Mokhemisa v Minister of Police (1340/2023) [2023] ZAFSHC 436 (9 November 2023)

80 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Condonation — Legal Proceedings Act — Application for condonation for non-compliance with notice requirements — Applicant arrested for rape, charges withdrawn after three years — Notice of intention to institute legal proceedings served after six-month period — Respondent argues claim has prescribed and no good cause shown for delay — Court finds applicant's affidavit substantially complies with regulations and that the claim has not prescribed — Good cause established due to circumstances surrounding the arrest and subsequent legal advice — Condonation granted.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This judgment concerns an interlocutory application for condonation brought in terms of section 3(4) of the Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002. The applicant sought condonation for non-compliance with the statutory requirement to serve a timeous notice of intended legal proceedings on an organ of state.


The parties were Thabang Berney Mokhemisa as the applicant (and plaintiff in the contemplated action), and the Minister of Police as the respondent (and intended defendant). The respondent opposed the condonation application and sought its dismissal with costs.


Procedurally, after the applicant had served a section 3 notice and issued summons for delictual damages, the respondent delivered a plea raising a special plea of non-compliance with section 3. The applicant then pursued condonation. Before addressing condonation, the court also dealt with a preliminary objection that the founding affidavit was not properly commissioned under the applicable regulations.


The underlying dispute related to intended delictual claims for compensation for unlawful arrest and associated loss of income, arising from the applicant’s arrest on a rape charge and the eventual withdrawal of that charge.


2. Material Facts


On 22 March 2020, the applicant was arrested at his workplace on a charge of rape. He made his first court appearance on 25 March 2020. The matter was postponed, and he remained in custody for approximately three months, until his release on bail in June 2020.


The criminal charge was ultimately withdrawn on 9 March 2023 on the stated basis of lack of evidence. Shortly thereafter, the applicant sought legal advice. He consulted an attorney on or about 14 March 2023 and served a statutory notice in terms of section 3 of Act 40 of 2002 on 15 March 2023, indicating an intention to institute proceedings for damages based on unlawful arrest and loss of income.


The applicant then issued summons on 16 March 2023 and served it on the respondent on 17 March 2023, shortly after the section 3 notice. The respondent delivered a plea in which it raised a special plea that the applicant had not complied with section 3, primarily because the notice was not served within six months of the date on which the “debt became due” as contemplated in section 3(2)(a), and because the respondent did not consent to proceedings without such compliance.


In opposing condonation, the respondent contended (among other points) that the applicant’s claim had prescribed, that the applicant had not shown good cause for the late notice, and that the late notice caused prejudice to the respondent. The respondent also raised a preliminary challenge to the validity of the applicant’s founding affidavit, alleging defective commissioning under Regulation 4(1) and (2) of the Administration of Oath Regulations.


Where the merits of the intended damages claim were mentioned, the court treated them at the level of allegations relevant to prospects, noting the applicant’s assertions that SAPS members failed to follow up on an alibi and that DNA results were negative and not made available timeously. The court did not determine those disputed merits but considered them only insofar as they bore on condonation.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions the court was required to determine were whether the applicant should be granted condonation for non-compliance with the notice provisions in section 3(1)(a) read with section 3(2)(a) of Act 40 of 2002, and whether the requirements in section 3(4)(b) were satisfied.


Before reaching condonation, the court had to decide a procedural issue: whether the founding affidavit should be admitted despite alleged non-compliance with the commissioning requirements in the relevant regulations.


The dispute involved a combination of legal interpretation and the application of law to fact, particularly in relation to (i) the statutory requirements for condonation, (ii) the respondent’s prescription argument connected to section 5(2) and (3) of Act 40 of 2002, and (iii) whether the applicant’s explanation constituted “good cause” and whether the respondent suffered unreasonable prejudice. The “good cause” and prejudice inquiries required an evaluative assessment guided by the statutory framework and the case law cited.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court first addressed the respondent’s point in limine concerning the alleged defective commissioning of the founding affidavit. It set out the requirements of Regulation 4(1) and (2), which require the commissioner of oaths to certify the deponent’s acknowledgement of the contents and to state the manner, place, and date of administering the oath, as well as to provide the commissioner’s full name and business address. The court found that the commissioner’s stamp reflected that commissioning occurred at Botshabelo Police Station on 17 May 2023. Although there was a complaint that only initials appeared in parts of the affidavit, the court considered that the commissioner’s identity was capable of being ascertained from the document as a whole. Relying on Absa Bank Ltd v Botha NO and Others 2013 (5) SA 563 (GNP), the court exercised its discretion to admit an affidavit where there had been substantial compliance with the regulations, and rejected the respondent’s objection.


Turning to condonation, the court set out section 3 of Act 40 of 2002 and emphasised that condonation under section 3(4)(b) requires satisfaction of three conjunctive requirements: the debt must not have prescribed, good cause must exist for the failure, and the organ of state must not have been unreasonably prejudiced. The court relied on Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs v C R Rance 2010 (4) SA 109 (SCA) for the proposition that these requirements are conjunctive. It further relied on Madinda v Minister of Safety & Security [2008] ZASCA 34; [2008] 3 All SA 143 (SCA) for the standard implicit in the phrase “if [the court] is satisfied”, describing it as an overall impression rather than proof on a balance of probabilities.


On prescription, the respondent argued that section 5(2) and (3) of the Act meant summons served before the expiry of 60 days after the section 3 notice must be “regarded” as served only after that 60-day period, and that this deemed service date caused the claim to prescribe. The court rejected this approach. It reasoned that section 5(3) was intended to regulate matters from the respondent’s side, particularly the steps to be taken in response to prematurely served process, and it noted that the respondent itself appeared to have approached the timing of its plea on the basis of that understanding. The court also considered it significant that the respondent had not pleaded prescription or relied on section 5(2) and (3) in its special plea. Applying the general principle (treated by the court as trite) that service of summons interrupts prescription, the court concluded that, at the time summons was served on 17 March 2023, the claim had not prescribed. The respondent’s prescription contention was therefore rejected.


On good cause, the court drew from Madinda that the inquiry is directed at fairness and may include factors such as prospects of success, reasons for delay, the sufficiency of the explanation, and bona fides. Without deciding the merits of the intended action, the court took into account the applicant’s allegations regarding investigatory failures and negative DNA results, concluding that if those allegations were established, the applicant’s prospects of success appeared favourable. The court further placed weight on the chronology following the withdrawal of charges: the applicant indicated he did not know notice was required, but once he obtained legal advice after the criminal case ended, he acted promptly, serving notice the day after consulting his attorney. The court regarded this as an important factor supporting good cause.


On prejudice, the respondent contended that issuing summons almost immediately after the notice deprived it of an adequate opportunity to investigate and to locate records (such as pocket books and occurrence books), which it asserted were archived due to the passage of time. The court was unpersuaded. It found it implausible that relevant records would have been out of reach given that the criminal case had only been withdrawn six days before notice was served, and it noted that the respondent’s members were custodians of the relevant records. The court also considered the respondent’s claim of insufficient time to prepare a defence to be inconsistent with the fact that it had filed a plea which included a special plea. Referring again to Madinda, the court endorsed the caution that courts should be slow to assume prejudice where a respondent does not properly lay a factual basis. It concluded that the respondent had not shown unreasonable prejudice resulting from the non-compliance.


The court also rejected the respondent’s contention that the application was brought only after receipt of the special plea, noting that the application had been served and filed before the plea, and accepting the applicant’s explanation that it anticipated such a plea. Ultimately, the court held that the statutory requirements were met and that it was in the interests of justice to grant condonation.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted the application for condonation under section 3(4) of Act 40 of 2002. It ordered that costs be costs in the cause, meaning the costs of the condonation application would follow the outcome of the main action.


Cases Cited


Absa Bank Ltd v Botha NO and Others 2013 (5) SA 563 (GNP).


Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs v C R Rance 2010 (4) SA 109 (SCA).


Madinda v Minister of Safety & Security [2008] ZASCA 34; [2008] 3 All SA 143 (SCA).


Legislation Cited


Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002.


Rules of Court Cited


No specific uniform rules were cited by number in the judgment; the court referred generally to “the rules of court” in discussing ordinary pleading timelines.


Held


The court held that the applicant’s founding affidavit, despite alleged defects in commissioning, substantially complied with the relevant regulations and should be admitted.


The court further held that the applicant satisfied the three conjunctive requirements for condonation under section 3(4)(b) of Act 40 of 2002. It rejected the respondent’s prescription argument based on section 5(2) and (3), accepted that good cause existed for the late notice given the prompt steps taken after withdrawal of charges and the prospects factor, and found that the respondent had not established unreasonable prejudice. Condonation was therefore granted, with costs in the cause.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Condonation for non-compliance with the notice provisions in section 3 of Act 40 of 2002 is governed by section 3(4)(b), which requires the applicant to satisfy three conjunctive elements: the debt must not have been extinguished by prescription, good cause must exist for the failure, and the organ of state must not have been unreasonably prejudiced.


In applying section 3(4)(b), the court adopted the approach that the statutory phrase “if [the court] is satisfied” entails an evaluative standard based on the overall impression made on the court rather than proof strictly on a balance of probabilities, as articulated in the cited authority.


The assessment of good cause is not confined to a single factor and is directed at fairness; it may include consideration of the explanation for the delay, bona fides, and prospects of success, without requiring the condonation court to determine the merits of the main claim.


In relation to affidavit formalities, the court applied the principle that a court retains a discretion to admit an affidavit that does not comply in every respect with commissioning requirements where there has been substantial compliance, particularly where the commissioner’s identity and the essential formalities can be ascertained from the document.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
>>
2023
>>
[2023] ZAFSHC 436
|

|

Mokhemisa v Minister of Police (1340/2023) [2023] ZAFSHC 436 (9 November 2023)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Reportable: YES/NO
Of
Interest to other Judges: YES/NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: YES/NO
Case
no: 1340/2023
In
the matter between:
THABANG
BERNEY MOKHEMISA
APPLICANT
and
THE
MINISTER OF POLICE
RESPONDENT
CORAM:
MTHIMUNYE, AJ
HEARD
ON:
17 AUGUST 2023
JUDGMENT
BY:
MTHIMUNYE, AJ
DELIVERED ON:
09 NOVEMBER 2023
[1]
This is an application in terms of section 3(4) of the Institution of
Legal Proceedings against
Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002
(“the Legal Proceedings Act”). The applicant seeks
condonation for non-compliance
with Section 3(1)(a) read with section
3(2)(a) of the Legal Proceedings Act.  The respondent opposes
the application and prays
for it to be dismissed with costs.
[2]
The applicant was arrested at his workplace on 22 March 2020 on a
charge of rape. His first appearance
was on 25 March 2020. The case
was postponed and he was kept in custody for approximately three (3)
months before he was released
on bail in June 2020. The charges
against him were eventually withdrawn on 9 March 2023 for lack of
evidence. On or about 14 March
2023 he consulted an attorney and on
15 March 2023, served a notice in terms of section 3 of Act 40 of
2002 notifying the respondent
of his intention to institute legal
proceedings for compensation for unlawful arrest and loss of income.
On 16
th
March 2023 the applicant issued summons and served
same on the respondent on 17 March 2023. In its plea, the respondent
raised
a special plea of non-compliance by the applicant with the
provisions of section 3 of Act 40 of 2002, firstly that the notice
was
not issued within 6 months from the date of the occurrence as
required by section 3(2)(a), and secondly that it did not consent
to
the institution of legal proceedings against them without compliance
with section 3(2)(a) of the Act.
[3]
The respondent opposes this application on the following basis: that
the applicant’s claim
has prescribed; that there is no good
cause shown by the applicant why the notice was not served within six
months from the date
of the occurrence; and that the non-compliance
with the timeframes by the applicant has caused prejudice to the
respondent.
[4]
In its opposing affidavit, the respondent firstly raised a point
in
limine
that the Founding Affidavit for this application was not
duly commissioned since the Commissioner of Oaths failed to state the
place
and date of the administration of the oath, as well as his full
names and business address as required by Regulation 4(1) and (2)
of
the Administration of Oath Regulations. Prior to determining the
application for condonation, this court must first deal with
this
issue. Regulation 4 provides as follows:
4.
(
1) Below the deponent’s
signature or mark the commissioner of oaths shall certify that the
deponent has acknowledged that
he knows and understands the contents
of the declaration and he shall state the manner, place and date of
taking the declaration.
(2)
The commissioner of oaths shall—
(a)
sign the declaration and print his full name and business address
below his signature; and
(b)
state his designation and the area for which he holds his appointment
or the office held by him if he holds his appointment ex

officio.”
[5]
The stamp of the Commissioner of oaths reflects that the affidavit
was commissioned at Botshabelo
Police Station on 17 May 2023.
Further, the respondent has argued that the commissioner of oaths
chose to put his initials instead
of his full names on the
declaration. From the first page of the affidavit, the initials of
the commissioner appear as K.E.M but
on the stamp, below his
signature appears what looks like a name and the surname to me. It is
inconceivable that the Commissioner
would have two different sets of
initials, one set being consistent throughout the pages of the
affidavit and a different set where
his name appears. Even in the
event that the name appearing below the stamp is a shortened version
of his name, I am of the view
that his identity can be easily
ascertained from the information contained in the affidavit.
This, in my view fulfils the
requirements in terms of section 4(1) of
the Regulations. In
Absa Bank Ltd v Botha NO and Others
2013 (5)
SA 563
(GNP
) at para 8 it was held that the court has a
discretion to refuse or admit an affidavit which does not fully
comply with the Regulations
where there has been substantial
compliance with the said Regulations. For these reasons, I am of the
view that the applicant’s
affidavit complies substantially with
the Regulations and must be admitted and the respondent’s
contrary averment be rejected.
[6]
I now turn to deal with the condonation application. Section 3 of the
Legal Proceedings Act reads
as follows:

1.  No
legal proceedings for the recovery of a debt may be instituted
against an organ of state unless-
(a)
the creditor has given the organ of state in question notice
in writing of his or her or    its intention to institute

legal proceedings in question; or
(b)
the organ of state in question has consented in writing to the
institution of that legal     proceeding (s)-
(i)
without such notice; or
(ii)
upon receipt of a notice which does not comply with all the
requirements set out in subsection (2).
2
A notice must-
(a)
within 6 (six) months from the date on which the debt became due, be
served on the
organ of state in accordance with section 4(1); and
(b)
briefly set out-
i)
the facts giving rise to the debt; and
(ii)
such particulars of such debt as are within the knowledge of the
creditor.
[7]
Section 3(4)(b) of the same Act sets out the requirements for
condonation of non-compliance with
the timeframes set out in section
3(1) and (2) and provides that a court may grant an application for
condonation if it is satisfied
that:

(i)
the debt has not been extinguished by prescription;
(ii)
good cause exists for failure by the creditor; and
(iii)
the organ of state was not unreasonably prejudiced by the failure.”
[8]
In
Minister of Agriculture and Land Affairs v C R Rance 2010 (4)
109 (SCA)
at 113A, it was stated that the requirements for
condonation listed in section 3(4)(b) are conjunctive and must all be
established
by the party seeking condonation. The phrase ‘
if
[the court] is satisfied’
has long been recognised as
setting a standard which is not proof on a balance of probabilities
but the overall impression made
on a court. This principle was
clearly enunciated in
Madinda v Minister of Safety & Security
[2008] ZASCA 34
;
[2008] 3 All SA 143
(SCA)
at para 8 as follows:

a standard
which is not proof on a balance of probabilities but rather an
overall impression made on the court which brings a fair
mind to the
facts set up by the parties”
I now turn to deal with
the three requirements individually.
Prescription
[9]
The respondent further, relying on section 5(2) and (3) of the Legal
Proceedings Act argues that the
applicant’s claim has
prescribed. Section 5(2) and (3) provides that:

(2) No process
referred to in subsection (1) may be served as contemplated in that
subsection before the expiry of a period of 60
days after the notice,
where applicable, has been served on the organ of state in terms of
section 3(2)(a).
(3) If any process
referred to in subsection (1) has been served as contemplated in that
subsection before the expiry of the period
referred to in subsection
(2), such process must be regarded as having been served on the first
day after the expiry of the said
period.”
[10]
Citing the above provision, the respondent submitted that the 60 days
from the date on which the summons
were actually served expired on 16
May 2023, and therefore the summons are deemed to have been served on
17 May 2023, at which
point, the three-year period would have expired
from the date of the cause of action and therefore rendering the
applicant’s
claim to have prescribed. The respondent further
submitted that the Act makes no provision for condonation of
non-compliance with
this particular section and as such the court
cannot condone non-compliance therewith. Further that since the
application of this
provision renders the applicant’s claim to
have prescribed, there is no point in this court condoning
non-compliance on a
claim that has already prescribed.
[11]
The respondent submitted to this court that this provision must be
applied for purposes of prescription.
Section 5(3)(2) provides that a
process served before the expiry of 60 days after service of notice
must be “
regarded
as having been served on the first
day after the expiry of the said period
”. It is my view
that this provision is meant for the respondent in respect of the
steps it must take in response to the process
served. It is also
noteworthy that the respondent appears to have attributed the same
meaning to this provision as it only served
its plea on 5
th
June 2023 although the summons was issued on 16 March 2023 and served
on the respondents on 17 March 2023. Ordinarily, following
the rules
of court as also stipulated in the applicant’s summons, the
respondent should have served its plea on or about
11
th
May 2023.
[12]
This court further noted that in its plea, the respondent did not
raise the issue of prescription or invoke
the provisions of section
5(2) and (3) of the Legal Proceedings Act. It is my view that this
contention by the respondent is herein
misplaced and has to be
rejected.
[13]
I do not deem it necessary to repeat the history and the chronology
of events in this matter as that has
been done in the introductory
paragraphs hereto, save to say that when regards is had to the trite
principle that the service of
summons interrupts prescription, at the
time of the service of the summons to the respondent, the applicant’s
case had not
prescribed. In this regard, the respondent’s
assertion that the applicant’s claim has prescribed is also
rejected.
Good
Cause
[14]
The respondent averred that the applicant has shown no good cause for
the delay thus falling short of meeting
the second requirement for
condonation. In
Madinda v Minister of Safety & Security
[2008] ZASCA 34
;
[2008]
3 All SA 143
(SCA)
at para 12, the Supreme Court of Appeal
analysed the meaning and effect of the concept of ‘good cause’
and found it
to be more about considering of all factors which bear
on the fairness of granting the relief.  These factors may
include
prospects of success, reasons for delay, sufficiency of the
explanation offered and the
bona fides
of the applicant. It is
not for this court to decide on the merits of the case. I however
have considered the applicant’s
allegations that the members of
SAPS failed to follow up on the evidence that the applicant was at
work at the time the offence
was allegedly committed despite the
applicant having so advised them. They further failed to even check
the applicant’s version
with his. I have further considered
that the DNA results were negative and that they were not made
available to the court timeously.
In the event that these allegations
are proven to be true, it appears to me that the prospects of success
favour the applicant.
[15]
The applicant was, for two years eleven months and some days, hanging
on tenterhooks until 9
th
March 2023 when charges against
him were withdrawn. He further stated that he was not aware that he
would be required to give notice
to the respondent prior to
instituting legal action, but did so as soon as he obtained legal
advice. A day after he obtained legal
advice he served the notice to
the Respondent. That after the charges were withdrawn against him, he
used the first available opportunity
to investigate and assert his
rights, i.e. consulted an attorney and then issued the notice
literally the following day, is to
me an important factor. In view
hereof, I am satisfied that the applicant has shown good cause for
the delay in issuing the notice.
Prejudice
[16]
With regards to prejudice, the respondent submitted that due to
summons being issued almost immediately after
the notice, the
respondent did not have enough time to prepare its defence. It argued
that the purpose of the notice is to ensure
proper investigation of
the matter as the respondent litigates against many and in this case
it was deprived of the time to investigate
and as such were not able
to locate records e.g. pocket books and occurrence books since three
years had passed and these were
archived. I must say that I find this
odd as the case was withdrawn on 9
th
March 2023 and the
notice served on 15 March 2023, literally six days after the
withdrawal of charges.
[17]
Firstly, members of the respondent are the custodian of the records
the respondent needed to investigate
this matter and secondly, the
said records, be it police pocket books or extracts thereof, could
not have possibly been out of
the respondent’s reach by then as
the case had been alive 6 days before. The averment about the
respondent not having had
sufficient time to prepare its defence is
also preposterous since the respondent did file a plea, and not just
a plea, but one
that also encapsulated a special plea. In the
Madinda
case, the Supreme Court of Appeal cautioned the courts to “
be
slow to assume prejudice for which the respondent itself does not lay
a basis”.
I am not persuaded that the respondent has been
unreasonably prejudiced by the applicant’s failure to comply
with the timelines
stipulated in section 3 of the Legal Proceedings
Act, neither will it by this court granting this condonation
application.
[18]
The respondent further argued that the applicant brought this
application after the respondent had raised a special
plea of
non-compliance however it is very clear, as the applicant avers that
the applicant brought the application prior to receiving
the plea as
the application was served and filed on 1 June 2023 whilst the plea
was served and filed on 5 June 2023. The applicant’s
averment
that it anticipated the special plea holds true. A standard for
condonation applications is the interests of justice.
I am persuaded
that the applicant has met all the requirements set out in section
3(4)(b) of the Legal Proceedings Act and further
that it is in the
interests of justice that this application must succeed.
Consequently,
I make the following Order:
Order
1.
The application for condonation is granted.
2.
Costs shall be costs in the cause.
D.
P. MTHIMUNYE, AJ
Appearances:
For
the Applicant:
Adv.
G. S. J. Van Rensburg
Instructed
by
Berkowitz
Cohen Wartski
c/o
McIntyre Van Der Post
Bloemfontein
For
the Respondent:
Adv.
E. B. Yawa
Instructed
by:
State
Attorney
Bloemfontein