About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Free State High Court, Bloemfontein
>>
2023
>>
[2023] ZAFSHC 279
|
|
Mokupi v S (A37/2023) [2023] ZAFSHC 279 (20 July 2023)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE STATE
DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
APPEAL NUMBER:
A37/2023
Reportable:
YES/ NO
Of Interest to other
Judges: YES/NO
Circulate to
Magistrates: YES/ NO
In the matter between:
SEBABETSANE ANDREW
MOKUPI APPELLANT
and
THE
STATE
RESPONDENT
HEARD
ON:
17 JULY 2023
CORAM
:
DAFFUE
J
et
NAIDOO, J
JUDGMENT
BY:
NAIDOO,
J
DELIVERED
ON:
20
JULY
2023
[1]
The appellant faced four charges, namely
1.1
Count 1 - Sexual Assault
1.2
Count 2 – Assault
1.3
Count 3 - Sexual Assault
1.4
Count 4 – Rape
1.5
The appellant was convicted on 24 October
2022, in the Regional Court sitting at Thaba Nchu, in respect of
counts 3 and 4, and was
sentenced on 26 October 2012 to life
imprisonment, both counts having been taken as one for the purpose of
sentence. The
appellant approaches this court in terms of
his automatic right of appeal, and
the appeal lies against both his conviction and sentence. Mr P Van
Der Merwe represented the
appellant and Mr Lencoe represented the
respondent.
[2]
The Appellant’s grounds of appeal
against the conviction and sentence are, in essence, that the court
a
quo
erred in:
2.1
finding that the state had proved its case
beyond reasonable doubt;
2.2
finding that the complainant was a credible
witness;
2.3
not considering that the rape incident was
never reported by the complainant to either her relatives or the
police, but only during
consultation with the prosecutor;
2.4
drawing a negative inference in respect of
the appellant’s version and not making a credibility finding
favourable to him;
2.5
attaching too much weight to the factors in
aggravation (of sentence), over-emphasising same and not
attaching any weight
to the appellant’s personal circumstances;
and
2.6
finding that no substantial and compelling
circumstances existed to justify a deviation from imposition of the
prescribed minimum
sentence.
[3]
The appellant is the biological father of
the complainant, whose mother passed away prior to the incidents
relevant to this matter.
After the passing of her
mother, the complainant stayed with her maternal aunt, but after
allegations of abuse by the aunt, the
complainant stayed with the
appellant and his girlfriend, N[...] T[...] (N[...]), at the
appellant’s mother’s home.
The appellant and N[...]
thereafter moved out to live in rented premises. The complainant went
to live permanently with the appellant
and N[...] in October 2021.
The incidents in counts 3 and 4 occurred in December 2021 and January
2022 respectively. The incidents
relevant to counts 1 and 2 were
alleged to have occurred in September 2021. Due to the complainant
being the only witness in respect
of the sexual assault (count 1) and
the assault (count 2), and the evidence that the complainant went to
live with the appellant
in October 2021, the court
a quo
was
not satisfied that the state had proved its case beyond reasonable
doubt in respect of those two counts and found the appellant
not
guilty in respect of counts 1 and 2.
[4]
The state alleges in Count 3 that on or
about 25
th
to 26
th
December 2021, the appellant sexually violated the complainant by
touching her breasts and in Count 4 that on or about 14
th
to 15
th
January 2022, he raped the complainant by penetrating her vagina with
his finger. The complainant was 14 years old at the time
of the two
incidents. The appellant’s sister was one of the state
witnesses who testified that N[...] and the complainant
arrived at
her home looking scared, and reported what the appellant had done to
the complainant. N[...] had injuries, consistent
with her version
that the appellant had assaulted her when she confronted him about
his conduct towards the complainant. N[...]
herself testified for the
state, confirming that she and the appellant had argued over his
conduct towards the complainant, especially
in view of the
complainant’s previous allegations of abuse of the complainant
by him.
[5]
The court
a
quo
was aware of and reminded itself
that the complainant was a single witness and a child, so that the
court should observe the necessary
caution when dealing with such
evidence. The court undertook a detailed analysis of the evidence in
respect of counts 3 and 4,
dealing with inconsistencies and the fact
that the complainant mentioned only to the prosecutor for the first
time that the appellant
had inserted his finger into her vagina. Her
explanation for not mentioning to anyone else was that she was
threatened by the appellant
that he would kill her if she did. The
court accepted this explanation, in view of the fact that the
complainant had not been successful
in previously getting the
attention she required in this matter. The court expressed the view
that family members, in spite of
the complainant’s previous
allegations, simply “swept the matter under the carpet”.
The complainant realised
that the family would not believe her if she
reported to them what the appellant had done. Therefore, the first
time she mentioned
it was to the prosecutor.
[6]
The court
a
quo
weighed this against all the other
evidence that had been led, and concluded that there was nothing
sinister in this, nor did the
court accept that the complainant was
falsely implicating the appellant, as he alleged. The court found
that the versions of the
appellant’s sister Manana Mokupi,
N[...], and Kgape, the young friend of the complainant to whom she
had reported what the
appellant had done to her, lent corroboration
to the version of the complainant that there were several incidents
of sexually inappropriate
behaviour on the part of the appellant
towards the complainant, which fortified the version that she had
proffered in court. Mr
Van der Merwe argued that this should be a
matter of concern and ought to cast doubt on whether this incident of
rape did in fact
occur. As I indicated, the court a quo dealt in
detail with this aspect and found that the surrounding evidence and
circumstances
enabled the court to accept the complainant’s
version.
[7]
In
this regard, the dictum of Mocumie JA in
Maila
v The State
(429/2022)
[2023]
ZASCA 3
(23
January 2023) at para 1 is apposite
:
“
Rape remains
under-reported nationally, but there may be no rapes more hidden than
those committed within families.
Sexual violence victims ‘often
experience a profound sense of shame, stigma and violation’.
These factors are compounded
by attempts from family members of the
victim or the perpetrator to influence the victims not to file
charges or, if charges have
been filed, to withdraw the case so that
the families can resolve the problem amicably. Often the perpetrator
offers to pay the
medical costs for the victim’s medical
treatment, including psychological treatment, and even maintenance of
the family in
cases of indigent families.”
The
complainant in this matter was in a very similar position, where the
adult family members to whom she had previously reported
the
appellant’s sexually deviant behaviour, took no action, leaving
her with the impression that they did not believe her.
[8]
The court
a
quo
undertook a thorough analysis of
the appellant’s version, which was in essence, a bare denial of
the allegations against
him. The court found, after considering the
totality of the evidence and applying the necessary caution with
regard to the complainant’s
evidence, that the state witnesses
were truthful and honest, and that the appellant’s version is
not reasonably possibly
true and stood to be rejected as false.
[9]
It is well established in our law that the
trial court is tasked with analysing and evaluating the evidence, and
that an appeal
court is limited in its ability to interfere with the
trial court’s conclusions, and may not do so simply because it
would
have come to a different finding or conclusion. The trial court
has the advantage of seeing and hearing witnesses, which places
it in
a better position than a court of appeal to assess the evidence, and
such assessment must prevail, unless there is a clear
and
demonstrable misdirection. The appellate Division set this out in
S
v Francis
1991(2) SACR 198 (A), at p
204
:
“
This
Court's powers to interfere on appeal with the findings of fact of a
trial Court are limited (
R
v Dhlumayo and Another
1948
(2) SA 677
(A)…Bearing in mind the advantage which a trial
Court has of seeing, hearing and appraising a witness, it is only in
exceptional
cases that this Court will be entitled to interfere with
a trial Court's evaluation of oral testimony” (other case
references
omitted). The court in
Dhlumayo
,
which was cited with approval in
Francis,
stated at
p705 [the majority per Greenberg JA and Davis AJA (Schreiner
dissenting)]:
“
The trial court
has the advantages, which the appeal judges do not have, in seeing
and hearing the witness and being steeped in
the atmosphere of the
trial. Not only has the trial court the opportunity of
observing their demeanour, but also their appearances
and whole
personality. This should not be overlooked.” A similar
view was adopted in
S v
Pistorius
2014 (2) SACR 315
(SCA) par 30,
which
cited,
inter
alia
Dhlumayo
with approval:
“
It
is a time-honoured principle that once a trial court has made
credibility findings, an appeal court should be deferential and
slow
to interfere therewith unless it is convinced on a conspectus of the
evidence that the trial court was clearly wrong.
R
v Dhlumayo and Another
1948
(2) SA 677
(A) at 706;
S
v Kebana
[2010]
1 All SA 310
(SCA) para 12. It can hardly be disputed that the
magistrate had advantages which we, as an appeal court, do not have
of having
seen, observed and heard the witnesses testify in his
presence in court. As the saying goes, he was steeped in the
atmosphere of
the trial. Absent any positive finding that he was
wrong,
this
court
is
not at liberty to interfere with his findings.”
[10]
Dhlumayo has been applied and cited with
approval in a long line of cases since 1948. More recently, the SCA
in
AM and Another v MEC for Health,
Western Cape
2021 (3) SA 337
(SCA)
applied
the dicta in Dhlumayo as set out above.
[11]
As I indicated earlier, the court
a
quo
undertook a comprehensive analysis
of the evidence.
The
court’s impression of the honesty and reliability of the
complainant and other state witnesses, was correctly fortified
by the many common-cause facts, which it detailed,
inter
alia
, that the complainant went to
live with her father and N[...] from October 2021 to January 2022,
that prior to the incident in
January 2022, there were already
allegations by the complainant of sexual impropriety on the part of
the appellant, that on the
14
th
January 2022, the complainant was alone in the house with the
appellant as N[...] slept at the neighbours’ house, and that
the appellant’s friend Zeke or Siki was also present in the
house that night, visiting the appellant. I cannot fault the
reasoning of the court in this regard and its conclusion that that it
was satisfied that her evidence in respect of the rape and
how it
occurred was reliable and that despite her youthfulness, the
requirements for the application of the cautionary rule were
met.
[12]
With regard to sentence, the appellant
argued that the sentence of life imprisonment was inappropriate, as
the court
a quo
failed
to properly consider his personal circumstances and erred in not
finding that substantial and compelling circumstances existed
to
justify imposition of a lesser sentence. The appellant’s
circumstances placed on record are that he was at the time of
commission of the offence, 37 years old, with four children. He is a
first offender in respect of this type of offence. I mention
that he
has a number of previous convictions (approximately eight) in respect
of other offences, ranging from theft to dealing
in drugs, from 2000
to 2021. Prior to his arrest, he was casually employed, earning an
amount of R800.00 per week, with which he
supported his girlfriend
and four children. The appellant was diagnosed with prostate cancer
at the beginning of 2022. In his Heads
of Argument as well as in oral
argument in court, Mr Van Der Merwe argued that the complainant did
not sustain physical injuries
and there was no evidence of any
lasting emotional trauma suffered by the complainant. The appellant
was deserving of a lesser
sentence. He suggested a term of
imprisonment of 15 to 20 years.
[13]
In its Heads of Argument, the state
supported the conviction and sentence in this matter, arguing that
the court
a quo
properly took account of all the mitigatory factors relevant to the
appellant’s personal circumstances, and found that no
compelling or substantial circumstances existed to justify its
departure from imposing the prescribed minimum sentence of life
imprisonment. Mr Lencoe argued the court took into account and
analysed all the personal circumstances of the appellant. The court
indeed emphasised that it had to perform the very difficult task of
balancing all the various factors relevant for sentencing,
and
discharging its duty to ensure that there was protection and
retribution as demanded by society. The court properly assessed
the
appellant’s personal circumstances and concluded that it could
find nothing substantial or compelling in the appellant’s
circumstances that warranted imposition of a sentence lesser than the
prescribed minimum.
[14]
An appeal court is also limited in its
ability to interfere with the sentence imposed by a trial court as
sentencing is within the
discretion of that court, unless an
irregularity has been committed or the discretion of the court has
been improperly applied.
[See
S V
Rabie 1975 (4) \SA 855 (A) at 857 D-F
]
I can find no such irregularity or improper application of the trial
court’s discretion.
[15]
The court
a
quo
mentioned that the state had not
proven permanent psychological trauma, but accepted that the events
must have been traumatic to
her. The complainant was not only crying
during her testimony but confirmed that the incidents affected her
school work. Unlike
her friends that talked about their fathers, she
was unable to do so. The court
a quo
correctly stated that the complainant had a right to be protected by
her father, but that he was ‘a wolf in sheepskin.’
[16]
In
S v
Tshabalala and another
2020 (2) SACR
38
(CC) at paragraphs 1 and 63 respectively, Mathopo AJ, writing for
a unanimous Constitutional Court bench remarked about the sexual
violence by men whereby women in this country are relegated to
second-class citizens. Also, that the scourge of rape has reached
alarming proportions in our country and that joint efforts are
required to curb this pandemic. The following principle is now
accepted as the Supreme Court of Appeal stated in S v
Kekana
2019
(1) SACR 1
(SCA) at paragraphs 39 to 42
:
“
[39] Due
to the seriousness of the offences, it is required that the elements
of retribution and deterrence should come
to the fore, and that the
rehabilitation of the appellant should be accorded a smaller role.
His personal circumstances similarly
have to bow to the interests of
society. As pointed out in
S
v Vilakazi
2009
(1) SACR 552
(SCA)
(2012
(6) SA 353
;
[2008] 4 All SA 396
;
[2008] ZASCA 87)
para 58, in cases
of serious crime the personal circumstances of the offender, by
themselves, will necessarily recede into the
background. Without
doubt, this is one of those cases.
[40] …
[41] In
S
v Mhlakaza and Another
1997
(1) SACR 515 (SCA)
([1997]
2 All SA 185
;
[1997] ZASCA 7)
at 519
c
– e
this
court pointed out that, given the high levels of violence and serious
crime in our country, when sentencing such crimes,
the emphasis
should be on retribution and deterrence Harms JA went on to explain,
with reference to
S
v Nkwanyana and Others
[1990] ZASCA 95
;
1990 (4) SA 735
(A) at 749C – D, that in other instances
retribution may even be decisive. See also
S
v Nkambule
1993
(1) SACR 136 (A)
at 147
c
– e
;
S
v Swart
2004
(2) SACR 370
(SCA)
paras
11 – 12;
S
v Govender and Others
2004
(2) SACR 381
(SCA)
para
32.
[42] The upshot of all
these authorities is that, whatever the appellant's complimentary
personal circumstances and his prospects
of rehabilitation, those
pale into insignificance when weighed against the aggravating
factors. In all the circumstances, I am
of the view that life
imprisonment on each of the murder counts is the only appropriate
sentence.”
[17]
In the circumstances, the following
order is made:
17.1
The appeal against conviction and sentence is dismissed
17.2
The conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant are confirmed.
NAIDOO, J
I concur.
DAFFUE, J
On
behalf of appellant:
Adv
PL Van Der Merwe
Instructed
by:
Legal
Aid South Africa
Bloemfontein
Justice Centre
On
behalf of respondent:
Adv.
Lencoe
Instructed
by:
The
Office of the Director of Public
Prosecutions
BLOEMFONTEIN