REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG LOCAL DIVISION, JOHANNESBURG
(1) REPORTABLE: NO
(2) OF INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3) REVISED
19 March 2024
____________ ______________________
DATE SIGNATURE
CASE NUMBER: 49514/2017
In the matter between
SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION SOC LTD First Applicant
SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNIT Second Applicant
and
LORNAVISION (PTY) LTD Respondent
In re:
SOUTH AFRICAN BROADCASTING CORPORATION SOC LTD First Plaintiff
SPECIAL INVESTIGATING UNIT Second Plaintiff
and
LORNAVISION (PTY) LTD First Defendant
JAMES AGUMA Second Defendant
2
Coram: DOSIO J
_________________________________________________________________
ORDER
_________________________________________________________________
1. The application for default judgment is granted.
2. The respondent is ordered to pay the sum of R62 733 556.61 with interest thereon
tempore morae from date of service of summons to the date of final payment.
3. The respondent is to pay the costs.
_________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
_________________________________________________________________
DOSIO J:
Introduction
[1] This is an application for default judgment , brought by the first and second applicants
who will be referred to as (‘the SABC’) and (‘the SIU’), against the first respondent, (‘Lornavision’).
[2] Lornavision has opposed the application.
[3] The first and second applicants are the first and second plaintiffs in the main action and
Lornavision is the first defendant. For purposes of this judgment, reference will be made to these
parties as they appear in the main action.
Background
[4] The SABC and Lornavision concluded a written services agreement on 10 July 2015, in
terms of which Lornavision was to assist the SABC with the collection of debt relating to the
payment of TV licenses.
[5] The second defendant (‘Mr Aguma’), was employed as the chief financial officer of the
SABC and initiated an irregular, unfair, non-competitive and non-transparent process to appoint
Lornavision, in a manner that contravened s217(1) of the Constitution.
3
[6] The SABC performed in terms of the illegal services agreement and paid Lornavision
the amount of R62 733 556.61.
[7] The written services agreement was declared unlawful, reviewed and set aside by th e
learned Shangisa AJ on 26 July 2017 and reasons were given on 2 August 2017.
[8] Summons was issued on 19 December 2017. Mr Aguma filed a plea and is not involved
in this application.
[9] Lornavision delivered four exceptions to the particulars of claim . This resulted in the
SABC amending their particulars of claim to the current form as at 5 September 2019. No action
was taken by Lornavision after it received the amended particulars of claim.
[10] On 22 October 2019 , the SABC and the SIU delivered their notice of bar which was
served on Lornavision. Lornavision had to deliver its plea by 29 October 2019.
[11] The application for default judgment was launched on 8 September 2020 and set down
for hearing on 24 November 2020.
[12] Lornavision launched an application to uplift the bar on 20 November 2020 and withdrew
same on 23 March 2022, tendering the wasted costs of the SABC and the SIU, up to and including
23 March 2022.
[13] There is a further matter, namely, 2020/9366 where the SIU is the plaintiff and
Kubentheran Moodley (‘Mr Moodley’) and Lornavision are the first and third defendants
respectively. The first and third defendants in matter 2020/9366 have filed a notice of exception.
The second defendant in matter 2020/9366 is Frans Lodewyk Munnic Basson (‘Mr Basson’) and
the SABC is the fourth defendant.
Submissions of the SABC and the SIU
[14] The SABC and the SIU argued that because Lornavision withdrew its application to
uplift the bar, all that is before this court is a pure default judgment and Lornavision cannot be
before the court at this stage.
[15] It was argued that because the court made an order that the contract was void ab initio,
the SABC is entitled to claim the profits made by Lornavision, which it obtained as a result of the
contract. Furthermore, the SABC in its particulars of claim makes out a case for unjust
enrichment.
4
[16] It was argued that the exception raised by Lornavision to the particulars of claim, do not
make the particulars of claim so bad, that no cause of action is apparent. It was argued that the
contract was set aside and, on that basis, Lornavision must simply repay the profits that the SABC
paid.
[17] It was submitted t hat Lornavision was unjustly enriched in the amount of
R62 733 556.61 and that the SABC was impoverished in the amount of R62 733 556.61.
[18] It was contended that the enrichment of Lornavision was at the expense of the SABC
and was unjustified. As a result, Lornavision is indebted to the SABC in the amount of R62 733
556.61. Reference was made to the Constitutional Court decision of Allpay Consolidated
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd And Others v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social Security
Agency And Others1 (‘Allpay 2’).
[19] The plaintiffs’ counsel made reference to the affidavit of Sylvia Nikiwe Tladi (‘Ms Tladi’)
in support of their claim. In this affidavit it is stated that according to the customer communications
service (‘CCS’), the system was to be managed in-house by the SABC, however the CCS system
was never managed in-house by the SABC and neither did the SABC have control over it.2 It was
argued that t he CCS system also never produced the increased collections and revenue as
promised by Lornavision.
[20] Reference was made to Ms Tladi’s affidavit which states that:
‘In my view the R2 135 000 excluding VAT that we paid for the pilot program referred to in sub-paragraph
9.1…was a total waste as Lornavision failed to deliver the increased revenue collection and the SABC
have received nothing in return - for this expenditure. The whole amount paid to Lornavision for the pilot
program was effectively fruitless and wasteful expenditure and we had no returns on this investment.‘3
[21] Counsel referred this court to a table that was prepared by Ms Tladi which shows that
there was a 100% success rate on the part of the SABC in collecting rates as opposed to the very
low collection rates by Lornavision.4
[22] Reference was also made to a damages affidavit filed by Brendan Daniels (‘Mr Daniels’),
who is employed as a senior forensic accountant by the SIU. In this affidavit it is stated that:
1 Allpay Consolidated Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd And Others v Chief Executive Officer, South African Social
Security Agency And Others 2014 (4) SA 179 (CC)
2 Affidavit of Ms Tladi para 45
3 Ibid para 48
4 Ibid para 88
5
‘I confirm that during 2017 I conducted an investigation in relation to the payments made by the First
Plaintiff to the First Defendant in terms of the service agreement which was declared unlawful, reviewed
and set aside by the above Honourable Court on 2 August 2017…My investigation revealed that during
the period 17 September 2015 to 16 February 2017 the First Plaintiff paid the First Defendant an amount
in the sum of R62 733 557. I attach a copy of a spreadsheet reflecting the pay ments made marked
“Annexure B”.’5
‘Accordingly, I confirm that the amounts listed in Annexure B are true and correct reflection of the loss
suffered by the First Plaintiff as a result of the unlawful agreement concluded between the First Plaintiff
and the First Defendant.’6
[23] Counsel referred to the judgment handed down by the learned Shangisa AJ which states
that:
‘There is nothing that demonstrates that Lornavision’s product was in any way unique or that it was the
sole provider of this type of services. Its debt collection drive could hardly be categorized as being unique
or innovative. In my view, the nature of the services provided by Lornavision fall outside the scope of
unique, innovative or exceptional circumstances that are contemplated in section 13.14 of the SABC’s
Policy. In the same vein, it is difficult to discern any exceptional cost benefit the agreement brought to bear
on the SABC.’7
‘…What is more, the SABC had its own internal resources and staff which were capable of executing some
of the tasks for which Lornavision had been appointed.’8
Submissions of Lornavision
[24] Lornavision raised the following three issues:
(a) The purported affidavit of Ms Tladi had not been properly commissioned and is
pro non scripto.
Reference was made to Regulation 7(1) of the ‘regulations governing the administering of an oath
or affirmation’9 which reads:
5 Affidavit of Mr Daniels para 4
6 Ibid para 5
7 Judgement of Shangisa AJ para 46
8 Ibid para 59
9 see GN Gap R1258 of 1972, published in GG 3619 of 21 July 1972, issued in terms of in terms of section 10 of the
Justices of the Peace and Commissioners of Oaths Act, 16 of 1963
6
‘(1) A commissioner of oath shall not administer an oath or affirmation relating to matter in which he has
an interest.’
It was argued that the affidavit of Ms Tladi was ‘commissioned’ by Ruark Theron (‘Mr Theron’).
Mr Theron had an interest in the matter, as the affidavit of Ms Tladi is attached to his answering
affidavit. This answering affidavit is in support of the plaintiffs’ /respondents’ contentions, in the
condonation and upliftment of the bar application, brought by Lornavision against the SABC, the
SIU and Mr Aguma. It was contended that if the affidavit of Ms Tladi was excluded, there is no
evidence before court pertaining to the merits of the plaintiffs’ claim.
(b) There are a number of related court actions pending , namely case number
2020/9366 and 2020/18135.
Lornavision’s counsel drew this court’s attention to a case management meeting held in respect
to the matter in casu, before Modiba J , held on 29 May 2020 . Advocate P. Cirone , who
represented the plaintiffs , indicated that ‘ the Plaintiffs intend to launch the consolidation
application by 12 June 2020 …’. The matter referred to by Advocate P. Cirone was matter
2020/9366. Counsel argued that no consolidation took place. It was argued that in matter
2020/9366, the SIU is the plaintiff and in terms of prayer three, the same amount of R62 733
556.61 is claimed by the SIU . As a result, it was argued that this court cannot grant the default
judgment as the request to pay the amount of R62 733 556.61 would not be just and equitable .
Furthermore, there would be a disregard for the provisions of s172 of the Constitution. It was
argued that the SABC had not made out a case for unjust enrichment.
(c) The plaintiffs wish to rely on the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam, as
their cause of action
It was contended that if the SABC wanted to rely on this cause of action it would have to allege
and plead that the SABC and/or its officials, representatives and/or em ployees are free of
turpitude. This is so because this condictio can only be successfully instituted by a plaintiff whose
own conduct was free from turpitude and that he/she did not act dishonourably.
Evaluation
[25] There is no plea filed by Lornavision. As a result, it is not possible or permissible in terms
of the Rules of court to oppose an application for default judgment. An application for default
judgment is not an opposed motion. All that Lornavision can do, once default judgment is granted,
is to apply for a rescission.
7
[26] There is no affidavit before court explaining under what circumstances the uplifting of
the bar application was withdrawn by Lornavision. If Lornavision believed in its exceptions , logic
dictates that it would not have withdrawn this application.
[27] In deciding a matter by way of default, all that a court needs to decide is whether the
amount claimed by the SABC is properly quantified. In this matter , the amount claimed is a
liquidated amount of R62 733 556.61. The written services agreement , in terms of which this
liquidated amount was paid, was declared unlawful and void ab initio. This requires restitution in
the amount of R62 733 556.61. The facts as alleged by the SABC and the SIU, in the particulars
of claim, stand uncontested and undisputed by Lornavision. Public policy and the interests of
justice dictate that it is just and proper, that default judgment be granted.
[28] In the matter of Allpay 2,10 the Constitutional Court held that the default position is that
the consequences of an invalid and unlawful contract must be corrected where this is still possible
or reversed if prevention of invalidity is no longer possible.11
[29] In the matter of Shabangu v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa
and Others,12 the Constitutional Court held that:
‘The problem of the original invalidity may be addressed in another way. Recovery of what was transferred
under an invalid agreement is governed either by enrichment or what was referred to in argument as the
“no-profit principle” put forward by this Court in AllPay Remedy.’13
‘While there is some kind of overlap between the basis for an enrichment claim (restoring a legally
unjustified imbalance) and the “no -profit principle” (not allowing profit from unlawfulness), there are
differences. Enrichment is a valid claim that may arise from an unlawful contract, while the no -profit
principle prevents the perpetuation of unlawfulness. The latter is part of regulating the just and equitable
relief of suspending the declaration of unlawfulness in respect of a contract. It is therefore bound up in
that just and equitable assessment and the continued (if suspended) operation/enforcement of an unlawful
agreement, something different to the remedial nature of an enrichment claim.’14
‘Whatever the merits or demerits are of substituting a just and equitable remedy, in keeping with the “no-
profit principle”, for an ordinary enrichment claim in invalid contracts by organs of state, recovery for unjust
10 Allpay 2 (note 1 above)
11 Ibid para 30
12 Shabangu v Land and Agricultural Development Bank of South Africa and Others (CCT215/18) [2019] ZACC 42;
2020 (1) SA 305 (CC) ; 2020 (1) BCLR 110 (CC) (29 October 2019)
13 Ibid para 26
14 Ibid para 27
8
enrichment or profit gained from an invalid agreement both seek to ameliorate or redress the
consequences of the invalidity through the re transfer of unjustified gains.’15
[30] This court has already declared that the written services agreement in terms of which
Lornavision allegedly performed is unlawful and void ab initio. The default position is that
Lornavision is not permitted to benefit from the proceeds of an unlawful contract , irrespective of
whether Lornavision is complicit or innocent in the fact of the unlawfulness.
[31] The declaration of unlawfulness and the setting aside of the contract bring into play the
provisions of s172(1)(b) of the Constitution.
[32] Section 172 of the Constitution states that:
‘Powers of courts in constitutional matters
172. (1) When deciding a constitutional matter within its power, a court—
(a) must declare that any law or conduct that is inconsistent with the Constitution is invalid to
the extent of its inconsistency; and
(b) may make any order that is just and equitable, including—
(i) an order limiting the retrospective effect of the declaration of invalidity; and
(ii) an order suspending the declaration of invalidity for any period and on any conditions, to
allow the competent authority to correct the defect.’
[33] In the matter of State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty)
Ltd16 (‘Gijima’), the Constitutional Court held that:
‘…under s 172(1)(b) of the Constitution, a court deciding a constitutional matter has a wide remedial power.
It is empowered to make “any order that is just and equitable”. So wide is that power that it is bounded
only by considerations of justice and equity.’17[my emphasis]
[34] This court has a wide discretion to craft a just and equitable order. In the absence of a
plea by Lornavision, the amounts referred to by Ms Tladi and Mr Daniels remain undisputed by
Lornavision. Lornavision cannot raise issues from the bar disputing the a mounts which should
have been contained in a plea.
15 Ibid para 28
16 State Information Technology Agency SOC Ltd v Gijima Holdings (Pty) Ltd 2018 (2) SA 23 (CC)
17 Ibid para 53
9
[35] In the context of public-procurement matters, priority should be given to the public good
to ensure that the public purse is not depleted.
[36] In exercising its discretion, this court orders that Lornavision has no entitlement to keep
the profits. Accordingly, default judgment is granted in the amount of R62 733 556.61
[37] Even if this court is wrong, the technicalities raised by Lornavision have no merit.
The objection to Ms Tladi’s evidence
[38] Lornavision contends that Ms Tladi’s affidavit must be ignored because it was
commissioned by a representative of the SIU. Lornavision asserts reliance on the provisions of
regulation 7 of the regulations governing the administering of an oath or affirmation which states
that:
‘A commissioner of oaths shall not administer an oath or affirmation relating to matter in which he has an
interest.’
[39] This, however, is not the updated and prevailing regulation. The Schedule, in the
Government Regulation 1428, dated 11 July 1980, substituted the previous Schedule mentioned
in regulation 7, para 2 and exempts from the provisions of regulation 7(1) the following:
‘A declaration taken by a commissioner of oaths who is not an attorney and whose only interest therein
arises out of his employment and in the course of his duty.’
[40] Mr Theron, the SIU representative, falls squarely within the exemption. He is not an
attorney and his only interest in the matter arises out of his employment with the SIU and in the
course of his duty. So, the point taken by Lornavision as to the inadmissibility of Ms Tladi’s
affidavit is of no assistance to Lornavision. Ms Tladi has also delivered a supplementary affidavit
in which she again confirms under oath the veracity and contents of her affidavit that she deposed
to in front of Mr Theron. This is in line with the decision of Radue Weir Holdings Ltd t/a Weirs
Cash & Carry v Galleus Investments CC t/a Bargain Wholesalers ,18 where the court held that
someone who relies on an un-commissioned affidavit should be given the opportunity to re-attest
it before a competent commissioner of oaths.19 This is what Ms Tladi did.
[41] Even if Ms Tladi had not deposed to a further supplementary affidavit, this court still has
a discretion to receive an affidavit attested otherwise than in accordance with the regulations ,
18 Radue Weir Holdings Ltd t/a Weirs Cash & Carry v Galleus Investments CC t/a Bargain Wholesalers 1998 (3) SA
677 (E) at 681G and 682H-J
19 Ibid at 681G and 682H-J
10
depending upon whether substantial compliance with them has been proved or not. The
regulations are directory not peremptory.20
[42] As a result, there is no legal basis upon which the affidavit of Ms Tladi’s should be
regarded as inadmissible. As stated supra in paragraph [ 34], the affidavit of Ms Tladi stands
uncontested and undisputed. Lornavision has not countered, disputed, denied or responded to a
single one of the factual allegations that she has made in her affidavit. In the replying affidavit, in
respect to the lifting of the bar, Lornavision made no comments in respect to Ms Tladi’s affidavit.
All that was said in the re plying affidavit is that the affidavit was not properly before the court.
There was no plea over in this respect.
[43] This court accordingly accepts the contents of Ms Tladi’s affidavit which states that:
(a) she informed Mr Basson that there was nothing new ‘by way of efficiency, advances, or
additions in value..’ in what Lornavision proposed;21
(b) the SABC was already in the process of doing what Lornavision offered, the approach
by Lornavision demonstrated no substantial costs saving to SABC and Lornavision already had
its own online platform;22
(c) the Customer Communications Service (‘ CCS’) system never produced the increased
collections and revenue as promised by Lornavision and even though the SABC paid for the CCS
system in full it never had control over it;23
(d) on 25 February 2016 Lornavision presented a report to the SABC in which it represented
that it had a 23% success rate when in fact this was false and amounted to a false
representation;24
20 see S v Msibi 1974 (4) SA 821 (T); Dawood v Mahomed 1979 (2) SA 361 (D) at 367A –B; Lohrman v Vaal
Ontwikkelingsmaatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1979 (3) SA 391 (T) at 396H–397A; Nkondo v Minister of Police 1980 (2) SA
362 (O) at 365A–B; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Malefane: In re Malefane v Standard Bank of South Africa
Ltd 2007 (4) SA 461 (Tk) at 465A–D
21 Affidavit of Ms Tladi see S v Msibi 1974 (4) SA 821 (T); Dawood v Mahomed 1979 (2) SA 361 (D) at 367A –B;
Lohrman v Vaal Ontwikkelingsmaatskappy (Edms) Bpk 1979 (3) SA 391 (T) at 396H –397A; Nkondo v Minister of
Police 1980 (2) SA 362 (O) at 365A –B; Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd v Malefane: In re Malefane v Standard
Bank of South Africa Ltd 2007 (4) SA 461 (Tk) at 465A–D
22 Ibid annexure AA2, p 056-309 par 20
23 Ibid annexure AA2, p 056-317 par 46
24 Ibid annexure AA2, p 056-324 paras 73 and 74
11
(e) the appointment of Lornavision together with the cancellation of the debt collection
agenda (‘DCA’) contracts caused the SABC to incur a substantial decrease in co llections from
arrear rentals;25 and,
(f) the appointment of Lornavision caused the SABC a substantial drop in revenue
collection.26
[44] There is accordingly no merit that Lornavision diligently performed under the written
services agreement.
Parallel litigation raised by Lornavision
[45] The existence of an alleged ‘parallel’ claim by the SIU against Mr Moodley and Mr
Basson, in case number 2020/9366, in their personal capacities, is not a defence.
[46] Case 2020/9366, instituted against Mr Moodley and Mr Basson , is premised on the
allegations that they conducted the business of Lornavision recklessly and/or with gross
negligence and/or with the intent to defraud the SABC and for fraudulent purposes. The SIU, who
is the plaintiff in that matter has premised the relief that it seeks on a breach of the provisions of,
inter alia, s s77(3)(b) and 77(3)(c) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008 . The argument raised by
Lornavision regarding the parallel litigation is devoid of merit and of no assistance to Lornavision.
[47] At paragraph 5 of the case management meeting held with Modiba J, on 29 May 2020,
it was recorded that:
‘…the plaintiffs are to take all steps to expedite the consolidation of the matter including barring the
defendants that have not pleaded and, where appropriate apply for default judgment in case number
9366/2020.’ [my emphasis]
[48] The SABC and the SIU never consolidated matter 2020/9366 with the matter in casu,
however, as argued by the plaintiffs’ counsel, this would only be done when the matters were trial
ready. Due to the many interlocutory applications that were brought by Lornavision, the matter in
casu was not trial ready. The failure to consolidate the matters cannot be a bar to granting a
default judgment.
[49] The case management meeting held by Modiba J on 24 February 2022 , is nearly two
years after the case management held on 29 May 2020. Modiba J held that:
25 Ibid annexure AA2, p 056-331 par above 94
26 Ibid annexure AA2, p 056-330 par above 91
12
‘4.1 Ad Default Judgment
4.1.1 Judge Modiba:
4.1.1.1 noted that the Default Judgment application was too complex to determine on paper as originally
intended; and
4.1.1.2 undertook to certify the application ready for hearing to enable the Plaintiffs to enrol same for
hearing in open court.’ [my emphasis]
[50] Paragraph five of the case management meeting, dated 29 May 2020, must be read
with paragraph four of the case management meeting dated 24 February 2022. In the former
case management meeting, the matter i n casu was to be consolidate d with matter 2020/9366
and the plaintiffs were to bar the defendants that had not yet pleaded. In the latter case
management meeting, the minutes reflect that the default judgment is too complex to determine
on the papers, and that it must be heard in open court. Considering both minutes, the SABC and
the SIU were in accordance with the requests of Modiba J to bring the matter before open court
for a default judgment.
[51] Exceptions were being raised by Mr Moodley and Lornavision in matter 2020/9366. As
a result, matter 2020/9366 was not ready to be consolidated with the matter in casu. Furthermore,
Mr Aguma had pleaded in the matter in casu and Lornavision had not. The matter was trial ready
in respect to Mr Aguma, but not in respect to Lornavison. It is inconceivable to expect the matter
in casu to be consolidated with matter 2020/9366 when the interlocutory applications were still
not finalised. As a result, a failure to consolidate, cannot be a defence to an application for default
judgment.
[52] Accordingly, the argument of a lack of consolidation is without merit and on this basis
there can be no reason to deny the plaintiffs a judgment by default.
Par delictum rule
[53] In the matter in casu, if Lornavision wanted to rely on the par delictum rule, same should
have been pleaded. Lornavision did not plead.
[54] A defendant can resist a claim made under the condictio ob turpem vel iniustam causam
by relying on the par delictum rule. It is for the defendant to allege and prove that the plaintiff was
also in delicto, that is, that the plaintiff was a party to the illegality . It is then for the plaintiff to
allege and prove facts that will enable the court to come to the plaintiff’s assistance by not
enforcing the par delictum rule, because justice and public policy so require.
13
[55] In the matter of Klokow v Sullivan ,27 the Supreme Court of Appeal stated that the
question of whether the par delictum rule should be relaxed or not, cannot be decided on the
pleadings and ought to be decid ed at the end of the trial. 28 The Supreme Court of Appeal held
further that:
‘...In general, where public policy considerations do not favour either party, the par delictum rule will
operate against the plaintiff. At exception stage, however, the par delictum rule will generally defeat a
plaintiff's claim only in the clearest of cases.’29 [my emphasis]
[56] From the matter of Klokow,30 a Court cannot decide at exception stage whether a
plaintiff has or hasn’t demonstrated a lack of turpitude , or whether it has pleaded sufficient
allegations to justify a relaxation of the par delictum rule.
[57] In light of the decision of Allpay 2,31 this becomes academic, in that t he decision of
Allpay 2 states that once a contract is void, then the party that benefitted from that illegal contract
must repay. As a result, this issue is also without merit.
Costs
[58] The counsel for the SABC and SIU initially requested party and party costs. During the
replication, this changed and costs on a punitive scale were requested.
[59] Costs are within the discretion of the c ourt and this court does not find that a punitive
cost order is warranted in this matter.
Order
1. The application for default judgment is granted.
2. The respondent is ordered to pay the sum of R62 733 556.61 with interest thereon
tempore morae from date of service of summons to the date of final payment.
3. The respondent is to pay the costs.
27 Klokow v Sullivan 2006 (1) SA 259 (SCA)
28 Ibid para 24
29 Ibid para 24
30 Ibid
31 Allpay 2 (note 1 above)
14
_
D DOSIO
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
JOHANNESBURG
This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’ representatives via
e-mail, by being uploaded to CaseLines and by release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand -
down is deemed to be 10h00 on 19 March 2024
15
Appearances:
For the First and Second Applicants/Plaintiffs: Adv. J Motepe SC
Instructed by: Werksmans Attorneys
For First Respondent/Defendant: Adv. I Semenya SC
Adv. P Muthige
Instructed by: Mabuza Attorneys