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[2023] ZAECMHC 64
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S v Somadlangathi (CC14/2022) [2023] ZAECMHC 64 (21 August 2023)
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE
DIVISION MTHATHA
BIZANA CIRCUIT
COURT
Case No: CC14/2022
In the matter between:
THE STATE
Vs
FEZILE SOMADLANGATHI
Accused
JUDGMENT
BROOKS J:
[1] The
accused is a 27 year old male resident of Ntshikintshane
Administrative Area, Flagstaff, Eastern Cape.
[2] In
the amended indictment he is charged of murder in contravention of
section 84 of Act 9 of 1983 read with
section 51(1) of Act 105 of
1997. The basis of the charge is an allegation that upon or
about 15 January 2021 and at or near
KwaDinda Location, Flagstaff, in
the district of Flagstaff, the accused acting in concert and in
execution of a common purpose,
did unlawfully and intentionally kill
Noxolo Nancy Mesilane, an adult female, by stabbing her with a knife.
[3] The
indictment continues to indicate that in the event of conviction the
provisions of section 51(1) of Act
105 of 1997 (the Act) will be
invoked on the basis that the murder was planned or premeditated and
was committed by a group of
persons in the execution of a common
purpose.
[4] The
accused was represented by counsel throughout the trial. Before
he pleaded both the accused and
his counsel confirmed that they were
aware that in the event of a conviction the minimum sentence
applicable in terms of the Act
would be life imprisonment. A
deviation from the prescribed minimum sentence would only be
competent if substantial and compelling
circumstances were to be
identified in the matter.
[5] The
accused pleaded not guilty to the charge. As he is entitled to
do, the accused made no outline of
the basis of his defence.
[6] The
first state witness was an adult male neighbour of the homestead in
which the deceased was killed.
He described in detail what he
found at the scene. This evidence was corroborated by the
second state witness, who was the
chairman of the local policing
forum who was summoned to the scene by the first state witness.
Both witnesses identified
the deceased as a policewoman employed by
the South African Police Service and stationed at Qhasa Police
Station.
[7]
What both witnesses found at the scene was further corroborated by an
indexed photograph album that was provisionally
handed in as EXHIBIT
A through the evidence of the third state witness, who was an adult
male sergeant in the South African Police
Service, who was also
stationed at Qhasa Police Station at the time. He attended the
crime scene in response to a report
made by the second state witness.
[8] The
state then sought to introduce into the evidence a warning statement,
utilising the provisions of section
219A of the Criminal Procedure
Act 51 of 1977, (the CPA), on the basis that the warning statement
contained admissions made by
the accused. Counsel for the
accused objected to the introduction of the statement. He did
so on the basis that the
warning statement had not been made freely
and voluntarily.
[9] In
the circumstances a-trial-within-a-trial was declared. The
state witness in the trial-within-a-trial
was the investigating
officer, who was a warrant officer at the time and a member of the
Organised Crime Unit in Mthatha.
She testified about the arrest
of the accused and the circumstances leading up to the taking of the
warning statement.
[10] It is apparent
from her evidence that she has been the investigating officer
appointed to the case from the outset.
It was she who
questioned the accused once he had been brought to Bizana Police
Station and who had taken the warning statement.
According to
this witness, at the outset, before the interview commenced, she
informed the accused of what she termed loosely,
“his rights”.
Amongst these were the right to remain silent and not to respond.
[11] According to
her, after she told him more about the nature of the offence and the
investigation, “he did not respond,
he just kept quiet and
looked at me”. Undeterred, she apparently persisted and
proceeded to address the accused whereupon
she says, “he then
told me that he can tell me something regarding that”.
She testified that she again, “Reminded
him of his rights”
and proceeded to obtain a warning statement.
[12]
Cross-examination of the investigating officer revealed that the
accused had arrived with her at Bizana Police Station
at
approximately 17h00 on the day of his arrest. She began with
the interview process. This must have taken a lot longer
than
suggested by her evidence in chief because she stated that after the
accused had completed the narration, he was detained.
She then
said the warning statement was obtained at 08h00 the following
morning and “as I was still awake, I made my statement”.
This detail emerged as part of an explanation about why the warning
statement lacks crucial details relating to the date and time
it was
taken.
[13] The
investigating officer stated earlier, “Because we were working
from the 24
th
up to the 25
th
, we just did not
sleep. I just worked through”. The differences
between the apparent ease with which the investigating
officer’s
evidence in chief suggests she was able to obtain the accused’s
compliance and the length of time suggested
strongly by her evidence
under cross-examination, must raise some doubt about her reliability
as a witness.
[14] The pro-forma
section of the warning statement is unhelpful. It was
apparently wrongly dated, “2021-01-2”.
In her
evidence in chief the investigating officer stated that she had
omitted the numeral 1 at the end of the date, as the statement
had
been obtained on 21 January 2021.
[15] Under
cross-examination, she was taken to task on this aspect, and she
requested access to the docket to be able to refresh
her memory.
Having been afforded this opportunity, she changed her evidence with
conviction, stating that the warning statement
had been taken on
24 January 2021.
[16] With the
content of the docket and with the accused’s version on
instructions, counsel for the defence took the
matter further.
A second request for access to the docket was made by the
investigating officer and was granted. This
produced a third
version namely, that the warning statement had been taken on 25
January 2021. This version now agreed with
the date given by
the accused to his counsel.
[17] Although
occurring immediately alongside the space allocated on the form, on
the proforma for the recordal of the date,
the space allocated to the
time at which the warning statement was made, was not filled in.
The time 08h00 was an estimate
made by the witness whilst describing
how she had worked through the night.
[18] No resort was
had to any record of the date and time of the detention of the
accused or to the date and time when he
was taken out of the cells to
make the warning statement. In this regard one might imagine
the occurrence book to have been
of assistance. The
unsatisfactory aspects of the investigating officer’s evidence
become a cause for increasing concern
where they cannot be explained
by resorting to official station records.
[19] In
Gcam-Gcam
v S
2015 (2) SACR 501
(SCA), the Supreme Court of Appeal stated
the following at paragraph 49:
“
When
confronted with confessions made by suspects to police
officers whilst in custody –
even when those officers are said
to be performing their duties independently of the investigating team
– courts must be
especially vigilant. For such people are
subject to the authority of the
police, are vulnerable
to the abuse of such
authority and are often not able to exercise their constitutional
rights before implicating
themselves in crimes. Experience of courts with police
investigations of serious crimes has shown
that
police officers are sometimes known to succumb to the temptation
to extract confessions
from suspects through physical violence or
threats of violence rather than engage in the painstaking task of
thoroughly investigating a case. This
is why the law provides
safeguards against
compelling an accused to make admissions
and confessions that can be used against him
in a trial
.”
[20] Under
cross-examination it was put to the investigating officer that the
accused’s version was that she had resorted
to the use of
pepper spray filled plastic bags being pulled over the accused’s
head and held close under his jaw in order
to persuade him to
cooperate. To this was added a novel technique by which a
plastic bag was held vertically over the accused’s
toes whilst
its bottom end was set alight, causing burning and melting plastic to
drop onto his toes.
[21] All of this
was denied. However, still no detail was given to explain why
the interview was indeed, as long as
it had now emerged was the case
and why the investigating officer had been obliged to work through
the night.
[22] Once again, in
Gcam-Gcam (supra)
, the Supreme Court of Appeal gives guidance
at paragraph 48 on the correct approach to be adopted, stating as
follows:
“
It
is not necessary to deal with the evidence of the police in any
detail. And I accept that the learned
judge was correct in
finding that much of the
appellant’s evidence was untrustworthy.
But I
think he too readily accepted all the evidence of the police without
properly analysing it and
did not properly consider those aspects
of the appellant’s
evidence that were reasonably possibly true
despite his mendacity. In fact, the
judge misdirected
himself by
approaching the evidence of the appellant on the basis that he
(and his co-accused)
needed to ‘put up credible versions’ to refute
the ‘overwhelmingly
strong and convincing evidence’ of
the police regarding the
admissibility of the
confessions. All that was
required of the appellant was to present a version that was
reasonably possibly
true, even if it contained demonstrable
falsehoods
.”
[23] The accused
did give evidence in the trial-within-a-trial. Indeed, it must
be recorded that he gilded the lily,
claiming that male policemen had
also taken part in assaulting him by holding his legs out and down
whilst he was handcuffed and
seated on the floor, then jumping on his
legs and his stomach. These details had not formed part of the
content of the evidence
relating to the assault that had been put to
the investigating officer.
[24] In essence
however, the accused contended that he did not want to talk to the
investigating officer, but after a lengthy
process of what he
described as torture during a long interview, where he was given all
the details about the offence, he eventually
capitulated.
[25] It is
apposite
at this point to make the observation that the police stations of
Qhasa, Mount Ayliff, Flagstaff and Bizana are all closely situated
geographically.
[26] The deceased
was a female member of the South African Police Service. The
news of her awful fate would have spread
easily and naturally amongst
the members of the South African Police Service deployed at those
stations. There can be little
doubt that it then spread quickly
over a wider part of the province.
[27] Moreover, a
photograph album containing graphic details of the barbaric manner in
which the deceased had been slaughtered
had been prepared days before
the arrest of the accused. According to the investigating
officer only claims made by undisclosed
police informers implicated
the accused.
[28] Even though
she was stationed at Mthatha at the time, it is reasonable to imagine
that the investigating officer would
have been incensed at the death
of a fellow female colleague.
[29] Against this
background and seen in conjunction with the weaknesses in the
evidence given by the investigating officer,
it is a reasonably
possibly true that the accused did not make the warning statement to
her freely and voluntarily.
[30] Before leaving
the issue of the warning statement, something needs to be said about
the inappropriateness of its structure.
On page 2 of the
pro-forma is a space in which the statement itself maybe recorded.
Thereafter, on the next page the following
question is posed, “Were
you in anyway threatened, assaulted or influenced to make this
statement and answer questions?”
It makes absolutely no
sense to have placed this vital question after the section in which
the statement is recorded. The
question and the possible
answers thereto are central to the issue of whether or not the
warning statement is to be made freely,
voluntarily, and therefore,
for obvious reasons, ought to be a question asked before any
statement made by a suspect is recorded.
[31] In this matter
the investigating officer confirmed that she had followed the
sequence of the questions as they found
expression on the form.
Accordingly, she claimed that she had asked this question after she
had recorded the statement from
the accused and saw nothing wrong in
this.
[32] It was
necessary for the Court to explain to her why the sequence of the
questions was offensive to the principles of
constitutionality and
ensuring that only statements that are made freely and voluntarily
are recorded. Moreover, this portion
of the form allows a
suspect to identify the person who had assaulted, threatened, or
influenced him or her to make the statement.
Again, this
opportunity ought to be given to the suspect before the statement is
taken.
[33] In this
matter, no details are recorded in respect of this element. The
enquiry into the evidence has revealed
that there existed within the
context of the interview, circumstances that permit for the
possibility that the accused was assaulted
as he claimed to have
been.
[34] Using this
pro-forma, how could it ever have been expected of the accused to
disclose this fact either at this stage
or before any statement was
recorded, when the very person that he claims had assaulted him and
pressurised him into making the
statement, was the person before whom
he now appeared.
[35] The warning
statement should never have been taken by the investigating officer
herself. With its potential for
self-incrimination, a warning
statement should always be taken by an individual who has not been
party to any arrest or interview
process that preceded the taking of
the warning statement. Only at the end could it be said that a
suspect had been given
a fair and proper opportunity to disclose that
he or she had been wrongly treated if this were the case.
[36] In the
circumstances upon an assessment of all the relevant evidence the
Court ruled that the warning statement was inadmissible
as evidence
against the accused.
[37] The state then
sought the introduction of the evidence of a confession in terms of
section 217 of the CPA. Counsel
for the accused objected
thereto on the basis that the confession had not been made freely and
voluntarily. In the circumstances
a second trial-within-a-trial
was declared.
[38] The first
state witness was a female member of the South African Police
Services, a sergeant, who testified that on 25
January 2021, whilst
still a constable stationed at Bizana Police Station, she was
requested by the investigating officer to escort
the accused to the
office of Capt. Nongceke who wanted him for the purposes of recording
a confession.
[39] Her evidence
was supported by an entry in the occurrence book that was handed in
as EXHIBIT C. The entry is headed
by the words, “prisoner
out for confession” and records the event as occurring at
11h05. It is also supported
by a statement that she made,
handed in as EXHIBIT D, wherein she states that she was requested to
escort the accused “to
attend a confession session”.
In the statement the time 11h05 is also mentioned. It was
apparent from both her
evidence and her statement that she was
assisted by a male police officer as the accused is a male person.
[40] Under
cross-examination, the witness was asked to look in the occurrence
book for an entry confirming the return of the
accused to the cells.
This was found by her against an entry made at 12h30.
[41] The next
witness was Capt. Nongceke, now retired. At the time he was a
captain in the South African Police Service
stationed at Bizana and
therefore a justice of the peace. He testified that he came on
duty at 07h30 on 25 January 2021
and was requested by the
investigating officer to take a confession from the accused.
The pro-forma that he utilised was
handed in as EXHIBIT E and the
captain read the content therein into the record.
[42] As he would
have done during the interview, he commenced at the beginning of the
form. The process, the questions
and information thus
communicated were interpretated into isiXhosa for the benefit of the
accused by the court interpreter.
The captain stated that on
the day in question he had acted as the interpreter or translator as
he recorded at the end of the proforma.
[43] One is
entitled to assume that the process demonstrated in court reflected
the process as it was on the day in question
and took roughly the
same amount of time. The process in court took approximately 40
minutes. The actual confession
statement made by the accused
was not included in the exhibits. However, the page numbering
evident from the document that
forms the exhibit indicates that it
indeed was recorded on the inner section of the pro-forma.
Capt. Nongceke confirmed what
was evident from the exhibit namely,
that the statement made by the accused covered nine A4 pages.
[44] In answers to
questions posed by the Court, the witness confirmed that it had taken
a long time to go through the pro-forma
with the accused and to
record in writing what he had told the witness. The observation
by the Court that the actual statement
was long, was agreed with and
the witness then added that the lengthy process was contributed to by
the accused who at times did
not talk.
[45] By process of
logical deduction based upon the evidence of the occurrence book
entry and the sergeant who supported it
by
viva voce
evidence,
it must have taken at least 5 minutes to fetch the accused from the
cells and to escort him to the captain and approximately
the same
length of time or slightly longer to respond to the summons by the
captain to fetch the accused and to escort him back
to the cells.
[46] Therefore, a
conservative assessment of the use of the time period demonstrated in
the occurrence book leaves 1 hour
and 15 minutes available to the
captain to deal with the accused. Of this period, if it were
done as the captain claimed
it had been, approximately 40 minutes
would have been occupied by reading the pro-forma out to the accused
and translating the
questions and information into isiXhosa for him.
[47] Each of the 22
pages of the entire document was signed at the foot by both the
accused and the witness. In addition,
the thumbprint of the
accused was placed next to his signatures. This group of
signatures and thumbprint occurs in five places
in the left hand
margins of some of the pages in addition to its occurrence with
regularity at the foot of each page.
[48] Done speedily
and upon an assumption of four sets of signatures per minute, the
entire process associated with signature
and thumbprint entry onto
the document must have taken about 8 minutes. The nett effect
of the allowances that must be made
for the processes referred to is
that only 27 or so minutes remains of the time period taken for the
recordal and interpretation
back to the accused of a statement that
is nine A4 pages in length. On a rough calculation this means 3
minutes per page.
It is not possible to perform such a task at
that rate, especially where the accused was silent at times, which
must mean that
somewhere in the completion of the pro-forma section
corners were cut.
[49] There are
disturbing features about the manner in which the pro-forma was
completed that are revealed from the document
itself. An
examination of the original exhibit shows that the captain has a
strong hand that is recorded in thick dark impressions
on the page.
He has a distinctive handwriting as one would expect. In
contrast the signatures of the accused are imprinted
with a lighter
hand resulting in thinner and lighter impressions on the page.
The captain testified that the accused had
used the same pen as the
captain had used and so one must conclude that the differences are
attributable to the relative strength
of their handwriting.
[50] These
characteristics are uniformly expressed throughout the pro-forma
until one reaches the last page. At the
foot of this page a
space is provided for the signature of the justice of the peace.
However, the captain did not sign it.
Next to the signature of
the accused, misleadingly identified on the pro-forma as “signature
of deponent”, the captain’s
hand is to be seen clearly in
the entry of the place and the date.
[51] However,
immediately below is a much lighter and thinner handwriting recording
the time as 10h00. This same lighter
and thinner handwriting is
found at the foot of the page alongside the space where the captain
ought to have signed as justice
of the peace. The lighter and
thinner handwriting records the place, date and time with a
lightness, thinness and letter
and numeral forms that are not found
anywhere else in the entries made by the captain.
[52]
Notwithstanding, the obvious visible differences in handwriting style
described in the preceding paragraph, the captain
claimed that it was
he who had made all the entries pertaining to place, date and time.
He explained that his failure to
sign as justice of the peace was due
to oversight as he had signed above already in his self-appointed
capacity as a translator.
[53] The concerns
surrounding the handwriting anomalies on the proforma are aggravated
by the fact that the time recorded
by the entries on the form in both
instances is 10h00. Quite simply, this does not fit in with the
times recorded in the
occurrence book. The captain confirmed
that he had arrived on time at 07h30, using his watch and the
television at home to
ensure that he was on time for work.
Therefore, he concluded his recordal of 10h00 was an accurate
reflection of the time
the confession taking was concluded.
[54] Returning to
the observations made about the length of time it would take to read
through the proforma and translate
each question, to record the
answers, to record the actual statement, to read it back and
translate everything for the accused
and then to apply 27 sets of
signatures and thumbprints, it would seem that if the captain is
correct, he must have started the
process at least around 08h00.
[55] It will be
recalled that this was the estimated time given by the investigating
officer in respect of the taking of the
warning statement. It
is not simply for the purposes of criticism that these concerns are
highlighted. They are extremely
relevant when regard is had to
the evidence given by the accused in this second
trial-within-a-trial.
[56] According to
the accused he was taken to captain’s office on two occasions.
On the first occasion he asked
the captain whether whatever was
recorded by him would be given back to the police or will be given to
the court. The accused
said in his evidence that he was
relieved to hear that the statement would not go back to the
investigation team and so he told
the captain that he knew nothing
and was then taken back to the cells.
[57] Shortly
thereafter, according to the accused, he was fetched from the cells
and taken back to the office where the investigating
officer had
interviewed him earlier. He claimed that other police were
there in the company of the investigating officer
who said that what
had just happened was not as they had agreed upon the day before.
She told him that they had all the time
in the world and that if the
accused did not go back and tell “that man” what they
wanted, they can “do things”
to him.
[58] The accused
was taken back to the captain a second time. He said that the
police had told him that if he did not
do what they wanted, the same
things would be done to him as had been experienced the day before.
[59] A little later
in his evidence in chief the accused added that initially he had
asked the captain if the statement would
go back to the police
because he did not want what had happened to him the day before to be
repeated. Therefore, he stated
the captain knew that he had
been assaulted. He concluded by saying that he “signed”
because he had been threatened.
[60] Under
cross-examination, the accused agreed with the captain’s
observation that at times he, the accused, remained
silent. The
accused explained that this was because he had to think about what he
had been told to say the day before.
The accused also stated
that he could remember clearly that the captain read out “the
rights” to him but could not
recall other things been read out
or translated. He stated that sometimes he just responded to a
question in the affirmative
because he was scared.
[61] Once again it
would be fair and accurate to say that the accused may have gilded
the lily when it comes to details about
his experience.
However, he bears no onus, and his version must be tested in the
context of and together with all the available
evidence in the state
case. The onus remains squarely on the state to prove that the
confession was made freely and voluntarily.
[62] Adopting the
same approach as directed by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
Gcam-Gcam
(supra)
, the Court cannot eliminate the possibility that there
may be some merit in the accused’s version by referring to the
evidence
from the police.
[63] The
investigating officer did not testify in the second
trial-within-a-trial. Given her inability to record the
date
and the time of the warning statement with accuracy, perhaps she
would not have been able to give clarity into the mutually
destructive evidence relating to the time when the confession was
taken.
[64] What is clear
is that the investigating officer directed the accused to a justice
of the peace hot on the heels of his
making a warning statement.
Why this was necessary has not explained.
[65] The proximity
of the dubious process of interviewing the accused and obtaining the
warning statement is sufficiently
close to the process of obtaining a
confession to permit for a concern that the one experience indeed
taints the other.
[65] If she were
secure about the integrity of the warning statement one would have
expected the investigating officer to
proceed to arrange for a
confession with less haste. It is also highly unsatisfactory
that the justice of the peace tasked
with taking the confession was a
commissioned officer stationed at Bizana with an office in the same
building as that used only
a few hours before by the investigating
officer.
[66] Given the
close geographical proximity of the police stations that have been
referred to in this matter and the identity
of the deceased as a
female member of the South African Police Force, it is highly likely
that the captain had heard details about
her murder. An
application of the mind to this reality would immediately have
excluded him as an appropriate justice of the
peace to approach.
[67] In addition,
in my view every possible step should be taken to avoid a situation
where a suspect perceives the confession
taking to be merely an
extension of the investigation. If he or she has complaints to
raise about assault or threats of assault
or inappropriate
intimidation of any other kind, how can the use of “in house”
commissioned officers of the South African
Police Service be seen as
providing an appropriate space within which to make reports against
the investigators?
[68] More than once
this court has been obliged to reiterate the preference for taking a
suspect to a magistrate for the purposes
of making a confession and
the principles that lie behind the preference; see for example,
S
v Ntantiso
an unreported judgment of this court under case number
CC04/2015 delivered on 23 August 2017.
[69] Given that
there is no satisfactory explanation for irreconcilable records
pertaining to the time when the confession
was taken, nothing
excludes the possibility that the accused is truthful when he states
that he made more than one trip to the
office of the justice of the
peace.
[70] The anomalies
in the handwriting to be found on the confession pro-forma cause
concern that permits of the possibility
that the form was partly
completed on the last page by a third party who inserted an incorrect
time. Such an occurrence would
violate the integrity of the
process of taking a confession. Perhaps the time 10h00 is the
time recorded somewhere, even
if only mentally, as being the time of
the accused’s first visit to the captain when it was expected
that he makes a confession,
but according to him did not.
[70] An
identification of all of these possibilities indicates that once the
police do not do their work properly, the door
is opened for concern
and doubt to enter the room. On a conspectus of all the
available evidence at the close of the second
trial-within-a-trail
the Court was unable to exclude a reasonable doubt that the state had
proven that the accused made a confession
freely and voluntarily.
[71] In the result
the Court ruled that the confession made by the accused on 25 January
2021 be excluded from the state case
against him.
[72] Thereafter,
the state handed in the post-mortem report covered by affidavit and
accompanying an identification of the
body of the deceased and a
report dealing with the issue of its transport.
[73] The cause of
death of the deceased is identified in the post-mortem report as
“extensive bleeding caused by injury
to major neck blood
vessels caused by stab neck” [
sic
]. The state case
was then closed.
[74] Counsel for
the defence made application for the discharge of the accused in
accordance with the provisions of section
174 of the CPA. The
section provides that if at the close of the state case no
prima
facie
has been made out against an accused person, he or she is
entitled to be acquitted.
[75] It is trite
that the test at this stage is to assess whether there is any
evidence before the Court upon which the Court
acting carefully may
convict the accused. None of the evidence placed before the
Court links the accused in a manner that
would enable this Court
acting carefully to find that he is guilty of the offence with which
he has been charged. It must
follow that he is entitled to an
acquittal on that charge.
[76]
Understandably, this matter has attracted public interest. It
demonstrates something of the appalling malady of
femicide with which
this country is plagued currently. It also combines therein an
example of the all too frequent murder
of members of the South
African Police Service. Most people who have taken an interest
in this matter would have hoped for
a conviction of the accused.
No doubt they will view the outcome now as a failed prosecution.
This would be wrong.
[77] Counsel for
the state, Mr Mzinyathi, has conducted the prosecution in this matter
with appropriate care and diligence.
He has also demonstrated
the high levels of competence and ethics that are required of an
officer of this court. There has
been no failure in the
prosecution. What has regrettably been demonstrated all too
clearly is a failure within the investigation
of the matter.
[78] It is plain
that this investigation was conducted in an unduly hasty and careless
manner. This led to the compromise
of the integrity of the
investigation in a manner rendering it unconstitutional and destined
for failure. No prosecutor should
be presented with a docket
that reveals such problems as are evident in this matter.
[79] The following
order is made:
On
count 1: The accused is found NOT GUILTY and is
DISCHARGED.
…………………………
RWN BROOKS
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
Appearances:
For
the State:
Adv. N Mzinyathi
Instructed
by
National Director of Public Prosecutions
Broadcast House
No. 94 Sissons Street
Fortgale
MTHATHA
For
the Accused:
Adv. T S Kekana
Instructed
by
Legal Aid South Africa
PRD Building
96 Sutherland Street
MTHATHA
Date
Delivered:
21 August 2023