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[2023] ZAECBHC 15
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Dike v Minister of Police and Another (404/2022) [2023] ZAECBHC 15 (18 July 2023)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
[EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, BHISHO]
CASE
NO.: 404/2022
In
the matter between: -
NOMBONISO
LILIAN DIKE
PLAINTIFF
and
MINISTER
OF POLICE
1
ST
DEFENDANT
NATIONAL
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
2
ND
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
NORMAN
J:
[1]
This application has been brought with the sole purpose of seeking
condonation for the applicant’s
non-compliance with the
provisions of section 3(2)(a) of the Institution of Legal Proceedings
Against Certain Organs of State Act
40 of 2002 (the Institution Act).
The application is opposed by the first respondent on the basis that
the claim has prescribed
in terms of section 11(d) of the
Prescription Act. Although there is focus on the first
respondent in the judgment, because
of his active participation in
the application, this judgment applies to the second respondent as
well although she failed to file
an answering affidavit. This
judgment also deals with her objection to the condonation based on
the prescription point.
[2]
Ms Magadlela appeared for the applicant and Ms Sangoni for the
respondents.
Relevant
facts
[3]
The applicant is a female adult residing at Khangelekile Community
settlement, Buck Kraal Farm,
Peddie, in the Eastern Cape. She is a
widow doing odd jobs and a primary care giver to three minor children
and one grandchild.
[4]
On or about 15 July 2022, the applicant instituted a claim for
damages against the Minister of
Police and the National Director of
Public Prosecutions for,
inter alia
, unlawful detention,
discomfort, malicious prosecution and legal fees in the amount of
R1 140 000.00.
[5]
In giving details relating to the claim, the
applicant stated the following:
5.1.
During the afternoon on 16 May 2019, masked members of the South
African Police Services entered her home
without a search warrant and
searched it. They planted drugs in her bedroom. They assaulted her in
an attempt to obtain a confession
from her. They arrested her without
probable cause. They did not inform her of her constitutional rights.
It was later established
that the officers who were involved in the
search were Sergeant Z. Ndyoko and Sergeant Maru who were attached to
the
TRT Fort Jackson police
station.
5.2.
She was kept in custody. The arresting officer recommended that
she be released on bail, however, the
prosecutor opposed bail. She
alleged that the opposition by the prosecutor was irrational and
malicious. She was kept at the East
London prison. She appeared in
court on 17 May 2019 and the case was postponed to 20 May 2019. On 20
May 2019 the case was further
postponed to 27 May 2019. She was
granted bail on 27 May 2019.
5.3.
After several postponements she was found not guilty and discharged
on 27 November 2020. On 11 March 2021,
she advised her attorneys of
record about her arrest. On that day, she alleged, she had
accompanied her now deceased husband who
had attended to the
attorney’s offices for a consultation. It was during that
consultation that she mentioned what had happened
to her. She was
advised by the attorneys that they first needed to request the docket
from the police station to assess her rights.
5.4.
The request for the docket was made to the police on 24 March 2021.
When the information officer from the
police station failed to
furnish the requested information, an appeal was lodged against the
deemed refusal on 11 May 2021, without
success. On 14 September 2021,
the applicant approached court, seeking an order to compel the first
respondent to furnish the docket.
She was granted the relief sought.
The first respondent was given fourteen days within which to furnish
the docket. The application
was not opposed by the first respondent.
5.5.
The sheriff served the order on the first respondent on 22 February
2022. The first respondent complied with
the order on 27 May 2022,
some three months later. The applicant submitted that there was
compliance one year and two months
after the initial request.
5.6.
The applicant complained that she was frustrated by the first
respondent and as such her claim had been compromised.
She regarded
the delay to furnish the information as an intervening incident which
suspended the running of prescription. On 26
April 2022 her attorneys
of record issued a notice in terms of the Institution Act. Again, on
26 May 2022 they issued another notice.
On 27 May 2022, she
consulted with her attorneys of record. She stated that she could not
have instituted her action without
the information received from the
police.
5.7.
The application for condonation was launched on 24 February 2023. On
02 March 2023, the respondents delivered
their notice to oppose. It
was only on 12 April 2023 that the first respondent delivered his
answering affidavit deposed to by
his legal officer, Ms J.A van
Rooyen.
[6]
All the facts set out by the applicant detailing her arrest,
detention and acquittal were denied
by the first respondent. He
stated that he had no knowledge of those allegations and put the
applicant to the proof thereof. The
first respondent further stated
that the claim had prescribed. He further relied on the decision of
the Constitutional Court in
Mtokonya
v Minister of Police
[1]
and
Abongile
Zamani v Minister of Police
[2]
, for the contention that the prescription point was upheld by those
courts. He further submitted that no proper case has been
made out in
the application and therefore it should be dismissed with costs.
[7]
In reply, the applicant’s attorneys of record submitted that
the claim has not prescribed
because the applicant was acquitted on
27 November 2020 and her claim would only prescribe on 27 November
2023. Summons was served
on 15 July 2022.
[8]
The first respondent submitted that this court may grant the
application sought in terms of section
3(4)(b) of the Institution Act
if satisfied that the provisions thereof have
been met.
Second
respondent
[9]
The second respondent, although she filed a notice to oppose, did not
file an answering affidavit. This court is not in
a position to
apply the averments made in the answering affidavit to her because,
the deponent made it clear that the answering
affidavit was filed on
behalf of the first respondent. It is for that reason that the
focus will be on the first respondent.
To the extent that the second
respondent persisted in the objection without an affidavit the
outcome herein will apply to her as
well, except where there is
specific intention to exclude her.
Applicant’s
legal arguments
[10]
In argument, Ms Magadlela submitted that: The action has not
been extinguished by prescription. There
is good cause that exists to
justify the delay in delivering the prescribed statutory notice upon
the respondents timeously. The
respondents have not been unreasonably
prejudiced by the failure to deliver the said notice. It is well
within this court’s
discretion to consider the fact that it
will be in the interests of justice to grant the relief sought even
if some of the jurisdictional
factors may not be satisfied.
[11]
She argued that prescription started to run when the applicant was
notified that she was discharged
from the criminal case. In this
regard, she relied on the case of
Holden
v Asmang Limited
[3]
.
She submitted that in
Sello
v Minister of Police N.O & Another
[4]
the
Court stated that:
“
[15] In
applying the principle held in
Miracle
Mile
that
a debt is due when it is immediately claimable by the creditor and
immediately payable by the debtor, the debt became claimable
by the
plaintiff on the date of his release from incarceration on 15 October
2015. However, the complete cause of action was only
established
after consultation with his attorneys on 6 June 2017. This
principle was also confirmed in
Truter
v
Deysel
[5]
where
the SCA held that, for the purpose of prescription, a debt is due
when the creditor acquires a complete cause of action
to approach a
court to recover the debt. Although the right to reclaim the amounts
arose the day after his release from incarceration,
in absence of any
knowledge of the identity of the respondents, the applicant’s
rights in law only became enforceable on
6 June 2017.”
[12]
She further submitted that strong merits may mitigate fault on the
part of the applicant in failing to serve
the required notice.
Relying on
Madinda
v Minister of Safety & Security, Republic of South Africa
[6]
the court dealt with the provisions of section 4(b) as follows:
“
[12]
. . . . . . There are two main elements at play in s 4(b), viz the
subject’s right to have the
merits of his case tried by a court
of law and the right of an organ of state not to be unduly prejudiced
by delay beyond the statutorily
prescribed limit for the giving of
notice. Subparagraph (iii) calls for the court to be satisfied as to
the latter. Logically,
subparagraph (ii) is directed, at least in
part, to whether the subject should be denied a trial on the merits.
If it were not
so, consideration of prospects of success could be
entirely excluded from the equation on the ground that failure to
satisfy the
court of the existence of good cause precluded the court
from exercising its discretion to condone. That would require an
unbalanced
approach to the two elements and could hardly favour the
interests of justice. Moreover, what can be achieved by putting the
court
to the task of exercising a discretion to condone if there is
no prospect of success? In addition, that the merits are shown to
be
strong or weak may colour an applicant’s explanation for
conduct which bears on the delay: an applicant with an overwhelming
case is hardly likely to be careless in pursuing his or her interest,
while one with little hope of success can easily be understood
to
drag his or her heels. As I interpret the requirement of good cause
for the delay, the prospects of success are a relevant consideration.
The learned judge a quo misdirected himself in ignoring them.”
[13] Ms
Magadlela submitted that it is in the interests of justice that the
non-compliance with the provisions
of the Institution Act be condoned
as there are good prospects of success in the claim. She further
submitted that the respondents
stand to suffer no prejudice if the
relief sought is granted. On the other hand, it is the applicant who
will suffer great prejudice,
should condonation be refused because
her claim has not yet prescribed. She submitted that a dismissal of
this application would
amount to refusal of an opportunity to
ventilate all the issues before court. She further submitted that
there is no prejudice
to be suffered by the respondents because they
are the custodians of the case docket, relevant registers, files and
statements
relating to the applicant’s arrest, detention,
assault and prosecution and that would enable them to defend the
claim against
them.
[14]
She submitted that the explanation tendered for the delay in filing
the statutory notice has been explained
sufficiently. She further
relied on the provisions of section 34 of the Constitution for the
contention that everyone has a right
to have any dispute that can be
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing
before a court, where appropriate
another independent and/or
impartial tribunal or forum. She submitted that the opposition
advanced by the first respondent lacks
details in that he simply
raised an issue of prescription but failed to provide any evidence
that supports the prescription claim.
She submitted that the
respondents’ opposition should be rejected. She prayed that the
applicant should succeed with costs.
First respondent’s
legal submissions
[
15]
Ms Sangoni, on the other hand, submitted that the applicant pleads
ignorance of the law and that she only
got to know about the
respondents’ indebtedness to her when she consulted a legal
representatives. She submitted that the
applicant’s explanation
for the length of the delay does not show good cause and that
ignorance of the law is no excuse.
She referred the court to
the decision in
Nair
v Telkom Soc & Others
[7]
for the submission that:
“
[
11
]
. . ..
In
deciding whether sufficient cause has been shown, the basic principle
is that the court has a discretion to be exercised judicially
upon a
consideration of all the facts and, in essence, is a matter of
fairness to both sides. Among the facts usually relevant
are the
degree of lateness, the explanation therefor, the prospects of
success, and the importance of the case. Ordinarily these
facts are
inter-related; they are not individually decisive, for that would be
a piecemeal approach.”
[16]
Ms Sangoni also relied on
Mtokonya
v Minister of Police
[8]
where the Chief Justice Zondo referred to a judgment by Moseneke J in
Eskom
v Bhonjanala
Platinum District Municipality where he stated:
“
The
submission that a claim or debt does not become due when facts from
which it arose unknown to the applicant, but only when such
claimant
has acquired certainty regarding the law and attendant rights and
obligations that might be applicable to such a debt.
If such a
construction was to be placed on the provision of section 12(3) grave
absurdity would arise. … A claimant cannot
blissfully await
authoritative, final, and binding judicial pronouncements before its
debt becomes due, or before it is deemed
to have knowledge of the
facts from which the debt arises.”
[17]
She submitted that the applicant had knowledge of the facts of the
claim from the date of her arrest and
that was the date when the
cause of action arose. She submitted that there is no adequate
explanation for the period of delay and
on this basis alone, based
on, inter alia, the
Mtokonya
decision, this court should
refuse the application for condonation. She submitted that the
application should be dismissed with
costs.
Discussion
[18]
Section 3(2) of the Institution Act provides:
“
Part
2
Notice of intended
legal proceedings to be given to organ of state
3.
(1) No legal proceedings for the
recovery of
a debt may be instituted against an organ of state
unless-
(a)
the creditor has given the organ of state in question notice in
writing of his or its intention
to institute the legal proceedings in
question; or
(b)
the organ of state in question has consented in writing to the
institution of that
legal proceedings –
(i) without such
notice; or
(ii) upon receipt of a
notice which does not comply with all the requirements set out in
subsection (2).
(2) A notice must-
(a)
within six months from the date on which the debt became due, be
served on the organ of
state in accordance with section 4(1); and
(i)
the facts giving rise to the debt; and
(ii)
such particulars of such debt as are within the knowledge of the
creditor
(b) briefly set out –
(i)
the facts giving rise to the debt; and
(3) For purposes of
subsection (2)(a)-
(a)
a debt may not be regarded as being due until the creditor has
knowledge of the identity
of the organ of state and of the facts
giving rise to the debt, but a creditor must be regarded as having
acquired such knowledge
as soon as he or she or it could have
acquired it by exercising reasonable care, unless the organ of state
wilfully prevented him
or her or it from acquiring such knowledge;
and
(b)
a debt referred to in section
2(2)(a), must be regarded as having become due on the fixed
date.”
[19]
Section 4(b) of the Institution Act provides that a court may grant
an application for condonation if it
is satisfied that:
“
(i)
the debt has not been extinguished by
prescription;
(ii)
good cause exists for the failure by the creditor; and
(iii)
the organ of state was not unreasonably prejudiced by the failure.”
[20]
As a starting point it is necessary to have regard to the facts and
questions of law pleaded by the parties.
At paragraphs
54 to 57 and 59 to 61, the applicant dealt with “ good
cause” and alleged ,
inter alia,
that she had no
knowledge of the law, she became aware of the civil laws after
consulting with her attorneys, the request
for the case docket was
peremptory , had the first respondent furnished the docket timeously
and not after one year and two months,
she would have issued the
statutory notice on time. She further alleged that she had good
prospects of success in the claim.
[21]
The first respondent dealt with those allegations
at paragraph 14 as follows:
“
14.
AD PARAGRAPHS 54,
55, 56,
57,
59, 60 & 61 THEREOF:
I deny the allegations
contained in these paragraphs, have no knowledge of same and put the
plaintiff to the proof thereof. I submit
further that the first
respondent has good prospects of success in the application and in
the action proceedings in respect of
the merits of the case.”
[22]
At paragraph
58
the applicant alleged:
“
I was advised
that before one may litigate against the state a Statutory notice
must be sent to the state. However, before delivering
such notice, my
attorneys advised me that, they first needed to request and obtain
the case docket so that they may investigate
my prospects of success
and further advise me of any legal recourse I may be able to seek.”
[23]
The allegations made in this paragraph were not
denied by the first respondent. They must therefore
be deemed
to be admitted. The applicant further alleged at paragraph 36
that the first respondent provided the information
that was requested
from him a year and two months later. A response to that allegation
by the first respondent is “
This is denied. The legal
representatives will argue that the allegations in these paragraphs
are not relevant for the above proceedings.
”
[
24]
There are no facts pleaded by the first respondent at all except a
legal conclusion that the applicant’s
claim has prescribed
based on section 11(d) of the Prescription Act. He further contended
that a prescribed claim cannot be resuscitated
by condonation.
[25]
In
Modipane
v M M Dada BK h/a Dada Motors Lichtenburg
[9]
,
Landman
J
,
at
para 12 when dealing with the role of pleadings stated:
“
[12]
At the outset is necessary to restate, briefly, the role and function
of pleadings in dispute resolution.
Pleadings define the ambit of the
dispute. They indicate what the nature of the dispute is and what
facts must be proven by the
plaintiff to sustain the claim. And
conversely the facts which must be resisted and facts which must be
proven to sustain the defence.
The pleaded facts also indicate the
legal principles applicable to the claim and defence even though it
is not customary to label
the nature of the claim or defence.”
[26]
Each
case must be treated on its own merits.
I have to consider the
reasons advanced for the delay by the applicant and an explanation
given by the first respondent in relation
to the allegations made
against him of,
inter alia,
having delayed in furnishing the
information requested, on time. The applicant had detailed the steps
she took in obtaining such
information, including, amongst others,
approaching court for an order directing the information officer of
the first respondent
to furnish to the applicant’s attorneys
with copies of the docket. The applicant demonstrated that she relied
on the first
respondent for the information she sought. This is
apparent from the fact that there are no facts from the first
respondent demonstrating
why the applicant was furnished with the
information that was requested after a year and two months.
There are no facts presented
by the first respondent to demonstrate
prejudice that he suffered as a result of the delayed notice. The
applicant, on the other
hand, demonstrated the prejudice she will
suffer should she be non- suited at this stage and her condonation
application be refused.
[27] It
must have been in contemplation of situations like these that the
Legislature deemed it appropriate to
provide for instances such as
those mentioned in section 3(3)(a) of the Institution Act, namely:
“
unless the organ of state wilfully prevented him or her or
it from acquiring such knowledge
”. In my view, it would be
a travesty of justice if the first respondent’s contribution to
the delay can simply be overlooked,
whilst in the same breath,
compliance with the statutory notice time period is insisted upon.
A delay of a year and two months
is long and it does not get
ameliorated by the prescription point. The respondent did not
furnish the information timeously.
He did not state what difficulties
he encountered, what steps he took in order to ensure that he or his
employees complied with
their constitutional mandate of ensuring that
they make information, upon request, available, on time, to the party
that requests
it.
[28]
The first respondent contends that the applicant knew about the cause
of action upon her arrest. If one were
to follow this reasoning it
would mean that there is absolutely no basis upon which people would
seek legal advice. Upon each and
every arrest then a cause of action
would arise and an applicant would be expected to rush to court and
institute an action. I
see no legal impediment to seeking legal
advice. In fact, it is a prudent thing to do because not every arrest
that is perceived
to be unlawful, is actionable. The applicant
demonstrated that she was not aware of her rights. Not every
individual is
au fait
with the concept of arrest. In
this instance the applicant demonstrated that she was not even aware
that she could have a
claim against the Minister as a result of the
conduct meted out to her and the unlawful search, according to her,
of her home.
[29]
After the institution of the action, the first respondent pleaded to
the combined summons and raised prescription
as a special plea. The
fact that prescription is being raised as a special plea does not on
its own mean that the claim has in
fact prescribed. Prescription is a
legal defence which may warrant leading of evidence at the trial and
the trial court will decide
whether the matter has indeed prescribed.
The respondent has not advanced any facts whatsoever upon which he
based his contention
that the applicant had knowledge of the identity
of him as the debtor more than three years before the action was
instituted. The
Constitutional Court in the
Mtokonya matter
at para 181 relied on
Gericke
where
Diemont JA held:
“
The
onus was clearly on the respondent to establish this defence. He
could not succeed if he could not prove both the date of the
inception and the date of the completion of the period of
prescription. He accordingly alleged in his special plea that the
debt
was prescribed because the debt had become due on 13 February
1971 and summons was issued only on 14 February 1974.
However,
the Act specifically provides that prescription begins to run only
when the debt becomes due and that it is not deemed
to become due
until the creditor has knowledge both of the identity of the debtor
and of the facts from which the debt arises.
It follows that if the
debtor is to succeed in proving the date on which prescription begins
to run he must allege and prove that
the creditor had the requisite
knowledge on that date.
[10]
[30] I
find that reliance on the
Mtokonya
case, is with respect,
misplaced. In
Mtokonya
the parties had submitted a special
case on prescription for adjudication. The parties further
agreed on certain facts giving
rise to the claim and disputes. The
High Court was requested to determine whether or not the applicant’s
claim had prescribed.
The Constitutional Court defined the
issue as:
“
[
10]
The issue for determination involves the interpretation of section 12
(3) of the Prescription Act. It is whether section 12
(3) requires
that a creditor should have knowledge that the conduct of the debtor
giving rise to the debt is wrongful and actionable
in law before
prescription may start running or before it can be said that the debt
is due...”
[31]
Similarly, in the
Minister of Police v Abongile Zamani
case, the Full Court, on appeal, was dealing with the dismissal
of a special plea based on prescription.
[32] That
is not what this court is faced with. This court is faced with
whether or not it should condone
the applicant’s failure to
deliver the statutory notice on time. I am satisfied that the
applicant has proffered adequate
explanation for the delay and thus
taking into account all the facts, she demonstrated good cause to
warrant condonation for the
late delivery of the statutory notice. On
the other hand, lack of facts and detail on the part of the first
respondent makes it
difficult for this court to find that its
objection to the condonation is justified. The information that was
requested has since
been provided to the applicant. Therefore, the
prejudice that was contemplated by the Legislature on the part of the
respondents
does not arise because, the information requested has
been provided. The first respondent will be able to pursue his
defence
in the matter. In any event, the first respondent has not
alleged that it has suffered any prejudice whatsoever because of the
failure on the part of the applicant to issue the notice timeously.
There are prospects of success at the trial because there are
no
facts advanced at this stage to explain why the applicant’s
home was searched without a warrant. A person’s home
is her
sanctuary and no law enforcement agent has a right to invade that
space without justification. No facts justifying
such invasion
have been advanced by the first respondent.
[33] In
its preamble the Institution Act provides:
“
AND
RECOGNISING THAT-
*
the Prescription Act, 1969 (Act No. 68 of 1969), being
the
cornerstone of the laws regulating the extinction of debts by
prescription, consolidated and amended the laws relating to
prescription;
*
some of the provisions of existing laws which provide
for different
periods of prescription in respect of certain debts are inconsistent
with the periods of prescription prescribed
by the
Prescription Act,
1969
;
AND BEARING IN MIND
THAT-
*
South Africa has moved from a parliamentary sovereign
state to a
democratic constitutional sovereign state;
*
the Bill of Rights is the cornerstone of democracy in
South Africa
and that the State must respect, protect, promote and fulfil the
rights in the Bill of Rights;”
[34] In
light of these considerations, and when one balances the explanation
given by the applicant, on the one
hand, and the resistance put up by
the respondent, on the other, one realises that there is no merit in
the resistance because
of the first respondent’ s conduct which
contributed to the delay. In essence, by not furnishing the
information, the first
respondent or its employees, prevented the
applicant from acquiring the knowledge she sought. The fact that the
information was
requested and when it was not provided she approached
court for relief, demonstrated the exercise of reasonable care on the
part
of the applicant, to obtain the information.
[35] In
the circumstances, I accordingly find that the applicant’s
condonation application is not hit by
prescription because she sought
advice after her discharge from the criminal proceedings on 27
November 2020. There is no
evidence put up by the respondent to
refute her allegations on lack of knowledge. The reliance on the
Holden
decision by the applicant is apposite where the court
at paragraph 9 stated:
“
[9]
The
importance of the fourth requirement, which is the only one with
which we are concerned in this appeal, lies in the fact that
the
claim can only arise if the proceedings were terminated in the
plaintiff’s favour. That is because a claim for malicious
proceedings cannot anticipate the outcome of proceedings yet to be
finalised. To hold otherwise would permit recognition of a claim
when
the proceedings may yet be decided against the plaintiff.”
[36] I
accordingly find that there is merit in the application. It is
in the interests of justice that the
court accepts the explanation
proffered by the applicant as adequate and thus condone
non-compliance with the time periods for
the issuing of the notice
and in particular the provisions of sections 3(2)(a) and (b) of the
Institution Act.
Costs
[37]
On the issue of costs, Ms Sangoni correctly submitted that the issue
of costs is a matter that resides within
the discretion of the court.
Ms Magadlela submitted that costs should be awarded to the applicant.
[38]
It is trite that when a party seeks condonation it is asking for an
indulgence. It is for that reason that
such party is usually ordered
to bear costs of the condonation application. However, in this
case, the delays caused by the
first respondent in furnishing the
docket to the applicant even after he had been served with the court
order, call for an order
of costs against him. I am mindful of the
fact that the notice to oppose and the plea of prescription in the
action were delivered
on behalf of both respondents. The second
respondent did not actively participate in the application because
the deponent
to the answering affidavit clearly stated that “
as
such depose this answering affidavit on behalf of the first
respondent”
. It is for that reason that the order of
costs will relate only to the first respondent.
[39]
In
the circumstances, I make the following Order:
1.
That the applicant’s failure to comply timeously with the
provisions of section 3(1)
read with
sections 3(2)(a)
and (b) of the
Institution of Legal Proceedings Against Certain Organs
of State Act 40 of 2002
is hereby condoned
and the applicant is granted leave to pursue its claim against the
first and second respondents.
2.
That the first respondent
is
directed to pay costs of this application.
T.V NORMAN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
Matter heard
on
:
15 June 2023
Judgment Delivered
on : 18
July 2023
APPEARANCES:
For
the PLAINTIFF:
ADV
L. MAGADLELA
Instructed
by:
SIPUNZI
ATTORNEYS
89
BEACONHURST DRIVE
OFFICE
NO.9
BEACON
PARK, BEACON BAY
EAST
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32
ALEXANDRA ROAD
KING
WILLIAMS TOWN
[1]
(CCT
200/ 16)
[2017] ZACC 33
, PARAS 37,44,45 and 46.
[2]
(12/2019)
[2021] ZAECBHC (12 February 2021).
[3]
Case No.: 1277/19
[2020] ZASCA 145
(5 November 2020) para 18.
[4]
(89077/16) [2022] ZAGPPHC 233 (13 April 2022) para 15.
[5]
[2006]
ZASCA 16
;
2006
(4) SA 168
(SCA)
at para 16.
[6]
(
153/07)
[2007] ZAZASCA 34
[2008] ZASCA 34
; ;
[2008] 3 ALLSA 143
SCA
[2008] ZASCA 34
; ;
2008 (4) SA 312
(SCA) (28
March 2008) para 12 & 13.
[7]
(JR 59/2020) [2021] ZALCJHB 449 (7 December 2021) at para 11.
[8]
(CCT 200/16)
[2017] ZACC 33
;
2017 (11) BCLR 1443
(CC);
2018 (5) SA
22
(CC) (19 September 2017).
[9]
(1559/2010)
[2011] ZANWHC 43
(30 June 2011).
[10]
Gericke
v Sack 1978 (1) SA 821 (A) at 827-8.