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[2023] ZAECELLC 32
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L.M v R.D.M (EL789/2022) [2023] ZAECELLC 32 (31 October 2023)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
[EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, EAST LONDON CIRCUIT COURT]
CASE
NO.: EL789/2022
In
the matter between: -
LM
APPLICANT
and
RDM
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
NORMAN
J:
[1]
The applicant, an ophthalmologist, instituted this application
seeking, amongst others, variation
of an Order granted by Stretch J
on 25 May 2023, in terms of Rule 43(6) of the Uniform Rules of Court.
The relief sought is couched
as follows:
“
5.1
That the maintenance Order made by this Court on 02 March 2023 and
varied on 25 May 2023 is set aside with effect from 06 April
2023, it
being the date upon which the Respondent ceased to require
maintenance;
5.2 The costs order
awarded to the Respondent on 25 May 2023 varied to the extent that –
5.2.1
the Respondent, in casu, is to pay costs of the application, or, in
the alternative;
5.2.2
each party is to pay its own costs.
6.
I also humbly seek an order that in respect of the reserved costs of
01 August 2023, each party be ordered to pay
its own costs.”
[2]
The parties were cited by their full names. It is now standard
practice in our courts that in
order to give effect to the
paramountcy principle entrenched in section 28 of the Constitution,
the interests of minor children
must be protected in legal
proceedings, including, divorce proceedings. In this case the parties
have minor children. I accordingly
deem it appropriate to refer to
the parties and their children by their initials only.
Relevant
facts
[3]
The relevant history of this matter is dealt with in detail in
the judgments of Stretch J and Collett AJ. I do not intend to repeat
it herein except where necessary and for context. The facts are
mostly common cause.
The applicant is married to
the respondent, a housewife, who instituted divorce proceedings
against him. He is defending the divorce
action. It is common cause
that on 02 March 2023 the respondent sought and was granted by
Collett AJ, by way of Rule 43 proceedings,
maintenance for herself,
contribution towards legal costs, together with various orders
relating to the needs of their minor children
in the following terms:
1.
“
The respondent shall pay to the
applicant the sum of R10 000.00 per month as and for maintenance
payable on the first day of
each month;
2.
The respondent shall make payment of the costs
of retaining the applicant and the minor children (Q& M) as
dependent members
on his medical aid scheme and make payment of all
reasonable and necessary private medical expenses not covered by the
medical
aid scheme;
3.
The respondent shall pay all the reasonable
costs of education of the minor children, including the minor
children’s school
fees as well as extra-mural,
extra-curricular, sporting activities, school uniforms, equipment and
attire relating to the minor
children’s education, sporting
and/or extra-mural and extra-curricular activities, cultural
activities, including the costs
of all and any school
extra-curricular sporting trips, camps, tours, excursions and the
costs of extra lessons for the minor children’s
educational
purposes.
4.
The respondent shall pay all reasonable costs
for the minor children’s clothing, toiletries, recreation and
pocket money as
may be reasonably required.
5.
The respondent shall continue to make payments
of the bond instalments on the matrimonial home and the home in Port
Alfred and all
associated costs including rates, lights and water,
excluding the prepaid electricity for the Port Alfred property where
the applicant
resides.
6.
The respondent shall make contribution to the
legal costs of the applicant in the sum of R50 000.00 to be paid
within 30 days
of the date of this order.
7.
Costs are to be costs in the cause.”
[4]
It is common cause that the applicant is the sole financial provider
for the family. It is also
common cause that for many years he was
paying the respondent an amount of R15 748.24 as a stipend/
salary on a monthly basis.
After the order of Collett AJ was made it
appears that the applicant paid R10 000.00 to the respondent and
ceased to pay the
monthly stipend/ salary. That gave rise to the
respondent instituting urgent variation proceedings seeking, amongst
others, an
order that the applicant be directed to pay the stipend in
addition to the R10 000.00 and that Collett AJ’s order be
varied accordingly. The applicant opposed the application.
The applicant’s stance was that in terms of Collett
AJ’s
order he was ordered to pay R10 000,00 as maintenance and
nothing more.
[5]
The variation application served before Stretch J on 25 May 2023. The
applicant opposed it. Stretch
J varied Collett AJ’s order and
issued the following Order:
“
PENDENTE
LITE ORDER
1.
The respondent is ordered to pay the applicant R41 496,48 on
or before Thursday, 1 June 2023.
2.
The respondent is ordered to pay to the applicant R25 748,24
on or before the first working day of each and every consecutive
month thereafter.
3.
To this end, paragraph 1 of the rule 43 order made by this court
on 2 March 2023 under case number EL789/2022 is varied to read as
follows:
“
The respondent
shall pay to the applicant the sum of R25 748,24 per month as
and for maintenance payable on the first day of
each month.”
4.
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application on
the scale as between attorney and client, which costs shall exclude
the costs of the certificate of urgency.”
[6]
The variation sought by the applicant in this application is
allegedly based on the fact that
during June 2023, he got to know
that the respondent had received a sum of R1 715 802.92.
She failed to disclose this
information before Stretch J. Upon
receiving this information he requested his attorneys of record to
direct a letter to
the respondent’s attorneys requesting them
to abandon the Order of 25 May 2023. He contended that the respondent
no longer
required maintenance after receipt of that large sum. He
further submitted that the non- disclosure of that material fact
before
Stretch J meant that the respondent had received judgment in
her favour, on falsified facts.
[7]
In response to that letter the respondent’s attorneys confirmed
that indeed the respondent
had received the sum mentioned on 6 April
2023. They also indicated that their instructions were that their
client had not falsified
any information and she had no intention of
abandoning the judgment of 25 May 2023. The applicant fell behind
with the payments
and as a result thereof the respondent obtained a
warrant of execution for the arrears.
[8]
On 13 July 2023 the Sheriff executed a warrant and attached the
applicant’s property. Thereafter
an urgent application seeking
to set aside the warrant and to seek leave to apply to set aside and
vary the order of 25 May 2023
was brought. The parties settled the
matter. The costs of the urgent application were reserved for later
determination.
[9]
In dealing with the changed circumstances of the respondent, the
applicant stated: The respondent
is unemployed. She resides at
a home owned by the JR Family Trust for which the applicant pays for
monthly. She lives alone
and she drives a vehicle which the applicant
pays for. He pays maintenance in respect of the respondent out of the
overdraft facility
that his medical practice has. It is difficult to
maintain the respondent and the needs of the children. Since the
applicant admitted
receipt of the large sum, she is no longer in need
of maintenance, as she is now wealthy. If she were to continue
receiving money,
he stated, she would be unjustly enriched whilst he
would be impoverished since he operates an overdraft facility.
[10]
He asked the court to set aside the maintenance orders as they are no
longer necessary for the upkeep of
the respondent. He further sought
an order that would operate retrospectively to the 6 April 2023 on
the basis that had the court
been advised of the R1 715 802.92,
the court would not have made the orders that it made. He contends
that the applicant
misled the court. In this regard he relied
on an affidavit deposed to by the respondent on 24 April 2023 where
she stated:
“
20.
It is necessary to urgently approach this Honourable Court for relief
as I am in financial distress
and I am unable to afford my day to day
living…”
[11]
He contends that the respondent knew that these allegations were
false and were made with the intention
of misleading the court into
believing that she had financial difficulties when in fact she had
none. He further stated that even
on 09 May 2023, when the matter was
heard, the respondent did not disclose this payment to the court. In
respect of the costs of
this application he submitted that the court
must show its displeasure based on the conduct of the respondent and
must order her
to pay costs on a punitive scale.
[12]
He stated that in the event that this court finds that the respondent
is entitled to maintenance, he would
have his attorneys release the
amount that is owed to her. He submitted that good cause exists
for this court to vary that
order which ordered him to pay costs. He
asked that in respect of those proceedings and those that were
settled on 1 August 2023
each party must bear its own costs.
[13]
The respondent, on the other hand, stated: The applicant is an
eye surgeon who has considerable wealth.
She has not been employed
for approximately 11 years as she was focusing on raising the minor
children born of their marriage.
The fact that the applicant had
failed to honour the initial rule 43 order has caused legal costs to
escalate between the parties.
She denied that the applicant is unable
to pay her monthly maintenance amount because apart from the
successful medical practice
that he runs, the applicant is a director
and shareholder in the East London Eye Hospital. He also has numerous
Trusts under his
control and multiple properties owned by those
Trusts which, according to her, will be a subject matter in an
application to join
the Trusts as she intends to amend her
particulars of claim in due course.
[14]
In response to the allegations about the sum of money she received,
she admitted that she received R1 715 802.92
as inheritance
from her late mother’s land claim which was instituted against
the Land Claims Commission. She contends that
she did not disclose
the amount because it is irrelevant to the orders for maintenance
pendente lite
. She confirmed that she refused to abandon the
previous court order. She disputed that the applicant is entitled to
the variation
of the order on the basis that the interim maintenance
orders are legally binding and are intended to provide her with
financial
support during the divorce proceedings.
[15]
She submitted that she cannot be required to use her inheritance to
maintain herself whilst the applicant
has legal obligations towards
her. The inheritance is her only valuable asset. To use it as
maintenance would go against the legal
principle of preserving
inherited wealth. She contends that the inheritance is excluded from
the joint estate as a matter of law.
[16]
She opposed the variation of the order on the basis that it would
perpetuate the financial imbalance between
the applicant and herself.
She stated that the applicant made bald allegations that he was not
able to pay maintenance to her but
gave no details about his
finances. It is for that reason that he is not entitled to any
variation of the order, she stated. She
denied that she was dishonest
in any manner. She contends that she is entitled to maintenance as
ordered by the court. She persisted
in seeking a punitive costs order
against the applicant but resisted a punitive costs order sought
against her.
Applicant’s
submissions
[17]
Mr Quinn SC appeared for the applicant and Mr Miller for the
respondent. Mr Quinn SC submitted that if the
payment of
R1 715 802.92 had been brought to the attention of the
Stretch J she would have made a different order to
the one that she
made. In this regard he relied on
Occupiers,
Berea v De Wet NO
[1]
,
for the contention
that it follows that if material facts are not disclosed or if fraud
is committed (i.e. the facts are misrepresented
to the Court) the
order will be erroneously granted. He compared what occurred
herein to instances where a court would act
in terms of Rule 42 to
rescind or vary an order that was erroneously granted, especially, if
there existed at the time of its issue
a fact of which the Court was
unaware, which would have precluded the granting of the judgment and
which would have induced the
Court, if aware of it, not to grant the
judgment. He also relied on
Southgate
Corporation v Engineering Management Services
[2]
for the contention that interlocutory orders can always be
reconsidered.
[18]
He further submitted that it is not up to the respondent to conceal
the amount on the basis that it was irrelevant,
that was a decision
that the court had to make. He submitted that the applicant is not
able to comply with the order of the court.
He urged the court to
vary the order of Stretch J in respect of the contribution towards
costs and the maintenance amount.
[19]
In conclusion, Mr Quinn submitted that the
respondent is not entitled to cash maintenance except for the
R15 748.00 for March 2023. He submitted that by reason of
receipt of the R1 715 802.00 there is no need for a contribution
towards costs. He further submitted that the remainder of
Collett AJ’s order is not affected including the cost order
made therein. He submitted that by reason of the respondent’s
reprehensible conduct, she should bear the costs of the
application
before Stretch J on a punitive scale.
Respondent’s
submissions
[20]
Mr Miller, on the other hand, submitted that: When the rule 43
application was heard by Collett AJ
the inheritance money had not
been received. Rule 43 prescribes the ambit of this application. This
application is
sui
generis
and
must follow the prescribed form of rule 43(6). The applicant is not
entitled to bring the application under rule 42 because
it is a rule
43(6) application. The applicant is bound by Collett AJ’s
judgment. Even if the court were to interfere with
Stretch J’s
order the court must keep Collett AJ’s judgment as is. The
respondent is no longer receiving the monthly
R15 800 that she
was accustomed to over the years. The court must have regard to the
income of the parties, the inheritance
received by the respondent and
the income that she no longer receives from the applicant. On the
applicant’s version, he
earns R375 000 per month. He
relied on the decision in
Micklem
v
Micklem
[3]
for
the contention that there would be no merit in setting aside Collett
AJ’s order.
Discussion
[21]
Rule 43 (6) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides:
“
43
(6) The court may, on the same procedure, vary its decision in the
event of a material change occurring in the circumstances
of either
party or a child, or the contribution towards costs proving
inadequate.”
[22]
In
GB
v DS
[4]
, Keightley stated:
“
..
the Rule is designed to provide interim cover to the spouse who has
been financially dependent on the other spouse, because of
their
particular marital circumstances, and who thus has a genuine need for
such support to continue until the matter is finally
dealt with on
divorce. This being the case, a claim for interim maintenance would
normally be accompanied by a claim for maintenance
on divorce. In the
absence of such a claim, the implication is that the critical
requirement of financial dependency on the other
spouse, which
underpins the application for interim maintenance is missing…”
The
maintenance order
[23]
It seems to me that both parties, in argument, were not averse to the
reinstatement of Collett AJ ‘s
order. That seems to be a
sensible approach because that order was made prior to the existence
of the inheritance amount. There
is of course one difficulty with
that approach and that is the fact that paragraph 1 of Collett AJ’s
order was varied by
the order that Stretch J issued. Therefore, any
reinstatement of Collett AJ’s order would mean reinstatement of
her order
in its varied form. In varying paragraph 1 of Collett AJ’s
order, Stretch J gave effect to what was intended by Collett AJ
as
evinced in her judgment. She simply added the two amounts of
R10 000.00 for maintenance and the stipend/ salary of
R15 748.24, totalling R25 748,24 and directed that that
amount was payable on the first day of each month.
[24]
That is what Collett AJ intended and the order of Stretch J simply
clarified and varied the order to avoid
any ambiguity. This means
that from 2 March 2023 to 02 October 2023 (eight months) maintenance
of R10 000.00 would amount
to R80 000.00. In addition,
thereto an amount of R15 748.24 as a stipend/ salary for the
same period would amount to
R125 985.92. A total of R205 985.92
is what would have been paid to the respondent by the applicant for
that period if
there was compliance with Collett AJ’s order.
[25]
This court will have no basis in law to interfere with that order
because the payment of a stipend/ salary
accords with the position
prior to the institution of divorce proceedings. The order simply
preserved the
status
quo
ante
the
divorce proceedings. Collett AJ decided that in addition to the
stipend the respondent required maintenance in the amount of
R10 000,00. Collett AJ was also alive to the fact that all other
financial obligations of the family were paid for by the
applicant.
There are no factors which support the contention that the respondent
does not require spousal maintenance.
The interpretation
that the applicant accorded to the order is not supported by the
judgment of Collett AJ. It also transpired that
even applicant’s
erstwhile counsel understood the order to mean that the R10 000.00
was in addition to the stipend.
[26]
There
is no doubt that the respondent requires maintenance. That need for
maintenance was identified by the applicant himself years
ago when he
provided her with a stipend on a monthly basis. That is the
status quo that the Rule 43 proceedings intended
to maintain pending
divorce. That obligation arose purely from the husband and wife
relationship. It should not be conflated
with inheritance that still
requires a determination by the trial court on whether or not it
forms part of the joint estate. That
enquiry relates to the division
of the joint estate, a totally different enquiry from the one that
applies to issues of maintenance.
The contention by the
applicant that the respondent is now wealthy and does not require
maintenance means in simple terms that,
the applicant must now
be completely relieved of an obligation that he undertook many years
ago (that of maintaining his wife by
giving her a monthly stipend/
salary); and the respondent should deplete her inheritance towards
maintenance in fulfilling an
obligation that her husband is
obliged to fulfil in terms of their marriage regime. That reasoning
is, with respect, flawed.
[27]
Other than the receipt of the inheritance amount there is nothing
else that the applicant has placed before
this court to warrant an
order releasing him from his obligation to continue maintaining the
respondent pending finalisation of
the divorce proceedings.
[28]
In
Estate
Sayle v Commissioner
for
Inland
Revenue
[5]
the court held that a marriage in community of property means that
the spouses become joint owners in undivided half shares of
the
assets they possess at the time of their marriage as well as of all
assets acquired by them during the subsistence of their
marriage. The
merging of the properties takes place automatically by virtue of the
parties being married in community of property.
[29]
Section 7(2)
of the
Divorce Act 70 of 1979
sets out certain factors
that a court
would consider before making an order for spousal
maintenance. These factors were considered by Collett AJ in her
judgment. For
the sake of completeness they are : The existing
or prospective means of each of the parties, their respective earning
capacities,
financial needs and obligations, the age of each of the
parties, the duration of the marriage, their standard of living prior
to
their divorce, the conduct in so far as it may be relevant to the
break-down of the marriage, and any other factor which the court
deems appropriate.
[30]
In
EH
v SH
[6]
the Supreme Court of Appeal held that it will only be just for a
maintenance order to be issued by a court where a party applying
for
the relief can establish a need to be supported by the other spouse.
The obligation for the payment of R15 748.24 emanates
from the
spousal obligation. It has nothing to do with the inheritance that
the respondent received. This court is concerned with
the means and
the financial support that the respondent was accustomed to for the
past eleven years.
[31]
The applicant has indicated that he has deposited these payments into
his attorneys Trust account and that
upon being ordered to pay them
he would do so. This undertaking is in stark contrast to the
applicant’s contention
that he is unable to pay spousal
maintenance. All that the applicant needs to do is to
instruct his attorneys to release
the money and pay it over to the
applicant.
Contribution
towards costs
[32]
The applicant sought to set aside both the orders
of Collett AJ and Stretch J on the basis that the respondent,
does
not require any contribution towards costs. When that order for
contribution towards costs was made by Collett AJ, the respondent
had
not received the inheritance amount. Stretch J did not interfere with
that order at all. The receipt of the inheritance
sum cannot be
applied retrospectively as it would seriously prejudice the
respondent. It would also have the effect of condoning
the
applicant’s non- compliance with the court’s order where
he has failed to make payment to the respondent.
[33]
In
Micklem
[7]
,
the court held as follows :
“
A
wife seeking a contribution towards costs is not entitled to payment
in full of the costs that she avers will be incurred in presenting
her case to the court nor all costs incurred to date.”
[34]
It is common cause that the applicant sought contribution towards
costs in the amount of R100 000.00
but Collett AJ granted her
half of that amount and Stretch J did not interfere therewith. The
applicant was ordered to pay R50 000.00
as contribution towards
legal costs of the respondent which sum was to be paid within 30 days
from the date of the order, being
2 March 2023. There are no
factors which justify a variation or setting aside of that amount as
suggested by the applicant.
It follows that the order of
Collett AJ must stand.
Punitive
costs order
[35]
In so far as the punitive costs order is concerned, Stretch J gave
detailed reasons why she ordered the applicant
to pay costs of the
application before her on a punitive scale. She gave those
reasons at paragraph 59 of her judgment as
follows:
“
[59]
The applicant seeks punitive costs. I intend making such an
order, not because the applicant seeks it, but to express
this
court’s displeasure at the respondent not having opposed this
matter with clean hands. The respondent has been disingenuous
on oath on at least five occasions: firstly, by stating that a third
party had been paying the R15 748.24 to the applicant;
secondly, by withdrawing his tender in the
rule 43
application to
continue to pay this money; thirdly, by denying in this application
that he had previously said on oath that he
was paying the R15 748.24
to the applicant; fourthly, by stating in this application that
the applicant received monthly
payments from an incorporated company
with its own legal personality, when it is clear from the
rule 43
papers that he was paying the money himself from his own business
account of which he is a sole proprietor; and fifthly,
by
describing the money which he paid the applicant as a salary, when
his own bank statement does not reflect this.”
(footnotes
omitted).
[36]
These reasons were based by Stretch J on the applicant’s
conduct only. That conduct had no bearing
whatsoever on the
inheritance money or its non- disclosure. In any event, the applicant
has not adduced any evidence to persuade
this court to vary the costs
order made against him. That costs order must accordingly
stand.
Non
– disclosure of the receipt of the inheritance amount
[37]
The respondent was obliged to mention the sum of inheritance
especially where she deposed to an affidavit
pleading poverty. As
correctly submitted by Mr Quinn, it was within the power of the court
to decide whether the inheritance was
relevant or not for the
determination of her need for maintenance. The non- disclosure of the
inheritance amount is material especially
in circumstances where the
respondent had moved court for relief on an urgent basis.
[38]
The respondent had clearly failed to take the court into her
confidence on 25 May 2023. In these proceedings, she
did not state
that she was not aware that she ought to have disclosed it, instead,
she decided to invoke the defence that it was
irrelevant to the
issues at hand and that inheritance did not form part of the joint
estate.
[39]
The inheritance sum received is substantial and
had it been disclosed there is a great possibility that
Stretch J
would not have granted the Order for the payment of the R41 496.48
on an urgent basis.
[40] By failing to
disclose the inheritance payment the respondent’s conduct is
deserving of censure. This court will
order that the respondent
should forfeit 50% of the costs granted on the scale as between
attorney and client, in her favour, by
Stretch J on 25 May 2023.
Payment
of R41 496.48
[41]
There is merit in the argument by Mr Quinn that paragraph 1 of the
Order made by Stretch J (for the payment
of R 41 496. 48) should
be set aside because the inheritance amount was not made known to the
court at that time. I did not
gain an impression in the argument
advanced by Mr Miller that the respondent was averse to the
reinstatement of the Order of Collett
AJ.
[42]
Stretch J ordered the applicant to pay the amount
of R41 496.48 on or before Thursday , 1 June
2023.
It appears that this payment was sought urgently on the basis that
the respondent was in financial distress hence it
had to be paid
within a few days after the order was made. The evidence proves
that she was not in financial distress at
that point as she was
already in possession of the inheritance sum. Furthermore, that
amount appears to be a duplication
of what is already ordered in the
varied paragraph 1 of Collett AJ’s order which was effective
from 2 March 2023. It would
be fair in the circumstances to set aside
that order as it will not cause prejudice to any of the parties.
Costs
[43]
In relation to this application I am of the view that each party will
bear its own costs. I trust that such
an order may discourage
both parties from rushing to court prior to them making an effort to
mediate their disputes.
[44]
Mr Miller submitted that the joinder application be removed from the
roll and costs thereof to be reserved
for later determination by the
trial court. Mr Quinn did not object to the proposed order.
[45]
Each party shall bear its own costs in relation to the costs ensuant
to the application for the stay of the
execution warrant which were
reserved on 01 August 2023.
PENDENTE
LITE ORDER
[46]
I accordingly make the following Order:
A.
The Order issued by Collett AJ on 02 March 2023
and varied by Stretch J on 25 May 2023 is hereby reinstated in the
following terms:
“
1.
The respondent shall pay to the applicant the sum of R25
748.24 per month as and for maintenance payable on the first
day of
each month.
2. The respondent
shall make payment of the costs of retaining the applicant and the
minor children (‘Q’ and
‘M’) as dependent
members on his medical aid scheme and make payment of all reasonable
and necessary private medical
expenses not covered by the medical aid
scheme;
3.
The respondent shall pay all the reasonable costs for education of
the minor children, including the
minor children’s school fees
as well as extra-mural, extra-curricular, sporting activities, school
uniforms, equipment and
attire relating to the minor children’s
education, sporting and/or extra-mural and extra-curricular
activities, cultural
activities, including the costs of all and any
school extra-curricular sporting trips, camps, tours, excursions and
the costs of
extra lessons for the minor children’s educational
purposes.
4.
The respondent shall pay all reasonable costs for the minor
children’s clothing, toiletries, recreation
and pocket money as
may be reasonably required.
5.
The respondent shall continue to make payments of the bond
instalments on the matrimonial home
and the home in Port Alfred and
all associated costs including rates, lights and water, excluding the
prepaid
electricity for the Port Alfred
property where the applicant resides.
6.
The respondent shall make a contribution to
the legal costs of the applicant in the sum of R50 000.00
to be
paid within 30 days of the date of this order.
7.
Costs are to be costs in the cause.”
B.
The Order issued
by Stretch J on 25 May 2023 is varied as follows:
1.
Paragraph 1 of the Order issued on 25 May
2023 for the
payment
of R41 496.48
is hereby set
aside.
2.
The respondent shall forfeit 50 % of the
costs granted in her favour on an attorney and client scale on 25 May
2023.
3.
Each party is to bear its own costs in
relation to the costs reserved on 1 August 2023 in respect of the
urgent application.
4.
The
joinder application is removed from the roll and costs thereof are
reserved for later determination by the trial court.
5.
In relation to this application, each
party shall bear its own costs.
T.V.
NORMAN
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Matter
heard on
10
October 2023
Judgement
Delivered on
31
October 2023
APPEARANCES:
For
the APPLICANT
ADV
QUINN SC
Instructed
by
Majali
Gwabeni Attorneys Inc.
Respondent’s
Attorneys
36
Darlington Road, Berea
East
London
(Ref:
Mr Gwabeni/NN/Civ)
Email:
alexgwabeni@outlook.com/
Majali.East@outlook.com
For
the RESPONDENT
ADV
MILLER
Instructed
by
Wheeldon
Rushmere & Cole Inc.
(Ref:
B Brody / Dianne/ S25822)
Email:
bbb@Wheeldon.co.za
c/o
IC CLARK INCORPORATED
25
St. Luke’s Road, Belgravia
EAST
LONDON
(Ref:
P de Azevedo/ P/A06
[1]
Occupiers
Berea v De Wet NO
2017 (5) SA 346
CC at 366 E – 367 A; Naidoo
v Matlala NO
2012 (1) SA 143
GNP at 153 C-E.
[2]
Southgate Corporation v Engineering Management Services
1977 (3) SA
534
A at 550 H.
[3]
1988
(3) SA 259
(C) at 262.
[4]
GB
v DS
(16/08/2018)
under case number 16158/16, Gauteng Local Division, unreported.
[5]
1945
AD 388.
[6]
2012
(4) SA 164 (SCA).
[7]
Micklem at para 262 I.