A.M v H.M and Others (42362/2021) [2023] ZAGPPHC 747 (31 August 2023)

82 Reportability

Trusts and Estates

Brief Summary

Execution — Exception to particulars of claim — Plaintiff's claims against defendants relating to a trust — Defendants excepted to the plaintiff's particulars of claim on grounds of vagueness and failure to disclose a cause of action — Court held that the plaintiff's claims regarding the trust were inadequately pleaded, lacking necessary parties and failing to establish a discernible cause of action — Exception upheld, with the court emphasizing the need for clarity in pleadings to enable fair response from defendants.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment

1. Introduction

The proceedings were an exception application brought in terms of Rule 23 of the Uniform Rules of Court. The first and second defendants, as excipients, objected to the plaintiff’s particulars of claim on the bases that they did not disclose a cause of action and were vague and embarrassing.

The parties were the plaintiff (A.M) and, as defendants, H.M (first defendant) and H.M N.O. (second defendant, cited in a trustee capacity), with A.M N.O. cited as third defendant (also in a trustee capacity). The Standard Bank of South Africa (bondholder over a trust property) and the Master of the High Court were further cited as defendants. The first and second defendants pursued the exception only in relation to the plaintiff’s third and fourth claims.

The procedural history reflected that the exception was heard on 16 May 2023, and judgment was delivered electronically on 31 August 2023. The court approached the matter as a pleading-stage challenge intended to determine whether the impugned claims were legally sustainable and sufficiently formulated to permit a proper plea.

The dispute concerned claims arising from a prior marriage and divorce, a settlement agreement allegedly regulating patrimonial consequences and trust-related obligations, and relief sought in relation to immovable properties held by the Akkedis Trust and payments allegedly made in relation to those properties.

2. Material Facts

It was common cause, as recorded by the court, that the plaintiff and the first defendant were previously married, and the marriage was dissolved by divorce on 4 February 2016. A written settlement agreement was alleged to have been concluded on 18 December 2015 at Pretoria, intended to regulate, among other matters, patrimonial and monetary claims between the former spouses.

The Akkedis Trust (identified by trust number in the particulars) was established on or about 12 July 2007. The court recorded that the trust held two immovable properties, described as the Mooikloof property and the Zimbali property, and that The Standard Bank of South Africa was the registered bondholder over the Zimbali property. The plaintiff, the first defendant, the third defendant, and the late Mr Jan Andreas Rautenbach (who died on 5 April 2018) were described as authorised trustees in the pleadings as summarised by the court. The beneficiaries included the plaintiff, the first defendant, and their children.

The exception was directed at allegations underpinning the plaintiff’s third and fourth claims, including the plaintiff’s allegation that the settlement agreement was concluded by the plaintiff and first defendant personally and in their capacities as trustees, and that the settlement contemplated decisions and steps relating to the transfer of the trust’s immovable properties to the plaintiff. The excipients’ objections included (amongst others) contentions that the settlement agreement attached to the particulars appeared to be an agreement between the plaintiff and the first defendant only, that the trust was not properly implicated as a party, and that the pleadings were defective in respect of the trust-related relief and trustee representation.

Where the court distinguished the scope of dispute, it recorded that the exception grounds were confined to the third and fourth claims, and that no complaints were levelled against the first two claims. The court’s reasoning focused primarily on the implications of the relief sought against trust assets and the alleged absence of proper joinder of the trust in circumstances where the relief would directly affect the trust’s interests.

3. Legal Issues

The central legal questions were whether, on the pleaded allegations, the plaintiff’s third and fourth claims were excipiable on the bases advanced, including whether they disclosed a legally cognisable cause of action and whether they were pleaded with sufficient clarity to allow the excipients to plead.

A key issue addressed in the reasoning was whether the pleadings were fatally defective due to non-joinder, in the sense that the plaintiff sought relief that would substantially and directly affect the trust and its assets, yet the trust was not properly joined as a party with a direct and substantial interest in the litigation.

The dispute primarily concerned questions of law and the application of legal pleading requirements to the pleaded facts, rather than factual disputes to be resolved on evidence. The court approached the matter through the doctrinal lens applicable to exceptions, including whether, on every reasonable interpretation, the impugned pleadings could sustain the legal conclusions contended for by the plaintiff.

4. Court’s Reasoning

The court restated the general approach to exceptions. It emphasised that an exception that a pleading does not disclose a cause of action strikes at the formulation and legal validity of the claim, and that while exceptions are useful to weed out legally meritless cases, they should not be approached in an overly technical manner that undermines their utility. In this respect, the court relied on authority emphasising a sensible, substance-focused approach to Rule 23 proceedings.

In addressing pleading sufficiency, the court endorsed the principle that particulars of claim must be formulated so that a defendant can reasonably and fairly be required to plead. Pleadings must be lucid, logical, and intelligible, with the cause of action emerging clearly from the factual allegations. This was connected to the modern pleading context in which requests for further particulars for pleading have been abolished, increasing the importance of clear and complete initial pleading.

The court also articulated the burden resting on an excipient. It referred to authority that exception is competent where pleadings are so vague that the nature of the claim cannot be determined, or where the pleading is bad in law because it fails to support a discernible and legally recognised cause of action. The excipient must establish that, on every interpretation reasonably capable of being attached to the pleading, it is excipiable, and that on all possible readings no cause of action can be made out.

Although six grounds of exception were advanced, the court stated that it did not intend to deal with every ground and would focus on what it regarded as the crux of the relief sought, namely the trust-related relief and the necessity of joining the trust to the proceedings. The court reasoned that the plaintiff’s third and fourth claims were centred on assets owned by the trust and that the relief sought would, in substance, affect the trust directly and substantially.

The court then applied the joinder principle that no court should make a decision adverse to a person’s interests without that person being joined to the proceedings. It stated that a court ordinarily cannot grant relief where another person’s interests may be directly affected, unless that person has been given formal notice through joinder. The test for required joinder was described as depending not on the general subject matter of the suit but on the manner and extent to which the relief sought may affect the interests of the party said to be necessary.

Applying this to the pleadings before it, the court concluded that the relief claimed by the plaintiff substantially and directly affected the trust and that any contractual relationship alleged between the plaintiff and the trust was legally relevant to the claim. On this footing, the court held that the non-joinder was material and legally fatal to the plaintiff’s third and fourth claims as pleaded, rendering them excipiable. The court considered it legally sound that the trust be joined to the action as a party with a direct and substantial interest in litigation concerning the terms of the agreement and monies alleged to be due.

The court linked this joinder defect to the broader conclusion that the plaintiff’s third and fourth claims were excipiable, given that they were “centered around the trust which is not a party to these proceedings.” The court then issued an order upholding all the grounds of exception.

5. Outcome and Relief

The court upheld the first to sixth grounds of exception raised by the first and second defendants.

The plaintiff was ordered to pay the costs of the exception on a party and party scale, including fees consequent upon the employment of counsel.

Cases Cited

Telematrix (Pty) Limited v Advertising Standards Authority S.A. 2006 1 ALL SA 6 (SCA); 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA).

M Ramanna and Associates cc v The Ekurhuleni Development Company (Pty) Ltd, Case No: 25832/2013 (4 April 2014) ZAGPJHC.

Luke M Tembani and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Another (Case no 167/2021) [2022] ZASCA 70 (20 May 2022).

Amalgamated Engineering Union v Minister of Labour 1949 (3) SA 637 (A) at 659.

Legislation Cited

No legislation was cited in the judgment beyond reference to the Uniform Rules of Court framework governing exceptions.

Rules of Court Cited

Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 23.

Held

The court held that the plaintiff’s third and fourth claims were excipiable, principally because the relief sought would directly and substantially affect the trust, yet the trust was not properly joined as a party with the requisite interest in the litigation. The court treated this non-joinder as material and legally fatal to the claims as pleaded and, in its order, upheld all six grounds of exception advanced by the first and second defendants. Costs were awarded against the plaintiff on the party and party scale, including counsel’s fees.

LEGAL PRINCIPLES

The judgment applied the principle that an exception for no cause of action challenges the legal validity of the pleaded claim, and that exceptions should be approached sensibly to eliminate claims lacking legal merit without adopting an overly technical stance that undermines the procedure’s purpose.

It reaffirmed that pleadings must be drafted so as to enable the opposing party to plead fairly, requiring allegations to be lucid, logical, and intelligible, and to disclose the cause of action clearly from the factual averments.

It further applied the principle that exception lies where pleadings are so vague that the nature of the claim cannot be determined, or where the pleaded material does not sustain a legally recognised cause of action, with the burden on the excipient to show that the pleading is excipiable on every reasonable interpretation.

Finally, the judgment applied the joinder rule that a court should not determine issues in a manner adverse to a person’s interests without that person being joined, and that necessary joinder turns on whether the relief sought may directly and substantially affect the interests of the absent party.