Blakes Maphanga Inc. v Outsurance Insurance Company Ltd (144/2009) [2010] ZASCA 19; 2010 (4) SA 232 (SCA) ; [2010] 3 All SA 383 (SCA) (19 March 2010)

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
>>
2010
>>
[2010] ZASCA 19
|

|

Blakes Maphanga Inc. v Outsurance Insurance Company Ltd (144/2009) [2010] ZASCA 19; 2010 (4) SA 232 (SCA) ; [2010] 3 All SA 383 (SCA) (19 March 2010)

Links to summary

THE
SUPREME COURT
OF
APPEAL
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case No: 144/2009
In the matter between:
BLAKES MAPHANGA INCORPORATED
Appellant
and
OUTSURANCE INSURANCE COMPANY LIMITED
Respondent
Neutral citation:
Blakes Maphanga Inc v Outsurance
(144/09)
[2010] ZASCA 19
(19 March  2010)
Coram:
NAVSA, MALAN, SHONGWE, TSHIQI JJA and MAJIEDT AJA
Heard:
5 March 2010
Delivered: 19 March 2010
Summary:
Attorney and client – fees – set-off against
moneys collected – whether fees liquidated or taxation necessary.
______________________________________________________________________________
ORDER
On appeal from:
North Gauteng High Court (Pretoria)
(Hartzenberg, Webster and Vilakazi JJ sitting as Full Court):
The appeal is dismissed with costs including the costs of two
counsel.
______________________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
MALAN JA (NAVSA, SHONGWE, TSHIQI JJA and MAJIEDT AJA concurring):
[1] This is an appeal, with the leave of this court, against a
judgment of the full court of the North Gauteng High Court upholding
the decision of Van Rooyen AJ in the High Court ordering the
appellant, Blakes Maphanga Incorporated, a firm of attorneys, to pay
to the respondent, their client, a certain amount of monies collected
on its behalf together with interest and costs.
[2] This case concerns the question whether an attorney may set off
against a claim by the client for payment of monies, collected
on its
behalf, fees owing by the client that were disputed and not taxed.
The appellant represented the respondent in close to four
hundred
litigious matters. On 4 March 2005 the respondent terminated the
appellant’s mandate and demanded, pursuant to the mandate
given to
the appellant, that monies collected on its behalf be paid over. The
appellant sought to ‘invoke’ set-off. It asserted
that it was
entitled to set off against the fees owing to it the monies so
collected. The question for decision is whether the fees
claimed are
liquidated amounts capable of being set off. This, in turn, depends
on whether taxation is required to render the fees,
which were
disputed, liquidated.
[3] The respondent is a short-term insurance company. It instructed
the appellant to represent it. Their relationship was governed
by an
oral agreement which provided for the remuneration of the appellant
in accordance with a fee structure and tariff. According
to the
respondent, all monies collected by the appellant on behalf of the
respondent had to be paid over without any deduction or
set-off.
Separate monthly accounts in respect of all work done and
disbursements made had to be rendered to the respondent and payment
had to be made within 30 days of delivery of the accounts.
[4] It is in dispute whether the mandate in terms of which the
appellant was appointed included a proviso, as alleged by the
appellant,
that set-off of the appellant’s fees against monies
collected for the respondent would be excluded only where the
respondent paid
the appellant’s monthly accounts timeously. Nor is
it clear what the terms of any ad hoc arrangement were. Also disputed
is whether
the terms of the mandate would endure after its
termination.
[5] When the respondent cancelled the appellant’s mandate it
requested the appellant to hand over all the relevant files to its
new attorneys. Negotiations between the parties followed, leading to
the appellant’s message to the respondent of 7 March 2005
that the
appellant was engaged in closing the files and that it would attend
to forthcoming trials during March and April. It stated
further:
‘
We have commenced the necessary administration and
wish to advise you that due to the enormous amount of administration
involved in
closure of the files, that we will be debiting a closure
fee of R 150 excluding Vat. The amount includes the courtesy of
making
your attorneys a complete duplicate file for collection upon
final payment of your account. ‘
[6] The respondent replied on 10 March 2005 by calling into question
the necessity of making duplicate files, undertaking to pay
disbursements made by the appellant on behalf of the respondent, but
disputing the R150 closing fee per file charged by the appellant
and
reserving the right to refer any fees that may be disputed to the
relevant Law Society. In addition the respondent called for
delivery
of the files by no later than 16 March 2005. In a subsequent letter
of 23 March 2005 the respondent intimated that the reason
for the
termination of the appellant’s mandate was, inter alia, that its
fees were no longer competitive.
[7] The appellant alleged that during the first half of 2005 the
respondent was in arrears with the payment of fees and imposed a
moratorium on new work to be given to the appellant. According to the
appellant, by February 2005, the respondent’s accounts were
in
arrears for a period of 180 days. The respondent was thus not meeting
its obligation to make payment within 30 days of receipt
of
statements of account. The appellant thereupon resolved, in January
2005, to set off the amounts owing for fees against amounts
collected
on behalf of the appellant. The appellant asserted that it was
entitled not only to invoke set-off but also to enforce
its lien to
retain the files until it was paid. The appellant rendered its final
accounts to the respondent under cover of a letter
dated 18 April
2005 which was received on 21 April 2005. In this letter the
appellant stated:
‘
We further confirm that the balance of the remaining
files which have not been handed over either to your offices or to TP
Mabasa
Attorneys will be available for collection against settlement
of our accounts.
Please note that should you have any queries and/or
disputes with respect to our accounts or any charges levied, we are
happy to proceed
to have the same taxed and undertake in this respect
to refund any differences which may accrue in your favour. The
converse obviously
applies, in that should we for any reason tax any
amount in excess of accounts rendered, we reserve the right to
recover same from
you.’
[8] The number of accounts received by the respondent amounted to 389
and the amount claimed by the appellant to R300 471,34. The
respondent, on the other hand, alleged that the agreed fee structure
and tariff had not been adhered to and that, if the fee structure
and
tariff had been followed, only an amount of R 66 794,78 would have
been owing to the appellant. The latter amount was paid to
the
appellant and the
balance,
an amount of R 233 676,56, was paid into the trust account of the
respondent’s attorneys pending the establishment of the
appellant’s
entitlement to the amounts claimed. In its letter of 26 April 2005
the respondent’s attorneys wrote:
‘
It would appear that you have, in all matters,
charged for making copies of the files for withdrawing as attorneys
of record and debited
an amount which we presume to be a closing fee,
which you describe as “to future correspondence and telephone
calls”. Our clients
deny that you are entitled to payment of these
amounts and denied liability therefore as far back as their letter of
10 March 2005.
We attach hereto a detailed spreadsheet detailing the
payments made into your account and the outstanding balance in each
matter,
which our clients are not prepared to pay. It must be pointed
out that in certain instances, there is a balance brought forward
which
is not adequately explained or substantiated and our client is
not prepared to pay these amounts before they are able to evaluate
them. You will note from the spreadsheet that there is an amount of R
233 676,56 that our clients believe they are not liable for.…
Our client is accordingly not prepared to pay the
balance of R 233 676,56 that you claim and have paid this amount into
our trust
account, pending the establishment of your entitlement to
the amounts you claim, either by way of agreement or taxation. Once
the
amounts payable to you have been agreed or taxed, we undertake to
forthwith make payment to you….
We note your intention to do a set-off, but record that
our client’s express agreement with you was that no set-off would
be done
and that you would account to our clients for all amounts
recovered on their behalf. Our clients require you to adhere to the
arrangement
and account to them.’
[9] The appellant responded by letter dated 28 April 2005:
‘
[P]lease note that the operation of set-off has been
applied. In the circumstances, you are requested to collect the
remainder of
your files by no later than 13h30 on 28 April 2005.
Please note that there is a balance due to Blakes Maphanga in the
amount of R
12 942,46 … which amount is due and payable. A number
of service providers, are still rendering their accounts to our
offices and
in the light thereof this balance will no doubt increase.
We will submit further accounts to your offices at month-end….
[S]hould you dispute any further amount, we suggest that
the invoices be presented for taxation in due course. At this stage,
we will
be able to establish whether reimbursements are due to either
party, alternatively whether any further fees are due to our
offices.’
[10] The respondent took issue with the contentions raised by the
appellant concerning set-off by referring in its attorney’s letter
of 29 April 2005 to two disputes; ie the one relating to the amount
due and the other whether the appellant was entitled to rely
on
set-off. After referring to rule 68.6.2.1 of the Rules of the Law
Society of the Transvaal it stated:
‘
[W]e fail to see how you can unilaterally decide what
“the amount due” to you adds up to in view of the dispute that
there exists.
Your conduct in unilaterally deciding the true extent
of the amount due is nothing more and nothing less than
parate
executie
i.e. execution without a Court
order….
[W]e are further instructed that it was specifically
agreed at the inception of the relationship that there had been
between yourselves
and Outsurance, that all monies collected on their
behalf would be paid over without applying set-off and that any fees
and disbursements
due to you would be settled separately.’
[11] It is common cause that none of the appellant’s bills was
taxed. In view of the disputes between the parties the respondent
launched proceedings for payment of the amount of R 233 676,56
(alternatively R 220 734,10) being monies collected by the appellant
on behalf of the respondent and held in its trust account. It is
common cause that the appellant delivered to the respondent batches
of statements of account on 23, 24 and 25 March 2005. The last batch
of statements of account was received on 21 April 2005. The
appellant
raised set-off as a defence claiming that its debt to the respondent
was extinguished. The respondent contended that an
attorney’s claim
for fees is not liquidated and thus not capable of being set off
until such time as they have been taxed. The
respondent further
contended that if the court were to find that an attorney’s fees
constituted a liquidated debt notwithstanding
the lack of taxation
the matter had to be referred to evidence in regard to the disputes
concerning the terms of the mandate and
the quantum of the fees
owing.
[12] In the high court, Van Rooyen AJ approached the matter on the
basis of the allegations made by the appellant in its answering
affidavit. He regarded as the real issue the question whether the
appellant was entitled to invoke set-off ‘as against monies [the
appellant] held in trust on behalf of [the respondent] at the time
its services were terminated, alternatively at the time set-off
was
applied.’ He said that a bill of costs was only proof of the cause
of action and that ‘taxation is merely a mechanism of
proof and not
a condition precedent to the operation of set-off. It follows that
set-off will operate in the absence of taxation,
provided the debt is
liquidated.’ He accepted, as alleged by the appellant, that the
agreement between the parties entailed that,
if payment of fees was
not made within 30 days of the rendering of the statement of account,
the appellant would be entitled to set
off fees owing to it against
monies collected for the respondent. However, because set-off had
been ‘applied’ before expiry of
the 30 day period (the last
account was received on 21 April 2005 and set-off ‘invoked’ by
the letter of 28 April 2005) no set-off
was effected. He in effect
found that the 30 day period allowed for the payment of fees survived
the termination of the agreement
and ordered the appellant to pay
over the monies collected on the respondent’s behalf.
[13] On appeal the full court held that it was settled law that
set-off could only operate where two liquidated claims existed that
could be set off against another. Hartzenberg J remarked that the
courts in a long line of cases held that claims by attorneys for
their fees became liquidated upon taxation. That, he said, was still
the position. The mere fact, he said, that fees may be owing
in terms
of an agreed tariff did not have, as a necessary result, that the
claim was liquidated. Where the client disputed the fees
the claim
for them was not liquidated. Since the amount of the fees payable in
this matter was in dispute the appellant’s claim,
had it sued for
payment, could have been met by a dilatory plea for the case to be
held over pending taxation.
[14] It is trite that where two persons are mutually indebted to each
other their obligations may be extinguished by set-off. Where
debts
in the same amount are set off, mutual extinction of the debts occur;
but where the amounts differ the smaller debt extinguishes
the larger
pro tanto. Set-off presupposes mutual obligations between two persons
in their personal capacities.
1
Thus, where a debt is owed to or by a person in a ‘representative’
capacity it cannot be set off against a debt owed to or by
that
person in his or her personal capacity. An example is where a debt is
owed to a person in his or her capacity as a trustee.
2
In the present case the question is thus not whether the fees owing
to the appellant may be set-off against the monies collected
and held
in trust but rather whether the fees debited and the monies
transferred from the trust account to the appellant’s business
account may be set off.
3
Since the papers are silent on this aspect, I shall assume that the
set-off invoked in this matter concerns debts owing to the parties
in
their personal capacities.
[15] Although set-off operates ipso iure
4
its operation may be excluded by agreement.
5
In this case set-off was purportedly effected by the appellant
deciding to ‘invoke’ set-off pursuant to the fees agreement
between
them. Set-off can only take place if both debts are
liquidated in the sense that they are capable of speedy and easy
proof.
6
It was submitted on behalf of the appellant that a claim by an
attorney for fees is a liquidated claim in the sense that it is
capable
of speedy and easy proof. It relied on the judgment in
Lester
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Narshi
7
that was approved of in
Fatti’s Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd v
Vendick Spares (Pty) Ltd
8
in the following terms:
‘
In the last-mentioned case [ie
Lester’s
case] the Court regarded a claim in respect of repairs on all the
facts before it as a liquidated claim, even though evidence had
to be
led on the necessity of doing the work, the nature of the work done
and the reasonableness of the charge therefor. All the
factors
connected therewith were readily ascertainable and proof in regard
thereto was ready to hand.’
In
Fatti’s
the court continued:
9
‘
If the claim is based on a contract, the
probabilities are that its existence and character can be proved to
the satisfaction of the
Court speedily and promptly. When for
instance a contract of sale is concluded and there is no express
agreement as to the price
of the article sold, it is an implied term
of the contract that a reasonable price will be paid for the article,
that is to say a
price ordinarily charged by persons who deal in such
articles at the time and place of the sale. Similarly, where a
contract for
the rendering of services is concluded and the parties
do not agree as to the remuneration to be paid therefor, it is an
implied
term of the contract that a reasonable remuneration will be
paid for such services; such remuneration depends on what is regarded
as reasonable in that particular trade or profession. In our
organised society with businesses, trades and professions organised
as they are it is normally a matter of no difficulty to determine the
usual and current market price of articles sold and the reasonable
remuneration for services rendered. These are matters which as a rule
can be ascertained speedily and promptly.’
[16] Although these considerations have general application a
different approach in relation to attorney’s fees evolved. The
relationship
between an attorney and client is based on an agreement
of
mandatum
entitling the attorney, in the absence of an
agreement to the contrary, to payment of fees on performance of the
mandate or the termination
of the relationship.
10
In
Benson
11
the court said:
‘
But what is clear is that by the end of the last
century it had become an established practice that the Court did not
undertake the
task of
inter alia
quantifying the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees and that taxation
of such a bill of costs was left to the taxing officer. This
did not
entail, however, that an attorney could not sue or obtain judgment on
an untaxed bill. Although … the Court assumed a discretion
to order
a bill to be taxed, and although a Court would not allow an action to
proceed if the client insisted on taxation, there
was no reason why
judgment could not be given for an attorney if the client was
satisfied with the
quantum
of the bill but defended the action on some other ground.’
[17] A client is entitled to taxation of his or her attorney’s
account. It follows that the amount of a disputed bill of costs
is
not liquidated. It is not capable of ‘easy and speedy proof’
.This was decided in so many words in
Arie Kgosi v Kgosi Aaron
Moshette &
others
12
where Wessels JP said:
‘
An untaxed bill of costs is not an absolute and
present debt, for it is one the exact amount of which is still to be
ascertained,
as it depends on the arbitrarium of the Taxing Master.
It cannot, therefore, be set off as against a liquidated debt.’
In
Tredoux v Kellerman
13
Griesel J dealt with an application for summary judgment for the
amount of the fees of an attorney and counsel. He had to consider
whether the amounts claimed were ‘liquidated’ as required by rule
32 of the Uniform Rules of Court. He said:
‘
A liquidated amount of money is an amount which is
either agreed upon or which is capable of “speedy and prompt
ascertainment”
or, put differently, where ascertainment of the
amount in issue is “a mere matter of calculation”. In my view the
plaintiffs’
claims in question do not fall in this category: they
involve an enquiry into the nature and extent of the professional
services
rendered, the reasonableness of fees charged, and so on.
These are not mere matters of calculation; they are matters for
taxation,
which fall within the compass of duties of the taxing
master. It is that official, and not the court, who must determine
the reasonableness
of professional fees charged by legal
practitioners . . . .
In any event, there is authority for the proposition
that an untaxed bill of costs does not constitute a liquidated amount
in money
– at least in circumstances, as here, where the bill is
being disputed . . . .
Even if I were to err in coming to this conclusion, and
even if the plaintiff’s claims were to be regarded as liquidated
amounts,
it has authoritatively been held that a party cannot recover
his or her costs in the absence of prior agreement or taxation . . .
.’
[18] The appellant stated in its letter of 18 April 2005 that it was
‘happy to proceed’ with taxation. It was thus aware of the
dispute relating to the accounts well before set-off was ‘invoked’.
In addition, it was known that the appellant’s closing
fee was
disputed as well as the question whether the appellant adhered to the
tariff agreed upon. The amounts claimed as fees were
thus not
liquidated and would only have become liquidated on taxation. The
fact that the fees may be determined in another manner
as contended
by counsel for the respondent is of no consequence. The fees will be
determined by the taxing master and not by the
court.
14
The duties of a taxing master include the duty to determine whether
costs ‘have been incurred or increased through over-caution,
negligence or mistake, or by payment of a special fee to an advocate,
or special charges and expenses to witnesses or to other persons
or
by other unusual expenses’.
15
It is his duty to ‘decide whether the services have been performed
and he should not close his eyes and ears to evidence which
may be
readily available to show that any work alleged to have been done was
in fact not done.’
16
Even where an agreement exists between an attorney and client a
taxing master is empowered to satisfy him or herself that fees
related
to work done and authorised were reasonable.
17
There are sound reasons for a client’s right to insist on taxation
and to regard the amount a bill of costs that has not been taxed
as
not liquidated. The question whether a debt may be capable of speedy
ascertainment is ‘a matter left for determination to the
individual
discretion of the Judge’.
18
In the case of a disputed bill of costs in litigious matters,
however, the reasonableness is to be determined by the taxing master
and not by the court.
[19] It follows that set-off as contended for by the appellant could
not occur. There is thus no basis for a referral of the matter
to
evidence. The appeal should thus be dismissed. The following order is
made:
The appeal is dismissed with costs including the costs of two
counsel.
_______________
F R Malan
Judge of Appeal
APPEARANCES
APPELLANT: DC Fisher SC (with her CS von Castricum)
Instructed by Blakes Maphanga Inc, Randburg
Honey Attorneys, Bloemfontein
RESPONDENT: PJ Vorster SC (with him WW Geyser)
Instructed by Weavind & Weavind, New Muckleneuk
Matsepes Attorneys, Bloemfontein
1
S van der Merwe, L F van Huysteen, M F B Reinecke and G F Lubbe
Contract General Principles
3 ed (2007) p 546ff.
2
De Beer v Kotze
1913 CPD 252
at 254.
3
Rule 69.5 of the Rules of the Law Society of the Transvaal (
GG
7164, 1 August 1980 as amended by
GG
16511, 7 July 1995 and
GG
17190, 17 May 1996 and
GG
17617, 22 November 1996)
provides: ‘A firm shall ensure that withdrawals from its trust
banking account are made only – 69.5.2
as transfers to its
business banking account, provided that such transfers shall be made
only in respect of money claimed to be
due to the firm.’ E A L
Lewis
Legal Ethics A Guide to Professional Conduct for South
African Attorneys
(1982) p 276 suggests that ‘the attorney
must not make such deductions and withdrawals from the trust money
unless he has good
reason to be certain that the fees cannot be
successfully challenged. In any instance where there is uncertainty
the money should
remain in the trust account until certainty is
achieved.’
4
Schierhout v Union Government (Minister of Justice)
1926 AD
286
at 289-90.
5
Herrigel NO v Bon Roads Construction Co (Pty) Ltd & another
1980 (4) SA 669
(SWA) at 676G-H;
Altech Data (Pty) Ltd v MB
Technologies (Pty) Ltd
1998 (3) SA 748
(W) at 761B-G.
6
Treasurer-General v Van Vuren
1905 TS 582
at 589;
Fatti’s
Engineering Co (Pty) Ltd v Vendick Spares (Pty) Ltd
1962 (1) SA
736
(T) at
738F-G.
7
1951 (2) SA 464
(C) at 470.
8
A
t 738G-H (see n 6 above).
9
At 739C-F.
10
Benson & another v Walters & others
1984 (1) SA 73
(A) at 83A-C. See
Deeb v Pinter; Shane & Stoler v Munro-Scott
t/a House of Bernadi
1984 (2) SA 507
(W) at 509A-D;
Truter,
Crous, Wiggill & Vos v Udwin
1981 (4) SA 68
(T) at 73C-D;
Goodricke & Son v Auto Protection Insurance Co Ltd (In
Liquidation)
1968 (1) SA 717
(A) at 722H-723B.
11
Benson
at 85B-D. See
Mouton & another v Martine
1968
(4) SA 738
(T) at 742; G B van Zyl
The Judicial Practice of
South Africa Volume II
3 ed (1923) p 965;
Herbstein and Van
Winsen The Civil Practice of the Supreme Court of South Africa
4 ed
(1997) p 736. Rule 4(2) of the rules of the Magistrates’
Courts Rules of Court states that ‘no judicial officer [ie a
magistrate]
shall … tax any bill of costs’.
12
1921 TPD 524
at 526. Mason J added at 526 that ‘as soon as the
client says I am not ready to pay, the attorney must have his bill
taxed; and
as soon as the question of taxation arises, the amount
depends in nearly every instance on the discretion of the taxing
officer.’
This approach has been followed consistently:
Dumah
v KlerksdorpTown Council
1951 (4) SA 519
(T) where Price J said
at 521G-H: ‘It was common cause between counsel that until these
costs had been taxed, set off could not
operate. It is unnecessary
to quote authority for this proposition. There is no lack of such
authority.’ Further
Haine v Podlashuc and Nicolson
1933 AD
104
at 111;
Van Aswegen v Pienaar & andere
1967 (3) SA
677
(O) at 678G-H;
Gramowsky v Steyn
1922 SWA 48 at 55-56;
Baskin & Barnett v Barnard
1928 CPD 58
at 60;
National
Bank v Marks & Aaronson
1923 TPD 69
at 71;
Lovell v
Paxinos & Plotkin; In re Union Shopfitters v Hansen
1937 WLD
84
at 86;
Wolhuterskop Beleggings (Edms) Bpk v Bloemfontein
Engineering Works (Pty) Ltd
1965 (2) SA 122
(O) at 123H;
Tredoux
v Kellerman
2010 (1) SA 160
(C) paras 18-21. See further RH
Christie
The Law of Contract in South Africa
5 ed 478; M
Jacobs, N E J Ehlers
Law of Attorneys’ Costs and
Taxation Thereof
(1979) p 29; H J Erasmus
Superior
Court Practice
p B1-213 n 4; E A L Lewis
Legal Ethics
p
276; D H Sampson
Randell and Bax The South African Attorneys
Handbook
3 ed (1983) p 159. The only authority to the contrary
is J C de Wet and A H van Wyk
Wyk Die Suid-Afrikaanse
Kontraktereg en Handelsreg
5 ed (1992) p 279 n 148 who remark
with reference to some of the above cases that it seems ‘tog of
koste danig gou getakseer kan
word as dit nodig is.’
13
P
aras 18-23 (see n 12 above). Cf
Santam
Ltd v Ethwar
[1998] ZASCA 102
;
1999 (2) SA 244
(SCA) at
253B-D.
14
In
Melamed & Hurwitz Inc v Goldberg
(686/2007)
[2009]
ZASCA 15
(19 March 2009) this court, apparently by agreement between
the parties, referred the determination of an attorney’s fees to

the Law Society. The point is that the court did not itself
determine the fees.
15
Rule 70(3) and cf
Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail & another v
Witter
2008 (6) SA 549
(SCA)
[2008] ZASCA 95
paras 14 ff.
16
Botha v Themistocleous
1966 (1) SA 107
(T) 110C-D. See
Maasdorp and Smit v Sullivan
1964 (4) SA 2
(E) at 3D-B.
17
Malcolm Lyons & Munro v Abro & another
1991 (3) SA
464
(W) at 469E-F.
18
Lester Investments (Pty) Ltd v Narshi
1951 (2) SA 464
(C) at
470E-F;
Neves Builders & Decorators v De la Cour
1985 (1)
SA 540
(C);
Fatti’s Engineering Company (Pty) Ltd v Vendick
Spares (Pty) Ltd
1962 (1) SA 376
(T);
S Dreyer and Sons
Transport v General Services
1976 (4) SA 922
(C) at 924G-H.