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[2023] ZAECBHC 25
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Njara v S (CA&R 16/2022) [2023] ZAECBHC 25 (17 August 2023)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE LOCAL
DIVISION: BHISHO
CASE NO: CA&R:
16/2022
In
the matter between:
MASONWABE
NJARA
APPELLANT
AND
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
Coram:
M Makaula ADJP
Heard:
22 March 2023
Delivered:
17 August 2023
JUDGMENT
M MAKAULA ADJP:
A.
BACKGROUND.
[1]
The appellant was convicted and sentenced on 22 October 2020
by the Regional Court for the Division of the Eastern Cape sitting at
Peddie for attempted murder of Masibulela Ngamngam (Mr Ngamngam) and
the murder of Hombakazi Gaga (the deceased). He was
sentenced
to ten (10) years’ and life imprisonment respectively.
The appeal is against both conviction and sentence.
[2]
The deceased and the appellant were in a love relationship. Mr
Ngamngam testified that he
fell in love with the deceased in October
2017 and at that time the appellant was no longer in a love
relationship with the deceased.
However, the appellant contended that
he was still in a love relationship with the deceased at the time of
her untimely death on
22 January 2018. The deceased was killed
with a firearm, at her home, which belonged to the appellant.
The appellant
alleged that the deceased was shot at by Mr Ngamngam
when they were struggling over the firearm. Mr Mngamnga contended
otherwise.
The court a quo found that the deceased and Mr
Ngamngam were shot by the appellant hence the appeal is before us.
B.
THE FACTS.
[3]
Mr Ngamngam is a single witness regarding the events that led to the
killing of the deceased.
As aforesaid, they fell in love in
October 2017. The deceased informed her that she was, before
she met him, in a romantic
relationship with the appellant which she
ended. However, the appellant did not want to accept being rejected
to an extent that
he threatened to kill her.
[4]
On a certain day, the appellant gave him and the deceased a lift in
his motor vehicle. When
they got to near deceased’s home,
where they were to alight, the appellant refused to let the
deceased alight.
The appellant instructed him to alight
from the motor vehicle. The appellant drove off with the deceased.
After a while,
the deceased came back and made a report about the
appellant. She had bruises on her knees and thighs. She
informed
him that the appellant while riding with her jumped from a
moving motorcycle allowing the deceased to crash.
[5]
On a subsequent day the deceased showed him messages on her phone,
which she alleged, were from the
appellant. In the messages,
the appellant was threatening to kill the deceased. One evening
at about 22h00, the deceased
requested him to accompany her to the
police station to lay charges against the appellant. The police
read the messages.
They, together with the police went to the
appellant’s home. He was not at home. The police asked
the deceased
to phone the appellant from her phone and ask him to
come to his home. The deceased indeed phoned the appellant and put
the phone
on speaker so that everybody could hear the conversation.
The deceased requested to meet with the appellant at his home. The
appellant
asked the deceased what the police wanted at his home and
refused to come to meet them. The police gave up and they went home.
The threatening messages continued to an extent that the deceased had
to obtain a protection order against the appellant.
[6]
On 22 January 2018 the deceased was with Mr Ngamngam in her room.
She went outside to brush
her teeth. She suddenly came back and
locked the door behind her. She reported to him that she saw
the appellant coming
towards her room. The appellant knocked at
the door, and no one answered the knock. The appellant
thereafter pushed
the door open. The appellant asked to see the
deceased outside. At that stage, the deceased was standing
against the
wall closer to a washing machine facing the deceased and
he was seated on a sofa. He heard a gunshot. He
immediately
stood up and looked. The appellant was standing on
the other side of the glass door. The appellant was carrying a gun
and
he fired a shot through the glass opening of the door at the
deceased. The deceased fell on the other side of the washing
machine. The appellant again shot at the deceased while she was
lying on the floor. He turned and pointed the gun at
him.
He jumped for the appellant. They wrestled over the firearm.
He testified as follows in this regard.
“…
whilst
we were wrestling, we ended up falling, and I was underneath and he
was on top of me, and Your worship, I could feel then
feel that my
left leg was not balancing anymore.” (sic)
At that stage they were
already outside the yard in front of the gate. He managed to
dispossess the appellant of the firearm.
The appellant ran away.
Thabiso called on him not to shoot at the appellant. He told
Thabiso that the appellant
had killed the deceased. He noticed that
the firearm had jammed. There was a bullet stuck in its
chamber. In hindsight,
he thought that was the reason the
appellant could not fire shots anymore and decided to let go of it.
He proceeded and placed
the firearm on top of the washing machine.
The deceased was lying on the floor. There was a lot of blood
on the floor.
They took her to the hospital where she passed
on.
[7]
After the struggle, he noticed that he had been injured. He was
not sure at what stage the
appellant shot at him. He assumed it
was when he jumped at him because it was after that that he felt his
leg going numb.
He testified that he was of the view that the
appellant had planned the killing of the deceased because he came on
foot leaving
his motorcycle at a distance away from the deceased’s
home.
[8]
Mr Thabisa Manjezi confirmed the evidence of Mr Ngamngam insofar as
it related to him. He
was at his home when he heard three (3)
gunshots. They were not fired in quick succession. He
went to investigate.
He saw men at the deceased’s home
involved in a scuffle. They carried on until they exited the
gate. It transpired
later that it was the appellant and Mr
Ngamngam. The appellant was overpowered,
and he ran away. He noticed that they were struggling
over a gun, which ended up with Mr Ngamngam. He shouted at him
not to shoot the appellant. He enquired from him what had
happened. Mr Ngamngam said the appellant shot at them and invited
him
to the deceased’s room. He saw the deceased lying in a
pool of blood on the other side of the washing machine.
Neighbours gathered and rendered assistance to the deceased. He
noticed that Mr Ngamngam was also injured.
[9]
Constable Luyanda Hlekani testified that he had helped the deceased
when she went to lay a complaint
about the death threats she had been
receiving from her ex-boyfriend. The ex-boyfriend was the
appellant. Indeed, he
responded to the complaint by visiting
the home of the appellant. The appellant was not present at his
home. The deceased
phoned him on his cellphone. He spoke
to the appellant as the phone was on loudspeaker. The appellant
initially said
he was busy with his goats. He asked the
deceased why she was in the company of the police. The
appellant then told
the deceased that he was not going to come and
meet them. His colleague, Constable Badu pleaded with the
appellant to come
but he refused. They gave up and went back to
the police station. They did not open a case docket because the
deceased
was advised to apply for a protection order, but the
incident was recorded in the occurrence book. The entry in the
occurrence
book was read into the record.
[10]
Constable Hlekani stated that the threatening messages were not shown
to him. He found that to have
been strange because it was at
22h00 and did not know how the appellant was able to see the police
van because it was at night.
[11]
Warrant officer Xabangele, as the investigator, was given the
deceased’s phone by her family four days
after she was shot and
killed. He then searched for the threatening messages on the
phone and found that they had been deleted.
He sent the phone
to their Cyber Unit in East London. He never received the phone
back and did not know what eventually happened
to it.
[12]
Dr Dominique John conducted the postmortem on the deceased’s
body and his chief postmortem findings
were two entrance and exit
gunshot wounds; fragmented skull cap; left collar bone; intracranial
bleeding; lacerated brain; lacerated
left subclavian vein and her
organs were pale.
[13]
Warrant Officer Nomboniso Makapela worked for the Local Criminal
Record Centre (LCRC) as a forensic field
worker. She visited
the crime scene, took photos, and compiled a photo album i.e.,
exhibit A. The crux of her evidence
is that when she took
photos of the crime scene there were no cartridges inside the room
where the deceased was killed. All
the cartridges were on the
verandah and outside.
[14]
The evidence of the accused somewhat overlaps with that of the
appellant in some respects. The appellant
insisted that he was
in a love relationship at the time of the death of the deceased.
He confirmed the evidence of Mr Ngamngam
about him giving them a lift
from town and dropping him off next to the deceased’s home.
He however denied that he
jumped off a moving motorcycle because of
which the deceased fell and sustained bruises. He further
confirmed receiving a
phone call from the deceased. He however
denied refusing to meet with the police. He told them that he
was at his farm
and had no transport to meet them at his home,
especially that it was at night. This is contrary to the
version of Mr Ngamngam
and Constable Hlekani as reflected above.
[15]
The appellant did not dispute that he was at the deceased’s
house when she was killed. He was
doing his chores and decided
to go and visit the deceased. The time was between 11h00 and
12h00. He proceeded to her rondavel
and knocked. There was no
response. He pushed the door open and met with the deceased.
He enquired as to why
she did not respond to his knock. She
said she had been sleeping. At that juncture someone pounced at
him around his
waist and took out his firearm which was tucked in his
waistband. That person turned out to be Mr Ngamngam. They
both
struggled for the possession of the firearm. During that
process, the firearm discharged a shot. He did not see where
the bullet landed. After a while a second shot went off again.
The tussle continued outside of the rondavel.
A third shot was
discharged whilst they were outside. He noticed that the
firearm had jammed. He let go of it and ran
away towards town
on foot. He denied that he drove off on a motorcycle as it had
been booked in for repairs at that stage.
He produced a receipt
which did not reflect a date, which his attorney conceded was
irrelevant.
[16]
The appellant was given an opportunity to explain in detail as to how
the deceased happened to be shot twice,
while standing and while
lying on the floor. He could not explain how that occurred.
His reply was that he did not
know because he was concentrating on
the person who was attempting to dispossess him of his firearm which
was tucked on his waist.
He however, denied that he shot the
deceased through the glass door as she was answering to his knock.
He further denied
that he shot her while lying on the floor. He
stated that he had knowledge of how a firearm worked.
Immediately he
realized that it had jammed, he let go of it and ran
away. He also stated that he would cock his firearm and then
engage
the safety lock. What that meant is that there was
always a bullet in the chamber ready to fire once the safety catch is
released. He, therefore, surmised that the safety catch was
tampered with during the struggle and Mr Ngamngam pulled the trigger
because he was always holding it on the barrel during the struggle.
[17]
The court
a quo
correctly identified the issues it had to
decide and the burden of proof. It was alive to the fact that ,
the version of
the accused and that of Mr Ngamngam are diametrically
opposed to one another. It also had regard to the evidence presented
prior
to the death of the deceased. Having reviewed the law
applicable, it dealt with its duty as follows:
“
The
court will be required to make findings on mainly three aspects,
namely (a) credibility of factual witnesses, (b) their reliability,
and (c) probabilities and must ultimately be satisfied that the
balance weighs so heavily in favour of the onus bearer that it
has
succeeded in discharging the onus of proof.”
Having analysed the
evidence, the court
a quo
accepted the evidence of the state
and found that it had proved the case against the appellant beyond a
reasonable doubt.
The court
a quo
found Mr Ngamngam and
the state witnesses to be credible and reliable.
C.
Grounds of Appeal against conviction.
[18] In
a nutshell the grounds of appeal may be summarised as follows.
(a)
That the state failed to prove that the
killing of the deceased was premeditated and planned.
(b)
The court erred in failing to find that the
death and the injury sustained by Mr Ngamngam resulted from a
struggle between the latter
and the appellant for the possession of
the firearm.
(c)
The injuries sustained by both the deceased
and Mr Ngamngam were frontal thus corroborating the evidence of the
appellant that they
were sustained during a struggle for the
possession of the firearm. The contention on appeal therefore is that
the court
a quo
erred in finding that the state proved the case against the appellant
beyond a reasonable doubt.
[19] I
have dealt in detail above with the evidence. The events
preceding the death of the deceased are
captured in the evidence of
Mr Ngamngam and Constable Hlekani and partly confirmed by the
appellant. It had been established
beyond reasonable doubt by
the state that there were threats made by the appellant against the
deceased. The evidence of
Mr Ngamngam about the first encounter
he had with the appellant when he gave them a lift from town is
confirmed by him albeit that
he denied driving off with the deceased
under duress. Mr Ngamngam’s accepted evidence however is
that when she returned
she had bruises. Such bruises were
consistent with someone who had fallen from a moving motorcycle.
There is no reason
why the evidence of Mr Ngamngam was to be rejected
in this regard.
[20] Mr
Ngamngam testified about threatening messages which were allegedly
sent by the appellant to the deceased.
To establish the
truthfulness of that allegation the deceased and Mr Ngamngam
proceeded to the police station to report that.
Indeed,
Constable Hlekani confirmed the report. He and Constable Badu acted
on it and proceeded to look for the appellant.
They spoke to
him, and he refused to come and meet with them. The evidence of
the appellant was correctly rejected by the
court
a quo
in
this regard. Constable Hlekani testified as follows:
“…
firstly,
he said he was at the goats; … and then he then – he
changed his stance and said he can see us. …
He said why
are you in the company of the police if you are looking for me. …
Before she – the complainant could answer
he said that he is
not going to go there; or he is not going to come there; Your
Worship.” (Sic)
[21]
This is a clear indication that the appellant knew he was sought by
the police, and he was avoiding and being
disrespectful towards
them. If the appellant had done nothing wrong or was in this
good love relationship with the deceased,
there was no reason for him
not to have gone to his home to meet with the deceased and the
police. Seeing the police with his loving
girlfriend, would have been
the cause for him to have wanted to go to them to enquire why was she
in their company.
[22]
The court
a quo
accepted their evidence in this regard.
It further found Constable Hlekani to have been a credible and
reliable witness.
I have no reason to interfere with this
finding. His evidence is without fault. The court
a quo
correctly rejected the appellant’s evidence in this regard.
[23]
The evidence of Mr Ngamngam, starting from the time the deceased came
back hurriedly from brushing her teeth
outside and closed the door
had not been challenged. The deceased reported to him that the
appellant was approaching, and
she was afraid. Indeed, the
appellant pushed the window that was part of the door, inserted his
hand and shot at the deceased
who staggered up to the washing machine
and fell. The appellant then shot her again while lying on the
floor. This
Mr Ngamngam witnessed. All that he did not
know was how he got injured. He saw the appellant pointing the
firearm towards
him, he jumped for it and a tussle over it ensued.
This evidence is logical and straight forward. It gives light
to
exactly what occurred. It cannot be faltered as also accepted by
the
court a quo.
[24]
The same cannot be said about the evidence of the appellant.
The appellant did not know how the deceased
was shot and killed.
He also did not know how Mr Ngamngam was injured. All he relied
on are possibilities and probabilities.
He testified that he
went to visit the deceased. He had his firearm, which he
carried with him all the time. He further
testified that he
always had it cocked with one bullet in the chamber ready to be
fired. He used the safety catch.
There was no
misunderstanding between him and Mr Ngamngam. The relationship
between the latter and the appellant should be
viewed in the light of
their previous encounter. They were not meeting each other for
the first time. They never quarrelled,
either before or on that
day. Without a reason and unexpectedly, Mr Ngamngam pounced on
him and wanted to dispossess him
of the firearm. That action
was unprovoked.
[25]
Weighing the version of Mr Ngamngam and what is stated above by the
appellant, common sense dictates that
Mr Ngamngam’s version is
more plausible. It is unconceivable that Mr Ngamngam who never
had any bad words or ill feelings
against the appellant would have
behaved in the manner described by the appellant. One may argue
that Mr Ngamngam did not
like what the appellant was doing to his new
girlfriend. However, that could easily be dismissed by the actions of
the deceased
supported by those of Mr Ngamngam of reporting the
matter to the police and seeking a protection order against the
appellant.
This view is fortified by the unceasing death
threats meted out by the appellant towards the deceased, the last of
which promised
to kill the deceased inside that week. Indeed,
the deceased was killed inside that week as promised by the
appellant.
[26] As
previously stated, no reasonable account has been given as to how the
deceased was shot. The accused’s
account of how that
occurred is unconvincing. It is guess work from the
time the scuffle started, how the safety
lock was unlocked, the
pulling of the trigger, the striking of the deceased by the bullets,
the positions they were in at the time
and how Mr Ngamngam was
injured. What is clear from his evidence is that, on
noticing that the firearm had jammed,
he let go of it and ran away.
That as well should be viewed in the backdrop of Mr Ngamngam that
after he gained possession
of the firearm, the appellant ran away.
The appellant could not account for anything that occurred. Mr
Ngamngam on
the other hand convincingly told how the deceased died at
the hands of the appellant and was honest enough to state that he did
not know how he sustained the injury because immediately after
shooting the deceased twice, the appellant turned the gun on him,
and
he jumped for it and a scuffle over it ensued. I agree with the
court
a quo
when it reasoned and found.
“
The
court is rather of the view that the circumstance’s surrounding
the gunshot injury of Masibulele supports the honesty
of his
version. He could have concocted a much simpler version than to
present a scenario where it is not clear to him how
he sustained that
injury … the objective surrounding circumstances leading up to
the demise of the deceased, supports the
credibility of Masibulele,
rendering his version not only relatively honest, but most
importantly also reliable.”
[27]
There is no reason for this court to interfere with the credibility
findings of the court a quo in respect
of this and other witnesses.
[28]
This court must look at the conduct of the parties prior and post the
shooting of the deceased. The
accused knowing that he was
sought after by the police i.e., Constables Hlekani and Badu, never
bothered himself to go and enquire
from them why they wanted him to
an extent of visiting his home in the company of the deceased. That
on its own is telling about
the behaviour of the appellant towards
the deceased. The ineluctable conclusion is that he knew
exactly that he was wanted
because of his threats towards the
deceased. After the deceased was shot at, the appellant did not
mention that he made enquiries
about whether the deceased was not
“
accidentally”
shot during the scuffle as expected of a person
who was so in love with her. He did not even go to report the
incident to
the police until he received a call from them.
[29] Mr
Ngamngam on the other hand did not behave like a person who had shot
and killed the deceased. Immediately,
after the appellant ran
away, he reported to Mr Manjezi who, after hearing three gunshots,
came out of his home to investigate.
Mr Ngamngam reported to
him that the appellant had shot the deceased and him. Mr
Ngamngam kept the firearm in the state in
which he dispossessed the
appellant and showed it to the police. He further made means to
see to it that the deceased was
taken to hospital. The conduct
of Mr Ngamngam is inconsistent with a person who was an instigator
and caused the death of
the deceased. The contrary is correct
about the behaviour of the appellant after the incident.
[30]
Once the evidence of the appellant is rejected, as it was correctly
done by the court
a quo
, his intention to kill the deceased
does not become an issue. The appellant, despite what he said
in his evidence went to
the deceased’s home armed with a cocked
firearm which was ready to discharge rounds of ammunition. He
shot at the deceased
at point blank range thus fatally wounding her.
The circumstances under which she was shot at, as described by Mr
Ngmangam,
are consistent with the injuries depicted in the
post-mortem report as found and testified to by Dr John who conducted
the post-mortem.
I have dealt with his findings regarding the
entrance and exit wounds and the location of the injuries. I
shall not venture
into the realm of speculating about how Mr Ngamngam
could have sustained his injury and the trajectory of the bullet that
struck
him.
[31]
The court
a quo
amply dealt with the reason why it concluded
that the murder of the deceased was premeditated. It correctly
relied on the
following dictum in S v Raath
2009 (2) SACR 46
(C):
“
Should
the state produce sufficient evidence for a finding that the murder
had been premeditated it will trigger the imposition
of the
prescribed mandatory sentence of life imprisonment. If not, the
applicable sentence regime will be in terms of the
provision of
section 51(2) read with Part II of Schedule 2 of the CLAA which is 15
years imprisonment for a first-time offender
convicted of murder.”
See also; Baloyi v The
State (739/2021)
[2022] ZASCA 35
(01 April 2022)
Accepting
the evidence of the state, as we must, there is no other inference
that could be drawn from the circumstances leading
to the death and
killing of the deceased by the appellant other than that the
appellant intended to kill her. He did so because
he could not
accept the rejection and in cold blood carried out that plan by going
to her home to shoot her. There is therefore
no merit in the
appeal against the conviction of the appellant.
Ad Sentence.
[32]
The appellant relied on his personal circumstances, that he
contributed towards the funeral of the deceased
and that he developed
arthritis whilst he was in prison, to argue that life imprisonment
was too severe. This court is not
allowed to interfere with the
sentence imposed by the court
a quo
unless it failed to
exercise its sentencing discretion properly and the sentence induces
a sense of shock. At the inception
of the trial, the appellant
was advised of the provision of section 51(1) of the Criminal Law
Amendment Act 105 of 1977.
The provision requires a court
convicting an accused of amongst other offences premeditated murder
to hand down life imprisonment
not unless there are substantial and
compelling factors which justify a departure thereof. It is by
now trite what constitutes
those circumstances. The exercise to
determine such, still involves the balancing act between the personal
circumstances
of the convicted person, the offence itself and the
interests of the community at large. The court
a quo
,
adequately dealt with the law in this regard. It considered the
personal circumstances of the appellant. In
rejecting the
notion that the personal circumstances should take precedence over
the other two factors, the court measured as follows:
“
The
court has come to the conclusion that the accused personal
circumstances and his prospects of rehabilitation should pale into
insignificance if weighed against the aggravating features of this
case … Nothing out of the ordinary stems from the personal
circumstances of the accused and as such it lacks any weightily
justification for a finding that substantial and compelling exist;
be
it individually or cumulatively. Time spent awaiting trial
cannot on its own constitute substantial and compelling circumstance
where life imprisonment is imposed. The court consequently
finds that there are no substantial and compelling circumstances
present, justifying the imposition of a lesser sentence in count ….”
[33] I
agree with the court
a quo
that there are no substantial and
compelling circumstances in this matter. The evidence that has
been accepted is that the
appellant planned to kill the deceased for
quite some time. He sent threatening messages to the
deceased. A protection
order was granted against him. He
on one occasion forcibly left with the deceased who later came back
with bruises on her
legs. As if that was not enough, the
deceased came to the deceased’s home and shot her. His
intention was to
kill her because he shot her on the forehead and on
the collarbone while lying on the floor. She was a defenceless
woman
who lost her life in the hands of the appellant who did not
accept her rejection. Mr Ngamngam was fortunate to survive with
only a bullet wound to his leg. The sentences imposed by the
court a quo are justified in the circumstances and there is
no reason
for this court to interfere with them.
Consequently, I make the
following order:
1.
The appeal against both conviction and
sentence is dismissed.
M MAKAULA
ACTING DEPUTY JUDGE
PRESIDENT OF THE HIGH COURT
DAWOOD J
I AGREE:
F B A DAWOOD
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
Appearances:
For
Appellant:
Adv
Giqwa
Instructed
by:
LEGAL
AID SOUTH AFRICA
KING
WILLIAMS TOWN LOCAL OFFICE
KING
WILLIAMS TOWN
For
the Respondent:
Adv
Philisane
Instructed
by:
DIRECTOR
OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
BHISHO