Redefine Properties Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others (29258/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 62; 2023 (1) SA 226 (GP) (9 February 2022)

80 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Property Law — Unlawful occupation — Application for eviction of unlawful occupiers — Applicant, Redefine Properties Ltd, sought to evict unlawful occupiers from Adjacent Property owned by the National Government, citing health and safety hazards affecting its industrial site — Respondents contended that the Gauteng Provincial Government was responsible for the Adjacent Property and raised objections of misjoinder and non-joinder — Court held that the National Government, as nominal owner, had an obligation to address the nuisance caused by unlawful occupation, and directed the respondents to take necessary remedial action.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was an opposed motion application in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria. The applicant sought relief arising from alleged unlawful occupation and nuisance conditions on an immovable property neighbouring its own property in Midrand, Gauteng.


The applicant was Redefine Properties Ltd, the registered owner of Erf 838 Halfway House Extension 3 Township, Registration Division I.R., Gauteng Province (“the Property”). The respondents were the Government of the Republic of South Africa (cited as the first respondent, and treated as the National Government), the Minister of Agriculture, Land Reform and Rural Development (second respondent), and the Minister of Public Works and Infrastructure (third respondent).


The matter had a notable procedural history. The application was initially launched on an urgent basis but was struck from the urgent roll on 29 June 2021 for lack of urgency. The applicant had also previously attempted to obtain relief in December 2020 by bringing proceedings against Gauteng provincial functionaries (two MECs), but that application was not proceeded with after the applicant was informed it had sued the wrong parties. The present application was heard on 10 November 2021, and judgment was handed down electronically on 9 February 2022.


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned which sphere of government bore responsibility, as owner/custodian of the adjacent land, to address alleged unlawful occupation and/or abate a nuisance affecting the applicant’s use and enjoyment of its property. The applicant’s main relief sought a direction compelling the first respondent to institute eviction proceedings in terms of the Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 (“the PIE Act”), alternatively to remove or remediate the nuisance.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that the applicant owned the Property and that it was used as an industrial site by a tenant operating a production plant for aerosol products. The Property directly bordered an adjacent parcel of land, described as Portion 1 of Holding Number 65, Halfway House Estate Agricultural Holdings, Midrand-Rabie Ridge MSS, Registration Division IR, Gauteng Province, held under Title Deed T86105/1988 (“the Adjacent Property”). The Adjacent Property was described as vacant land, save for the alleged occupation and related activities.


The applicant alleged that unlawful occupiers had been present on the Adjacent Property since 2018, and that there was no running water, sewage disposal, or amenities on that land. It relied on harms it said emanated from the Adjacent Property, including interference with stormwater drainage, open fires/burning of materials, smoke affecting operations, and safety risks due to the storage of hazardous substances (gas and alcohol) on the applicant’s Property. The applicant asserted that these conditions created a health hazard, nuisance, and fire hazard, and that it faced potential financial harm if its tenant terminated the lease because of the conditions next door.


From March 2018, the applicant (through correspondence) engaged Gauteng provincial functionaries regarding the conditions on the Adjacent Property. It was told, at stages, that the Adjacent Property had been expropriated for a roadway, and that provincial departments were custodians of vested property. No effective steps were taken to resolve the problem, leading to litigation attempts.


A core factual contest related to the Adjacent Property’s administration and responsibility. The respondents appeared to accept that the Adjacent Property was registered in the name of the National Government, but contended that responsibility lay with the Gauteng Provincial Government, because the land had been “vested” or was in the process of being vested in the province in terms of item 28(1) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, read with section 239 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1993. In a supplementary affidavit, the respondents stated that the Adjacent Property had been “finally and officially vested” in the Gauteng Provincial Government and that the Registrar of Deeds was being asked to endorse the title deed accordingly, with provincial government responsible for lodging relevant documents.


The respondents also disputed the characterisation of the situation as an unlawful occupation requiring eviction. They contended that the alleged activities were periodic refuse recycling and/or dumping typical of the area, and that there were no permanent structures amounting to an informal settlement, making eviction relief inappropriate or impossible to enforce. They further suggested that complaints ought to have been directed to municipal enforcement structures, although the court noted that municipal powers to abate nuisances do not preclude a neighbouring owner from approaching a court for relief against another owner.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions the court was required to determine were, first, which sphere of government bore responsibility for the Adjacent Property for purposes of the relief sought, given the respondents’ reliance on “vesting” under item 28(1) of Schedule 6. This was primarily a question of law and the application of law to fact, turning on the legal effect of a vesting certificate and whether responsibility shifted before registration/endorsement by the Registrar of Deeds.


Second, the court had to determine whether the applicant was entitled to relief compelling the respondents (as asserted owners/custodians) to institute eviction proceedings under the PIE Act, or whether the appropriate remedy lay instead in neighbour-law principles, particularly the law of nuisance, and the court’s discretionary power to grant equitable relief regulating neighbour relations. This involved application of legal standards to factual findings and required an evaluative determination of unreasonableness in nuisance, as well as a discretionary assessment of what relief would be reasonable and equitable in the circumstances.


Third, the court had to decide whether, on the facts it accepted, a private nuisance existed and what form of remedial order could be granted without disregarding broader constitutional considerations, including the property right in section 25 and housing-related considerations in section 26, together with the statutory framework of PIE.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the dispute as one implicating ownership responsibilities, the relationship between neighbours, and the regulation of land use. It reiterated that ownership is not absolute and may be limited by constitutional provisions, statute, and common-law principles, including the body of law governing relationships between neighbouring owners. In that framework, the court identified nuisance as a key neighbour-law limitation: a private nuisance involves interference with a neighbour’s use and enjoyment of land, particularly interference with the comfort of human existence on the land, and is actionable only when the interference is unreasonable, assessed objectively on the circumstances and as a factual enquiry.


A major preliminary point concerned the respondents’ defence that the Adjacent Property had been vested in the Gauteng Provincial Government, such that national respondents were allegedly “precluded” from dealing with it and bore no obligations. The court interpreted item 28(1) of Schedule 6 as a mechanism that facilitates vesting and registration of state immovable property between spheres of government through a certificate and subsequent endorsement/entry by the Registrar of Deeds. The court reasoned that the vesting process is not complete merely upon issuance of a certificate. In its view, the process is finalised only once the Registrar makes the required entries or endorsements in the deeds records to register the property in the name of the receiving government.


On that interpretation, the court held that pending vesting does not create a state of limbo that leaves third parties without an accountable owner. Absent proof that the Registrar had completed the necessary endorsements, the Adjacent Property’s ownership (and the obligations associated with ownership) remained with the National Government. The court therefore rejected the respondents’ contention that legal responsibility shifted immediately upon certification, at least as against a third party such as the applicant.


Turning to the requested eviction relief, the court accepted that, as owner, the National Government would generally have rights and obligations comparable to private landowners, including addressing unlawful occupation and nuisance on its land. However, the court did not consider it appropriate to direct the respondents to evict the occupiers. It viewed eviction as not necessarily a suitable solution in the circumstances, particularly given the nature of the dispute as one fundamentally grounded in the reciprocal rights and obligations of neighbouring owners and the need for an equitable resolution. It also had regard to the constitutional context, including the need to balance rights and interests as described in constitutional eviction jurisprudence, and the PIE Act’s role in protecting unlawful occupiers against arbitrary evictions.


The court then assessed whether a nuisance had been established on the evidence it accepted. It found that the applicant had proven a private nuisance occurring on the Adjacent Property that interfered with the applicant’s use and enjoyment of its Property and with the tenant’s physical comfort, convenience, and wellbeing. It characterised the interference as beyond what the applicant or its tenant could reasonably be expected to tolerate, and concluded that the nuisance should be remedied. While the court noted that municipal and legislative nuisance-abatement mechanisms exist, it treated that as not precluding a court-based remedy in neighbour law.


In crafting relief, the court emphasised that it had a wide discretion in neighbour-law disputes to grant the most reasonable and equitable order. It also stated that it could not ignore the interests and constitutional values implicated for persons not before the court, including the “unlawful occupiers,” and it referred to the Constitution’s foundational values such as human dignity, equality, and the advancement of rights and freedoms. These considerations influenced the form of relief: rather than compelling eviction proceedings as the primary remedy, the court ordered the owner (the National Government) to halt/remediate the nuisance in a manner it deemed fit, including through eviction proceedings if chosen, but in compliance with applicable legislative instruments.


The court further sought to prevent repeated litigation and practical frustration by requiring a compliance report and granting the applicant leave to approach the court on the same papers, supplemented as necessary, including for contempt relief if the order was not obeyed.


On costs, the court held that costs should follow the result. Although substantive relief was granted only against the first respondent, the second and third respondents were not treated as having achieved a separate success because all respondents jointly opposed the application on the same bases with shared representation. The court also considered the applicant’s efforts to resolve the dispute without litigation and the lack of effective action by government. It ordered costs against the first respondent on the attorney-and-client scale, as sought by the applicant.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted relief directing the first respondent (the National Government) to take steps within 60 days to remediate the nuisance on the Adjacent Property that interfered with the applicant’s use and enjoyment of its Property, and to provide a written report to the applicant within 15 days after taking such steps.


The court ordered that remediation must reasonably comply with applicable health and safety legislation and must ensure that the use and occupation of the Adjacent Property does not pose a threat to the safety and wellbeing of the applicant, its tenants, their employees, and lawful users/occupiers of the Adjacent Property. It further ordered the first respondent to take reasonable steps to prevent recurrence of the nuisance in the future.


The applicant was granted leave to return to court on the same papers (supplemented as necessary) to seek contempt orders if the first respondent failed timeously to comply with the remedial obligations.


The first respondent was ordered to pay the costs of the application on the attorney-and-client scale.


Cases Cited


De Charmoy v Day Star Hatchery (Pty) Ltd 1967 4 SA 188 (D).


Diepsloot Residents & Landowners Association v Administrator Transvaal 1993 1 All SA 132 (T); 1993 1 SA 577 (T); 1993 2 All SA 59 (T); 1993 3 SA 49 (T).


Diepsloot Residents’ & Landowners’ Association v Administrator, Transvaal 1994 2 All SA 299 (A); 1994 3 SA 336 (A).


Gien v Gien 1979 2 SA 1113 (T).


Pappalardo v Hau 2010 2 All SA 338 (SCA).


Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC); 2004 12 BCLR 1268 (CC).


Regal v African Superslate (Pty) Ltd 1963 1 SA 102 (A).


Three Rivers Ratepayers Association and Others v Northern Metropolitan 2000 4 SA 377 (W).


Yellow Star Properties 1020 (Pty) Ltd v Department of Development Planning and Local Government (Gauteng) (549/2007) [2009] ZASCA 25; 2009 (3) SA 577 (SCA); [2009] 3 All SA 475 (SCA) (27 March 2009).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, including section 1, section 25, section 26, and item 28(1) of Schedule 6.


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993, including section 239.


Expropriation Act 63 of 1975.


Less Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991.


Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998.


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, in terms of item 28(1) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution, the “vesting” of state immovable property between spheres of government is not completed merely upon issuance of a vesting certificate. The vesting process is completed when the Registrar of Deeds makes the necessary entries or endorsements to register the property in the name of the receiving government. Absent proof of such registration/endorsement, ownership and the obligations of ownership remained with the National Government.


The court further held that the applicant had established the existence of a private nuisance on the Adjacent Property that unreasonably interfered with the applicant’s use and enjoyment of its Property. While the National Government, as owner, bore responsibility to address the situation, the court did not grant an order compelling eviction proceedings as the primary remedy. Instead, it exercised its discretion to order remediation of the nuisance, allowing the first respondent to select lawful means (including possible eviction proceedings compliant with applicable legislation) to halt and prevent the nuisance.


The court ordered time-bound remedial steps, reporting obligations, preventative measures against recurrence, leave to pursue contempt proceedings on the same papers if necessary, and attorney-and-client costs against the first respondent.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that ownership of land is not absolute and is limited by constitutional, statutory, and common-law constraints. In neighbour-law contexts, these constraints include reciprocal obligations between neighbouring owners and the court’s capacity to regulate competing uses of land to protect health, wellbeing, comfort, and property interests.


In relation to nuisance, the court applied the common-law principle that a private nuisance consists of an interference with a neighbour’s use and enjoyment of land through interference with the comfort of human existence on the land. Such interference is actionable only if it is unreasonable, assessed objectively in light of all relevant circumstances, and the inquiry is fact-specific.


The judgment reaffirmed that courts have a wide discretion in neighbour-law disputes to craft orders that are reasonable and equitable, rather than mechanically granting the specific form of relief requested. In exercising that discretion, the court considered constitutional values, including the foundational values of dignity and the advancement of rights, and acknowledged the need to be attentive to the interests of persons not directly before the court.


On the constitutional and statutory interface, the judgment recognised that eviction-related relief implicates the balancing of rights and interests, including the property right (section 25) and protections against arbitrary evictions (section 26), with the PIE Act providing a statutory framework safeguarding unlawful occupiers from arbitrary eviction. The court’s remedial approach reflected sensitivity to that framework by directing remediation compliant with applicable legislation rather than ordering eviction as the immediate and exclusive remedy.


Finally, the court articulated a legal principle concerning state-asset “vesting” under transitional constitutional provisions: a certificate issued under item 28(1) of Schedule 6 facilitates the process, but does not complete the vesting against third parties until the Registrar of Deeds records the vesting by endorsement/registration in the deeds records.

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[2022] ZAGPPHC 62
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Redefine Properties Ltd v Government of the Republic of South Africa and Others (29258/2021) [2022] ZAGPPHC 62; 2023 (1) SA 226 (GP) (9 February 2022)

IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
(1)
REPORTABLE:
YES
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES:
YES
(3)
REVISED.
09
FEBRUARY 202
2
CASE NO: 29258/2021
In the matter
between:
REDEFINE
PROPERTIES LTD
Applicant
and
THE GOVERNMENT OF
THE REPUBLIC
First
Respondent
OF SOUTH
AFRICA
THE MINISTER OF
AGRICULTURE, LAND REFORM
Second
Respondent
AND RURAL
DEVELOPMENT OF THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE MINISTER OF
PUBLIC WORKS AND
Third
Respondent
INFRASTRUCTURE OF
THE REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
DATE OF HEARING:
10 NOVEMBER 2021
.
DATE OF JUDGMENT:
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email. The date and time of hand-down
is deemed to be 10h00 on
09
FEBRUARY 2022
.
JUDGMENT
KHASHANE
MANAMELA, AJ
Introduction
[1]
The applicant, Redefine Properties Ltd, is the registered owner of
Erf 838 Halfway House Extension
3 Township, Registration Division
I.R., Gauteng Province (the Property). The Property is situated
adjacent to Portion 1 of Holding
Number 65, Halfway House Estate
Agricultural Holdings, Midrand-Rabie Ridge MSS, Registration Division
IR, Gauteng Province held under
Title Deed T86105/1988 (the Adjacent
Property).
In other words, the Property and the
Adjacent Property have a common boundary.
The applicant
complains about the condition of (and human activities on) the
Adjacent Property by some unidentified persons (the unlawful
occupiers). Save for the alleged unlawful occupation, t
he
Adjacent Property is a vacant piece of land.
Through this
application the applicant seeks that the first respondent, the
Government of the Republic of South Africa (the National
Government),
as the owner of the Adjacent Property be directed to evict the
unlawful occupiers from the Adjacent Property in terms
of the
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land
Act 19 of 1998 (the PIE Act), alternatively remove the
nuisance.
[2]
The application is opposed by the National Government, the Minister
of Agriculture, Land Reform
and Rural Development (the Minister of
Agriculture), cited as the second respondent, and the Minister of
Public Works and Infrastructure
(the Minister of Public Works), cited
as the third respondent. The opposition is primarily on the basis
that the responsibilities
or obligations in respect of the Adjacent
Property lie with the Gauteng Provincial Government.
[3]
The matter came before on 10 November 2021, after it was enrolled for
the opposed motion week
of 08 November 2021. Mr WN Shapiro SC
appeared for the applicant and Ms NR Choeu and Mr GM Mamabolo jointly
appeared for the three
respondents. I reserved this judgment after
listening to argument by counsel. The judgment also benefitted from
the written argument
by counsel, for which I am grateful.
[4]
It is also important to mention some pertinent issues in the
background. This application was initially
issued on an urgent basis.
It was struck off the roll of the urgent Court on 29 June 2021 for
want of urgency. But that was not the
first time the applicant had
approached the Court for relief. The applicant had tried earlier to
cause the unlawful occupiers to
be evicted from the Adjacent Property
in December 2020. That application was against the MEC for Roads and
Transport, and the MEC
for Infrastructure Development, both of the
Gauteng Provincial Government. The application was not proceeded with
after the applicant
was informed that it had sued wrong parties in
the form of the Gauteng Provincial Government. Although this issue
has no direct bearing
on the determination to be made in this
application, but it is not irrelevant.
Applicant’s
case
[5]
As already stated, the applicant owns the Property bordering the
Adjacent Property. The Property
is an industrial site used by a
tenant as a production plant for aerosol products. The Adjacent
Property is vacant save for the alleged
unlawful occupation which
began in 2018 when the occupiers moved in. It has no access to
running water, sewage disposal or any other
amenities. The applicant
considers the living conditions on the Adjacent Property  to be
a health hazard, nuisance and fire
hazard.
[6]
From March 2018 the applicant - through its attorneys and by way of
correspondences - started
engaging the functionaries of the Gauteng
Government. The applicant was subsequently told that the Adjacent
Property had been expropriated
for establishing a roadway. Also that
the custodians of all properties “vested” in the Provincial
Government were the MEC for
Roads and Transport, and the MEC for
Infrastructure. The applicant was advised that the Roads Maintenance
Directorate had been directed
to clear the site and legally remove
the informal settlement, if necessary. But nothing tangible happened,
despite the applicant’s
threats of legal action.
[7]
In September 2020 the applicant brought an application against the
two MECs mentioned above
to compel them to take the necessary steps
to clear the Adjacent Property. It had by then been established that
there were approximately
15 (fifteen) persons occupying the Adjacent
Property. This lawsuit was withdrawn in March 2021 when the State
Attorney advised that
the Gauteng Government was not the owner of the
Adjacent Property, but that the National Government was the “nominal
owner”.
[8]
In June 2021 the applicant launched this application, this time,
evidently suing the National
Government and the two Ministers. In
this application the applicant essentially seeks that the Ministers
be directed to institute
eviction proceedings against the unlawful
occupiers of the Adjacent Property, alternatively (in case the
Adjacent Property is lawfully
occupied), the Ministers be directed to
take remedial action in respect of the nuisance thereon. As the
grounds for relief, the applicant
says that the Ministers are the
custodians of all property owned by the National Government and,
therefore, have an obligation to
abate the nuisance, threat and
interference posed by the condition of the Adjacent Property.
Further, the Property generates income
and the applicant is likely to
suffer significant financial loss should the tenant terminate the
lease agreement due to the unlawful
occupation of the Adjacent
Property. Also, the condition of the Adjacent Property poses threat
to the safety of both the applicant’s
tenant and the unlawful
occupiers, themselves. There have been some previous incidents of
flooding of the Property due to blocked
stormwater drains on the
Adjacent Property; the tenant’s inability to offload gas from a
truck due to open fires or the burning
of materials on the Adjacent
Property, and the summoning of the fire brigade by the tenant due to
smoke in the tenant’s factory
coming from the burning of waste on
the Adjacent Property. The burning of material or open fires is
concerning as the tenant stores
large quantity of hazardous gas and
alcohol on the Property. The storage of these substances ought to
comply with the health and
safety regulations to ensure that there is
no threat to lives on both the Property and the Adjacent Property.
[9]
The applicant says that it is unable to directly invoke the
provisions of the PIE Act as it
is not the owner [or in charge] of
the Adjacent Property.
[1]
But
should this Court be unconvinced about the eviction of the occupiers,
then this Court in the interests of justice and safety
should direct
the respondents to take remedial steps to avert the nuisance on the
Adjacent Property.
First,
second and third respondents’ case
[10]
The three respondents are jointly opposing this application. Whilst
appearing to admit that the Adjacent
Property is owned by the
National Government they appear to vacillate about whether it is the
National Government (either through
the Minister of Public Works
and/or the Minister of Agriculture) or the Gauteng Provincial
Government responsible for the Adjacent
Property.  There are
even assertions that the relief sought squarely fall within the
jurisdiction of the City of Johannesburg
as the responsible level to
enforce the by-laws and other applicable local government legal
instruments. The respondents raised the
objections or defences of
misjoinder and/or non-joinder to bolster their claims. I hasten to
point out that I find no merit in such
defences or objections.
Overall they label the application an abuse of the process of this
Court and its pursuit to be
mala fide
and laced with ulterior
and extortive motives.
[11]
The respondents say the so-called nuisance is a general problem
around the entire Halfway House industrial
area and therefore not
exclusive to the Adjacent Property. The activities complained about
is nothing more than a “now common refuse
recycling activities”
prevalent in all central business districts or CBDs. These activities
do not constitute an informal settlement
“undesirable and
uncomfortable as it might be to the applicant and the greater
population”. The activities may be “periodic
nuisance created by
the refuse recycling individuals pitching plastic structures when
they separate their garbage for recycling”.
[2]
There may also be illegal dumping on the Adjacent Property, but not
to a level of an informal settlement with permanent structures.
Therefore, there are no people to be evicted and such eviction would
be impossible to enforce. The applicant ought to have approached
the
City of Johannesburg, the police or the traffic department to lodge a
complaint. I hasten to confirm that it is correct that
local
authorities or municipalities are authorised in terms of legislation
to direct the occupiers or owners of land or premises
to abate
nuisances on the property they occupy or own.
[3]
A landowner may apply to the local authority for an abatement order
to be issued, but only where the conditions or state of affairs
constituting the nuisance is envisaged in the relevant legislation
granting jurisdiction to the local authority.
[4]
But this does not bar a landowner from approaching a court of law for
relief against a neighbouring landowner.
[12]
The respondents explained that the Adjacent Property was expropriated
on 24 March 1988 under the Expropriation
Act 63 of 1975 by the then
National Government. In 2014 and 2018 the Gauteng Department sought
the “National department” through
an application to issue a
certificate in terms of item 28(1) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa,1996
(the Constitution).
[5]
The certificate, among others, conferred the control, usage and
vesting of the Adjacent Property to the Gauteng Government. The
“vesting”
process is still underway. But the ownership and
control of the Adjacent Property is with the Gauteng Government and
the National
Ministers “are entirely precluded from dealing
with the said property”.
[6]
[13]
Later by way of a supplementary affidavit the respondents stated that
the Minister of Agriculture has “finally
and officially vested”
the Adjacent Property in the Provincial Government in terms of
section 239 of the Constitution of the Republic
of South Africa, 1993
and item 28(1) of Schedule 6 of the Constitution.
[7]
It is further stated that the Minister of Agriculture has requested
the Registrar of Deeds (Pretoria) to endorse the vesting of the
Adjacent Property in the name of the Gauteng Government. It is also
explained that in terms of the protocol of Government, the Gauteng
Government is responsible for lodging the relevant documents with the
Deeds Office for the required endorsement of the title deed
to the
Adjacent Property. Therefore, for all intents and purposes, the
Gauteng Government is the owner of the Adjacent Property after
the
item 28(1) certificate is signed, the statement continued.
Applicable
legal principles
[14]     This matter
concerns directly the ownership of land and the responsibilities
attaching thereto. There
is also the issue of the use of land,
particularly the land belonging to the government or the State. The
latter issue, to a large
extent, is shaded by the former, but is not
in any way insignificant.
[15]     The ownership of
land is (or the rights derived therefrom are) not absolute as may be
subject to express
or inherent limitations.
[8]
The
express or inherent limitations, including those from the
Constitution and other statutory or common law may apply.
[9]
These limitations may be for the regulation of the specific types of
land use or to limit the use of land in specified areas.
[10]
Also the limitation of ownership by operation of law may be in the
interests of other legal subjects, mainly, by the rules governing
the
relationship between neighbouring landowners.
[11]
[16]     The principles of
the common law relevant to the relations between neighbours may
impose certain limitations
on the landowners.
[12]
This may be in the following forms: nuisance, encroachment, lateral
support, and the drainage of surface waters.
[13]
The
neighbours enjoy a reciprocal right to use and enjoy their respective
land in a manner that is conducive to their health,
well-being and
comfort.
[14]
For
example, neighbours may not cause damage or destruction to one
another’s property.
[15]
When called upon to intervene, the court has a wide discretion to
grant such orders as deemed necessary to offer the most reasonable
and equitable relief.
[16]
[17]     One of the
limitations of the neighbour law imposed on the landowners is in the
form of a nuisance.
[17]
A
limitation in the form of a private nuisance
[18]
is when there is interference by a neighbour with an owner’s use
and enjoyment of his or her land through interference with
the
comfort of human existence on the land.
[19]
The corollary of this is that through the ownership of land a
landowner is entitled to inhabit and occupy land in personal physical
comfort, convenience and wellbeing.
[20]
The
violation of this interest occurs when the subject land or the
premises thereon is invaded by the substances or phenomena
such as
foul odour, smoke, gas, fumes, noise or vibration, often in excessive
quantities or levels.
[21]
These
may give rise to a cause of action in nuisance.
[22]
But the Court ought to determine whether the alleged interference
goes beyond what a neighbour can be expected to tolerate. In other
words an interference will not be actionable as a nuisance unless it
is unreasonable.
[23]
The test of unreasonabless involves an objective
[24]
evaluation of the circumstances and it is factual.
[25]
1
[18]     The primary relief
sought in this matter implicates primarily the Constitutional right
to property in
terms of section 25
[26]
of the Constitution. The alternative relief concerns the right of
access to adequate housing under section 26
[27]
of the Constitution. The latter right proscribes the law which may
allow arbitrary evictions.
[28]
The PIE Act represents the law which guarantees the freedom from
arbitrary evictions even to the unlawful occupiers of land. The
provisions of the PIE Act and the Less Formal Township Establishment
Act 113 of 1991
[29]
have an effect on neighbour law and neighbourhood law. Overall the
rights or interests involved here, as stated by the Constitutional
Court in
Port Elizabeth Municipality
v Various Occupiers
,
[30]
would
require to be balanced.
[19]
Although the ownership of the
Property
by the applicant is common cause, the same cannot be said of the
ownership of the Adjacent Property. There is reference to
“nominal
ownership” and custodianship in the quest by the respondents to
explain that although the Adjacent Property is registered
in the name
of the National Government, this level of government, including the
cited Ministers do not have any legal obligations
with regard to this
piece of land. The source of this appears to be item 28(1) of
Schedule 6 to the Constitution.
[20]
Item 28(1) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution provides for the
registration
of
immovable property owned by the State. It reads as follows:
“
(1)
On the production of a certificate by a competent authority that
immovable
property owned by the state is vested in a particular government
in terms of section 239 of the previous Constitution,
a
registrar of deeds must make such entries or endorsements in or on
any relevant register, title deed or other document to register
that
immovable property in the name of that government
.
(2)
No duty, fee or other charge is payable in respect of a registration
in terms of subitem (1).
”
[underlining added for emphasis]
[21]     Evidently, item
28(1) is pivoted upon section 239 of the previous Constitution (i.e.
the Constitution
of the Republic of South Africa 200 of 1993).
Section 239, similarly to item 28(1), dealt with the transitional
arrangements in respect
of the assets and liabilities of the State.
[22]     Section 239(2)
contained provisions similar to those in item 28(1) and read:
“
(a) A
registrar of deeds shall upon the production of a certificate by a
competent authority that immovable property described
in
the certificate is vested in a particular government in terms of this
section, make such entries or endorsements in or on any relevant
register, title deed or other document to register such immovable
property in the name of such government.
(b) No duty, fee or other charge
shall be payable in respect of a registration in terms of
paragraph
(a).
”
[underlining added for emphasis]
[23]
The above legal principles are applied to the facts or the legal
submissions on behalf of the parties in this
matter to the extent
applicable, next.
Applicable
legal principles and the submissions by the parties (discussed)
General
[24]
The applicant’s case, put in simple terms, is that, as the owner of
the Property it is affected by
the unlawful occupation or nuisance
emanating from the Adjacent Property. It applies that the first
respondent and/or the second
and third respondents as the owner
and/or entities responsible for the Adjacent Property be compelled to
either evict the unlawful
occupiers, alternatively, to take steps in
order to remediate or ameliorate the conditions of use or occupation
of the Adjacent Property.
The applicant says its hands are tied, so
to speak, as it cannot directly evict the unlawful occupiers under
the PIE Act. This legislation
requires that applicant for an eviction
be either the owner or the person in charge of the Adjacent
Property.
[31]
[25]
The respondents’ case or defence (after all the haze of the
misjoinder and non-joinder is cleared)
is that, although the Adjacent
Property is owned by the National Government the latter has “vested”
the Adjacent Property in
the Provincial Government or such process is
underway. This defence is advanced jointly with a rather bizarre
denial of the use or
occupation of the Adjacent Property in
contravention of the law or by-laws.
[32]
There is also another ground of opposition or defence, which appears
to have been raised partly to premise the respondents’ assertion
that the two Ministers have been misjoined to this application. The
latter ground is that any orders granted against the Ministers
would
be inconsequential as they are not responsible for the Adjacent
Property. Next, I discuss the defence of the “vesting”
of the
Adjacent Property and the other defences.
Vesting of
property owned by the State
[26]
The issue of the vesting of the Adjacent Property is significant,
mainly, as it affects the determination
of which government (national
or provincial) bears the responsibilities to give effect to any
relief that may be granted in this
matter. It ought to be discussed
and determined first.
[27]
As already hinted above, item 28(1) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution
provides for the registration
of
immovable property owned by the State. My reading of this provision
tells me that it merely facilitates the “vesting” from
the one
part of government to another of an immovable property owned by the
State.
[33]
The “vesting”
places the
administration
of the property in the second government in which it is vested, but
the ownership of the property remains with the
first government.
[34]
[28]
Evident from the provision the process clearly involves the
production of a certificate of the vesting
to the Registrar of Deeds.
The latter would then be required to make entries or endorsements in
its relevant register(s), title deed
or other relevant document to
effect the vesting of the immovable property in the name of the
beneficiary government.
[29]
The process of vesting would be finalised or achieved when the
Registrar has completed the abovementioned
tasks. This, in my view,
means that before the Registrar of Deeds makes entries in or
endorsements of the relevant documents the
vesting is not attained.
This would mean that the registered owner’s rights and obligations
in respect of the material property
or land remain unaffected by the
pending “vesting”.  The owner is not discharged or absolved
of the obligations. The owner
also retains the rights applicable to
the ownership of the material property.
[30]
Consequently, I respectfully disagree with the respondents’
contention to the effect that there is
a transfer of rights
immediately upon the furnishing of the
certificate
by a competent authority for the vesting before the certificate is
given effect to by the Registrar of Deeds. In my view,
before
the Registrar records the vesting  (i.e. by making entries and
endorsements to the relevant documents or records) the
owner is not
precluded
from dealing with the Adjacent Property. However, to the extent that
there may be any such preclusion it would apply only
inter
partes
the
two government entities involved in the vesting process, but not
third parties, such as the applicant. I
agree
with the respondents that a
certificate
in terms of item 28(1), among others, confers the control, usage and
vesting of immovable properties in the government
in whose favour it
is issued. But I disagree – with respect - that such certificate
has an effect in law beyond the two governments
before the Registrar
has effected the registration of the vesting in her records. Also, it
is my view, that the
vesting
process is incapable of creating a state of
limbo
between
the certification by the one government and the recording of the
vesting of the impugned property in the name of the other
government.
[31]
Therefore,
absent proof of registration by the Registrar, the ownership and
control of the Adjacent Property is not yet “finally
and
officially”
[35]
vested in
the Gauteng Provincial Government but remains with the National
Government until the completion of the vesting process,
as provided
in item 28(1) of Schedule 6 to the Constitution.
[36]
Eviction of the unlawful occupiers
[32]
The conclusion reached regarding the vesting of the Adjacent Property
means that the National Government is
the relevant party for purposes
of the relief sought in this matter, be it eviction of the unlawful
occupiers or the remediation
of the nuisance.
[33]
The applicant, in the main, seeks that this Court direct the
respondents to launch eviction proceedings
against the unlawful
occupiers. As an alternative the applicant prays that the respondents
be directed to take steps to remove the
nuisance.
[34]
As part of the opposition of the relief sought, the respondents have
labelled the relief sought incompetent.
They deny any unlawful
occupation of the Adjacent Property worthy of an eviction process.
They further argue that even if this Court
can order that eviction
proceedings be instituted,  none of the respondents play the
executive or political role envisaged by
the relief sought by the
applicant. Other government entities ought to have been joined in
this litigation, they further argue. I
have already dismissed the
latter part of the defence. The respondents’ latest ground of
opposition is that the vesting process
- under way - would saddle the
Provincial Government with the relevant responsibilities. Therefore,
the applicant ought to have cited
the latter or rather waited for the
vesting process to unfold, the respondents contend. I have also found
that the National Government’s
ownership of the Adjacent Property
remains unaffected by the vesting process until it is completed.
[37]
[35]
As the owner of the Adjacent Property the National Government has
rights and obligations attaching to
such ownership comparable to
those of private landowners, including regarding the eviction of
unlawful occupiers of its land and
remediation of nuisance
thereon.
[38]
But I do not
consider it appropriate to direct the respondents to evict the
unlawful occupiers. It does not appear to be a suitable
solution
under the circumstances of this matter. In my view the determination
to be made in this matter ought to be derived from
the principles or
rules governing the relationship between neighbouring landowners. It
ought to flow from the obligations attaching
to the ownership of
immovable property
[39]
and the
reciprocal right of neighbouring landowners to use and enjoy their
respective land in a manner that is conducive to their
health,
well-being and comfort.
[40]
This
is essentially what the current dispute is about.
Remediation of the nuisance
[36]     I find that the
applicant has established that there is a nuisance of a private
nature occurring on the
Adjacent Property. But it does not really
make any difference if the nuisance could also be classified as a
public nuisance.
[41]
The nuisance interferes with the applicant’s use and enjoyment of
the Property (or of those occupying the Property with the applicant’s
consent) due to the interference with the comfort of human existence
on the Property.
[42]
The
applicant’s tenant on the Property cannot inhabit and occupy the
Property in the physical comfort, convenience and wellbeing
due to
the violations stated above emanating from the Adjacent
Property.
[43]
The
interferences are beyond what the tenant of the Property or the
applicant can be expected to tolerate. The nuisance ought
to be
remedied.
[37]     The essence of
this part of the relief sought is that the respondents, particularly
the first respondent
(i.e. the National Government) as the owner of
the Adjacent Property, halt or remedy the nuisance interfering with
the use and enjoyment
of the Property. I say this whilst mindful of
the fact that the applicant may have pointed the relief sought
towards the second and
third respondents (i.e. the Ministers). But I
proceed from an angle of the ownership of the Adjacent Property, as I
have already
stated.
[38]     The Court is
allowed a wide discretion to issue an order for the resolution of a
dispute between the
neighbours in the most reasonable and equitable
manner.
[44]
In the exercise of its discretion this Court cannot and should not
close its eyes to other concerning issues which may affect the
rights
or interests of other persons, even if such persons are not appearing
before the Court. I have in mind, mainly, the so-called
unlawful
occupiers. For section 1 of the Constitution states that this country
is founded on values, among others, of “
human
dignity, the achievement of equality and the advancement of human
rights and freedoms
”.
[45]
The relief granted would strive towards the inclusion of these
values.
Conclusion
[39]     Therefore,
considering what is stated above, I will grant relief not necessarily
in the exact terms of
the notice of motion. There is a basis for this
in the facts I found proven in the matter. I have also considered the
practicability
in which the harm complained of could be prevented by
the first respondent.
[46]
The Constitutional values and principles referred to above played a
significant role in this regard. Overall, I also find the interests
of justice to warrant this.
[40]     I will simply
direct the first respondent or the National Government to halt the
nuisance complained
of. This the first respondent can do in whatever
manner it deems fit, including eviction proceedings, but the steps
taken ought to
be compliant with the applicable legislative
instruments. The first respondent will be required to furnish a
report to the applicant
on compliance with the order granted. In
order to avoid a possible “merry-go-round” in litigation, which
will no doubt frustrate
the applicant, especially after the vesting
process has been completed, I will authorise the applicant to
approach this Court on
the same papers with whatever supplementation
it is required.
[41]     Costs of the
application would follow the outcome. Although the relief granted is
only against the first
respondent this does not translate into
victory for the second and third respondents. Besides, it is also
significant that the respondents
joined forces in their opposition of
this matter, raising the same defences and utilising the same legal
representatives. This fact
by itself would render any order
distinguishing which costs were incurred with regard to the first
respondent and those possibly
with regard to the other respondents
irrational. I also find such a scenario inimical of the interests of
justice.  It is equally
significant to bear in mind that the
applicant was forced to take the route that it did after trying to
amicably resolve the issue
with the government, both at national and
provincial levels to no avail. The applicant should be assisted not
to be out of pocket
as reasonably as it may be. Therefore, the costs
payable by the first respondent shall be at the scale of attorney and
client, as
prayed for by the applicant.
Order
[42]
In the premises, I make the following order:
a)
subject to b) hereof, the first respondent is directed within 60
(sixty) days from
date of this order to take steps, either directly
or indirectly through the second respondent and/or third respondent
or any other
government entity or person, to remediate the nuisance
on Portion 1 of Holding Number 65, Halfway House Estate Agricultural
Holdings,
Midrand-Rabie Ridge MSS Local Authority, Registration
Division IR, Gauteng Province held under Title Deed T86105/1988
(hereafter
referred to as “the Adjacent Property”) interfering
with the use and enjoyment of Erf 838 Halfway House Extension 3
Township,
Registration Division I.R., Gauteng Province (hereafter
referred to as “the Property”), and thereafter furnish a written
report
to the applicant within 15 (fifteen) days of steps taken in
this regard;
b)
the remediation in terms of a) hereof is directed to reasonably
comply with the
applicable health and safety legislation and to
ensure that the use and occupation of the Adjacent Property does not
pose a threat
to the safety and wellbeing of the applicant, its
tenants, the property of the applicant and/or the tenants; employees
of the applicant
and/or tenants, and the lawful users and/or lawful
occupiers of the Adjacent Property;
c)
the first respondent is directed to take reasonable steps to prevent
the nuisance
stated in a) hereof from re-occurring in the future;
d)
The applicant is granted leave to approach this Court on the same
papers, supplemented
insofar as it may be necessary, for orders
declaring the first respondent to be in contempt of the orders in a),
b) and c) hereof
in the event the first respondent fails timeously to
take the steps set out above; and
e)
the first respondent is directed to pay the costs of the application
at the scale
of attorney and client.
Khashane La M.
Manamela
Acting Judge of
the High Court
09 FEBRUARY 2022
Appearances
:
For the
Applicant
:
Mr WN Shapiro SC
Instructed
by
:
MacGregor Erasmus Attorneys Inc, Durban
c/o Macintosh Cross
& Farqharson, Pretoria
For the Respondents

:
Ms NR Choeu
Mr GM Mamabolo
Instructed
by
:
State Attorney, Pretoria
[1]
The legal standing
to institute eviction proceedings under the PIE Act is granted the
“owner” of land or someone
“
in
charge” of the land. Section 1 of the PIE Act defines an “owner”
as “the registered owner of land, including an organ
of state”.
And the same provision defines a “person in charge” of land as
“a person who has or at the relevant time had
legal authority to
give permission to a person to enter or reside upon the land in
question”.
[2]
Respondents’ Answering
Affidavit at par 33.8.
[3]
Church, J. 2016.
Nuisance
,
LAWSA, vol 19, 2
nd
ed, LexisNexis (online version - last updated, 29 February 2016)
(hereafter Church on
Nuisance
)
at 198.
[4]
Church on
Nuisance
at 198.
[5]
See par [20] below for the
reading of item 28(1) of the Schedule 6 to the Constitution.
[6]
Respondents’ Answering
Affidavit at par 33.23.
[7]
See par [20] below.
[8]
Van
Wyk, J. 2017. “Land Administration”, in
LAWSA,
vol
25(1), 3
rd
ed, LexisNexis (online version- last updated on 31 January 2017)
(hereafter Van Wyk
Land
Administration
)
at par 47. See Church on
Nuisance
and Van der Merwe, CG. 2014. “Things”, in
LAWSA,
Vol
27, 2
nd
ed,
LexisNexis (online version - last updated on 31 January 2014)
(hereafter Van der Merwe on Things) at par 142.
[9]
Van Wyk
Land
Administration
at par
47.
[10]
Van Wyk
Land
Administration
at par
47.
[11]
Ibid.
[12]
Van Wyk
Land
Administration
at par 55.
[13]
Ibid
.
[14]
Van Wyk
Land
Administration
at par 55.
[15]
Ibid.
[16]
Van der
Merwe on Things at par 168.
[17]
Van Wyk
Land
Administration
at par
55 relying, among others, on
Regal
v African Superslate
(
Pty
)
Ltd
1963 1 SA 102 (A);
Gien
v Gien
1979 2 SA 1113 (T)
and
Pappalardo v
Hau
2010 2 All
SA 338 (SCA).
[18]
In
Muller, G
et
al
.
‘Silberberg and Schoeman’s: The Law of Property’, 6
th
ed, LexisNexis (online version) (hereafter
Silberberg
and Schoeman’s Law of Property
)
at par 6.2 states that there are three main categories of the
limitations which may be imposed on the ownership of property:

public law limitations (imposed on all owners of a particular kind
of property to benefit society or certain sections of society);
restrictions imposed in the interests of neighbour relations, and
individual restrictions.
[19]
Church on
Nuisance
at par 170.
[20]
Ibid
.
[21]
Church on
Nuisance
at par 170.
[22]
Ibid.
[23]
Silberberg and Schoeman’s
Law of Property
at
par 174.
[24]
Gien v Gien
1979 (2) SA 1113
(T) at 1120.
[25]
De Charmoy v Day
Star Hatchery
(
Pty
)
Ltd
1967 4 SA 188 (D)
192.
[26]
Section 25(1) of
the Constitution reads: “No one may be deprived of property except
in terms of law of general application, and
no law may permit
arbitrary deprivation of property.”
[27]
Section 26 of the
Constitution reads in the material part: “(1) Everyone has the
right to have access to adequate housing. (2)  The
state
must take reasonable legislative and other measures, within its
available resources, to achieve the progressive realisation
of this
right. (3)  No one may be evicted from their home …
without an order of court made after considering all the
relevant
circumstances. No legislation may permit arbitrary evictions.”
[28]
Section 26(3) of the
Constitution.
[29]
The provisions of the Less
Formal Township Establishment Act 113 of 1991 were considered
in
Diepsloot
Residents & Landowners Association v Administrator
Transvaal
1993
1 All SA 132
(T); 1993 1 SA 577 (T);
1993
2 All SA 59
(T); 1993 3 SA 49 (T);
Diepsloot
Residents
’
&
Landowners
’
Association
v Administrator
,
Transvaal
1994
2 All SA 299
(A); 1994 3 SA 336 (A) which
concerned an interdict against the settlement of persons on the land
designated
in terms of the Less Formal Township Establishment Act
113 of 1991, on the ground that such settlement would cause a public
nuisance
and interfere with the common-law rights of the applicants.
[30]
Port Elizabeth Municipality v
Various Occupiers
2005 1 SA 217 (CC); 2004
12 BCLR 1268 (CC).
[31]
See footnote 1 above for the
definitions of “owner” and a person “in charge” of the land
in terms of the PIE Act.
[32]
See par [11] above.
[33]
See par [20] above for the
reading of item 28 of Schedule 6 to the Constitution.
[34]
Yellow
Star Properties 1020 (Pty) Ltd v Department of Development Planning
and Local Government (Gauteng)
(549/2007)
[2009] ZASCA 25; 2009 (3) SA 577 (SCA) ; [2009] 3 All SA 475 (SCA)
(27 March 2009)
at
par [13].
[35]
See par [13] above.
[36]
See par [20] above for the
reading of item 28.
[37]
See pars [29]-[31] above.
[38]
See pars [15]-[18] above.
[39]
Regal v African
Superslate (Pty) Ltd
1963 (1) SA 102
(A) at 209.
[40]
Van Wyk
Land
Administration
at par 55.
[41]
Three Rivers
Ratepayers Association and Others v Northern Metropolitan
2000 (4) SA 377
(W) in which Snyders J dealt with a public nuisance
in the form of people occupying land (colloquially referred to as
“squatting”)
belonging to the municipality and held (at 380)
that there is no difference between the legal principles or rules
regarding a public
nuisance and a private nuisance.
[42]
Church on
Nuisance
at par 170.
[43]
Ibid
.
[44]
Van der Merwe on Things at
par 168.
[45]
Section 1 of the Constitution,
with italics supplied.
[46]
Church on
Nuisance
at 186.