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2023
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[2023] ZAFSHC 459
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Yika v National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa (2217/2022) [2023] ZAFSHC 459 (20 November 2023)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable:
YES/NO
Of
Interest to other Judges: YES/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES/NO
Case
number: 2217/2022
In
the matter between:
SAMUEL
MOKETE YIKA
PLAINTIFF
and
NATIONAL
UNION OF METALWORKERS
OF
SOUTH AFRICA
DEFENDANT
CORAM:
NAIDOO, J
HEARD
ON:
14, 15 and 17 NOVEMBER 2023
DELIVERED
ON:
20 November 2023
JUDGMENT
[1]
The plaintiff issued summons against the defendant, National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa
(NUMSA) for the payment of damages for
past and future loss of income. The relief claimed in the summons
reads,
inter alia
, as follows:
“
1.
Payment of R3 660 033.90,
2.
Interest at a rate of 7.25% per annum a tempora morae,
3.
Costs of suit.”
Adv Mashinini appeared
for the plaintiff and Adv S Dlali appeared for NUMSA in this court.
[2]
The background to the matter, as pleaded in the Particulars of Claim,
is that, the plaintiff was
employed as a security guard by EFS
Security Company in Bethlehem, Free State Province, until he was
dismissed on 6 July 2020,
which dismissal he claims to be unfair. The
plaintiff alleges that he was a member in good standing of NUMSA at
the time of his
dismissal, having been paying a monthly subscription
fee of One Hundred and Fifty Seven Rand and Eight Cents (R157.08). As
such,
he was entitled to be represented by NUMSA at any labour
dispute with his employer, and that upon the payment of the said
subscription
fee, a contract of mandate came into existence between
him and NUMSA. The contract was concluded in Bethlehem on a
date unknown
to him, where he acted in person and NUMSA was
represented by its (unnamed) shop steward.
[3]
The plaintiff alleges that an express, alternatively tacit and/or
implied agreement came
into existence between him and NUMSA,
with the following material terms:
“
1.
Plaintiff to pay monthly subscription fee of R157-80 per month’
2.
Defendant will at all material times render services to Plaintiff
related to labour matters including
labour dispute with employer,
3.
Defendant is under legal duty of mandate to render to the Plaintiff
services related the course
and scope of Defendant’s mandate,
4.
Defendant is required to exercise the degree of skill and care to the
Plaintiff that can
reasonably be expected of a trade union, bring
Defendant in the prevailing circumstances”.
The plaintiff alleges
that at all material times, he fulfilled his mandate
(sic) by paying the
subscription fees timeously.
[4]
A shop steward of NUMSA, Mr Ezekiel Mngomezulu (Mngomezulu),
represented the plaintiff at a disciplinary
hearing against him by
his employer. Subsequent to such hearing, the plaintiff was dismissed
from his employment. On the advice
of the shop steward, he referred
the matter to NUMSA’s organiser in Bethlehem, Chris Seotsane
(Seotsane), who undertook to
refer the matter to the Commission of
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), in order to challenge
the substantive fairness
of his dismissal. With the assistance of
Mngomezulu, he followed up the matter and was assured that the matter
was referred to
the CCMA. He subsequently discovered that the matter
was referred to the CCMA after the 30- day period allowed for the
referral
of such dispute, and that, without his knowledge, an
application for condonation was made to the CCMA, which application
was not
granted, having the result that his unfair dismissalhas not
been addressed.
[5]
The plaintiff alleges that Mngomezulu and Seotsane were employees of
NUMSA, acting within the
course and scope of their employment with
NUMSA, alternatively, they acted in furtherance of NUMSA’s
interest, particularly
service to its members. He alleges, further,
that they acted negligently in not referring his dispute timeously,
causing his dismissal
to remain unchallenged. He also alleges that as
a result of such negligence, he suffered a loss income, in the past
and for the
future. Based on NUMSA’s alleged negligence, he
claims from it, an amount of Two Hundred and Sixty Seven Thousand and
Forty
One Rand and Ten Cents (R267 041.10) as past loss of
earnings, calculated on his monthly salary of Fifteen Thousand Seven
Hundred and Sixty Eight Rand and Thirty Cents (R15 768.30) from
the date of his dismissal (6 July 2020) “to date”,
being
seventeen (17) months. It is not clear which is the latter date
referred to. In respect of future loss of earnings, the plaintiff
claims an amount Three Million Three Hundred and Ninety Two Thousand
Nine Hundred and Ninety Two Rand and Eighty Cents (R 3 392 992.80),
based on a retirement age of 65 years, which would have been reached
18 years from the date of his dismissal. Therefore, the total
amount
claimed by the plaintiff is Three Million Six Hundred and Sixty
Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety Two Rand and Ninety Cents
(R3 660 992.90).
[6]
NUMSA denied knowledge that the plaintiff was a member in good
standing and the plaintiff was
put to the proof thereof. It also
denied that a contract of mandate came into existence upon payment of
subscription fees, or that
such a contract, with an unfettered
obligation to render services related to labour matters to the
plaintiff, existed or was created.
NUMSA’s case is that it has
a discretion with regard which disputes of its members to take on and
to what extent such disputes
are to be pursued. NUMSA has a duty to
advise its members in respect of the merits of the case and to
refrain from burdening courts
and labour fora with matters that have
no prospects of success. It further alleges that at all relevant
times, it took all necessary
steps to deal with the plaintiff’s
dispute against his employer.
[7]
NUMSA’s version is that their local organiser, Seotsane,
consulted with the plaintiff and
asked him to provide to Seotsane all
the documents relevant to his dispute. The plaintiff provided the
Notice of Termination of
Employment, and was immediately asked to
provide all the other documentation relevant to his disciplinary
hearing, such as the
record of the disciplinary hearing and the
charge sheet, before the expiration of thirty days. The plaintiff
failed to do so, rendering
NUMSA unable to properly assess the merits
of the plaintiff’s case. It decided to refer the dispute to the
CCMA anyway, and
was informed by the latter that the referral was one
day late. Seotsane decided to apply for condonation as the delay was
not excessive.
[8]
The plaintiff’s employer opposed the application for
condonation and in the course of exchanging
pleadings, provided the
documentation that Seotsane had requested the plaintiff to provide.
The employer provided the record of
the plaintiff’s
disciplinary hearing from which it became apparent that the plaintiff
was charged with six (6) counts of
misconduct and had pleaded guilty
to four (4) of those charges. NUMSA alleges that when those 4 charges
are considered individually,
each one justifies the sanction of
dismissal. The charges that the plaintiff pleaded guilty to are:
8.1
Deviation from laydown procedure for asset in transit;
8.2
Putting client assets at risk;
8.3
Putting lives of your colleagues at risk, and
8.4
Risking the company’s financial/future operations.
[9]
The plaintiff gave no information or instructions that countered the
allegations of his employer
in connection with his dismissal. The
Commissioner therefore decided the matter on the available evidence
and refused the application
for condonation on the basis that the
plaintiff’s case did not have good prospects of success. The
plaintiff was advised
of the outcome of the condonation application
telephonically on 14 April 2021 and NUMSA also advised him of the
various options
he could exercise, should he wish to pursue the
matter. I mention that a further point raised by NUMSA is that the
plaintiff may
not claim loss of income until retirement, as he was
gainfully employed in the security industry after his dismissal from
EFS Security
Company. I will deal further with this aspect shortly.
[10]
The plaintiff testified in this matter and called no other witnesses.
He testified that he is unemployed
and indicated that he was
dismissed by his previous employer, as a result of which, and acting
on the advice of Mngomezulu, the
latter sent documents to Seotsane.
He indicated that only the letter of termination was sent. He further
testified that Seotsane
gave an assurance that the documents had been
sent to the CCMA, and he only later discovered that the documents
were sent late
and that an application for condonation was made.
According to him, he was advised that his case was dismissed. He
insisted that
it was the negligence of NUMSA that caused his matter
not to be heard by the CCMA, with the result that he could not do
anything
about his unfair dismissal. He also confirmed his claim for
past and future loss of earnings calculated on the basis I indicated
earlier.
[11]
The plaintiff did not disclose during evidence in chief that he
pleaded guilty to the charges brought against
him by his former
employer. Only one question was asked of him about the charges and
whether they were serious. He said he did
not consider them to be
serious. It was only in cross-examination that he conceded that he
pleaded guilty to the 4 of the charges,
and furthermore that, at that
time, he was issued with a written warning for a previous similar
misconduct. The period of the written
warning had not expired when he
committed the misconduct giving rise to the charges, which were the
subject matter of the disciplinary
hearing.
[12]
An aspect of the evidence that emerged in cross-examination and which
bears directly on the plaintiff’s
claim for loss of earnings is
that he was employed in the security industry after his dismissal
from EFS Security Company. Disturbingly,
no mention of this was made
in the Particulars of Claim, nor in the plaintiff’s evidence in
chief. As I indicated, he pointedly
testified that he was unemployed.
In cross-examination, he was referred to the records of the Private
Security Industry Regulatory
Authority (PSIRA), with which employers
and employees are required to register before they can work or trade
in the security industry.
The plaintiff confirmed that the records
related to him and his employer, Royal Security CC. He testified that
he commenced working
for Royal Security CC on 12 May 2021. He issued
summons on 13 May 2022. Exhibit C2 indicates that the expiry date of
his PSIRA
certificate was 21 June 2022 and was pending renewal.
Exhibit C1 reflects that the plaintiff’s PSIRA certificate was
renewed,
that he was employed by Royal Security CC and that the
expiry date of the certificate is 20 January 2025
[13]
The plaintiff’s evidence is that he worked for Royal Security
CC on a contract basis and that his contract
ended earlier this year
(2023). He refrained from giving any further details of his
employment, insisting that he is currently
unemployed. What emerges
from this evidence is that he was employed at least since 12 May
2021, and was clearly so employed when
he issued the summons in this
matter, yet alleged therein that he is unemployed. The probabilities
are that he was continuously
in employment until this year, for him
to have renewed his PSIRA certificate which has an expiry date of 20
January 2025.
Another
probability is that the PSIRA certificate is valid for two years,
considering that the plaintiff’s current certificate
expires in
January 2025. If that is so, then it begs the question why, if he
commenced his employment with Royal Security in May
2021, would his
certificate expire a year later in June 2022, as is evident from
exhibit C2? There is no evidence before this court
which can answer
this question.
[14]
The plaintiff was extensively cross - examined on the aspect of his
employment post dismissal from EFS Security
Company as well as the
aspect of his prospects of success, should the condonation have been
granted by the CCMA. It was startling
to note that in spite of his
concession that he pleaded guilty to four charges of dismissible
misconduct, that he did so while
being on written warning for
previous similar misconduct, and that he at no stage challenged the
substantive fairness of the disciplinary
hearing leading to his
dismissal, the plaintiff not only brushed aside the charges as not
being serious, but insisted that he had
good prospects of succeeding
in his claim of unfair dismissal. He then closed his case, at which
point the defendant applied for
the court to grant absolution from
the instance. Both counsel prepared written Heads of Argument in
support of their respective
contentions in respect of the application
for absolution.
[15]
Uniform Rule 39(6) provides for an application to be made at the
close of the plaintiff’s case for
absolution from the instance
as follows: “At the close of the case for the plaintiff, the
defendant may apply for absolution
from the instance, in which event
the defendant or one advocate on his behalf may address the court and
the plaintiff or one advocate
on his behalf may reply. The defendant
or his advocate may thereupon reply on any matter arising out of the
address of the plaintiff
or his advocate”.
[16]
Uniform Rule 18 also finds application in this matter. The relevant
provision is subrule (6) which provides
that:
“
A
party who in his or her pleading relies upon a contract shall state
whether the contract is written or oral and when, where and
by whom
it was concluded, and if the contract is written a true copy thereof
or of the part relied on in the pleading shall be
annexed to the
pleading”.
[17]
The test for granting absolution from the instance is well
established in our law from as early as 1917 when the
test was first
formulated in
G
ascoyne
v Paul and Hunter
1917 TPD 170
and since approved in a long line
of cases. The
test to be applied is not whether
the evidence established what would finally be required to be
established, but whether there is
evidence upon which a court,
applying its mind reasonably to such evidence, could or might (not
should, or ought to) find for the
plaintiff. [See
Erasmus
Superior Court Practice
RS
21, 2023, D1-530
and the numerous cases cited therein].
[18]
In the present matter, it is perhaps useful to start with the
plaintiff’s allegations in respect of the contract
he alleges
came into existence between him and NUMSA. It is trite that if a
party relies upon a contract in his pleading, he is
required to state
whether it was written or oral, when and by whom it was entered into,
and if it was written, then at least a
true copy thereof should be
annexed to the pleading. The plaintiff alleges that a contract was
entered into between himself and
the defendant, duly represented by a
shop steward. He makes no allegation as to whether it was written or
oral, he alleges that
the date is unknown to him but gives no reasons
as to why he is does not know the date, considering he acted
personally in the
conclusion of the contract.
[19]
The plaintiff furthermore, alleges certain express, tacit or
alternatively implied terms, without setting
out circumstances from
which such terms can be inferred. This is particularly so as
no contract was attached to the Particulars
of Claim, and one is left
to surmise whether it was a written agreement or whether it may have
been an oral agreement. He has furnished
no reasons for the lacunae
in his pleadings. In my view, the plaintiff has not complied with
Rule 18(6).
[20]
With regard to the negligence on the part of NUMSA, which the
plaintiff relies on to found his claim against
it, he clearly did not
furnish NUMSA with the record of the disciplinary hearing, which it
required in order to assess the merits
of his case. It is clear from
the content of the Referral of Dispute form and the affidavit in
support of the application for condonation
that NUMSA did not have
access to the information contained in the minutes of the
disciplinary hearing. Its version that the plaintiff
failed to
furnish this document is far more probable than that of the plaintiff
who initially conceded that he did not provide
the document to NUMSA
and then insisted that the shop steward, Mngomezulu, furnished the
document to Seotsane.
[21]
I also accept NUMSA’s version that it saw the minutes of the
disciplinary hearing for the first time
when it was attached to the
opposing affidavit in respect of the condonation application. It also
is more probable that if NUMSA
had sight of the document it would not
have referred the dispute to the CCMA, as the plaintiff would have
had little or no prospects
of success. I am consequently of the view
that the plaintiff has not properly established the terms of the
contract he alleges
came into existence between him and NUMSA, nor
that there was any negligence on the part of NUMSA.
[22]
The evidence most destructive to the plaintiff’s case is that
in respect of his claim for loss of earnings.
By his own admission,
he was employed after he was dismissed by EFS Security Company,
although he tried to dismiss it as contract
work, which does not
count as employment. He clearly earned a salary during this period
and attempted to mislead the court into
believing that he was
unemployed during the entire period after his dismissal. He continued
to be employed for over two years thereafter,
until at least a few
months ago. The basis of his calculations, as I have set out earlier
is flawed, for two reasons. He also provided
no details of the period
he was employed post dismissal nor the amounts he had earned from
such employment. Firstly, it is clear
from his evidence under cross –
examination that the amounts relating to past and future loss of
earnings are based on his
gross salary and do not take into account
all the usual deductions that are made from the salary of an employed
person and secondly
it completely omits the salary he earned from his
employment with Royal Security CC. Similarly, he has made no
provision, in respect
of future loss of earnings, for such items as
contingency deductions, tax, and other deductions which his earnings
would have been
subject to. These calculations would have become
relevant if the dismissal could have been shown to be unfair, and
NUMSA shown
to be negligent, neither of which was done.
[23]
During his oral address before court, Mr Dlali reiterated that
the plaintiff’s failure to provide the relevant
documentation
to it in the form of the record of the disciplinary hearing, caused
the delay in referring the dispute to the CCMA,
and not any
negligence or failure on its part. If it had received the evidence,
which came to its attention at a late stage, it
would not have
referred a dispute to the CCMA, and there would have been no need to
apply for condonation, as it was of the view
that the merits of the
plaintiff’s case had no prospects of success in the CCMA. MR
Dlali also dealt with the issue of the
alleged contract between the
parties, submitting that the plaintiff had failed to place any cogent
evidence before the court in
that respect.
[24]
He raised similar arguments, as I have set out earlier, in respect of
the plaintiff’s employment after
his dismissal by EFS Security
Company, and the flawed calculations of past and future loss of
earnings. He also intimated that
the plaintiff has not proved his
entitlement to damages in the form of loss of earnings. Mr Dlali made
the point that if the court
were to uphold the plaintiff’s
claim for loss of earnings, he has in any event, failed to claim an
amount in accordance with
labour practices in this country. It is
settled law that a claim for past loss of earnings would be limited
to an amount equivalent
to twelve (12) months’ salary post
dismissal. The plaintiff has claimed loss of earnings for 17 months.
I was referred to
the case of
Food and Alliance Workers Union v
Ngcobo NO 2013(5) SA 378 (SCA)
. In that matter the Supreme Court
of Appeal had found that the union was negligent in not referring the
dispute to the Labour Court,
and held that the dismissal was unfair,
and while reinstatement was not appropriate, the employees were
entitled to a discretionary
solatium. It held that not more than 12
months’ salary was appropriate in the circumstances.
[25]
Mr Mashinini’s Heads of Argument simply repeated the
allegations in the Particulars of Claim, which
I have previously set
out in this judgment. The submissions in the Heads are that the
plaintiff has proved that NUMSA was negligent,
causing him damages
and that he had shown his entitlement to payment of the damages he
seeks. The court engaged with Mr Mashinini
with regard to the
plaintiff’s evidence as well as other evidence placed before
the court, and enquired whether he still
holds the view that the
plaintiff had proved his case. Mr Mashinini’s response was that
he stood by his Heads of Argument
[26]
In my view, the plaintiff has failed to place evidence before this
court in support of the claims he makes
and the relief he seeks. I am
unable to find that, based on the evidence before me, this court,
applying its mind reasonably to
such evidence, could or might find
for the plaintiff. He has simply failed to make out a case for the
relief he seeks.
[27]
In the circumstances, the following order is made:
27.1
Absolution from the instance is granted;
27.2
The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendant’s party and party
costs.
S
NAIDOO J
On
behalf of the Plaintiff:
Adv
Mashinini
1
st
Floor, Office 103
Afrikaner
Building
Cnr
Zastron and DeVilliers Streets
Bloemfontein
(Ref
Yik001D#1245)
On
behalf of the Defendant:
Adv
S Dlali
Instructed
by:
CN
Phukubje Inc Attorneys
Johannesburg
(Ref:
Mr Phukubje/Modisane/NUMSA/981/22)
c/o
Salley’s Attorneys
Salley’s
Yamaha Building
55
Nelson Mandela Drive
Bloemfontein