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2023
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[2023] ZAFSHC 436
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Mokhemisa v Minister of Police (1340/2023) [2023] ZAFSHC 436 (9 November 2023)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable: YES/NO
Of
Interest to other Judges: YES/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES/NO
Case
no: 1340/2023
In
the matter between:
THABANG
BERNEY MOKHEMISA
APPLICANT
and
THE
MINISTER OF POLICE
RESPONDENT
CORAM:
MTHIMUNYE, AJ
HEARD
ON:
17 AUGUST 2023
JUDGMENT
BY:
MTHIMUNYE, AJ
DELIVERED ON:
09 NOVEMBER 2023
[1]
This is an application in terms of section 3(4) of the Institution of
Legal Proceedings against
Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002
(“the Legal Proceedings Act”). The applicant seeks
condonation for non-compliance
with Section 3(1)(a) read with section
3(2)(a) of the Legal Proceedings Act. The respondent opposes
the application and prays
for it to be dismissed with costs.
[2]
The applicant was arrested at his workplace on 22 March 2020 on a
charge of rape. His first appearance
was on 25 March 2020. The case
was postponed and he was kept in custody for approximately three (3)
months before he was released
on bail in June 2020. The charges
against him were eventually withdrawn on 9 March 2023 for lack of
evidence. On or about 14 March
2023 he consulted an attorney and on
15 March 2023, served a notice in terms of section 3 of Act 40 of
2002 notifying the respondent
of his intention to institute legal
proceedings for compensation for unlawful arrest and loss of income.
On 16
th
March 2023 the applicant issued summons and served
same on the respondent on 17 March 2023. In its plea, the respondent
raised
a special plea of non-compliance by the applicant with the
provisions of section 3 of Act 40 of 2002, firstly that the notice
was
not issued within 6 months from the date of the occurrence as
required by section 3(2)(a), and secondly that it did not consent
to
the institution of legal proceedings against them without compliance
with section 3(2)(a) of the Act.
[3]
The respondent opposes this application on the following basis: that
the applicant’s claim
has prescribed; that there is no good
cause shown by the applicant why the notice was not served within six
months from the date
of the occurrence; and that the non-compliance
with the timeframes by the applicant has caused prejudice to the
respondent.
[4]
In its opposing affidavit, the respondent firstly raised a point
in
limine
that the Founding Affidavit for this application was not
duly commissioned since the Commissioner of Oaths failed to state the
place
and date of the administration of the oath, as well as his full
names and business address as required by Regulation 4(1) and (2)
of
the Administration of Oath Regulations. Prior to determining the
application for condonation, this court must first deal with
this
issue. Regulation 4 provides as follows:
4.
(
1) Below the deponent’s
signature or mark the commissioner of oaths shall certify that the
deponent has acknowledged that
he knows and understands the contents
of the declaration and he shall state the manner, place and date of
taking the declaration.
(2)
The commissioner of oaths shall—
(a)
sign the declaration and print his full name and business address
below his signature; and
(b)
state his designation and the area for which he holds his appointment
or the office held by him if he holds his appointment ex
officio.”
[5]
The stamp of the Commissioner of oaths reflects that the affidavit
was commissioned at Botshabelo
Police Station on 17 May 2023.
Further, the respondent has argued that the commissioner of oaths
chose to put his initials instead
of his full names on the
declaration. From the first page of the affidavit, the initials of
the commissioner appear as K.E.M but
on the stamp, below his
signature appears what looks like a name and the surname to me. It is
inconceivable that the Commissioner
would have two different sets of
initials, one set being consistent throughout the pages of the
affidavit and a different set where
his name appears. Even in the
event that the name appearing below the stamp is a shortened version
of his name, I am of the view
that his identity can be easily
ascertained from the information contained in the affidavit.
This, in my view fulfils the
requirements in terms of section 4(1) of
the Regulations. In
Absa Bank Ltd v Botha NO and Others
2013 (5)
SA 563
(GNP
) at para 8 it was held that the court has a
discretion to refuse or admit an affidavit which does not fully
comply with the Regulations
where there has been substantial
compliance with the said Regulations. For these reasons, I am of the
view that the applicant’s
affidavit complies substantially with
the Regulations and must be admitted and the respondent’s
contrary averment be rejected.
[6]
I now turn to deal with the condonation application. Section 3 of the
Legal Proceedings Act reads
as follows:
“
1. No
legal proceedings for the recovery of a debt may be instituted
against an organ of state unless-
(a)
the creditor has given the organ of state in question notice
in writing of his or her or its intention to institute
legal proceedings in question; or
(b)
the organ of state in question has consented in writing to the
institution of that legal proceeding (s)-
(i)
without such notice; or
(ii)
upon receipt of a notice which does not comply with all the
requirements set out in subsection (2).
2
A notice must-
(a)
within 6 (six) months from the date on which the debt became due, be
served on the
organ of state in accordance with section 4(1); and
(b)
briefly set out-
i)
the facts giving rise to the debt; and
(ii)
such particulars of such debt as are within the knowledge of the
creditor.
[7]
Section 3(4)(b) of the same Act sets out the requirements for
condonation of non-compliance with
the timeframes set out in section
3(1) and (2) and provides that a court may grant an application for
condonation if it is satisfied
that:
“
(i)
the debt has not been extinguished by prescription;
(ii)
good cause exists for failure by the creditor; and
(iii)
the organ of state was not unreasonably prejudiced by the failure.”
[8]
In
Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs v C R Rance 2010 (4)
109 (SCA)
at 113A, it was stated that the requirements for
condonation listed in section 3(4)(b) are conjunctive and must all be
established
by the party seeking condonation. The phrase ‘
if
[the court] is satisfied’
has long been recognised as
setting a standard which is not proof on a balance of probabilities
but the overall impression made
on a court. This principle was
clearly enunciated in
Madinda v Minister of Safety & Security
[2008] ZASCA 34
;
[2008] 3 All SA 143
(SCA)
at para 8 as follows:
“
a standard
which is not proof on a balance of probabilities but rather an
overall impression made on the court which brings a fair
mind to the
facts set up by the parties”
I now turn to deal with
the three requirements individually.
Prescription
[9]
The respondent further, relying on section 5(2) and (3) of the Legal
Proceedings Act argues that the
applicant’s claim has
prescribed. Section 5(2) and (3) provides that:
“
(2) No process
referred to in subsection (1) may be served as contemplated in that
subsection before the expiry of a period of 60
days after the notice,
where applicable, has been served on the organ of state in terms of
section 3(2)(a).
(3) If any process
referred to in subsection (1) has been served as contemplated in that
subsection before the expiry of the period
referred to in subsection
(2), such process must be regarded as having been served on the first
day after the expiry of the said
period.”
[10]
Citing the above provision, the respondent submitted that the 60 days
from the date on which the summons
were actually served expired on 16
May 2023, and therefore the summons are deemed to have been served on
17 May 2023, at which
point, the three-year period would have expired
from the date of the cause of action and therefore rendering the
applicant’s
claim to have prescribed. The respondent further
submitted that the Act makes no provision for condonation of
non-compliance with
this particular section and as such the court
cannot condone non-compliance therewith. Further that since the
application of this
provision renders the applicant’s claim to
have prescribed, there is no point in this court condoning
non-compliance on a
claim that has already prescribed.
[11]
The respondent submitted to this court that this provision must be
applied for purposes of prescription.
Section 5(3)(2) provides that a
process served before the expiry of 60 days after service of notice
must be “
regarded
as having been served on the first
day after the expiry of the said period
”. It is my view
that this provision is meant for the respondent in respect of the
steps it must take in response to the process
served. It is also
noteworthy that the respondent appears to have attributed the same
meaning to this provision as it only served
its plea on 5
th
June 2023 although the summons was issued on 16 March 2023 and served
on the respondents on 17 March 2023. Ordinarily, following
the rules
of court as also stipulated in the applicant’s summons, the
respondent should have served its plea on or about
11
th
May 2023.
[12]
This court further noted that in its plea, the respondent did not
raise the issue of prescription or invoke
the provisions of section
5(2) and (3) of the Legal Proceedings Act. It is my view that this
contention by the respondent is herein
misplaced and has to be
rejected.
[13]
I do not deem it necessary to repeat the history and the chronology
of events in this matter as that has
been done in the introductory
paragraphs hereto, save to say that when regards is had to the trite
principle that the service of
summons interrupts prescription, at the
time of the service of the summons to the respondent, the applicant’s
case had not
prescribed. In this regard, the respondent’s
assertion that the applicant’s claim has prescribed is also
rejected.
Good
Cause
[14]
The respondent averred that the applicant has shown no good cause for
the delay thus falling short of meeting
the second requirement for
condonation. In
Madinda v Minister of Safety & Security
[2008] ZASCA 34
;
[2008]
3 All SA 143
(SCA)
at para 12, the Supreme Court of Appeal
analysed the meaning and effect of the concept of ‘good cause’
and found it
to be more about considering of all factors which bear
on the fairness of granting the relief. These factors may
include
prospects of success, reasons for delay, sufficiency of the
explanation offered and the
bona fides
of the applicant. It is
not for this court to decide on the merits of the case. I however
have considered the applicant’s
allegations that the members of
SAPS failed to follow up on the evidence that the applicant was at
work at the time the offence
was allegedly committed despite the
applicant having so advised them. They further failed to even check
the applicant’s version
with his. I have further considered
that the DNA results were negative and that they were not made
available to the court timeously.
In the event that these allegations
are proven to be true, it appears to me that the prospects of success
favour the applicant.
[15]
The applicant was, for two years eleven months and some days, hanging
on tenterhooks until 9
th
March 2023 when charges against
him were withdrawn. He further stated that he was not aware that he
would be required to give notice
to the respondent prior to
instituting legal action, but did so as soon as he obtained legal
advice. A day after he obtained legal
advice he served the notice to
the Respondent. That after the charges were withdrawn against him, he
used the first available opportunity
to investigate and assert his
rights, i.e. consulted an attorney and then issued the notice
literally the following day, is to
me an important factor. In view
hereof, I am satisfied that the applicant has shown good cause for
the delay in issuing the notice.
Prejudice
[16]
With regards to prejudice, the respondent submitted that due to
summons being issued almost immediately after
the notice, the
respondent did not have enough time to prepare its defence. It argued
that the purpose of the notice is to ensure
proper investigation of
the matter as the respondent litigates against many and in this case
it was deprived of the time to investigate
and as such were not able
to locate records e.g. pocket books and occurrence books since three
years had passed and these were
archived. I must say that I find this
odd as the case was withdrawn on 9
th
March 2023 and the
notice served on 15 March 2023, literally six days after the
withdrawal of charges.
[17]
Firstly, members of the respondent are the custodian of the records
the respondent needed to investigate
this matter and secondly, the
said records, be it police pocket books or extracts thereof, could
not have possibly been out of
the respondent’s reach by then as
the case had been alive 6 days before. The averment about the
respondent not having had
sufficient time to prepare its defence is
also preposterous since the respondent did file a plea, and not just
a plea, but one
that also encapsulated a special plea. In the
Madinda
case, the Supreme Court of Appeal cautioned the courts to “
be
slow to assume prejudice for which the respondent itself does not lay
a basis”.
I am not persuaded that the respondent has been
unreasonably prejudiced by the applicant’s failure to comply
with the timelines
stipulated in section 3 of the Legal Proceedings
Act, neither will it by this court granting this condonation
application.
[18]
The respondent further argued that the applicant brought this
application after the respondent had raised a special
plea of
non-compliance however it is very clear, as the applicant avers that
the applicant brought the application prior to receiving
the plea as
the application was served and filed on 1 June 2023 whilst the plea
was served and filed on 5 June 2023. The applicant’s
averment
that it anticipated the special plea holds true. A standard for
condonation applications is the interests of justice.
I am persuaded
that the applicant has met all the requirements set out in section
3(4)(b) of the Legal Proceedings Act and further
that it is in the
interests of justice that this application must succeed.
Consequently,
I make the following Order:
Order
1.
The application for condonation is granted.
2.
Costs shall be costs in the cause.
D.
P. MTHIMUNYE, AJ
Appearances:
For
the Applicant:
Adv.
G. S. J. Van Rensburg
Instructed
by
Berkowitz
Cohen Wartski
c/o
McIntyre Van Der Post
Bloemfontein
For
the Respondent:
Adv.
E. B. Yawa
Instructed
by:
State
Attorney
Bloemfontein