Van Wyk N.O. and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy (2015/2022) [2023] ZAFSHC 302 (2 August 2023)

80 Reportability
Civil Procedure

Brief Summary

Exceptions — Locus standi — Plaintiffs, as Trustees of the Jagersfontein Community Trust, cited in combined summons without individual citation — Defendant's exception based on alleged non-compliance with Rule 18(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court — Court finds merit in exception, noting that all Trustees must be cited individually in actions — Authority to institute action — Resolution appended to particulars of claim insufficient to authorize Trustees to institute legal action against Defendant — Court allows Plaintiffs to amend particulars of claim to rectify deficiencies within 45 days, failing which claim may be struck out.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter concerned exception proceedings brought by the Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy (the defendant) against the combined summons and particulars of claim issued by multiple plaintiffs who purported to act in their capacities as trustees of the Jagersfontein Community Trust (IT 225/2009). The plaintiffs sought relief that included a substantial claim for damages and relief framed as specific performance linked to an alleged approval relating to prospecting rights.


The procedural posture was that the defendant delivered four grounds of exception directed at the adequacy of the plaintiffs’ pleadings, including whether the pleadings disclosed a cause of action and complied with the Uniform Rules of Court. In addition, the defendant sought condonation for the late filing of the exception, which required determination before the merits of the exceptions could be resolved.


The dispute, as presented in the pleadings attacked by exception, arose from the plaintiffs’ allegations that the trust (and/or an associated entity referred to as Wheatfields Investments No. 168 (Pty) Ltd) had suffered significant financial loss and was entitled to enforce rights said to flow from an approval granted by the defendant under the minerals regulatory framework. The judgment, however, was confined to the pleading and procedural sufficiency of the claims rather than the merits of any mining or prospecting entitlement.


Material Facts


The plaintiffs were cited in the summons as trustees of the Jagersfontein Community Trust. Letters of Authority issued by the Master were incorporated into the plaintiffs’ papers. Those Letters of Authority aligned with the citation of trustees in the summons except that a person reflected in the Letters of Authority, Mr Floyd Teu, appeared not to have been cited in the combined summons.


Within the particulars of claim, under a heading dealing with locus standi, the pleadings alleged that Mr Gerber was empowered by a trustees’ resolution, and that he in turn authorised Mr Van Wyk to litigate on behalf of the trustees. The court treated this as indicating that the plaintiffs attempted to rely on a form of representative authority within the pleadings rather than properly citing all trustees as litigating parties in an action.


A resolution appended to the particulars of claim (dated 28 July 2012) recorded the appointment of certain individuals as co-trustees and authorised them to take decisions and perform actions relating to prospecting and mining for diamonds on tailings and properties in the vicinity of Jagersfontein, including to sign on behalf of the trust. The court accepted, on the face of the resolution as pleaded, that it did not expressly authorise the institution of legal proceedings against the defendant.


The plaintiffs pleaded a damages claim of ZAR 30 billion described as loss of earnings that the trust and/or Wheatfields would “marginally” have earned between 2013 and 2021. In support of quantification, the particulars of claim referred to information including a consulting report indicating tonnage of tailings, a reported average grade (carats per ton), and an estimated dollar-per-carat price, as well as a formula attached as an annexure.


The plaintiffs also relied on an alleged approval granted by the defendant to the trust to exercise prospecting rights over mining property. The defendant’s exception proceeded on the basis that the approval, if it existed, had to be in writing, and that the plaintiffs had not attached it or pleaded its terms and had not pleaded a breach of identified terms sufficient to ground a claim for specific performance.


Legal Issues


The central legal questions were whether the plaintiffs’ particulars of claim were excipiable for failing to comply with pleading requirements and for lacking averments necessary to sustain the relief claimed. The issues were largely questions of law and pleading sufficiency, together with the application of settled procedural principles to the pleaded facts.


More specifically, the court had to determine whether the particulars of claim adequately pleaded (a) the plaintiffs’ locus standi in a trust context and proper citation of trustees in action proceedings, (b) the existence of authority for the institution of action on behalf of the trust, (c) compliance with pleading requirements for damages (including sufficient particularity for quantification), and (d) whether reliance on an alleged statutory approval for prospecting rights was properly pleaded, including whether the terms of that approval and the alleged breach were sufficiently set out to sustain a claim for specific performance.


In addition, the court had to determine an ancillary procedural matter, namely whether the defendant made out a case for condonation in relation to the timing of the exception.


Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the exceptions with reference to the principle that pleadings must contain a clear and concise statement of material facts and must allege the necessary facts to sustain a cause of action, with explicit reliance on Rule 18(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court. In relation to the trust’s standing in action proceedings, the court treated it as settled that a trust is represented by all of its trustees, and that trustees must be properly cited as parties in an action. The court considered that the plaintiffs’ pleading style suggested an attempt to use a form of representative citation more commonly associated with application proceedings, which does not ordinarily satisfy the requirements for action proceedings where parties must be cited individually.


Although the court found merit in the defendant’s challenge to locus standi and citation, it held that the defect was capable of being cured by amendment. It indicated that the plaintiffs could address the problem by amending the particulars of claim to cite all trustees in the relevant paragraph and aligning the heading and citation with the Letters of Authority, while deleting superfluous paragraphs that attempted to establish representative authority.


On the question of authority, the court considered the defendant’s contention that the trust, as a legal entity of a particular character, requires the trustees to act together and that litigation authority should be derived from a resolution authorising the institution of proceedings. Examining the appended resolution, the court held that, while it conferred powers regarding prospecting and mining activities and signing on behalf of the trust, it did not explicitly authorise the named trustees to institute action against the defendant. On that basis, the court upheld the second ground of exception.


As to the damages claim, the court applied Rule 18(10), which requires that a plaintiff claiming damages set them out in a manner enabling the defendant reasonably to assess the quantum. The defendant’s complaint was that the plaintiffs failed to plead the basis of the ZAR 30 billion claim and did not sufficiently explain computation. The court, however, noted that paragraph 10A of the particulars of claim did provide a stated basis (tonnage, grade, pricing assumptions, and an attached formula). Although the court regarded this as “thin” and capable of more comprehensive pleading, it held that there was nevertheless some basis from which the defendant could plead and, if necessary, request further particulars. The third ground of exception was therefore rejected.


Regarding the fourth ground, the court accepted the defendant’s reliance on section 6(2) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002, which provides that decisions taken under the Act must be in writing and accompanied by reasons. The court reasoned that where a claimant relies on written documentation (and documents incorporated by reference forming part of a chain), the pleading should attach the documents or, if they are unavailable, should at least plead the terms recorded in them. It found merit in the contention that the plaintiffs had not attached the approval on which they relied, had not pleaded its terms, and had not pleaded a breach or contravention of identifiable terms sufficient to support a claim for specific performance.


In addressing the appropriate order, the court took into account broader fairness considerations, including the plaintiffs’ apparent lack of legal representation and the potential implications of an overly technical approach for access to court, with reference to section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. The court nevertheless emphasised that the Uniform Rules of Court apply to all litigants. Balancing these considerations, it exercised a discretion to allow the plaintiffs an opportunity to remedy the pleading defects rather than disposing of the action at this stage, extending the usual period to 45 days and indicating that failure to amend could result in the claim being struck out.


The court granted condonation to the defendant, being satisfied that a proper case had been made out. On costs, it recognised that a party seeking condonation typically pays costs, while a party substantially successful in exception proceedings would ordinarily be entitled to costs. It ultimately exercised a discretion, considering that both parties had elements of success and that the plaintiffs represented a small community and were not legally represented, to order that each party pay its own costs.


Outcome and Relief


The court upheld the defendant’s exceptions on the first, second, and fourth grounds, and dismissed the exception on the third ground relating to quantification of damages.


The plaintiffs were granted leave to remedy their pleadings by addressing the successful grounds of exception within 45 calendar days of the order. The court directed that, should the plaintiffs fail to effect the necessary amendments within that period, their claim may be struck out.


Condonation sought by the defendant was granted. An order was made that each party pays its own costs.


Cases Cited


No cases were cited in the judgment.


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996 (section 34).


Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002 (section 6(2)).


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 18(4).


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 18(10).


Held


The court held that the particulars of claim were excipiable in material respects because the plaintiffs, suing as trustees, did not properly plead and align the citation and locus standi requirements for action proceedings, and because the pleaded resolution did not provide authority to institute litigation against the defendant.


The court further held that reliance on an alleged statutory approval required that the written approval be attached or its terms be pleaded, together with a pleaded breach sufficient to sustain the claim for specific performance, and the failure to do so rendered the pleading defective.


The court held, however, that the pleaded material relating to the damages computation, while limited, provided some basis enabling the defendant to plead and to seek further particulars, and was therefore not excipiable under Rule 18(10) on the papers as they stood.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Pleadings in action proceedings must comply with Rule 18(4) by setting out a clear and concise statement of material facts, including proper identification and citation of parties, and must contain the necessary averments to sustain the causes of action relied upon.


In litigation involving a trust, the trust is represented by all trustees, and trustees must be properly cited as litigating parties in action proceedings; defects in citation and locus standi are capable of being cured by appropriate amendment where the underlying authority documentation exists but is not properly reflected in the pleadings.


A trust’s litigation steps require proper authority, and a trustees’ resolution relied upon for authority must support the institution of the proceedings in question; a resolution authorising operational decisions (such as prospecting or mining activities) does not necessarily constitute authority to institute legal proceedings unless it clearly does so.


Where damages are claimed, Rule 18(10) requires that the quantification be pleaded with sufficient particularity to enable the defendant reasonably to assess the quantum, although the presence of a pleaded methodology and inputs may be sufficient at exception stage even if further particularity may later be required.


Where a party relies on a statutory decision or approval that must be in writing (as contemplated by section 6(2) of the Mineral and Petroleum Resources Development Act 28 of 2002), the pleading should attach the written instrument or plead its material terms (and, for specific performance, plead the relevant obligations and breach), because reliance on an unpleaded or unattached written decision may result in a failure to disclose a cause of action.


In managing pleading defects, the court may exercise a discretion to allow amendment in a manner consistent with procedural fairness and access to court considerations under section 34 of the Constitution, while still requiring compliance with the Uniform Rules of Court.

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[2023] ZAFSHC 302
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Van Wyk N.O. and Others v Minister of Mineral Resources and Energy (2015/2022) [2023] ZAFSHC 302 (2 August 2023)

IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE STATE
DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
no: 2015/2
022
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
CIRCULATE TO MAGISTRATES:
YES/NO
In
the matter between:
RIAAN
LAMBERTUS VAN WYK N.O.
First
Plaintiff
REALEBOGA
BOSALETSE N.O.
Second
Plaintiff
PUMZILE
F NGXITO N.O.
Third
Plaintiff
MASEHLEPHO
E MOHAJANE N.O.
Fourth
Plaintiff
TSIETSIE
JOSEPH TAU N.O.
Fifth
Plaintiff
DITABA
L SEBONYANE N.O.
Sixth
Plaintiff
AADIL
MATHER N.O.
Seventh
Plaintiff
PATRICK
A MABILO N.O.
Eighth
Plaintiff
YSUF
KERBELKER N.O.
Ninth
Plaintiff
LUCY
AMMON N.O.
Tenth
Plaintiff
ESIAS
JEREMIAH GERBER N.O.
Eleventh
Plaintiff
[In
their capacities as Trustees for the time being
of
the JAGERSFONTEIN COMMUNITY TRUST –
IT
225/2009]
And
MINISTER
OF MINERAL RESOURCES AND ENERGY
Defendant
CORAM:
P R CRONJÉ, AJ
HEARD
ON:
02 JUNE 2023
DELIVERED
ON:
2 AUGUST
2023
JUDGMENT
BY:
P R
CRONJé, AJ
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties’ representatives by email, and release to SAFLII.
The
date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 14h30 on 2 August
2023.
I
THE EXCEPTIONS
[1]
The Defendant raised four grounds of exception against the
Plaintiffs’ combined
summons.
[2]
The first ground attacks the
locus standi
of the First
Plaintiff (“Mr Gerber”) to act as representative of all
the Plaintiffs, in their capacities as Trustees
of Jagersfontein
Community Trust (“JCT”), alternatively to act on behalf
of Wheatfields Investments No. 168 (Pty) Ltd.
[3]
In the combined summons the Plaintiffs are cited as Trustees as per
Letters of Authority
issued by the Master of the Northern Cape
Division of the High Court in Kimberley. The Letters of Authority
corresponds with the
citation of the Plaintiffs, save for Mr Floyd
Teu, who appears in the Letters of Authority but not in the combined
summons.
[1]
[4]
Under the heading “
LOCUS STANDI
” in the
particulars of claim, Mr Gerber is cited in terms of an authority
vested in him by resolution of Trustees, who has
subsequently
authorised the First Plaintiff (“Mr Van Wyk”) with
authority to litigate on behalf of the fellow Trustees.
It is
apparent that none of the Trustees were specifically cited as
Plaintiffs in paragraph 1 of the particulars of claim. I hasten
to
state that the Plaintiffs were not legally represented in the
exception proceedings, but that Mr Gerber argued their case.
[5]
The first ground of exception of the Defendant is that there is no
compliance with
Rule 18(4) of the Uniform Rules of Court that
requires that every pleading must contain a clear and concise
statement of material
facts on which the pleader relies.  It
states that the particulars of claim fails to cite and describe the
parties and that
the Plaintiffs therefore lack
locus standi
.
It then proceeds to state that the particulars of claim lack the
necessary averments to sustain a cause of action.
[6]
There is merit in the Defendant’s exception. It is trite that a
Trust is represented
by all the Trustees and they have to be cited,
also in the particulars of claim.  One gains the impression that
Mr Gerber,
and/or Mr Van Wyk, and/or the Trustees applied the
citation in representative capacity that is used in application
proceedings.
This does not generally apply to actions where the
parties have to be cited individually.
[7]
The deficiency, however, can be cured if paragraph 1.1 of the amended
particulars
of claim is amended to cite all the Trustees and
paragraph 1.2 – 1.3 is deleted as it would be superfluous.
Paragraph
1.1 and the heading of the summons and particulars of claim
have to correspond with the Letters of Authority.  The saving
grace for the Trust is that the Letters of Authority was incorporated
into the pleadings of the Plaintiffs but it needs to be addressed.
[8]
The second ground relates to the lack of authority.  The
Defendant states that
a Trust is a legal
personae
sui generis
and
requires that all Trustees act together on behalf of the Trust.
This can only be done by Resolution signed by the Trustees.
The
Resolution appended to the particulars of claim does not authorize
any of the Trustees to institute legal action in the name
of the
Trust.  The Defendant therefore disputes the lack of authority
to institute the claim.
[2]
[9]
The Resolution was, at face value, passed on 28 July 2012.
Paragraph 3 of the
Resolution states (freely translated): Floyd Tau,
Esias Jeremiah Gerber and Ysuf Kerbelker are appointed as co-trustees
on behalf
of the Trust and is authorized to take all decisions,
perform all action and instruction in respect of prospecting and
mining for
minerals (diamonds) on tailings and properties situated in
the vicinity of Jagersfontein and to sign on behalf of the Trust.

It is clear from this that it does not explicitly authorize the named
Trustees to institute action against the Defendant. The second
ground
of exception therefore has to succeed.
[10]
The third ground is that the Plaintiffs pray for damages in the
amount of R30 billion for loss
of earnings since 2013 to 2021.
[3]
The Defendant, correctly, states that Rule 18(10) of the Uniform
Rules of Court provides that where a Plaintiff sues for
damages, it
shall set it out in such a manner as will enable the Defendant to
reasonably assess the quantum.  The Plaintiffs
failed to plead
the basis on which the amount is claimed and how it is quantified or
computed.  It does not set out facts
illustrating income
previously earned or income that would potentially be earned for the
period in which the amount is claimed.
[11]
Paragraph 10A of the particulars of claim contains the quantification
of the Plaintiffs’
claim.  I include them verbatim:

10A.1
In quantifying the patrimonial loss claimed on the abovementioned
basis, the following information was used:
10A1.1
included in their application for filing of pit at Jagersfontein Mine
lodged by JD April 2012, is
a Report by SRK Consulting in which it
was stated that the tailing dams on said mine had R26 million tons
earmarked for mining
as diamondiferous gravel;
10A1.2
DBCM made a statement to the Mining Weekly reported on 18 March 2010,
in which they stated that,
the average grade of 12.8 carats per 100
tons;
10A1.3
The Jagersfontein Mine is famous for the largest jewel-quality
diamonds with the purest colours in
the world, classified as Type Two
diamonds.  The estimated colour per carat price projected by
DeBeers in 2000 at USD 147
per carat cannot be an indication of the
quality and size of the diamonds extracted. To be marginal, the
average dollar per carat
price of diamonds extracted can be set at
USD 551.00 per carat (S
ee
: Annexure ‘AOP5’ –
Submissions made by DBCM during the QUESTCO Process); and
10A1.4
To illustrate how reserved and reasonable the applicant’s claim
sounding in money is, attached
hereto as Annexure ‘AOP6”,
is a formula using the above marginal dollar per carat rate and
calculating the average
rand value of the diamonds extracted by JD.

[12]
In the first prayer it is stated:

Damages
in the amount of ZAR 30 billion for the loss of earnings the
JCT/Wheatfields would have marginally earned since 2013 to
2021.

[13]
Although thin, and not as comprehensive as it could be, there is some
basis for the calculation
of the claim.  I am of the view that
the Defendant would be able to plead and request further particulars
in this respect.
I therefore do not find in favour of the
Defendant on the third ground of exception.
[14]
The fourth ground is that the Plaintiffs rely on an approval given by
the Defendant to the JCT
to exercise prospecting rights over mining
property.  It states that Section 6(2) of the MPRD Act provides
that any decision
taken in terms of the provisions of the Act must be
in “
writing
and accompanied by reasons
”.
The Defendant states that it is incontrovertible that the approval
relied upon by the Plaintiffs must be contained
in a written
document, setting out the prospecting rights and obligations of the
holder of those rights, as against those of the
grantor, including
any other relevant terms thereof.  The Defendant then states
that the Plaintiffs’ demand for specific
performance in terms
of the approval does not state the terms or attach the approval upon
which reliance is placed.  It furthermore
states that the
Plaintiffs failed to plead a breach or a contravention of the terms
of the approval for which they seek specific
performance.  The
Plaintiffs’ action therefore lacks the necessary averments to
sustain a claim for specific performance.
[4]
[15]
I believe that there are merits in the fourth ground.  It is
accepted (trite) that where
a person relies on written documents and
documents that are attached to those documents, they have to
included. This applies to
the whole chain. If a person does not have
it, then s/he should state it and at least plead the terms that were
recorded in that
document.
II
GENERAL REMARKS
[16]
Courts do not give advice. I therefore only make general comments.
[17]
The amended pleadings show that large portions of the text is struck
through, apparently in an
attempt to highlight what was changed. It
overburdens the papers and may create confusion. Amended papers/pages
are also marked
“AMENDED PAGE”, which makes it easier to
see an amendment. Footnotes are not used in pleadings but generally
in heads
of argument and judgements.
[18]
Notwithstanding that the Plaintiffs claim that they are not legally
represented, one gains the
impression that they do have some sort of
assistance in the formulation of the pleadings.
[19]
Section 34 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa
provides that everyone has the
right to have any dispute that can be
resolved by the application of law decided in a fair public hearing
before a court or, where
appropriate, appropriate, another
independent and impartial tribunal or forum.
[20]
To take an overly strict approach to the pleadings may infringe
section 34 and have a detrimental
effect on the Trust. Yet, the
Uniform Rules of Court still have to be followed by all litigants.
[21]
I am of the view that the Trust should be given an opportunity to
correct the pleadings by effecting
proper amendments and address the
grounds of exception of the Defendant.
[22]
I therefore intend to afford the Trust the opportunity to address the
deficiencies in the citing
of all of the Trustees as Plaintiffs and
to
address
the balance of the objections
that the Defendant refers to.  The Court normally grants the
party against whom exceptions succeed
thirty (30) days to remedy the
defects.
[23]
Taking into consideration that the Plaintiffs are, at face value, not
legally assisted/represented,
I recommend
to
seek
legal advice in addressing the deficiencies. This would
be in the interest of justice.
[24]
I resolved to afford the Plaintiffs forty five (45) days from date of
delivery of this judgement
to rectify the deficiencies, failing which
the Plaintiffs’ claim may be struck out.
III
CONDONATION
[25]
The Defendant filed an application for condonation and I am satisfied
that a proper case is made
for the relief. I therefore grant
condonation.
IV
COSTS
[26]
A party that askes for condonation does generally pay for the
indulgence. The Plaintiffs would
therefore, generally, be entitled to
the costs of opposition.
[27]
The Defendant, however, was substantially successful in its exception
and would be entitled to
its costs.
[28]
Bearing in mind that the parties would both be liable for costs and
taking into consideration
that the Plaintiffs are not legally
represented and represents a small community in the Western Free
State, I exercise my discretion
in ordering both parties to pay their
own costs.
[29]
I make the following orders.
ORDER
1.
The Plaintiffs are granted leave to remedy their pleadings by
addressing the
first, second and fourth grounds of exception within
forty five (45) calendar days from date of this order.
2.
Should the Plaintiffs fail to effect the necessary amendments within
forty five
(45) calendar days, their claim may be struck out.
3.
Each party pays its own costs.
P R CRONJé, AJ
For
the Plaintiffs
:
Mr
RL Van Wyk: Presented arguments.
Address
of Plaintiffs
Esias
J Gerber
22
Sea Breeze Villas
Beach
Boulevard
Dias
Beach, Mossel Bay
E-mail
:
gerberej@gmail.com
riaanvanwyk772@gmail.com
For
the Defendant:
Adv.
K. Moroka SC – Heads of Argument
Adv.
L. Tlelai – appearance and Heads of Argument
State
Attorney
Bloemfontein
[1]
Pleadings, p.
20; p. 30
[2]
Pleadings, p.
5, para 2.1 – 2.5
[3]
Pleadings, p.
6, para 3.1
[4]
Pleadings, p.
7, para 4.1 – 4.8