the quantum of damages. I disagree. Christa sought a declarator
against the defendant holding
him liable for the trauma suffered by
her children. In the absence of any evidence proving that such trauma
was in fact suffered,
her action in her representative capacity
should therefore have been dismissed with costs.
[37] The following order is made:
(1) The appeal is dismissed except to the extent
indicated in this order.
(2) The appellant is to pay the costs of the appeal
including the costs of two counsel.
(3) The order of the court below is set aside and is
replaced by the following:
'(a) It is declared that the defendant is liable to pay
to the first and second plaintiffs 75 per cent of such damages as
they are
able to prove or as may be agreed upon.
(b) The defendant is ordered to pay the first and second
plaintiffs' costs, including the costs consequent upon the employment
of
two counsel.
(c) The third plaintiff's claim is dismissed with
costs.'
___________
S
A MAJIEDT
JUDGE
OF APPEAL
APPEARANCES:
For Appellant : M P Van Der Merwe
Instructed by : The State Attorney, Pretoria
The State Attorney, Bloemfontein
For Respondent : J G Cilliers SC
M van Rooyen
Instructed by : P G de Jager Attorney, Pretoria
Van Deventer & Thoabala Inc, Bloemfontein
1
Issued
by the National Commissioner of SAPS and published in
GG
20778 30 December 1999.
2
S
v Baloyi (Minister of Justice & another intervening)
[1999] ZACC 19
;
2000
(2) SA 425
(CC),
2000 (1) SACR 81
;
2000 (1) BCLR 86
para 11. See
also:
Van Eeden v Minister of Safety &
Security (Women's Legal Centre Trust as amicus curiae)
2003 (1) SA 389
(SCA);
[2002] 4 All SA 346
para
13.
3
Section
7(1)(e).
4
Section
7(6).
5
Section
7(1)(a).
6
Section
17.
7
Sections
9(1)(a) and (b).
8
Para
36(6).
9
As
set out in para 3(1).
10
Para
4.
11
Para
5.
12
Para
5(2)(d).
13
Para
10.
14
133
of 1993.
15
Omar
v Government of the Republic of South Africa & others
(Commission for Gender Equality, Amicus Curiae)
[2005] ZACC 17
;
2006 (2) SA 289
(CC) para 14.
16
See,
for instance, the Domestic Violence Act of 1995 of New Zealand; the
Family Law Act, 1996 of the UK; the Domestic Violence
Act of 1996 of
Ireland and the Domestic Violence Protection Act of 2000 of Ontario.
17
See,
for example,
Minister of Police v
Skosana
1977 (1) SA 31
(A) at 34,
International Shipping Company (Pty)
Ltd v Bentley
1990 (1) SA 680
(A) at
700E-701F;
Minister of Safety &
Security v Van Duivenboden
2002 (6) SA
431
(SCA) para 22.
18
P
ara
24.
19
Carmichele
v Minister of Safety Security & another
2004
(3) SA 305
(SCA);
Minister of Safety &
Security v Luiters
[2006] ZASCA 11
;
2006 (4) SA 160
(SCA),
2007 (2) SA 106
(CC).
20
Sea
Harvest Corporation (Pty) Ltd & another v Duncan Dock Cold
Storage (Pty) Ltd & another
2000
(1) SA 827
(SCA),
[2000] 1 All SA 128
para 27.
21
Minister
of Safety & Security v Van Duivenboden
para
22.
22
Jones
v Santam Bpk
1965 (2) SA 542
(A) at
555.