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[2023] ZAKZPHC 46
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Sarmcol Quality Tyres (Pty) Ltd and Others v Farrel Incorporated and Another (8147/2022P) [2023] ZAKZPHC 46 (5 May 2023)
FLYNOTES:
CIVIL PROCEDURE – Exception – Allegations for cause of
action – Claim against attorneys –
Breach of mandate –
Contention that clients not properly advised – Claim against
union and former employees for
damages arising out of a protected
strike – Court unable to find that plaintiffs’ claims
are bad in law –
Three exceptions out of 11 upheld –
Plaintiffs given 15 days to amend particulars of claim.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Case
no:
8147/2022P
In
the matter between:
SARMCOL
QUALITY TYRES (PTY) LTD FIRST
PLAINTIFF
REMA
TIP TOP AFRIQUE (PTY) LTD SECOND
PLAINTIFF
DBP
AFRICA (PTY)
LTD THIRD
PLAINTIFF
and
FARREL
INCORPORATED FIRST
DEFENDANT
DUNSTAN
MARK
FARREL SECOND
DEFENDANT
Coram:
Mossop J
Heard:
20 April 2023
Delivered:
5 May 2023
ORDER
The
following order is granted
:
1.
The
plaintiffs’ application to amend is adjourned sine die with
costs reserved;
2.
The first,
second, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth and eleventh exceptions
(the latter incorrectly numbered as the second tenth
ground of
exception) as numbered in the defendants’ notice of exception
dated 5 August 2022 are dismissed;
3.
The third,
fourth and eighth exceptions as numbered in the defendants’
notice of exception dated 5 August 2022 are upheld;
4.
The plaintiffs
are given fifteen days from the date of this judgment to either:
(a)
Set down their
notice of amendment; alternatively
(b)
Amend their
notice of amendment and set it down; or
(c)
Deliver a
fresh notice of amendment;
5.
In the event
that the plaintiffs fail to amend their particulars of claim within
fifteen days of the date of this order, the defendants
are given
leave to apply for the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims
against them;
6.
Each party
shall pay its own costs.
JUDGMENT
Mossop
J
:
[1]
Before me is an exception, comprised of 11 separate grounds, to the
plaintiffs’
particulars of claim. The first defendant is an
incorporated firm of attorneys and the second defendant, a qualified
and admitted
attorney, is its only director. From time to time, the
first defendant was mandated by the plaintiffs to provide them with
certain
legal services. The plaintiffs, being dissatisfied with the
services rendered to them by the first defendant, have instituted
action
proceedings against the first defendant for certain damages
and have joined the second defendant to those proceedings. In
response
to the plaintiffs’ action, the defendants have
delivered the series of exceptions to the particulars of claim
referred to
above, predicated solely on the ground that the
particulars of claim lack allegations necessary to sustain a cause of
action. I
shall henceforth refer to the parties as they are cited in
the summons.
[2]
When the matter was called, Mr Hollander appeared for the plaintiffs
and
Mr Wallis SC appeared for the defendants. Both counsel are
thanked for their helpful submissions.
[3]
The particulars of claim are divided into three distinct claims.
[4]
The first
claim alleges a breach of mandate by the first defendant. The
plaintiffs, each of which previously bore a different name,
[1]
allege that during 2013 the first defendant accepted a mandate from
them to claim damages from a trade union, the National Union
of
Metalworkers of South Africa (the trade union), and certain former
employees of the plaintiffs arising out of damages sustained
by the
three plaintiffs during a protected strike. In formulating their
claim, the plaintiffs pleaded that they had also taken
cession of
other parties’ claims against the trade union and the former
employees.
[5]
Having accepted the mandate, the plaintiffs plead that the first
defendant
instituted action against the trade union and the former
employees out of the High Court, Pietermaritzburg. The action was
based
entirely on the provisions of section 11(1) of the Regulation
of Gatherings Act 205 of 1993 (the Act). After an initial success
in
the High Court, Pietermaritzburg before Van Zyl J, the action
ultimately failed when it was taken on appeal to the Supreme Court
of
Appeal by the trade union.
[6]
The plaintiffs allege that in basing the cause of action entirely on
the
provisions of the Act, the applicability of which was admittedly
uncertain, the first defendant was negligent in that it failed
to
plead an alternative delictual cause of action or failed to consider
proceeding in the Labour Court in terms of the provisions
of section
68(1)
(b)
of the Labour Relations Act 66 of 1995 (the LRA).
Such conduct, so the plaintiffs plead, constitutes negligent conduct
on the part
of the first defendant.
[7]
The
plaintiffs plead that they paid an amount of approximately R6 million
to the first defendant for its legal services and when
the
unrecovered damages claimed from the trade union are added to that
amount, they allege that the first defendant is liable to
it on this
claim in the amount of approximately R7,5 million, for which amount
the second defendant is jointly and severally liable
in terms of the
provisions of
section 19(3)
of the
Companies Act 71 of 2008
.
[2]
[8]
The second claim is, again, a claim based upon a breach of mandate.
The
mandate in this instance is distinct from the mandate pleaded in
the first claim. The mandate was granted to the first defendant
by
the three plaintiffs arising out of proceedings in the Labour Court
instituted by the trade union and 36 former reinstated employees
of
the plaintiffs, who were claiming approximately R7 million from the
first plaintiff, approximately R3 million from the second
plaintiff
and approximately R6 million from the third plaintiff in respect of
back pay and interest.
[9]
The plaintiffs allege that the first defendant defended the Labour
Court
proceedings when it ought to have known that there was no
legally sustainable defence to the claims for back pay when
reinstatement
has already been ordered. In doing so, it is pleaded
that the first defendant relied upon legally unsustainable defences
and thus
acted negligently.
[10]
The first defendant’s mandate was consequently terminated by
the plaintiffs. Having
done so, the plaintiffs plead further that
they settled the Labour Court proceedings because of the fact that
the first defendant
had raised legally unsustainable defences on
their behalf and paid the trade union and the reinstated employees
the sum of R11
930 926.77 together with taxed costs of R170 000.
[11]
The
plaintiffs plead further that had the first defendant properly
advised them of the correct legal position, they would not have
opposed the Labour Court proceedings and would have settled with the
trade union and the reinstated employees at a lesser amount,
which
the plaintiffs estimate to be the amount of R5 965 463.39, being half
the amount that they actually settled at. The plaintiffs
paid the
first defendant the sum of approximately R2 567 859.38 in legal fees
and in the circumstances it, alternatively the second
defendant (for
the same reason pleaded in the first claim), is indebted to the
plaintiffs in the amount of R7 803 322.77. This
is calculated by
adding the difference between the R11 930 926.77 actually paid to the
trade union and the reinstated employees
and the amount that the
plaintiffs believe they would have settled at, in the amount of R5
965 463.39, to the taxed legal costs
paid in the amount of R170 000
and the R2 567 859.38 million paid to the first defendant as fees.
[3]
[12]
The third and final claim also relates to a breach of mandate and
pertains to legal proceedings
initially commenced before the
Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (the CCMA) by
certain dismissed employees
of the plaintiffs. The dismissed
employees believed their dismissal to be unfair and sought
appropriate relief before the CCMA.
The CCMA found in favour of the
employees and ordered their reinstatement. The plaintiffs then sought
the review of that award
in the Labour Court and were successful and
the award was set aside. The trade union and the employees then
appealed to the Labour
Appeal Court but were unsuccessful. However, a
further appeal to the Constitutional Court was successful and the
dismissed employees
were accordingly reinstated.
[13]
The plaintiffs then mandated the first defendant to advise them on
the best approach to
take in reinstating the employees, for which
advice the first respondent would be financially compensated. The
plaintiffs plead
that the first defendant negligently failed to
advise them that the reinstated employees would have a claim for back
pay and also
failed to advise them to negotiate with the trade union
and the reinstated employees regarding the payment of that back pay.
The
inference appears to be that the plaintiffs did not pay the back
pay. The trade union and certain of the employees then instituted
proceedings in the Labour Court against the first plaintiff for
payment of the back pay and sought payment from the first plaintiff
of the amount of approximately R2,4 million, against the second
plaintiff for approximately R1,4 million and against the third
plaintiff for the payment of approximately R430 000. That action is
ongoing and is, as yet, unresolved.
[14]
The Labour Court proceedings have been defended by the plaintiffs,
who thus far have been
obliged to spend an amount of approximately
R630 000 on legal fees. The plaintiffs allege that had the first
defendant properly
advised them, they would not have incurred those
legal fees. It is further alleged that the second defendant is liable
to the plaintiffs,
jointly and severally, with the first defendant on
the same basis as is pleaded in the first two claims.
[15]
In response to these pleaded allegations, the defendants allege that
the plaintiffs have
failed to disclose a cause of action in each of
their three claims and the particulars of claim are accordingly
excipiable. The
notice of exception delivered by the defendants seems
to have ignited some reflection by the plaintiffs on their pleaded
case.
It appears that in certain instances, the plaintiffs
acknowledged that there were shortcomings in what they had pleaded.
As a consequence,
a notice of application to amend was delivered by
the plaintiffs after delivery of the notice of exception. The notice
of amendment
proposes certain amendments to the plaintiffs’
first and second claims only and to the concluding prayer to the
particulars
of claim. That notice has, in turn, drawn a notice of
objection from the defendants who claim that the proposed amendments
will
not cure the alleged defects identified in the particulars of
claim. As a consequence, the plaintiffs brought a formal application
for the granting of the amendments in terms of the provisions of
Uniform
rule 28(4).
[16]
It was proposed by Mr Hollander that the application for the
amendments sought be heard
first and then the exception. Mr Wallis
did not favour that approach and after brief argument on this issue,
I accordingly ordered
that the exception be dealt with first and that
the application for the amendments be adjourned sine die.
[17]
Turning to
consider the grounds of the various exceptions, I commence with a
reference to the dicta of Marais JA in
Vermeulen
v Goose Valley Investments (Pty) Ltd
,
[4]
where he stated that:
‘
It
is trite law that an exception that a cause of action is not
disclosed by a pleading cannot succeed unless it be shown that
ex
facie
the allegations made by a
plaintiff and any document upon which his or her cause of action may
be based, the claim
is
(not
may be) bad in law
.’
[18]
In
raising an exception, neither of the parties may adduce any facts
extraneous to what is stated in the pleadings, other than facts
that
may be agreed upon between them.
[5]
It follows that the defect in respect of which the exception is
raised must appear from the pleading to which objection
is
taken.
[6]
In
considering what is pleaded in the particulars of claim being
examined:
‘
…
a court must
assume the correctness of the factual averments made in the relevant
pleading, unless they are palpably untrue or so
improbable that they
cannot be accepted.’
[7]
[19]
In
McKelvey
v Cowan NO
,
[8]
the court, when faced with an exception, stated that:
‘
It
is a first principle in dealing with matters of exception that, if
evidence can be led which can disclose a cause of action alleged
in
the pleading, that particular pleading is not excipiable. A pleading
is only excipiable on the basis that no possible evidence
led on the
pleadings can disclose a cause of action.
’
[20]
In
assessing the sufficiency of particulars of claim and the way that
they have been pleaded, the distinction between the primary
factual
allegations that a plaintiff must plead and the secondary allegations
upon which the plaintiff will rely must be recognised.
The primary
allegations must be pleaded and the secondary allegations, which
comprise the evidence needed to prove the primary
allegations, ought
not to be pleaded.
[9]
The
distinction between the primary allegations (facta probanda) and
secondary allegations (facta probantia) was authoritatively
dealt
with and explained in
McKenzie
v Farmers’ Co-operative Meat Industries Ltd
,
[10]
where the court accepted the definition of Lord Esher MR in
Read
v Brown
[11]
of
primary allegations as being:
‘
every
fact which it would be necessary for the plaintiff to prove, if
traversed, in order to support his right to the judgment of
the
Court. It does not comprise every piece of evidence which is
necessary to prove each fact, but every fact which is necessary
to be
proved.
’
[12]
[21]
Facta
probantia, on the other hand, are the facts that must be led to
prove the facta probanda.
[13]
As was said in
JSS
Industrial Coatings CC v Inyatsi Construction (South Africa) (Pty)
Ltd
:
‘
It
is trite that only facta probanda must be pleaded. Facta
probantia are led as evidence during trial
.’
[14]
[22]
In addressing me on the issue of the application for an amendment, Mr
Hollander very correctly
acknowledged that portions of the
particulars of claim are susceptible to criticism, hence the proposed
amendments. The approach
that I accordingly intend taking is to
assume that where a ground of exception raised by the defendants is
met by a response from
the plaintiffs that the complaint is to be
addressed by a proposed amendment, that the exception is sustained in
respect of that
point only. I can discern no profit being gained from
debating the merits of a portion of the particulars of claim knowing
that
it is not in its final form. Implicit in the intention to amend
is an acknowledgment of a deficiency in that part of the pleading.
In
adopting this approach, however, I express no opinion on whether the
proposed amendments are adequate.
[23]
With
these general principles in mind and my approach explained, I turn
now to consider the exceptions raised by the defendants.
As
previously stated, they number 11 in all.
[15]
I
shall deal with all the exceptions raised in respect of each claim
before proceeding to consider all the exceptions pertaining
to the
next claim and so on. There are, however, certain exceptions that are
common to some of the claims. Unless the outcome would
be different
in respect of another claim, once the exception has been considered
and dealt with, it will not be dealt with again
in any great detail.
I shall refer to each exception as it is numbered in the notice of
exception.
[24]
The first
claim has attracted five grounds of exception. The first ground, in
turn, has two parts to it: the first is that no particularity
has
been pleaded about the cession that is relied upon by the plaintiffs
and the second is that there is no particularity as to
what property
was damaged, who bore the risk in respect of such property and which
of the plaintiffs suffered the loss pleaded
by the plaintiffs.
[25]
As regards the
first part of the first exception, it is important to recognise that
the plaintiffs’ claim is not a claim based
upon a cession: it
is a claim based upon a breach of mandate. The fact of a cession has,
however, been pleaded. That is the principal
fact. The finer details
of the cession, such as when, where and with whom it occurred, are
the secondary facts and are matters
for evidence or can be revealed
by an appropriately worded request for further particulars for trial.
As regards the second part
of the exception, the particulars of claim
make no reference to any damage to property. That is something that
the defendants have
read into the particulars of claim. They are not
entitled to do so, as the exception can only lie against the
particulars of claim
as they are presently worded, not as the
defendants believe that they should be worded. This ground of
exception therefore cannot
succeed.
[26]
The second
ground of exception relates to the legal fees paid by the plaintiffs
to the first defendant. The defendants claim that
all three
plaintiffs could not have made the payment. I can see no reason
why each of the plaintiffs could not have contributed
a portion of
the fees paid to the first defendant. However, if the position is, as
seems to be assumed by the defendants, that
only a single plaintiff
made the payment, then the plaintiffs have allowed for this in the
wording of the prayer to the particulars
of claim where they pray for
judgment jointly in their favour alternatively for payment to the
first plaintiff, alternatively the
second plaintiff, alternatively
the third plaintiff. I consequently find no merit in this ground of
exception.
[27]
The third
ground of exception is that the plaintiffs have not pleaded averments
necessary to establish that the conduct of the defendants
was the
cause of the damages that they have allegedly suffered. To this, the
plaintiffs have submitted that what has been pleaded
is sufficient to
establish a cause of action but have also indicated that the
complaint is to be addressed in the proposed amendment.
[28]
The fourth
ground of exception is that the first claim, as presently pleaded,
will overcompensate the plaintiffs. This is because
the plaintiffs
claim legal costs arising out of the litigation and the damages
arising out of damage to their property. The argument
proceeds that
there are no facts pleaded to establish that the plaintiffs would
not, even if successful, have incurred legal fees.
As with the
previous ground, the plaintiffs indicate that the objection is to be
addressed in their proposed amendment.
[29]
The fifth and
final ground of exception relating to the first claim is that the
defendants allege that counsel was instructed by
the first defendant
to conduct the litigation on behalf of the plaintiffs. Having raised
this fact, it is then submitted that counsel
retained the obligation
to make decisions concerning the conduct of the litigation and
therefore, by implication, if any negligence
is found to exist in the
way the litigation was conducted it cannot have been due to the
negligence of the defendants.
[30]
A further
point taken in this ground of exception is that the particulars of
claim state that in relying upon section 11(1) of the
Act, the first
defendant:
‘…
relied
upon a cause of action in terms of section 11(1) of the RGA
[16]
which
was:
13.1.1
possibly not applicable; and
13.1.2
possibly incorrect,’.
Thus,
so the argument proceeds, reliance on that section of the Act could
also be possibly applicable and possibly correct. It is
further
pressed that at least one judge, Van Zyl J, believed this alternative
proposition to be correct, so in those circumstances,
how could the
first defendant have been negligent?
[31]
Had the first
claim not said any more, then there may have been some merit to this
ground of exception. But the difficulty for the
defendants is that
the plaintiffs did say more. They went on to plead that because of
the uncertainty of relying solely on the
Act, a prudent and cautious
attorney would have pleaded an alternative cause of action founded in
delict, further alternatively
ought to have considered the
desirability of proceeding not in the High Court but in the Labour
Court in terms of section 68(1)
(b)
of the
LRA. The first defendant did not do so and was, therefore, according
to the plaintiffs, negligent.
[32]
I agree with
Mr Hollander that the detail contained in this ground of exception
ought more properly to be incorporated into the
defendants’
plea. In my view, a cause of action has been pleaded and this
ground of exception must fail. That disposes
of the exceptions taken
in respect of the first claim.
[33]
There are four
grounds of exception attaching to the second claim. The sixth ground
of exception is that the plaintiffs have pleaded
that an amount of
approximately R12 million was paid to the trade union without
indicating how much of that amount was paid by
each plaintiff. In my
view, the case is adequately pleaded as to why the money was paid
over to the trade union and how much was
paid. The fact that the
particulars of claim do not reveal how much of that total each
plaintiff paid logically cannot mean that
what is an adequately
pleaded claim is now rendered inadequate. Any uncertainty on this
issue will be capable of being clarified
by evidence at trial or by a
request for further particulars for the purposes of trial. A cause of
action has properly been pleaded
and this ground of exception cannot
be sustained.
[34]
The seventh
ground of exception is a repetition of the second ground of objection
to the first claim, the only difference being
that the amounts to
which reference are made are not the same. The previous ground of
exception found no favour with me for the
reasons already provided.
The defendants consequently cannot expect this ground to achieve a
more palatable result for it. It must
also fail.
[35]
The eighth
ground of exception pertaining to the second claim is that the claim
lacks averments that legal fees may be claimed as
damages where the
defence of the claim appears from the particulars of claim to have
resulted in a reduction of the claim in excess
of the legal fees.
This ground is to be dealt with by the plaintiffs’ intended
amendment.
[36]
The ninth
ground of exception is a repetition of the fifth ground of exception
in which it is explained that counsel was briefed
and was entrusted
with the running of the litigation. I have already expressed a view
on these allegations. These allegations belong
in the defendants’
plea and the objection is not sustained. That completes a
consideration of the exceptions taken to the
second claim.
[37]
The third
claim has attracted two grounds of exception. The tenth ground of
exception is a repetition of the second ground of exception
and deals
with the allegation that all three plaintiffs could not have made the
payment. It is not sustained for the same reasons
mentioned when
dealing with the second ground of exception.
[38]
The
eleventh ground of exception (incorrectly marked in the notice of
exception as the second tenth ground of exception) is that
the third
claim does not specify that the litigation in the Labour Court has
terminated, it being submitted that any damages allegedly
sustained
by the plaintiffs can only arise once that has occurred. I do not
share that view. The Labour Court litigation is ongoing
according to
the particulars of claim but the plaintiffs are able at this stage to
quantify the amount that they have expended
thus far in defending
those proceedings. I can conceive of no reason why they cannot claim
those damages now. There may be difficulties
ahead for the plaintiffs
concerning any further legal costs that are incurred in the
litigation based upon the once and for all
principle,
[17]
but
that is a matter for another day. In my view, the particulars of
claim have correctly made out a cause of action.
[39]
In
conclusion, I consider the dicta of Heher J in
Jowell
v Bramwell-Jones and others
,
[18]
where he stated that:
‘
The
plaintiff is required to furnish an outline of his case. That does
not mean that the defendant is entitled to a framework
like a
cross-word puzzle in which every gap can be filled by logical
deduction. The outline may be asymmetrical and possess rough
edges
not obvious until actually explored by evidence. Provided the
defendant is given a clear idea of the material facts which
are
necessary to make the cause of action intelligible, the plaintiff
will have satisfied the requirements.
’
[40]
Earlier in the
same judgment, Heher J stated that:
‘
It
is therefore incumbent upon a plaintiff only to plead a complete
cause of action which identifies the issues upon which the plaintiff
seeks to rely, and on which evidence will be led, in intelligible and
lucid form and which allows the defendant to plead to it
.
’
[19]
[41]
I am satisfied that this is what the plaintiffs have
done. I am also unable to find that the plaintiffs’ claims are
bad in
law. The plaintiffs’ claims may not in the long run
succeed, but that does not mean that they have been objectionably
pleaded.
[42]
I am of the
view that by virtue of the fact that each party has enjoyed some
measure of success in this matter, there should be
no order as to
costs.
[43]
I accordingly grant the following order:
1.
The
plaintiffs’ application to amend is adjourned sine die with
costs reserved;
2.
The first,
second, fifth, sixth, seventh, ninth, tenth and eleventh exceptions
(the latter incorrectly numbered as the second tenth
ground of
exception) as numbered in the defendants’ notice of exception
dated 5 August 2022 are dismissed;
3.
The third,
fourth and eighth exceptions as numbered in the defendants’
notice of exception dated 5 August 2022 are upheld;
4.
The plaintiffs
are given fifteen days from the date of this judgment to either:
(a)
Set down their
notice of amendment; alternatively
(b)
Amend their
notice of amendment and set it down; or
(c)
Deliver a
fresh notice of amendment;
5.
In the event
that the plaintiffs fail to amend their particulars of claim within
fifteen days of the date of this order, the defendants
are given
leave to apply for the dismissal of the plaintiffs’ claims
against them;
6.
Each party
shall pay its own costs.
MOSSOP
J
APPEARANCES
Counsel
for the excipients
Mr
P J Wallis SC
Instructed
by:
O’Dwyer
Incorporated
25
Ireland Road
Upper
Ferncliff
Pietermaritzburg
Counsel
for the plaintiffs
Mr
L Hollander
Instructed
by
Jurgens
Bekker Attorneys
Care
of:
Viv
Greene Attorneys
132
Roberts Road
Clarendon
Pietermaritzburg
Date
of Hearing : 20 April 2023
Date
of Judgment : 5 May 2023
[1]
All the plaintiffs appear to previously have been part of the Dunlop
group of companies. The three plaintiffs formerly all had
a name
that included the word ‘Dunlop’ in it.
[2]
Section
19(3) reads: ‘
If
a company is a personal liability company the directors and past
directors are jointly and severally liable, together with
the
company, for any debts and liabilities of the company as are or were
contracted during their respective periods of office.’
The
plaintiffs have pleaded that the first defendant is a personal
liability company.
[3]
However, it appears to me that there has been an arithmetical error
in
paragraph
32.1 of the particulars of claim. In that paragraph the plaintiffs
have pleaded that the difference between the amount
of
R11 930 926.77 and R5 965 463.39 is R5 065 463.39. It is
not: the difference is, in fact, R5 965 463.38. This impacts
upon
the total amount claimed. The correct calculation is thus R5 965
463.38 plus R170 000 plus R2 567 859.38 to give a
total of R8
703 322.76 and not the amount of R7 803 322.77 claimed by the
plaintiffs. This will obviously have to be remedied
by the
plaintiffs by way of an amendment.
[4]
Vermeulen
v Goose Valley Investments (Pty) Ltd
2001 (3) SA 986
(SCA) para 7.
[5]
First
National Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Perry NO and others
2001
(3) SA 960
(SCA);
[2001]
3 All SA 331
(A) para 6.
[6]
Viljoen
v Federated Trust Ltd
1971
(1) SA 750
(O)
at 754E-H.
[7]
Voget
and others v Kleynhans
2003
(2) SA 148
(C)
para 9.
[8]
McKelvey
v Cowan
NO
1980 (4) SA 525
(Z) at 526D-E.
[9]
Evins v
Shield Insurance Co Ltd
1980 (2) SA 814
(A) at 825G;
Makgae
v Sentraboer (Koöperatief) Bpk
1981
(4) SA 239
(T) at 244C-H;
King's
Transport v Viljoen
1954 (1) SA 133
(C) at 138-139.
[10]
McKenzie
v Farmers’ Co-operative Meat Industries Ltd
1922
AD 16.
[11]
Read v
Brown
(1888)
22 QBD 128
; initially followed in
Belfort
v Morton and Co
1920
CPD 589
at 591.
[12]
McKenzie
v Farmers’ Co-operative Meat Industries Ltd
1922
AD 16
at 23.
[13]
Inzinger
v Hofmeyr and others
[2010]
ZAGPJHC 104;
[2010] JOL 26423
(GSJ) para 16.
[14]
JSS
Industrial Coatings CC v Inyatsi Construction (South Africa) (Pty)
Ltd
[2013]
ZAGPJHC 209 para 7.
[15]
There
are two exceptions in the notice of exception that each bear the
number 10, thus there are 11 grounds of exception.
[16]
This is an abbreviated reference to the Regulation of Gatherings Act
205 of 1993.
[17]
Evins v
Shield Insurance Co Ltd
1980 (2) SA 814
(A) at 835B-D.
[18]
Jowell
v Bramwell-Jones and others
1998
(1) SA 836
(W) at 913F-G.
[19]
Ibid
at
902G-H.