About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, Makhanda
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, Makhanda
>>
2023
>>
[2023] ZAECMKHC 102
|
|
Lucietto N.O. v Wellman and Others (1697/2023) [2023] ZAECMKHC 102 (26 September 2023)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, MAKHANDA)
Case
No.: 1697/2023
Date
of hearing: 10 August 2023
Judgment
delivered on: 26 September 2023
In
the matter between:
TRACEY
LUCIETTO N.O.
APPLICANT
And
ANDREW
WELLMAN
FIRST
RESPONDENT
BATE
CHUBB & DICKSON INC
SECOND
RESPONDENT
ANDRE
VAN WYK
THIRD
RESPONDENT
REPORTABLE: YES
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES
REVISED
22/09/2023
JUDGMENT
MTSHABE
AJ:
INTRODUCTION
[1]
The Applicant in her capacity as the Executrix in the Estate of her
late husband, Franco Renato
Lucietto, brought an urgent application
on 30
th
May 2023 against the Respondents seeking in the
main an amount R350 000-00 (three hundred and fifty thousand
rands) be paid
to her from the proceeds of the sale of member’s
interest of Luccietto Wellman CC. This three hundred and fifty
thousand
rands was to be paid into the estate account.
[2]
In
Webster
v Mitchell
[1]
,
the court vocalized the test for the granting of interim relief as
follows: “
In
an application for a temporally interdict, applicant’s right
need not be shown by a balance of probabilities. It is sufficient
if
such right is prima facie established, though open to some doubt. The
proper manner of approach is to take facts as set out
by the
applicant, together with any facts set out by the Respondent which
applicant cannot dispute and to consider whether, having
regard to
the inherent probabilities, the applicant could on those facts obtain
final relief at the trial. The facts set up in
contradiction by the
respondent should then be considered, and if serious doubt is thrown
upon the case of applicant, he could
not succeed. In considering the
harm involved in the grant or refusal of a temporal interdict, where
a clear right to relief is
not shown, the Court acts on the balance
of convenience. If, though there is prejudice to the respondent, that
prejudice is less
than that of the applicant, the interdict will be
granted. Subject, if possible, to conditions which will protect the
respondent”.
[3]
In
Webster
v Mitchell
supra
,
reference was made with approval to the case Setlogelo v
Setlogelo
[2]
,where
Innes
JA
,
dealing with the requirements to demonstrate interim harm, state the
following: “
The
element is only introduced by in cases where the right asserted by
the applicant, though prime facia established, is open to
some doubt.
In such a case the test must be applied where the continuance of the
thing against which an interdict is sought would
cause irreparable
injury to the applicant. If so, the better Courts is to grant the
relief if the dis continuances of the act complained
of would not
involve irreparable injury to the other party “.
[4]
In
National
Treasurer and others v Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and
others
[3]
,
it was found that Setlogelo requirements
supra
in
respect of an interdict still found application within a
constitutional democracy, wherein the following stated by the court:
“
Under
the Setlogelo test, prima facie
right that the claimant must establish is not nearly the right to
approach a Court in order to review
an administrative decision. It is
a right to which, if not protected by an interdict, irreparable harm
would ensue. An interdict
is meant to prevent future conduct and to
decisions already made. Quite apart from the right to review and to
set aside in impugned
decisions, the applicants should have
demonstrated prima facie right that is threatened by impending or
imminent irreparable harm.
The right to review the impugned decisions
did not require any preservation pendente lite.”
[5]
Furthermore the applicant for an interdict must established that
there is no other alternative remedy available.
The alternative
remedy postulated in this contest must-
(a) be adequate in the
circumstances;
(b) be ordinary and
reasonable;
(c) be a legal remedy;
(d)
grant similar protection
[4]
.
[6]
In the case of
Erasmus
v Afrikander Proprietary Mines Ltd
[5]
,
it was held that it was not necessary for the applicant to establish
on a balance of probabilities that the injury will occur;
he must
simple establish on a balance of probabilities that are grounds for a
reasonable apprehension that his rights will detrimentally
affected.
[7]
Finally the requirements for the granting of interim interdict which
the applicant must satisfy are the following-
(a)
prima facie
right.
(b) the well-grounded
apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief is not granted
and the ultimate relief is eventually
granted.
(c) a balance of
convenience in favour of the granting of the interim relief;
(d)
the absence of any other satisfactory remedy
[6]
[8]
It is against the above legal backdrop, that the applicant approached
this Honourable Court and on 30
th
May 2023 the Court
granted the following order-
1.
A Rule Nisi be and is hereby issued calling
upon Respondents to show cause on 20
th
June 2023 at 09H30, soon thereafter as counsel
maybe heard, why the following order should not be made.
1.1
Interdicting and restraining the Second
Respondent from disbursing the funds that it holds on behalf of or on
the instructions of
the First Respondent following the sale of the
Lucietto Wellman CC, registration number 2003/009298/23, in order to
found jurisdiction
against First Respondent.
1.2
The First Respondent be directed to instruct
the Second Respondent to disburse to the Applicant, the amount of
R350 000-00,
in the settlement of the amount due to the
Applicant following proceeds of the sale of members’ interest
of the Lucietto
Wellman CC; in the alternative.
1.3
The Respondents, jointly and severally, be
directed to debate the amount due to the Applicant with her,
disclosing all documentation
that maybe relevant, in order to
determine such amounts as maybe be due to her.
1.4
The Second Respondent retain an additional
amount of one R100 000.00 (one hundred thousand rands) in its
trust account pending
the finalization of this matter to ensure any
costs orders that maybe in favour of the Applicant.
2.
The relief sought in paragraph 1.1 operate with
immediate effect, pending the final outcome of this application.
3.
The Second and Third Respondents be and are
hereby directed to pay costs of this application jointly and
severally with First Respondent
in the event of them opposing the
relief sought.
4.
This application today be and are hereby
reserved.”
PARTIES
[9]
The proper introduction of the parties in this matter would, in my
view facilitate an easy flow
of reading.
[10]
The Applicant is an Executrix in the Estate of her late husband,
Franco Renatto Lucietto, who passed away
on 6 June 2019 at Hogsback.
[11]
The First Respondent of Andrew Wellman, who currently resides in the
city of Perth in Western Australia who
in the present proceedings has
been represented by the Second Respondent and has, in respect of the
financial affairs of the Close
Corporation, been assisted by the
Third Respondent.
[12]
The Second Respondent is a legal firm of Attorneys, namely Bate Chubb
and Dickson Inc., Suite 3 Norvia House,
34 Western Avenue, Vincent,
East London and in these proceedings has been represented by its
Director, namely, Ashely Kretzmann.
The Second Respondent is joined
in these proceedings by the reason of the fact that it holds the
funds which are the subject of
the consideration in these
proceedings.
[13]
The Third Respondent is Andre Van Wyk, a Chartered Accountant who
conducts practice under the name, Van Wyk
Chartered Accountants at 30
Drake Road, Nahoon, East London.
URGENCY
[14]
First Respondent has raised a number of points in
limine.
One
of them is the issue of urgency. It is a Respondent’s case that
the matter is not urgent despite the fact that the interim
relief was
granted on 30
th
May 2023. The First Respondent still in
August 2023 argues that the matter was and still is not urgent.
[15]
The court order that was granted on 30
th
May 2023, which I
have referred to above, was granted in the absence of the First
Respondent. It is my view that when an order
is granted in the
absence of a party and that court order comes to the attention of the
party, the first available remedy, in my
view is to bring an
application in terms rule 6 (12) (c) which reads as follows; “
a
party against whom an order was granted in its absence in an urgent
application may by notice set down the matter for reconsideration
of
the order”.
This rule envisages the determination of the
matter.
[16]
The First Respondent during the hearing of this matter could not
explain why it did not exhaust the remedy
available in Rule 6(12)(c)
of the Uniform Rules of Court. Furthermore, I am of the view that the
Honourable Court could not have
granted an order 30
th
May
2023 if it was not urgent, and the applicant has not meant the
requirements of for the granting of interim relief.
[17]
I must mention that the legal principles governing urgency are set
out in Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules
of Court (the rules). The
courts have over the years provided guidelines to the application of
this rule. Rule 6(12)(a) confers
a discretional power on the court
seized with an application of this nature to dispense with the forms
and service envisaged in
rules and to dispense on the application of
such time and place and manner and to prescribe procedure as it deems
appropriate.
[18]
The primary enquiry is aimed at the determination of whether there
must be a departure at all from the usual
process.
[7]
[19]
In
Hultzer
v Standard Bank of South Africa (Pty) Ltd
[8]
the court stated the following-
‘’
The
court will, however, only grant such relief where an Applicant is
able to persuade the court that extreme cogent grounds of
urgency
exist”.
[20]
Rule 6(12)(a) provides as follows:
“
In
urgent applications
the Court or a Judge may dispense with the forms and service provided
for in these rules and may dispose of
such matter at such time and
place and such manner in accordance which such procedure (which shall
as far as practicable be in
terms of these rules as it deems fit”.
[21]
Further, Rule 6(12)(b) renders it peremptory for the applicant to
“
set forth explicitly the circumstances which averred render
the matter urgent and reasons why the applicant claims that
substantial
redress could not be afforded at a hearing in due
course.”
[22]
In
East Rock
Trading
7 (Pty) Ltd and Another v Eagle Valley Granite (Pty) Ltd and
Others
[9]
,
the court stated the following the import thereof is that the
procedure as set out in Rule 6 (12) is not there for the mere taking.
An applicant has to set forth explicitly the circumstances which he
avers render the matter urgent. More importantly, the applicant
must
state the reasons why he claims that cannot be afforded substantial
redress in due course. The question of whether a matter
is
sufficiently urgent to be enrolled and heard as an urgent application
is under pinned by the issue of the absence of substantial
redress in
the application in due course. The rules allow the court to come
assistance of a litigant because of the latter where
to wait for the
normal course as laid down by the rules, it will not obtain
substantial redress. The correct and crucial test is
whether, if the
matter were to follow its normal course as laid down by the Rules, an
applicant will be afforded substantial redress.
If he cannot be
afforded substantial redress at a hearing in due course, then the
matter qualifies to be enrolled
and
heard as urgent application.”
[23]
In the case of
Mogalakwena
Local Municipality v The Provincial Executive Council, Limpompo
[10]
the court confirmed that it seems to me that when urgency is an issue
the primary investigation should be determine whether the
Applicant
will be afforded substantial redress and a hearing in due course. If
the Applicant cannot establish prejudice in this
sense, the
application cannot be urgent. Once such prejudice is established,
other factors come into consideration. These factors
include (but not
limited to) whether the Respondents can adequately present their case
in time available between the notice of
application to them and
actual hearing, other prejudice to the Respondents and the
administration of justice the strength of the
case made by the
Applicant and any delay by the applicant in asserting its rights.
This factor is only called usually by counsel
acting for the
Respondents self-created urgency.”
[24]
In
Thulare
v Sekhukhune
,
the court, dealing with issue of urgency and delay in bringing the
application noted the following- “There
is
no merit in the issue of the urgency raised by the Respondent. The
delay on its own is not a good ground to prevent the granting
of
urgent relief. The court still bears the obligation to decide whether
after taking into account all circumstances of the matter,
urgent
relief is warranted. The test is whether the circumstances of the
case are such that the Applicant ill or will not be afforded
substantial redress at a hearing due course
[11]
.
[25]
I am of the view that the Honourable Court could not have granted an
order on 30
th
May 2023 if it was no satisfied that the
matter is urgent. In the circumstances, having considered authorities
and the Applicant’s
position, I dismiss the point in
limine
of urgency. I find that the matter is urgent and falls to dealt with
as an urgent application.
NON-COMPLIANCE
RULES OF COURT DEALING WITH SERVICE
[26]
One of the directors of the Second Respondent (Bate Chubb and Dickson
Inc) is Mr Ashely Kretzmann. On 26
May 2023 Mr Kretzmann wrote an
email to the attorneys of the Applicant advising that the Second
respondent has been authorized
to accept service on behalf of the
First respondent
[12]
. The
application papers were also served upon the respondent via email.
The First Respondent received the papers, and he appointed
an
attorney who communicated to the Applicants Attorney that the
applicant does not oppose the interim relief sought by the applicant
on condition that the costs of that application were reserved
[13]
.
[27]
Rule 5 of the Uniform Rules of Court, Edictal Citation, is ordered
when service must be effected upon a respondent
who is outside the
Republic of South Africa. The First Respondent expressly authorized
the Second Respondent who accept service
on his behalf.
[28]
It is my view that the purpose of Rule 5 is to effect service of
process or application outside South Africa.
In this case it appears
to me that the process was not served outside South Africa. They were
served in South Africa on an authorized
representative of the First
Respondent.
[29]
The purpose of services in any proceedings is to bring them to the
attention of the Respondent and object
of the Rule has been fulfilled
in this matter as the service was effected upon the First
Respondent’s authorized representative,
Mr Kretzmann.
[30]
In the case of
Consani
Engineering (Pty) Ltd v Anton Steinecker Maschinenfabrik GmbH
[14]
,
the court stated the following- “
It
seems to me, however, that, once a defendant has entered appearance
to defend as it has done in the present matter, non-compliance
with
the rules as to service and with Section 27 becomes irrelevant. The
purpose of service in terms of the Rules is to bring the
edictal
citation to the attention of the Defendant and the purpose of s27 is
to ensure that such Defendant has sufficient time
to defend if it so
wishes. Both of these objectives have been achieved by the particular
statutory provision and rules have been
exhausted “.
[31]
In this matter the First Respondent has appointed attorneys in South
Africa to represent him. The First Respondent
is in possession of the
court papers, and I am at view that it was not necessary the
Applicant to proceed way of edictal citation
when the First
Respondent authorized his attorneys to accept service on his behalf.
[32]
Furthermore it is not the First Respondent’s case that the
papers were never served upon him. Then
it becomes common course that
he was aware of the papers. Even if I am wrong in concluding that the
point in
limine of
service should be dismissed, should be, the
fact that the First Respondent filed an affidavit in June 2023 is the
clear indication
to me that he has the papers and had the opportunity
to answer the allegations in the founding affidavit.
[33]
Accordingly the point in
limine
of service
dismissed.
DISPUTE
OF FACT
[34]
Rule 6(5)(g) of the Uniform Rules of Court provides that the court
may direct that oral evidence be
heard on specified issues with a
view of resolving any dispute of fact and to that end, the court may
order any deponent to appear
personally, and such persons be examined
and cross-examined as witnesses.
[35]
In this matter the first Respondent submits that there is a dispute
of fact which cannot be resolved on papers.
[36]
I am of the view that there is no dispute of fact in this matter
which needs to be referred to oral evidence.
The Applicant’s
claim in this matter is founded upon her express condition of sale,
that she would agree to the sale of the
business if the estate was
paid an amount of three hundred and fifty thousand rand. Her
alternatively claim as appearing in the
Notice of Motion is that the
claim is for debatment of the account.
[37]
It is well known from the
Plascon-Evans
v Riebeeck
[15]
that the rule Plascon-Evans states that in motion proceedings, a
final order maybe granted if the facts stated by the Respondent,
together with admitted facts in the Applicant’s affidavits,
justify the order.
[38]
The Plascon-Evans rule was initially formulated in
Stellenbosch
Farmer’s Winery v Stellenval Winery (Pty) Ltd
[16]
where the court stated the following: “
Where
there is dispute as to the facts, a final interdict should be granted
in motion proceedings only if the facts as stated by
the Respondents
together with the admitted facts in the Applicant’s affidavit
justify such an order, or where it is clear
that the facts, although
not formally admitted, cannot be determined and must be regarded as
admitted.”
[39]
In
Plascon-Evans
supra
the Appellant Division held that
the general rule is that in proceedings where disputes of fact have
arisen on affidavits, a final
order, whether an interdict or some
other form of relief, maybe granted if the facts averred in the
Applicant’s affidavits,
which have been admitted by the
Respondent together with facts alleged by the Respondent, justify
such an order.
[40]
In
Wightman
t/a JW Constructions v Head Four (Pty) Ltd and Another
[17]
the court held as follows: -
‘’
A
real, genuine and bona fide dispute of fact can exist only where the
court is satisfied that the party who purports to raise the
dispute
has in his affidavit seriously and unambiguously addressed the facts
said to be disputed. There will of course be instances
where a bare
denial meets the requirements because there is no other way open to
disputing party and nothing more can therefore
be expected of him.
But even that may not be sufficient if the fact averred lies purely
within the knowledge of the averring party
and no basis is laid for
disputing the veracity or accuracy of the averment. When the facts
averred are such that the disputing
party must necessarily possess
knowledge of them and be able to provide an answer (or counter
vailing evidence). If they be not
true or accurate but, instead of
doing so, rests his case on a bear of ambiguous denial the court will
generally have difficulty
in finding that test is satisfied. See
generally because factual averments stand apart from a border matrix
of circumstances all
of which needs to be born in mind when arriving
at a decision. A litigant may not necessarily recognize or understand
the nuances
of a bare or general denial as against a real attempt to
grapple with all relevant factual allegation made by the other party.
But when he signs the answering affidavit, he commits himself to its
contents, inadequate as they are maybe and will only in exceptional
circumstances be permitted to this disavow. There is thus a serious
duty imposing upon a legal adviser who settles an answering
affidavit
to ascertain engage with facts which his client disputes and reflect
such disputes fully and accurate in the answering
affidavit. If that
does not happen it should come as no supplies that the court takes a
robust view of the matter.”
[41]
In this matter, the First Respondent alleges that there is dispute of
fact on the other hand the Applicant
submits that the First
Respondent has not raised a real, genuine, or bona fide dispute of
fact.
[42]
The Applicant in this matter relies on a sale agreement. The
Applicant states that it is his intention to
sell the deceased’s
estate share to the close cooperation if she was paid an amount of
R350 000.00 (three hundred and
fifty thousand rands).
[18]
[43]
The First Respondent confirms the sale agreement. He goes further to
instruct his attorney to give the Applicant
an irrevocable
undertaking to pay the amount to the Applicant for the proceeds of
the sale.
[44]
I am of the view that effectively there is no dispute of fact in
respect of the commitment to pay the amount
of R350 000.00
(three hundred and fifty thousand rands) to the estate from the first
proceeds of the sale of the member’s
interest in the Retail
Pharmacy.
[45]
Furthermore the sale agreement, paragraph 16 thereof states that the
purchaser will settle all the
creditors and loans up to the date of
take over on the dues dates and will be subtracted from purchase
price.
[46]
It is my view that the First Respondent has not raised the real,
genuine or
bona fide
dispute of fact as that does not appear
in his answering affidavit.
[47]
In the circumstances, I accordingly find that the point limine of a
dispute of fact should also fail.
FACTS
[48]
The agreement of sale of the member’s interests in this matter
was signed on 1 April 2022. The offer
was accepted by the third
Respondent and the Applicant. The communication between the Applicant
and Third Respondent expressly
communicates the Applicant’s
intention to accept the purchase price if the deceased’s estate
would receive R350 000-00.
[49]
Second Respondent, was represented by Ashley Krezmann (a director)
wrote a letter on 29
th
March 2022, wherein it is
categorically stated that the applicant will be paid an amount of
R350 000-00 on the sale.
[50]
This issue of R350 000-00 did not be disputed by the First
Respondent. I am of the view that the Respondents
clearly agree that
the Applicant will be entitled to an amount R350 000-00 from the
proceeds of the sale.
[51]
Furthermore it was agreed on 1 April 2022 that the purchaser would be
responsible for all the debts by including
South African Revenue
Services, creditors which were owned by the pharmacy to that date of
the take over and will settle the debts
on due date. It was further
Provided that the purchaser will settle all the creditors and loans
up to date of take over on due
dates.
[52]
In the founding affidavit the Applicant states the
following:-
“
The
agreement that I was presented with contemplated an offer of
R2 000 000.00 (two million rands) for the entire member’s
interest in the close cooperation and in my capacity as executrix, I
accepted the amount R350 000-00 on condition that it
was paid as
soon as the proceeds of the sale became available. Accordingly, an
amount of R1 000 000.00 (one million rands)
was paid to the
trust account of the Second Respondent and I have since been advised
that an amount well in excess of that amount
in dispute hereof
R350 000-00 approximately R640 000—00 remains, with the
difference with the R1000 000.00 (one million
rands) and current
balance having been disbursed by the Second respondent on the
instruction of the First Respondent.”
[53]
The Applicant further states that notwithstanding
request for information and request for payment of the
agreed amount
of R350 000-00 to the state, she has not been able to secure
payment or any form of accounting with regards
to the proceeds of the
sale of the members interest in the close cooperation. The averment
referred above by the Applicant in the
founding affidavit are not
expressly denied by the First Respondent in the answering affidavit.
Furthermore, it is not disputed
by the Respondents that an amount of
R1 000 000.00 (one million rands) is paid or is in the
trust account of the Second
Respondent.
FINAL
INTERDICT
[54]
The requirements for the granting of the final relief or final
interdict are the following:-
54.1 A clear right;
54.2 An injury actually
committed or reasonably apprehended and
54.3
No alternative remedy. See
[19]
[55]
The Applicant’s resistance of right is based on a being a party
to the sale agreement of the close
cooperation, in which the diseased
has a 30% members’ interest. It is clear that she has a right
to be protected as the First
Respondent has failed and or refused to
pay her funds from the proceeds of the sale of the close cooperation.
Furthermore, these
funds are available in the Second Respondent’s
trust account, and they must be paid to the Applicant.
[56]
It is common cause that the First Respondent has refused
to pay the Applicant any amount due to her in terms
of the proceeds
of sale and alleges that no funds are due to the Applicant. This
cannot be correct. It was agreed that the Applicant
would be an
entitled to R350 000-00 and the First Respondent did not dispute
that.
[57]
Furthermore, I am of the view that the Applicant
has no other remedy available to her other than to approach
the
Honourable Court for the payment of R350 000-00 as the First
Respondent has refused to inform or instruct the Second Respondent
to
pay such money to the Applicant.
CONCLUSSION
[58]
Having consider legal principles the facts of this matter, I am of
the view that the Applicant is discharged
onus resting on her to be
entitled to the relief she seeks.
[59]
Accordingly it is ordered that the
rule nisi
granted by the
Honourable Court on 30
th
May 2023 is confirmed, save
paragraph 1.3 of the
rule nisi
which is an alternative relief
is not confirmed.
Accordingly, I confirm paragraphs 1.1, 1.2
and 1.4 of the rule nisi.
[60]
I must mention that the issue of costs appears to have been decided
already as paragraph 3 of the order granted
on 30
th
May
2023 deals with the issue of costs as there is no application by the
Respondent vary paragraph 3 of the order granted on 30
th
May 2023. Paragraph 3 of the order granted on 30
th
May
2023, is a stand-alone paragraph, and part of
rule nisi.
MTSHABE
AJ
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
Counsel
for the Applicant
Adv
Sephton
Netteltons
Attorneys
High
Street
MAKHANDA
Counsel
for the First Respondent
Adv.
Miller
Cloete
Attorneys
High
Street
MAKHANDA
[1]
1948
(1) SA 1186 (WLD)
[2]
1914
AD 221
@ 227
[3]
2012
(6) SA 223
(CC ) at PARA 50
[4]
Minister
of Law and Order v Committee of the Church Summit 1994 (3) 89 (B) at
99
[5]
1976
(1) SA 950
(W) at 965, Minister of Law and Oder, Bophuthatswana v
Committee of Church Summit of Bophuthatswana
1994 (3) SA 89
(B) at
99 A-B
[6]
Ferriera
v Levin NO and other
1995 (3) SA 813
(W) 830 D at 834 (C)
[7]
Luna
Meubel Vervaardigers (Edms) Bpk v Makin and Another
1977 (4) SA 135
(W) at 136 H-137 F
[8]
1999
2 ILJ 106 (LC) 109
[9]
2011
ZAGPHC 196
at par 6
[10]
2014
(JOL32103) (GP) @ PARA 63-64
[11]
3494/2020
(2020) ZALMPPHC 44 3 July 2020) a para 15
[12]
Replying
affidavit, Annexure TL 17 page 130 of the record
[13]
Replying
affidavit, annexure TL9 page 134 of the record
[14]
1991
(1) SA 822
(T) at 824
[15]
1984
(3) SA 623 (A)
[16]
1957
(4) SA 234
(C)
[17]
[2008] ZASCA 6
;
2008
(3) SA 371
SCA)
[18]
founding
affidavit, pages 8 of annexure TL5-TL6 attached to the founding
affidavit.
[19]
Setlogelo
v Setlogelo
1914 AD 221