Yika v National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa (2217/2022) [2023] ZAFSHC 459 (20 November 2023)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Labour Law — Union's Duty of Care — Negligence in Representation — Plaintiff, a former employee of EFS Security Company, claimed damages from NUMSA for loss of income following his dismissal, alleging that the union failed to represent him adequately in a labour dispute. He contended that NUMSA's negligence in not timely referring his case to the CCMA resulted in his unfair dismissal not being challenged. NUMSA denied the existence of a contract of mandate and asserted that it acted within its discretion regarding the representation of members. The court found that the plaintiff had not disclosed his subsequent employment in the security industry and had pleaded guilty to charges justifying his dismissal, undermining his claim for loss of income. The court held that NUMSA was not liable for the alleged negligence as the plaintiff's own actions and circumstances contributed to the outcome of his case.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This was a civil damages action in the High Court (Free State Division, Bloemfontein) in which the plaintiff claimed compensation for past and future loss of income allegedly caused by the defendant trade union’s negligent handling of a labour dispute.


The plaintiff was Samuel Mokete Yika. The defendant was cited and described in the pleadings and judgment as the National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA). The dispute arose from the plaintiff’s dismissal by his employer (EFS Security Company) and the subsequent handling of the plaintiff’s intended unfair dismissal challenge at the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA).


The matter proceeded to trial. After the plaintiff testified and closed his case without calling any further witnesses, NUMSA brought an application for absolution from the instance in terms of Uniform Rule 39(6). The judgment concerned that application and whether the plaintiff had produced sufficient evidence to require the defendant to answer.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether a trade union could be held delictually and/or contractually liable in damages to a member for an alleged failure to timeously refer an unfair dismissal dispute to the CCMA, resulting in the dispute not being adjudicated because condonation was refused.


2. Material Facts


The plaintiff was employed as a security guard by EFS Security Company in Bethlehem until his dismissal on 6 July 2020. He contended that his dismissal was unfair and that he was, at the time, a member in good standing of NUMSA, paying monthly subscriptions. On that basis, he alleged the existence of a contract of mandate between himself and NUMSA under which NUMSA was obliged to render labour-related assistance, including representation in labour disputes, with reasonable skill and care.


It was common cause in the pleaded narrative that a NUMSA shop steward, Mr Ezekiel Mngomezulu, represented the plaintiff at his disciplinary hearing. It was also part of the plaintiff’s case that thereafter a NUMSA organiser in Bethlehem, Mr Chris Seotsane, undertook to refer the dispute to the CCMA. The plaintiff’s case was that he was assured the dispute had been referred, but later discovered that the referral was lodged outside the 30-day period, and that an application for condonation had been brought without his knowledge. Condonation was refused, with the practical effect (on the plaintiff’s version) that the substantive fairness of his dismissal was never determined.


NUMSA’s version was that Seotsane consulted with the plaintiff and requested that he provide the documentation necessary to assess the merits of the dispute, including the disciplinary record and charge sheet, before expiry of the referral period. On NUMSA’s account, the plaintiff failed to provide those materials timeously, impairing NUMSA’s ability to assess the case. NUMSA nevertheless referred the dispute and was told it was one day late, after which Seotsane brought a condonation application.


A material factual development relied upon by the court was that, during the condonation exchange, the employer produced the disciplinary record. From that record it emerged (as recorded in the judgment) that the plaintiff faced six counts of misconduct and pleaded guilty to four, namely deviation from laydown procedure for an asset in transit, putting client assets at risk, putting colleagues’ lives at risk, and risking the company’s financial/future operations. It also emerged in cross-examination that at the time the plaintiff committed the misconduct he had an existing written warning for similar misconduct that had not expired.


A further key factual aspect relevant to damages, and treated as significant by the court, was the plaintiff’s post-dismissal employment. In evidence-in-chief, the plaintiff presented himself as unemployed. In cross-examination he accepted that PSIRA records reflected his employment by Royal Security CC from 12 May 2021, that his PSIRA certificate status and renewal history supported that he had been working in the security industry for an extended period, and that he had in fact been employed when he issued summons in May 2022. The court treated the absence of disclosure of this employment in the particulars of claim and in evidence-in-chief as materially damaging to the plaintiff’s loss-of-earnings case.


The plaintiff’s quantification was based on a monthly salary figure and claimed past loss for a stated 17 months and future loss to an asserted retirement age of 65, producing a total claim exceeding R3.6 million. The court treated the calculation method as materially flawed on the evidence presented.


3. Legal Issues


The principal question was whether, at the close of the plaintiff’s case, there was evidence upon which a court could or might find for the plaintiff, such that the defendant should be required to answer, or whether absolution from the instance should be granted.


Within that overarching enquiry, the court identified interrelated issues of pleading and proof. These included whether the plaintiff had properly pleaded and supported the alleged contract of mandate in compliance with Uniform Rule 18(6), and whether the plaintiff had placed sufficient evidence before the court to establish negligence by NUMSA’s representatives (and thus vicarious responsibility), as well as causation and damages.


The dispute involved a combination of questions of law (the applicable test for absolution and the pleading requirements where reliance is placed on a contract), questions of fact (what documentation was provided to NUMSA, whether NUMSA acted negligently, and the plaintiff’s employment history), and the application of law to fact (whether the evidential material met the threshold to survive absolution).


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court began with the procedural framework for absolution from the instance. Relying on the established approach derived from Gascoyne v Paul and Hunter 1917 TPD 170, the court stated that the enquiry is not whether the plaintiff’s evidence proved what would ultimately be required at the end of the whole case, but whether there is evidence on which a court, applying its mind reasonably, could or might find for the plaintiff.


The court then considered the plaintiff’s pleaded reliance on a contract. Referring to Uniform Rule 18(6), the court emphasised that a litigant who relies on a contract must state whether it is written or oral, and when, where, and by whom it was concluded, and must annex a true copy if it is written. The court held that the plaintiff’s particulars of claim were deficient: the plaintiff did not state whether the alleged agreement was written or oral, alleged that the date was unknown despite having acted personally, and did not set out circumstances supporting the alleged express, tacit, or implied terms. The court concluded that the plaintiff had not complied with Rule 18(6), and that the alleged mandate and its terms had not been properly established.


On negligence, the court evaluated the competing versions regarding the disciplinary record. It accepted NUMSA’s account as more probable: that NUMSA did not have the disciplinary minutes before the referral and only obtained them when the employer attached them in the condonation proceedings. The court reasoned that, had NUMSA had sight of the disciplinary record earlier, it would likely not have referred the dispute to the CCMA because the plaintiff’s prospects would have been poor. The court therefore was not satisfied, on the plaintiff’s evidence, that NUMSA had negligently failed to act timeously in a way that could found liability.


The court treated the evidence about the plaintiff’s disciplinary case as materially adverse to the plaintiff’s assertion that he had good prospects of success in an unfair dismissal challenge. The plaintiff’s concession in cross-examination that he pleaded guilty to four serious charges, coupled with the existence of an unexpired written warning for similar misconduct and the absence of any substantive challenge to the fairness of the disciplinary process, undermined the plaintiff’s insistence that his unfair dismissal claim had strong prospects. In the court’s assessment, this further weakened the plaintiff’s attempt to link NUMSA’s conduct to the loss he claimed.


On damages, the court considered the plaintiff’s claim for loss of earnings to be especially destructive to his own case. The court relied on the plaintiff’s admissions and the PSIRA documentation showing post-dismissal work. It held that the plaintiff attempted to create the impression that he had been unemployed throughout, when he had in fact been employed for a substantial period after dismissal. The court also found that the computations were flawed because they were based on gross salary without normal deductions, omitted the income earned at Royal Security CC, and made no provision for items such as contingency deductions and tax. The court noted that these calculations would only become relevant if the plaintiff had established unfair dismissal and negligence, which the court held he had not.


Although NUMSA’s counsel referred to Food and Alliance Workers Union v Ngcobo NO 2013(5) SA 378 (SCA) to support the proposition that compensation for loss of earnings in this context is typically limited and discretionary, the court’s conclusion on absolution did not turn on determining a capped quantum. The court’s reasoning was that the plaintiff had not produced sufficient evidence to establish the foundational requirements for the relief claimed, including a properly established mandate, negligent breach, and a coherent evidential basis for damages.


In the result, the court held that it was unable to find that, on the evidence presented, a court could or might find for the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff had failed to make out a case requiring an answer.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted absolution from the instance at the close of the plaintiff’s case.


The plaintiff was ordered to pay the defendant’s party-and-party costs.


Cases Cited


Gascoyne v Paul and Hunter 1917 TPD 170.


Food and Alliance Workers Union v Ngcobo NO 2013(5) SA 378 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


No legislation was cited in the judgment as authority for the decision.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rule 39(6).


Uniform Rule 18(6).


Held


The court held that the plaintiff failed, on the evidence led, to establish a properly pleaded and evidenced contractual mandate, failed to place sufficient evidence of negligence by the union, and failed to provide a reliable factual basis for the claimed past and future loss of earnings, particularly in light of his post-dismissal employment and the defects in his calculations. Applying the test for absolution from the instance, the court found there was no evidence on which a court could or might find for the plaintiff, and absolution was accordingly granted with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that absolution from the instance at the close of the plaintiff’s case is granted where the plaintiff has not produced evidence upon which a court, reasonably applying its mind, could or might find for the plaintiff, as articulated in Gascoyne v Paul and Hunter 1917 TPD 170 and subsequently endorsed in later authority.


It applied the pleading rule that a litigant who relies on a contract must plead whether it is written or oral, when and where it was concluded, by whom it was concluded, and must annex a copy if written, in accordance with Uniform Rule 18(6). Non-compliance may render the pleaded contractual foundation insufficiently established for purposes of sustaining a claim, particularly where the contract is central to the cause of action.


The judgment further reflected that a claim for loss of earnings requires an evidential foundation that accounts for materially relevant circumstances, including actual post-event earnings and coherent calculation methodology. Where a plaintiff’s own evidence reveals post-dismissal employment and undermines the premise of continuous unemployment, and where the calculation is materially incomplete or flawed, the damages case may be insufficient to survive absolution, especially where the underlying liability case is also not made out.

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[2023] ZAFSHC 459
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Yika v National Union of Mineworkers of South Africa (2217/2022) [2023] ZAFSHC 459 (20 November 2023)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable:
YES/NO
Of
Interest to other Judges: YES/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES/NO
Case
number: 2217/2022
In
the matter between:
SAMUEL
MOKETE YIKA
PLAINTIFF
and
NATIONAL
UNION OF METALWORKERS
OF
SOUTH AFRICA
DEFENDANT
CORAM:
NAIDOO, J
HEARD
ON:
14, 15 and 17 NOVEMBER 2023
DELIVERED
ON:
20 November 2023
JUDGMENT
[1]
The plaintiff issued summons against the defendant, National Union of
Metalworkers of South Africa
(NUMSA) for the payment of damages for
past and future loss of income. The relief claimed in the summons
reads,
inter alia
, as follows:

1.
Payment of R3 660 033.90,
2.
Interest at a rate of 7.25% per annum a tempora morae,
3.
Costs of suit.”
Adv Mashinini appeared
for the plaintiff and Adv S Dlali appeared for NUMSA in this court.
[2]
The background to the matter, as pleaded in the Particulars of Claim,
is that, the plaintiff was
employed as a security guard by EFS
Security Company in Bethlehem, Free State Province, until he was
dismissed on 6 July 2020,
which dismissal he claims to be unfair. The
plaintiff alleges that he was a member in good standing of NUMSA at
the time of his
dismissal, having been paying a monthly subscription
fee of One Hundred and Fifty Seven Rand and Eight Cents (R157.08). As
such,
he was entitled to be represented by NUMSA at any labour
dispute with his employer, and that upon the payment of the said
subscription
fee, a contract of mandate came into existence between
him and NUMSA. The contract was concluded in Bethlehem  on a
date unknown
to him, where he acted in person and NUMSA was
represented by its (unnamed) shop steward.
[3]
The plaintiff alleges that an express, alternatively tacit and/or
implied agreement  came
into existence between him and NUMSA,
with the following material terms:

1.
Plaintiff to pay monthly subscription fee of R157-80 per month’
2.
Defendant will at all material times render services to Plaintiff
related to labour matters including
labour dispute with employer,
3.
Defendant is under legal duty of mandate to render to the Plaintiff
services related the course
and scope of Defendant’s mandate,
4.
Defendant is required to exercise the degree of skill and care to the
Plaintiff that can
reasonably be expected of a trade union, bring
Defendant in the prevailing circumstances”.
The plaintiff alleges
that at all material times, he fulfilled his mandate
(sic) by paying the
subscription fees timeously.
[4]
A shop steward of NUMSA, Mr Ezekiel Mngomezulu (Mngomezulu),
represented the plaintiff at a disciplinary
hearing against him by
his employer. Subsequent to such hearing, the plaintiff was dismissed
from his employment. On the advice
of the shop steward, he referred
the matter to NUMSA’s organiser in Bethlehem, Chris Seotsane
(Seotsane), who undertook to
refer the matter to the Commission of
Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA), in order to challenge
the substantive fairness
of his dismissal. With the assistance of
Mngomezulu, he followed up the matter and was assured that the matter
was referred to
the CCMA. He subsequently discovered that the matter
was referred to the CCMA after the 30- day period allowed for the
referral
of such dispute, and that, without his knowledge, an
application for condonation was made to the CCMA, which application
was not
granted, having the result that his unfair dismissalhas not
been addressed.
[5]
The plaintiff alleges that Mngomezulu and Seotsane were employees of
NUMSA, acting within the
course and scope of their employment with
NUMSA, alternatively, they acted in furtherance of NUMSA’s
interest, particularly
service to its members. He alleges, further,
that they acted negligently in not referring his dispute timeously,
causing his dismissal
to remain unchallenged. He also alleges that as
a result of such negligence, he suffered a loss income, in the past
and for the
future. Based on NUMSA’s alleged negligence, he
claims from it, an amount of Two Hundred and Sixty Seven Thousand and
Forty
One Rand and Ten Cents (R267 041.10) as past loss of
earnings, calculated on his monthly salary of Fifteen Thousand Seven
Hundred and Sixty Eight Rand and Thirty Cents (R15 768.30) from
the date of his dismissal (6 July 2020) “to date”,
being
seventeen (17) months. It is not clear which is the latter date
referred to. In respect of future loss of earnings, the plaintiff

claims an amount Three Million Three Hundred and Ninety Two Thousand
Nine Hundred and Ninety Two Rand and Eighty Cents (R 3 392 992.80),

based on a retirement age of 65 years, which would have been reached
18 years from the date of his dismissal. Therefore, the total
amount
claimed by the plaintiff is Three Million Six Hundred and Sixty
Thousand Nine Hundred and Ninety Two Rand and Ninety Cents

(R3 660 992.90).
[6]
NUMSA denied knowledge that the plaintiff was a member in good
standing and the plaintiff was
put to the proof thereof. It also
denied that a contract of mandate came into existence upon payment of
subscription fees, or that
such a contract, with an unfettered
obligation to render services related to labour matters to the
plaintiff, existed or was created.
NUMSA’s case is that it has
a discretion with regard which disputes of its members to take on and
to what extent such disputes
are to be pursued. NUMSA has a duty to
advise its members in respect of the merits of the case and to
refrain from burdening courts
and labour fora with matters that have
no prospects of success. It further alleges that at all relevant
times, it took all necessary
steps to deal with the plaintiff’s
dispute against his employer.
[7]
NUMSA’s version is that their local organiser, Seotsane,
consulted with the plaintiff and
asked him to provide to Seotsane all
the documents relevant to his dispute. The plaintiff provided the
Notice of Termination of
Employment, and was immediately asked to
provide all the other documentation relevant to his disciplinary
hearing, such as the
record of the disciplinary hearing and the
charge sheet, before the expiration of thirty days. The plaintiff
failed to do so, rendering
NUMSA unable to properly assess the merits
of the plaintiff’s case. It decided to refer the dispute to the
CCMA anyway, and
was informed by the latter that the referral was one
day late. Seotsane decided to apply for condonation as the delay was
not excessive.
[8]
The plaintiff’s employer opposed the application for
condonation and in the course of exchanging
pleadings, provided the
documentation that Seotsane had requested the plaintiff to provide.
The employer provided the record of
the plaintiff’s
disciplinary hearing from which it became apparent that the plaintiff
was charged with six (6) counts of
misconduct and had pleaded guilty
to four (4) of those charges. NUMSA alleges that when those 4 charges
are considered individually,
each one justifies the sanction of
dismissal. The charges that the plaintiff pleaded guilty to are:
8.1
Deviation from laydown procedure for asset in transit;
8.2
Putting client assets at risk;
8.3
Putting lives of your colleagues at risk, and
8.4
Risking the company’s financial/future operations.
[9]
The plaintiff gave no information or instructions that countered the
allegations of his employer
in connection with his dismissal. The
Commissioner therefore decided the matter on the available evidence
and refused the application
for condonation on the basis that the
plaintiff’s case did not have good prospects of success. The
plaintiff was advised
of the outcome of the condonation application
telephonically on 14 April 2021 and NUMSA also advised him of the
various options
he could exercise, should he wish to pursue the
matter. I mention that a further point raised by NUMSA is that the
plaintiff may
not claim loss of income until retirement, as he was
gainfully employed in the security industry after his dismissal from
EFS Security
Company. I will deal further with this aspect shortly.
[10]
The plaintiff testified in this matter and called no other witnesses.
He testified that he is unemployed
and indicated that he was
dismissed by his previous employer, as a result of which, and acting
on the advice of Mngomezulu, the
latter sent documents to Seotsane.
He indicated that only the letter of termination was sent. He further
testified that Seotsane
gave an assurance that the documents had been
sent to the CCMA, and he only later discovered that the documents
were sent late
and that an application for condonation was made.
According to him, he was advised that his case was dismissed. He
insisted that
it was the negligence of NUMSA that caused his matter
not to be heard by the CCMA, with the result that he could not do
anything
about his unfair dismissal. He also confirmed his claim for
past and future loss of earnings calculated on the basis I indicated

earlier.
[11]
The plaintiff did not disclose during evidence in chief that he
pleaded guilty to the charges brought against
him by his former
employer. Only one question was asked of him about the charges and
whether they were serious. He said he did
not consider them to be
serious. It was only in cross-examination that he conceded that he
pleaded guilty to the 4 of the charges,
and furthermore that, at that
time, he was issued with a written warning for a previous similar
misconduct. The period of the written
warning had not expired when he
committed the misconduct giving rise to the charges, which were the
subject matter of the disciplinary
hearing.
[12]
An aspect of the evidence that emerged in cross-examination and which
bears directly on the plaintiff’s
claim for loss of earnings is
that he was employed in the security industry after his dismissal
from EFS Security Company. Disturbingly,
no mention of this was made
in the Particulars of Claim, nor in the plaintiff’s evidence in
chief. As I indicated, he pointedly
testified that he was unemployed.
In cross-examination, he was referred to the records of the Private
Security Industry Regulatory
Authority (PSIRA), with which employers
and employees are required to register before they can work or trade
in the security industry.
The plaintiff confirmed that the records
related to him and his employer, Royal Security CC. He testified that
he commenced working
for Royal Security CC on 12 May 2021. He issued
summons on 13 May 2022. Exhibit C2 indicates that the expiry date of
his PSIRA
certificate was 21 June 2022 and was pending renewal.
Exhibit C1 reflects that the plaintiff’s PSIRA certificate was
renewed,
that he was employed by Royal Security CC and that the
expiry date of the certificate is 20 January 2025
[13]
The plaintiff’s evidence is that he worked for Royal Security
CC on a contract basis and that his contract
ended earlier this year
(2023). He refrained from giving any further details of his
employment, insisting that he is currently
unemployed. What emerges
from this evidence is that he was employed at least since 12 May
2021, and was clearly so employed when
he issued the summons in this
matter, yet alleged therein that he is unemployed. The probabilities
are that he was continuously
in employment until this year, for him
to have renewed his PSIRA certificate which has an expiry date of 20
January 2025.
Another
probability is that the PSIRA certificate is valid for two years,
considering that the plaintiff’s current certificate
expires in
January 2025. If that is so, then it begs the question why, if he
commenced his employment with Royal Security in May
2021, would his
certificate expire a year later in June 2022, as is evident from
exhibit C2? There is no evidence before this court
which can answer
this question.
[14]
The plaintiff was extensively cross - examined on the aspect of his
employment post dismissal from EFS Security
Company as well as the
aspect of his prospects of success, should the condonation have been
granted by the CCMA. It was startling
to note that in spite of his
concession that he pleaded guilty to four charges of dismissible
misconduct, that he did so while
being on written warning for
previous similar misconduct, and that he at no stage challenged the
substantive fairness of the disciplinary
hearing leading to his
dismissal, the plaintiff not only brushed aside the charges as not
being serious, but insisted that he had
good prospects of succeeding
in his claim of unfair dismissal. He then closed his case, at which
point the defendant applied for
the court to grant absolution from
the instance. Both counsel prepared written Heads of Argument in
support of their respective
contentions in respect of the application
for absolution.
[15]
Uniform Rule 39(6) provides for an application to be made at the
close of the plaintiff’s case for
absolution from the instance
as follows: “At the close of the case for the plaintiff, the
defendant may apply for absolution
from the instance, in which event
the defendant or one advocate on his behalf may address the court and
the plaintiff or one advocate
on his behalf may reply. The defendant
or his advocate may thereupon reply on any matter arising out of the
address of the plaintiff
or his advocate”.
[16]
Uniform Rule 18 also finds application in this matter. The relevant
provision is subrule (6) which provides
that:

A
party who in his or her pleading relies upon a contract shall state
whether the contract is written or oral and when, where and
by whom
it was concluded, and if the contract is written a true copy thereof
or of the part relied on in the pleading shall be
annexed to the
pleading”.
[17]
The test for granting absolution from the instance is well
established in our law from as early as 1917 when the
test was first
formulated in
G
ascoyne
v Paul and Hunter
1917 TPD 170
and since approved in a long line
of cases. The
test to be applied is not whether
the evidence established what would finally be required to be
established, but whether there is
evidence upon which a court,
applying its mind reasonably to such evidence, could or might (not
should, or ought to) find for the
plaintiff. [See
Erasmus
Superior Court Practice
RS
21, 2023, D1-530
and the numerous cases cited therein].
[18]
In the present matter, it is perhaps useful to start with the
plaintiff’s allegations in respect of the contract
he alleges
came into existence between him and NUMSA. It is trite that if a
party relies upon a contract in his pleading, he is
required to state
whether it was written or oral, when and by whom it was entered into,
and if it was written, then at least a
true copy thereof should be
annexed to the pleading. The plaintiff alleges that a contract was
entered into between himself and
the defendant, duly represented by a
shop steward. He makes no allegation as to whether it was written or
oral, he alleges that
the date is unknown to him but gives no reasons
as to why he is does not know the date, considering he acted
personally in the
conclusion of the contract.
[19]
The plaintiff furthermore, alleges certain express, tacit or
alternatively implied terms, without setting
out circumstances from
which such terms can be inferred.   This is particularly so as
no contract was attached to the Particulars
of Claim, and one is left
to surmise whether it was a written agreement or whether it may have
been an oral agreement. He has furnished
no reasons for the lacunae
in his pleadings. In my view, the plaintiff has not complied with
Rule 18(6).
[20]
With regard to the negligence on the part of NUMSA, which the
plaintiff relies on to found his claim against
it, he clearly did not
furnish NUMSA with the record of the disciplinary hearing, which it
required in order to assess the merits
of his case. It is clear from
the content of the Referral of Dispute form and the affidavit in
support of the application for condonation
that NUMSA did not have
access to the information contained in the minutes of the
disciplinary hearing. Its version that the plaintiff
failed to
furnish this document is far more probable than that of the plaintiff
who initially conceded that he did not provide
the document to NUMSA
and then insisted that the shop steward, Mngomezulu, furnished the
document to Seotsane.
[21]
I also accept NUMSA’s version that it saw the minutes of the
disciplinary hearing for the first time
when it was attached to the
opposing affidavit in respect of the condonation application. It also
is more probable that if NUMSA
had sight of the document it would not
have referred the dispute to the CCMA, as the plaintiff would have
had little or no prospects
of success. I am consequently of the view
that the plaintiff has not properly established the terms of the
contract he alleges
came into existence between him and NUMSA, nor
that there was any negligence on the part of NUMSA.
[22]
The evidence most destructive to the plaintiff’s case is that
in respect of his claim for loss of earnings.
By his own admission,
he was employed after he was dismissed by EFS Security Company,
although he tried to dismiss it as contract
work, which does not
count as employment. He clearly earned a salary during this period
and attempted to mislead the court into
believing that he was
unemployed during the entire period after his dismissal. He continued
to be employed for over two years thereafter,
until at least a few
months ago. The basis of his calculations, as I have set out earlier
is flawed, for two reasons. He also provided
no details of the period
he was employed post dismissal nor the amounts he had earned from
such employment. Firstly, it is clear
from his evidence under cross –
examination that the amounts relating to past and future loss of
earnings are based on his
gross salary and do not take into account
all the usual deductions that are made from the salary of an employed
person and secondly
it completely omits the salary he earned from his
employment with Royal Security CC. Similarly, he has made no
provision, in respect
of future loss of earnings, for such items as
contingency deductions, tax, and other deductions which his earnings
would have been
subject to. These calculations would have become
relevant if the dismissal could have been shown to be unfair, and
NUMSA shown
to be negligent, neither of which was done.
[23]
During his oral address before court, Mr Dlali reiterated that
the plaintiff’s failure to provide the relevant
documentation
to it in the form of the record of the disciplinary hearing, caused
the delay in referring the dispute to the CCMA,
and not any
negligence or failure on its part. If it had received the evidence,
which came to its attention at a late stage, it
would not have
referred a dispute to the CCMA, and there would have been no need to
apply for condonation, as it was of the view
that the merits of the
plaintiff’s case had no prospects of success in the CCMA. MR
Dlali also dealt with the issue of the
alleged contract between the
parties, submitting that the plaintiff had failed to place any cogent
evidence before the court in
that respect.
[24]
He raised similar arguments, as I have set out earlier, in respect of
the plaintiff’s employment after
his dismissal by EFS Security
Company, and the flawed calculations of past and future loss of
earnings. He also intimated that
the plaintiff has not proved his
entitlement to damages in the form of loss of earnings. Mr Dlali made
the point that if the court
were to uphold the plaintiff’s
claim for loss of earnings, he has in any event, failed to claim an
amount in accordance with
labour practices in this country. It is
settled law that a claim for past loss of earnings would be limited
to an amount equivalent
to twelve (12) months’ salary post
dismissal. The plaintiff has claimed loss of earnings for 17 months.
I was referred to
the case of
Food and Alliance Workers Union v
Ngcobo NO 2013(5) SA 378 (SCA)
. In that matter the Supreme Court
of Appeal had found that the union was negligent in not referring the
dispute to the Labour Court,
and held that the dismissal was unfair,
and while reinstatement was not appropriate, the employees were
entitled to a discretionary
solatium. It held that not more than 12
months’ salary was appropriate in the circumstances.
[25]
Mr Mashinini’s Heads of Argument simply repeated the
allegations in the Particulars of Claim, which
I have previously set
out in this judgment. The submissions in the Heads are that the
plaintiff has proved that NUMSA was negligent,
causing him damages
and that he had shown his entitlement to payment of the damages he
seeks. The court engaged with Mr Mashinini
with regard to the
plaintiff’s evidence as well as other evidence placed before
the court, and enquired whether he still
holds the view that the
plaintiff had proved his case. Mr Mashinini’s response was that
he stood by his Heads of Argument
[26]
In my view, the plaintiff has failed to place evidence before this
court in support of the claims he makes
and the relief he seeks. I am
unable to find that, based on the evidence before me, this court,
applying its mind reasonably to
such evidence, could or might find
for the plaintiff. He has simply failed to make out a case for the
relief he seeks.
[27]
In the circumstances, the following order is made:
27.1
Absolution from the instance is granted;
27.2
The plaintiff is ordered to pay the defendant’s party and party
costs.
S
NAIDOO J
On
behalf of the Plaintiff:
Adv
Mashinini
1
st
Floor, Office 103
Afrikaner
Building
Cnr
Zastron and DeVilliers Streets
Bloemfontein
(Ref
Yik001D#1245)
On
behalf of the Defendant:
Adv
S Dlali
Instructed
by:
CN
Phukubje Inc Attorneys
Johannesburg
(Ref:
Mr Phukubje/Modisane/NUMSA/981/22)
c/o
Salley’s Attorneys
Salley’s
Yamaha Building
55
Nelson Mandela Drive
Bloemfontein