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2023
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[2023] ZAFSHC 302
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Van Wyk N.O. and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy (2015/2022) [2023] ZAFSHC 302 (2 August 2023)
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE
DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
no: 2015/2
022
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
CIRCULATE TO MAGISTRATES:
YES/NO
In
the matter between:
RIAAN
LAMBERTUS VAN WYK N.O.
First
Plaintiff
REALEBOGA
BOSALETSE N.O.
Second
Plaintiff
PUMZILE
F NGXITO N.O.
Third
Plaintiff
MASEHLEPHO
E MOHAJANE N.O.
Fourth
Plaintiff
TSIETSIE
JOSEPH TAU N.O.
Fifth
Plaintiff
DITABA
L SEBONYANE N.O.
Sixth
Plaintiff
AADIL
MATHER N.O.
Seventh
Plaintiff
PATRICK
A MABILO N.O.
Eighth
Plaintiff
YSUF
KERBELKER N.O.
Ninth
Plaintiff
LUCY
AMMON N.O.
Tenth
Plaintiff
ESIAS
JEREMIAH GERBER N.O.
Eleventh
Plaintiff
[In
their capacities as Trustees for the time being
of
the JAGERSFONTEIN COMMUNITY TRUST –
IT
225/2009]
And
MINISTER
OF MINERAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY
Defendant
CORAM:
P R CRONJÉ, AJ
HEARD
ON:
02 JUNE 2023
DELIVERED
ON:
2 AUGUST
2023
JUDGMENT
BY:
P R
CRONJé, AJ
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, and release to SAFLII.
The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 14h30 on 2 August
2023.
I
THE EXCEPTIONS
[1]
The Defendant raised four grounds of exception against the
Plaintiffs’ combined
summons.
[2]
The first ground attacks the
locus standi
of the First
Plaintiff (“Mr Gerber”) to act as representative of all
the Plaintiffs, in their capacities as Trustees
of Jagersfontein
Community Trust (“JCT”), alternatively to act on behalf
of Wheatfields Investments No. 168 (Pty) Ltd.
[3]
In the combined summons the Plaintiffs are cited as Trustees as per
Letters of Authority
issued by the Master of the Northern Cape
Division of the High Court in Kimberley. The Letters of Authority
corresponds with the
citation of the Plaintiffs, save for Mr Floyd
Teu, who appears in the Letters of Authority but not in the combined
summons.
[1]
[4]
Under the heading “
LOCUS STANDI
” in the
particulars of claim, Mr Gerber is cited in terms of an authority
vested in him by resolution of Trustees, who has
subsequently
authorised the First Plaintiff (“Mr Van Wyk”) with
authority to litigate on behalf of the fellow Trustees.
It is
apparent that none of the Trustees were specifically cited as
Plaintiffs in paragraph 1 of the particulars of claim. I hasten
to
state that the Plaintiffs were not legally represented in the
exception proceedings, but that Mr Gerber argued their case.
[5]
The first ground of exception of the Defendant is that there is no
compliance with
Rule 18(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court that
requires that every pleading must contain a clear and concise
statement of material
facts on which the pleader relies. It
states that the particulars of claim fails to cite and describe the
parties and that
the Plaintiffs therefore lack
locus standi
.
It then proceeds to state that the particulars of claim lack the
necessary averments to sustain a cause of action.
[6]
There is merit in the Defendant’s exception. It is trite that a
Trust is represented
by all the Trustees and they have to be cited,
also in the particulars of claim. One gains the impression that
Mr Gerber,
and/or Mr Van Wyk, and/or the Trustees applied the
citation in representative capacity that is used in application
proceedings.
This does not generally apply to actions where the
parties have to be cited individually.
[7]
The deficiency, however, can be cured if paragraph 1.1 of the amended
particulars
of claim is amended to cite all the Trustees and
paragraph 1.2 – 1.3 is deleted as it would be superfluous.
Paragraph
1.1 and the heading of the summons and particulars of claim
have to correspond with the Letters of Authority. The saving
grace for the Trust is that the Letters of Authority was incorporated
into the pleadings of the Plaintiffs but it needs to be addressed.
[8]
The second ground relates to the lack of authority. The
Defendant states that
a Trust is a legal
personae
sui generis
and
requires that all Trustees act together on behalf of the Trust.
This can only be done by Resolution signed by the Trustees.
The
Resolution appended to the particulars of claim does not authorize
any of the Trustees to institute legal action in the name
of the
Trust. The Defendant therefore disputes the lack of authority
to institute the claim.
[2]
[9]
The Resolution was, at face value, passed on 28 July 2012.
Paragraph 3 of the
Resolution states (freely translated): Floyd Tau,
Esias Jeremiah Gerber and Ysuf Kerbelker are appointed as co-trustees
on behalf
of the Trust and is authorized to take all decisions,
perform all action and instruction in respect of prospecting and
mining for
minerals (diamonds) on tailings and properties situated in
the vicinity of Jagersfontein and to sign on behalf of the Trust.
It is clear from this that it does not explicitly authorize the named
Trustees to institute action against the Defendant. The second
ground
of exception therefore has to succeed.
[10]
The third ground is that the Plaintiffs pray for damages in the
amount of R30 billion for loss
of earnings since 2013 to 2021.
[3]
The Defendant, correctly, states that Rule 18(10) of the Uniform
Rules of Court provides that where a Plaintiff sues for
damages, it
shall set it out in such a manner as will enable the Defendant to
reasonably assess the quantum. The Plaintiffs
failed to plead
the basis on which the amount is claimed and how it is quantified or
computed. It does not set out facts
illustrating income
previously earned or income that would potentially be earned for the
period in which the amount is claimed.
[11]
Paragraph 10A of the particulars of claim contains the quantification
of the Plaintiffs’
claim. I include them verbatim:
“
10A.1
In quantifying the patrimonial loss claimed on the abovementioned
basis, the following information was used:
10A1.1
included in their application for filing of pit at Jagersfontein Mine
lodged by JD April 2012, is
a Report by SRK Consulting in which it
was stated that the tailing dams on said mine had R26 million tons
earmarked for mining
as diamondiferous gravel;
10A1.2
DBCM made a statement to the Mining Weekly reported on 18 March 2010,
in which they stated that,
the average grade of 12.8 carats per 100
tons;
10A1.3
The Jagersfontein Mine is famous for the largest jewel-quality
diamonds with the purest colours in
the world, classified as Type Two
diamonds. The estimated colour per carat price projected by
DeBeers in 2000 at USD 147
per carat cannot be an indication of the
quality and size of the diamonds extracted. To be marginal, the
average dollar per carat
price of diamonds extracted can be set at
USD 551.00 per carat (S
ee
: Annexure ‘AOP5’ –
Submissions made by DBCM during the QUESTCO Process); and
10A1.4
To illustrate how reserved and reasonable the applicant’s claim
sounding in money is, attached
hereto as Annexure ‘AOP6”,
is a formula using the above marginal dollar per carat rate and
calculating the average
rand value of the diamonds extracted by JD.
”
[12]
In the first prayer it is stated:
“
Damages
in the amount of ZAR 30 billion for the loss of earnings the
JCT/Wheatfields would have marginally earned since 2013 to
2021.
”
[13]
Although thin, and not as comprehensive as it could be, there is some
basis for the calculation
of the claim. I am of the view that
the Defendant would be able to plead and request further particulars
in this respect.
I therefore do not find in favour of the
Defendant on the third ground of exception.
[14]
The fourth ground is that the Plaintiffs rely on an approval given by
the Defendant to the JCT
to exercise prospecting rights over mining
property. It states that Section 6(2) of the MPRD Act provides
that any decision
taken in terms of the provisions of the Act must be
in “
writing
and accompanied by reasons
”.
The Defendant states that it is incontrovertible that the approval
relied upon by the Plaintiffs must be contained
in a written
document, setting out the prospecting rights and obligations of the
holder of those rights, as against those of the
grantor, including
any other relevant terms thereof. The Defendant then states
that the Plaintiffs’ demand for specific
performance in terms
of the approval does not state the terms or attach the approval upon
which reliance is placed. It furthermore
states that the
Plaintiffs failed to plead a breach or a contravention of the terms
of the approval for which they seek specific
performance. The
Plaintiffs’ action therefore lacks the necessary averments to
sustain a claim for specific performance.
[4]
[15]
I believe that there are merits in the fourth ground. It is
accepted (trite) that where
a person relies on written documents and
documents that are attached to those documents, they have to
included. This applies to
the whole chain. If a person does not have
it, then s/he should state it and at least plead the terms that were
recorded in that
document.
II
GENERAL REMARKS
[16]
Courts do not give advice. I therefore only make general comments.
[17]
The amended pleadings show that large portions of the text is struck
through, apparently in an
attempt to highlight what was changed. It
overburdens the papers and may create confusion. Amended papers/pages
are also marked
“AMENDED PAGE”, which makes it easier to
see an amendment. Footnotes are not used in pleadings but generally
in heads
of argument and judgements.
[18]
Notwithstanding that the Plaintiffs claim that they are not legally
represented, one gains the
impression that they do have some sort of
assistance in the formulation of the pleadings.
[19]
Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
provides that everyone has the
right to have any dispute that can be
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing
before a court or, where
appropriate, appropriate, another
independent and impartial tribunal or forum.
[20]
To take an overly strict approach to the pleadings may infringe
section 34 and have a detrimental
effect on the Trust. Yet, the
Uniform Rules of Court still have to be followed by all litigants.
[21]
I am of the view that the Trust should be given an opportunity to
correct the pleadings by effecting
proper amendments and address the
grounds of exception of the Defendant.
[22]
I therefore intend to afford the Trust the opportunity to address the
deficiencies in the citing
of all of the Trustees as Plaintiffs and
to
address
the balance of the objections
that the Defendant refers to. The Court normally grants the
party against whom exceptions succeed
thirty (30) days to remedy the
defects.
[23]
Taking into consideration that the Plaintiffs are, at face value, not
legally assisted/represented,
I recommend
to
seek
legal advice in addressing the deficiencies. This would
be in the interest of justice.
[24]
I resolved to afford the Plaintiffs forty five (45) days from date of
delivery of this judgement
to rectify the deficiencies, failing which
the Plaintiffs’ claim may be struck out.
III
CONDONATION
[25]
The Defendant filed an application for condonation and I am satisfied
that a proper case is made
for the relief. I therefore grant
condonation.
IV
COSTS
[26]
A party that askes for condonation does generally pay for the
indulgence. The Plaintiffs would
therefore, generally, be entitled to
the costs of opposition.
[27]
The Defendant, however, was substantially successful in its exception
and would be entitled to
its costs.
[28]
Bearing in mind that the parties would both be liable for costs and
taking into consideration
that the Plaintiffs are not legally
represented and represents a small community in the Western Free
State, I exercise my discretion
in ordering both parties to pay their
own costs.
[29]
I make the following orders.
ORDER
1.
The Plaintiffs are granted leave to remedy their pleadings by
addressing the
first, second and fourth grounds of exception within
forty five (45) calendar days from date of this order.
2.
Should the Plaintiffs fail to effect the necessary amendments within
forty five
(45) calendar days, their claim may be struck out.
3.
Each party pays its own costs.
P R CRONJé, AJ
For
the Plaintiffs
:
Mr
RL Van Wyk: Presented arguments.
Address
of Plaintiffs
Esias
J Gerber
22
Sea Breeze Villas
Beach
Boulevard
Dias
Beach, Mossel Bay
E-mail
:
gerberej@gmail.com
riaanvanwyk772@gmail.com
For
the Defendant:
Adv.
K. Moroka SC – Heads of Argument
Adv.
L. Tlelai – appearance and Heads of Argument
State
Attorney
Bloemfontein
[1]
Pleadings, p.
20; p. 30
[2]
Pleadings, p.
5, para 2.1 – 2.5
[3]
Pleadings, p.
6, para 3.1
[4]
Pleadings, p.
7, para 4.1 – 4.8