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[2023] ZAKZPHC 2
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R.M.D v K.D (16995/22P) [2023] ZAKZPHC 2 (13 January 2023)
FLYNOTES:
PRIMARY RESIDENCE OF CHILD
Family
– Children – Primary residence – Animosity and
feuding between separated parents – Interests
of child –
Daughter aged five and impressionable – In her best
interests to traverse this period while being
cared for by her
mother.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
Case No:
16995/22P
In the matter between:
R[…] M[…]
D[…]
APPLICANT
and
K[…]
D[…]
RESPONDENT
ORDER
The following order is
granted:
1.
The
application of the applicant, R[…] M[…] D[…], is
dismissed with costs.
2.
The
counter application of the respondent, K[…] M[…], is
granted on the following terms:
(a)
The
primary place of residence of the minor child, S[..] F[…] D[…]
(the minor child) shall be with the respondent.
(b)
The
applicant shall be granted reasonable access to, and contact with,
the minor child.
(c)
The
respondent is authorised to enrol the minor child at Atholton Primary
School, Umhlanga from January 2023 as a full-time student;
and
(d)
The
applicant is directed to pay the costs of the counter application.
JUDGMENT
MOSSOP J:
[1]
This
is an ex-tempore judgment.
[2]
This
opposed urgent application is being heard on the last day of the
recess period prior to the commencement of the new court year.
The
matter first came before me on Tuesday this week in the recess motion
court when I was persuaded by counsel that it was so
pressingly
urgent that I should hear it without undue delay. Having agreed to
hear the matter in rushed circumstances, and now
having heard
argument, it would be churlish not to deliver an ex-tempore judgment.
If judgment is to be delayed, then the expedited
hearing of the
matter will have been wasted. Given the circumstances, this judgment
may accordingly not be as thorough as it could
be, and I hope that
the reasoning behind the decision that I have come to is not
obfuscated by the haste with which this judgment
has been prepared
and delivered. Having adopted this approach, however, I do not wish
it to be understood that I agree that the
matter is urgent, as I
shall explain shortly.
[3]
The
applicant seeks an order in the following terms:
‘
(a)
This matter be heard on an urgent
basis, and the time limits and notice periods be dispensed with;
(b)
An
order be granted to the effect that the primary Residence [sic] of
the minor child, S[…] F[…] D[…], be with
the
Applicant, and the Respondent be granted all reasonable access and
contact with the minor child;
(c)
The
minor child is enrolled at and attends Hilltops Pre-Primary School in
Hilton from January 2023 in Grade R on a full time basis;
(d)
Cost
[sic] of the Application, if defended.’
[4]
The
respondent has delivered notice of a counter application in which she
seeks the following relief:
‘
1.
The matter is deemed urgent and the normal forms and service required
by the Uniformed [sic] Rules
of Court are dispensed with;
2.
Primary residence of the minor c child S[..] F[…] D[…]
be with the applicant,
K[…] M[…];
3.
The Respondent, R[…] M[…] D[…] be granted
reasonable access and contact
with the minor child;
4.
The Respondent in the main application is authorised to enrol the
minor child in Atholton
Primary School, Umhlanga from January 2023
and on a full-time basis.
5.
The Respondent be and is hereby ordered to pay the costs of this
application.’
[5]
While
there is a counter application, to avoid confusion I shall throughout
this judgment refer to the father of the minor child
as the applicant
and the mother as the respondent, irrespective of which application
it is that I am referring to.
[6]
From
the nature of the relief claimed it is obvious that this is a dispute
involving a minor child. Despite what I was told about
the urgency of
the matter, this is not a naturally urgent matter. The urgency is
apparently that the minor child is required to
start school next week
and it is undecided at this juncture which school she should attend
as the parties are unable to agree on
this. The parties have known of
the commencement of the school term for a long time. Through their
seemingly endless feuding, they
have created any urgency that may
exist and in so doing have jumped the queue of cases awaiting
adjudication and pressurised the
court to deal with the matter in a
fashion that suits them. But for the fact that the matter does
involve a minor child, I would
have struck the matter off the roll
and allowed it to take its normal course through the rolls. However,
it is now before me, and
I will deal with it because it is in the
best interests of the minor child that a decision regarding her
future be taken given
the inability of her parents to agree with each
other.
[7]
The
Judgment of Solomon is a story from the Hebrew Bible in which Solomon
heard a dispute between two women who both claimed to
be the mother
of a young child. Solomon proposed to the two women that the child be
cut in two, with each woman to receive half
of the child. The woman
who falsely claimed the child as hers entirely approved of this
proposal, while the biological mother of
the child begged that the
sword of Solomon’s soldier, which had been drawn in preparation
for the child to be cleaved in
two, be sheathed, and the child
committed to the care of her rival. Solomon’s proposal led to
the true mother revealing herself
and sacrificing her personal
interests for the best interests of the child.
[8]
Regretfully,
in this matter neither of the parties has demonstrated that they
truly have the best interests of their minor child,
S[…] F[…]
D[…], a young girl born on 27 September 2017 (the minor
child), at heart. Indeed, it appears likely
that both would have
embraced Solomon’s proposal that the minor child be cut in two
rather than yield to the other. The animosity
between them that must
have contributed to the destruction of their relationship has not
abated following the failure of the relationship.
Instead, it appears
that it has intensified. They are both adults yet have not conducted
themselves as adults would. They appear
to have declared war on each
other and disregarded what effect this has on the minor child.
[9]
The
applicant is the natural father of the minor child. The respondent is
her birth mother. The parties never married. They resided
together
for a period but no longer do so. When they lived together, they
lived at Howick, KwaZulu-Natal. When they separated,
which occurred
when the minor child was 14 months old, the respondent moved to La
Mercy on the north coast of this province, a
substantial distance
from Howick. The applicant remains in Howick. The applicant has a
child from a previous relationship, as does
the respondent.
[10]
Mr
Temlett, who appears for the respondent, submitted this morning that
the matter is not a difficult one to decide. I agree that
the issues
in dispute are not complex. Indeed, they are the type of decisions
that parents of minor children throughout the length
and breadth of
this country make as a matter of course on a day-to-day basis.
Unfortunately, the parties, both of whom profess
to be guided by the
best interests of the minor child, are unable to make these
decisions. They require the court to make those
decisions for them.
In
P
v P
,
[1]
the
court stated that:
‘
Determining
what custody arrangement will serve the best interests of the
children in any particular case involves the High Court
making a
value judgment based on its finding of facts in the exercise of its
inherent jurisdiction as the upper guardian of minor
children…’.
[11]
The
two issues that require resolving are:
(a)
Where
should the minor child’s primary place of residence be?
(b)
Where
should the minor child go to school?
[12]
While
two issues are mentioned above, there is, in truth, only a single
issue, namely, where the minor child’s primary place
of
residence should be. Given the fact that the applicant and the
respondent live far apart, it is not feasible that the minor
child
should live with one parent but go to school in an area where the
non-custodial parent resides. Thus, the answer to the first
issue
will determine the answer to the second issue.
[13]
At
the moment, the arrangement between the parties is that they share
the care of the minor child with each other. The minor child
spends
one week with the applicant and then one week with the respondent.
Last year, the applicant enrolled the minor child at
Hilltops
Pre-Primary School (Hilltops), a school in the area in which he
resides. I shall have more to say about this shortly.
The respondent,
on the other hand, did not enrol the minor child in school last year
but has started her on an online educational
programme that can be
accessed from her home. The respondent has since secured agreement in
principle that the minor child will
be accepted at Atholton Primary
School in Umhlanga should she succeed with her counter application.
[14]
Over
the fractious history of the parties’ relationship since they
went their separate ways, the Office of the Family Advocate
has
performed two investigations and delivered two reports on the issue
of who the primary care giver should be. There has been
litigation
between the parties but I do not intend going into that litigation in
any great detail. A psychologist has also investigated
the issue of
the care of the minor child and has prepared a report. The Family
Advocate in both reports prepared by that office
recommended joint
custody of the minor child. No guidance at all was accordingly
provided as to which of the two parents should
be the primary care
giver. The psychologist instructed has not done much better. He has
categorically stated that the decision
is to be made by the court not
by him. In stating this, the psychologist appears to have
misunderstood what was asked of him. He
was not asked to make the
final decision: he was asked to make a recommendation. He did,
however, conclude that the shared residency
arrangement that
currently prevails:
‘…
is
likely to be detrimental to the child and I find no grounds on which
to make such a recommendation.’
I
shall revert to the psychologists report later in this judgment.
[15]
While
the parties appear incapable of agreeing on anything, they are,
surprisingly, both in agreement that the phase of the minor
child’s
life where she migrated between their respective homes on a weekly
basis has come to an end. The minor child now
needs a permanent home
and must attend a school as close as possible to her home.
[16]
Because
of the shared custody of the minor child over a relatively protracted
period, both parties have had the opportunity to strengthen
their
bonds with the minor child. They also both acquired experience in
caring for the minor child. The reports of the Family Advocate
thus
indicate that the minor child is comfortable in both their company.
The applicant and the respondent accordingly both have
the necessary
parenting skills.
[17]
From
the facts disclosed in the papers, it appears that the applicant may
be in a stronger financial position than the respondent.
He owns
certain immovable property that he acquired from an inheritance. He
also has his own house. The respondent does not own
property, nor
does she live in a house: she rents a flat with her mother. She has,
however, rented at the same place for the last
five years and is thus
settled in her accommodation.
[18]
The
applicant claims, further, that he can structure his workday so that
he is able to spend more time with the minor child. He
claims that
this puts him in an advantageous position because the respondent is a
salaried employee and cannot make decisions on
how to structure her
working day. However, in her answering affidavit, the respondent
rejects this and states that her position
has changed, and she will
be able to spend more time working from home, thus giving her more
time with the minor child. Both the
applicant and the respondent have
employed domestic assistants to assist them with the running of their
respective households.
[19]
I
indicated earlier that the parties have declared war on each other.
This has revealed itself in the fact that the applicant discloses,
for a reason best known to himself, that the respondent’s
mother, the minor child’s maternal grandmother, has been
convicted, twice, on charges of fraud. He declines to allow his
daughter to be raised by her granny. This is what he states in
this
regard:
‘
Respondent’s
mother, whom [sic] is put forward as the role model and matriarchal
figure is a convicted criminal (with more
than one conviction at
different times) for crimes that have an underlying necessity for
dishonesty. This is the very same woman
that the Respondent wants our
minor child to spend most of her waking hours with, on a permanent
basis, while she is at work, and
deems this to be better suited to
spending time with me. I am at a loss with regards to this
stand-point, and do not wish for my
child to be effectively raised by
this women [sic], be taught (directly or indirectly by example) how
to act in life, as there
is clearly a complete lack of morals and
ethics in such a household;’
[20]
Not
to be outdone, the respondent has put up indistinct photographs with
her papers which she claims depicts traces of cannabis
that she
alleges the applicant uses. I confess that after scrutinising the
photograph I am not able to see this.
[21]
The
parties seem willing to make any allegation that has the effect of
casting the other in a bad light. It is difficult to understand
how
they believe that this is in the best interests of the minor child.
[22]
I
do, however, acknowledge that the issues of care and contact are
emotive subjects that rarely fail to provoke conflicting emotions.
In
addressing those issues, t
he
best interests of the minor child remain the yardstick against which
everything must be measured. It is the paramount consideration.
In
Shawzin
v Laufer
,
[2]
a matter decided before the advent of the Constitution, the court
stated:
‘
In
view of the circumstances of this case, I think it necessary to make
a few comments on the duty of a Court, sitting as upper-guardian
of
minor children, when it has to resolve a dispute concerning custody.
To the Court, as upper-guardian, the problem of custody
is a somewhat
singular subject, in which there is substantially one norm to
applied, namely the predominant interests of the child.’
[23]
The
Constitution of our country echoes the importance of the concept of
the best interests of the child
.
Section 28(2) of the Constitution reads as follows:
‘
A
child's best interests are of paramount importance in every matter
concerning the child.’
Section
28(2) has been interpreted as creating
an
‘expansive guarantee’ and constitutes, not only a guiding
principle, but also a right.
[3]
The principle of the best interests of the child has also been
incorporated in section 9 of the Children’s Act 38 of 2005
(the
Children’s Act).
[24]
The importance of
protecting the best interests of minor children lies partly in the
fact that they are a vulnerable group of people
that make up a large
constituent part of our society, but they lack the means to act in
their own interests. There are other reasons
as well. The preamble to
the Children’s Act stresses that the protection of the
interests and rights of minor children:
‘…
leads
to a corresponding improvement in the lives of other sections of the
community because it is neither desirable nor possible
to protect
children’s rights in isolation from their families and
communities’.The preamble to the Children’s
Act goes on
to state that, in addition, children must be
protected
and assisted to facilitate the:‘full and harmonious
development’ of their personalities and should be
permitted to grow up in a family environment and in an atmosphere of:
‘happiness, love and understanding’.
[25]
Prior
to the new Constitutional dispensation, courts tended to be guided by
an unwritten rule that dictated that the custody of
young children
should invariably be awarded to the mother. In
Myers
v Leviton
,
[4]
regarded widely as being the high-water mark of judicial conservatism
on custody matters, Price J expressed this philosophy as
follows:
‘
There
is no one who quite takes the place of a child’s mother. There
is no person whose presence and natural affection can
give a child
the sense of security and comfort that a child derives from his own
mother – an important factor in the normal
psychological
development of a healthy child.’
[26]
The
maternal preference rule, however, has never been a rule of law but
has always merely been what it says on the box, a statement
of
judicial preference.
[5]
That
this is so is demonstrated by the fact that:
‘…
for
decades the law in South Africa with regard to the award of custody
is that the best interests of the minor child must prevail.’
[6]
[27]
Times
have, however, moved on and views on parenting have changed. In
V
v V
,
[7]
Foxcroft J acknowledged this change when he stated:
‘
The
old position where the custody of young children was invariably
granted to mothers has changed. As far as young children are
concerned, the pendulum has swung to accommodate the possibility of a
father being a suitable custodian parent to young children.’This
change was brought about because of society reassessing the concept
of ‘mothering’. The word ‘mothering’
is
redolent of gender, but society came to the view that there is a
place for men in the concept of ‘mothering’. Thus,
in
Van
Der Linde v Van Der Linde
,
[8]
Hattingh J stated that he could not accept the universally prevailing
axiom that ‘mothering’ was a component of a woman’s
being only and accepted that it was a part of a man’s being as
well. A man could be as good a ‘mother’ as the
biological
mother and, conversely, a mother could be just as good a ‘father’
as the biological father. The quality
of a parental role is now not
simply to be determined by gender. This view was followed in
Van
Pletzen v Van Pletzen
[9]
.
[28]
There
is thus a line of judicial reasoning that supports the principle that
the quality of parenting is not simply gender based.
Each case,
however, must be determined on the facts that apply to that matter.
The development of the law in this direction does
not mean that
maternity is no longer a factor to be considered by a court. In
Ex
parte Critchfield and Another
,
[10]
Willis J stated as follows:
‘
In
my view, given the fact of pregnancy or, more particularly, the facts
of the dynamics of pregnancy, it would not amount to unfair
discrimination (ie it would not be unconstitutional) for a court to
have regard to maternity as a factor in making a determination
as to
the custody of young children. On the other hand, it would amount to
unfair discrimination (and, correspondingly, be unconstitutional)
if
a court were to place undue (and unfair) weight upon this factor when
balancing it against other relevant factors. Put simply,
it seems to
me that the only significant consequence of the Constitution when it
comes to custody disputes is that the Court must
be astute to remind
itself that maternity can never be, willy-nilly, the only
consideration of any importance in determining the
custody of young
children. This, as I have indicated above, has for a long time been
the position in our common law.’
[29]
In
an ideal world, it would be in the best interests of the minor child
if she continued to form part of an intact, united, loving
family
where her needs were catered for and where she felt secure. In such
circumstances she would be given the best opportunity
to develop into
a well-balanced and responsible member of society who will be able,
one day, to contribute to her society. That
the minor child is not in
ideal circumstances in this matter is obvious. The fact that the once
happy home that she formed part
of is no longer in existence cannot
be avoided. Inexorably, life continues, and the best must be made of
it. It is now in the best
interests of the minor child that she
matures in a peaceful, dignified environment where her estranged
parents behave like adults
and show respect for each other and do not
expose her to any disputes that may exist between them. Under no
circumstances is the
minor child to be manipulated to extract an
advantage for the one parent at the other’s expense.
[30]
In
my view there are indications that the applicant has attempted to do
exactly that. As previously mentioned, last year he enrolled
the
minor child at Hilltops. She would have been four years old when this
occurred. The bizarre thing about this is that the applicant,
by
agreement, only had the minor child with him every alternate week.
The minor child accordingly only went to school every second
week. It
is difficult to understand what benefit that could possibly hold for
her. At the lowest level, it must have been confusing
for her. On a
higher level, she would constantly be behind her fellow pupils, which
may have affected her self-confidence. The
respondent submits that it
was a stratagem employed by the applicant to try and establish a
status quo that he could insist upon
retaining when the question of
who should be appointed as her primary care giver was brought before
the court, as both parties
both knew would inevitably occur because
of the positions that they had adopted on the issue. In other words,
that it was a calculated
ploy invoked by the applicant to strengthen
his position as custodian parent. The applicant responds to that
allegation as follows:
‘
The
child needed, in my opinion, interaction, and preparation for her
future schooling career, and the decision was made solely
with S[…]’s
best interests in mind, and certainly not my own future schemes, as
the Respondent seems to project;’
Implicit
in this explanation is that the applicant must have believed that
while the minor child was with him, she lacked interaction
with
others. It is also evident therefrom that the decision was made
without reference to the respondent, in breach of an order
of the
Lion’s River Children’s Court which provided, inter alia,
that:
‘
The
parties shall consult with one another in respect of all major
decisions before such decision is taken, such as the minor child’s
educational, medical, religious and cultural needs.’
In
this latter regard, the respondent states that:
‘…
the
Applicant informed me that he had made a unilateral decision to place
S[…] in school, and that she had attended school
that Friday.’
[31]
In
my view, there is merit in the respondent’s submission that the
enrolment of the minor child is a stratagem employed by
the applicant
as I can discern no other purpose behind such a strange arrangement.
I am fortified in this conclusion by the fact
that in a report
prepared by the Office of the Family Advocate dated 31 August 2022,
one of the reasons advanced by the applicant
as a ground for him to
be awarded care of the minor child was the following:
‘
He
has already enrolled the child at Hilltops Pre-primary school.’
[32]
There
is another aspect of the applicant’s approach to this matter
that troubles me. It is to do with the respondent’s
mother. I
have no specific knowledge of the offences that the respondent’s
mother committed let alone the circumstances under
which they were
committed. I do not know when they were committed. I also do not know
whether she has been rehabilitated. I am
certainly not able to
endorse the applicant’s insulting views that the respondent’s
household as it is presently constituted
lacks morals or ethics.
[33]
The
applicant has spoken in disgraceful and disrespectful terms about the
respondent’s mother. I have already narrated an
extract from
the applicant’s founding affidavit earlier in this judgment. I
remain unconvinced that it was necessary, or
relevant, to raise the
issue of her criminal convictions. But even if I am wrong in this
regard and it was correct to do so, it
ought to have been raised in a
more measured, less offensive manner. I am simply unable to accept
that it follows that a criminal
conviction, or convictions, renders
the respondent’s mother unworthy of having a place in her
granddaughter’s life.
[11]
[34]
While
the applicant has been scathing in his views of the respondent’s
mother, I take a different view on the matter. Support
systems are
vital when it comes to rearing children. It is not possible for a
single parent to always be in attendance when required
and the
presence of an older relative is often a great boon for such a single
parent. Rather than view her presence in the respondent’s
and
minor child’s life as a negative feature, I view it as a
positive factor.
[35]
The
psychologist who prepared a report and the issues, Mr. Clive Willows,
performed a psychological assessment of the parties. As
regards the
applicant he concluded as follows:
‘
Within
relationships he may be demanding of others but will resent demands
being placed on him. It is likely that he would want
circumstances to
be as he chooses and to project an image of being correct and
resistant to criticism.There is evidence of a history
of anti-social
behaviour and repressed hostility. He perceives himself to be
socially withdrawn.’
With
regard to the respondent, Mr Willows concluded as follows:
‘
The
clinical profile raises no concerns regarding a specific pathological
condition. She presents with mild symptoms of depression
and somatic
complaints.She has suspicious, distrustful thoughts but these are
probably associated with her current circumstances
rather than being
of a pervasive or extreme nature.She tends to isolate herself
socially which may be due to her distrusting thoughts.’
[36]
These
finding by Mr Willows tends to confirm the respondent’s
complaints that the applicant is unresponsive to requests made
of
him, ignores inputs she provides and is content to act on his own
accord irrespective of any orders or agreements that bind
the
parties. In my view, the potential for further conflict in the future
looms large if he is awarded sole care of the minor child.
[37]
In
coming to a decision, it is impossible to not attach any weight to
the age of the minor child. She has just turned five years
old. She
is entirely dependent on her care giver for her survival and will
continue to be so for some considerable time. She is
also at an
impressionable age. In my view, it would be in her best interests to
traverse this period of her life whilst being cared
for by the
respondent. As Maya AJA stated in
F
v F
[12]
:
‘
Despite
the constitutional commitment to equality, the division of parenting
roles in South Africa remains largely gender-based.
It is still
predominantly women who care for children and that reality appears to
be reflected in many custody arrangements upon
divorce.’
[38]
Given
the lack of co-operation that exists between the parties it is
inevitable that there should be many disputes of fact on the
papers.
I have been careful not to simply resolve those disputes using the
approach advocated in
Plascon-Evans
Paints (Tvl) Ltd. v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
.
[13]
This is because adopting such an approach may incorrectly result in
disputes concerning the minor child being resolved by way of
an
assumption rather than by way of an established fact.
[39]
This
morning, Ms Franke who appears for the applicant, handed up a draft
order that proposed to deal with the matter on an interim
basis. I
would be requested to grant an order that would apply in the interim
and the parties could revisit the issues at a later
date in the
future. I have considered whether there is any merit in this. I think
there is not. The whole basis for the bringing
of the application in
the first instance was for a final decision to be taken on where the
minor child should have her principal
place of residence and which
school she should go to. To grant an interim order would undo that.
Finality is what the parties sought.
That is what they shall get.
[40]
After
considering all the competing issues and the personalities involved,
and notwithstanding the fact of the move away from the
maternal
preference rule, I have formed the view that it is in the best
interests of the minor child that her primary place of
residence
should be with the respondent. It follows that the respondent must be
enrolled at the school proposed by the respondent,
namely Atholton
Primary School.
[41]
The
applicant’s role in the minor child’s life must, however,
continue to be acknowledged and honoured. He has previously
enjoyed
liberal contact with the minor child. He will not be able to enjoy
the same contact given the order that I intend making
and the
respondent should be sensitive to his needs and ensure that he enjoys
as much contact as possible. Indeed, I would urge
both parties to
take a moment to reflect on the status of their relationship and to
try and improve it. Nothing can change the
fact that they both
contributed to produce the miracle of nature that is their daughter.
They will have to have dealings with each
other for many years to
come. Their relationship would be enhanced and would be more
tolerable if they interacted as friends rather
than as embittered
former partners.
[42]
I
accordingly grant the following order:
1.
The
application of the applicant, R[…] M[…] D[…], is
dismissed with costs.
2.
The
counter application of the respondent, K[…] M[…], is
granted on the following terms:
(a)
The
primary place of residence of the minor child, S[..] F[…] D[…]
(the minor child) shall be with the respondent.
(b)
The
applicant shall be granted reasonable access to, and contact with,
the minor child.
(c)
The
respondent is authorised to enrol the minor child at Atholton Primary
School, Umhlanga from January 2023 as a full-time student;
and
(d)
The
applicant is directed to pay the costs of the counter application.
MOSSOP
J
APPEARANCES
Counsel
for the applicant
: Ms S Franke
Instructed
by:
: Skye Forsyth Attorneys
Unit
16, Rotunda Centre
1
Cedara Road
Hilton
Counsel
for the respondent
: Mr J W Temlett
Instructed
by
:
Brookes Attorneys.
2
Charles Way
Kloof
Date
of Hearing
: 13 January 2023
Date
of Judgment
: 13 January 2023
[1]
P
v P
2007
(5) SA 94
(SCA)
para [14].
[2]
Shawzin
v Laufer
1968 (4) SA 657
(AD) 662G-H.
[3]
S
v M
(Centre for Child Law as Amicus Curiae)
[2007]
ZACC 18
;
2008
(3) SA 232
(CC)
para [22].
[4]
Myers
v Leviton
1949
(1) SA 203 (TPD) 214.
[5]
Bashford
v Bashford
1957
(1) SA 21 (N) 24.
[6]
Ex
parte Critchfield and Another
1999
(3) SA 132
(W) 142B-C.
[7]
V
v V
1998
(4) SA 169
(C) 176F-G.
[8]
Van
Der Linde v Van Der Linde
1996
(3) SA 509
(O) 515B-C.
[9]
Van
Pletzen v Van Pletzen
1998 (4) SA 95 (O) 101 B-E.
[10]
Ex
parte Critchfield and Another
1999 (3) SA 132
(W) 143A-E.
[11]
Obviously,
I do not include a person who has a criminal conviction for sexual
offences involving young children.
[12]
F v F
2006 (3) SA 42
(SCA);
[2006]
1 All SA 571 (SCA)
para
12.
[13]
Plascon-Evans
Paints (Tvl) Ltd. v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984]
ZASCA 51
;
[1984] 2 All SA 366
(A);
1984 (3) SA 623
;
1984 (3) SA 620
(21 May 1984).