P.M.M v T.N.M and Others (282/2021) [2023] ZAFSHC 247 (22 June 2023)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Family Law — Divorce — Forfeiture of benefits — Plaintiff sought divorce and division of joint estate after 22 years of separation from the defendant — Valid customary marriage established between the parties, while subsequent civil marriage of the defendant was declared null and void — Defendant's counterclaim for forfeiture of patrimonial benefits failed due to inability to prove specific benefits of the marriage — Court granted division of joint estate, including defendant's pension funds, in favor of the plaintiff.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The matter was a divorce action in the Free State Division of the High Court (Bloemfontein). The plaintiff, P[…] M[…] M[…], instituted proceedings against her husband, the 1st defendant, T[…] N[…] M[…], seeking a decree of divorce and the division of the joint estate, including the 1st defendant’s pension interest held with the 4th defendant, SALA Pension Fund. The 2nd defendant, N[…] L[…] M[…], was cited as the 1st defendant’s purported subsequent spouse, and the 3rd defendant, the Department of Home Affairs, was cited in relation to marital registration issues.


Procedurally, although the action initially appeared straightforward, it became contested when the 1st defendant delivered a counterclaim seeking forfeiture of patrimonial benefits against the plaintiff. At trial, oral evidence was led from four witnesses, including both spouses and two of their adult children. The hearing took place on 30 and 31 May and 2 June 2023, and judgment was handed down electronically on 22 June 2023.


The general subject matter concerned the consequences of the breakdown of a customary marriage that was in existence for decades but marked by prolonged separation, and in particular whether the plaintiff should forfeit patrimonial benefits under section 9(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 when the marriage in community of property was dissolved.


Material Facts


It was common cause by agreement before the commencement of the trial that the parties concluded a customary marriage on or about 6 December 1980, that the customary marriage was valid in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, and that it still subsisted at the time of litigation. It was also agreed that a subsequent civil marriage concluded between the 1st and 2nd defendants in March 2020 was null and void, with consequential implications for the Department of Home Affairs’ records.


The evidence relied upon by the court established that the marriage relationship deteriorated against a backdrop of migrant labour and socio-economic hardship. The 1st defendant worked away from the family home (including at the mines), and the parties later relocated to Bloemfontein at different times. On the version accepted as relevant for determining the forfeiture claim, the parties lived in Bloemfontein but not under the same roof, and they were completely separated for approximately 22 years.


A significant factual dispute concerned whether the plaintiff had deserted the marital home and children around 1998 and thereafter played no role in supporting or raising them (as the 1st defendant alleged), or whether she moved to Bloemfontein to seek work because of inadequate support from the 1st defendant and continued to provide support and maintain contact with the children over the years (as the plaintiff alleged). The plaintiff’s evidence was supported by two of the parties’ daughters, who testified that the plaintiff remained involved in their lives and provided money, clothing, and support.


For purposes of the forfeiture enquiry, the court emphasised the paucity of evidence from the 1st defendant about the content and value of the joint estate. While he referred to owning a home and having had pension benefits, he did not place evidence before the court establishing the value of the home, the value of the pension interest, what (if anything) was paid out upon retirement in 2021, or what remained available in the pension fund. This lack of specific financial evidence was treated as material to the outcome of the counterclaim.


Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the 1st defendant, as the party seeking forfeiture, had satisfied the requirements of section 9(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 for an order that the plaintiff forfeit patrimonial benefits of the marriage, wholly or in part. This raised a question primarily of the application of legal principles to facts, including whether adequate factual material had been presented to enable the statutory enquiry.


More specifically, the court had to determine whether the 1st defendant had established the specific benefits that the plaintiff would receive from the marriage in community of property upon divorce, and whether (only if that threshold were met) the plaintiff would be unduly benefited relative to the 1st defendant if forfeiture were not ordered, having regard to the statutory factors of duration, circumstances causing the breakdown, and substantial misconduct.


Although the validity of the customary marriage and the invalidity of the later civil marriage were addressed in the final order, those issues were not in dispute at trial due to the parties’ pre-trial agreement. The sole live dispute requiring adjudication was the 1st defendant’s counterclaim for forfeiture and the related consequences for the division of the joint estate, including pension interests.


Court’s Reasoning


The court began by setting out the statutory framework in section 9(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979, which empowers a court granting divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown to order forfeiture of patrimonial benefits if satisfied, having regard to the listed factors, that without such order the one party will be unduly benefited relative to the other.


The court then summarised the established approach in the case law. Relying on Engelbrecht v Engelbrecht 1989 (1) SA 597 (CPD), it emphasised that in a marriage in community of property each spouse acquires joint rights to the other’s property by operation of law upon marriage, and that inequality of contribution does not automatically justify forfeiture. The court highlighted the principle drawn from Engelbrecht that a forfeiture claim cannot succeed unless the party seeking it proves the nature and extent of the benefit, because without that proof a court cannot determine whether any benefit would be undue.


The court further applied the two-stage approach endorsed by the Appellate Division in Wijker v Wijker 1993 (4) SA 720 (AD). On this approach, the court first determines whether the party against whom forfeiture is sought will in fact be benefited by the patrimonial consequences of the marriage. Only if that is established does the court proceed to the second stage, which is whether the benefit would be undue when assessed in light of the statutory factors. The judgment also referred to appellate approval of the principle that where the claimant fails to establish the specific benefits, it is unnecessary to proceed to consider alleged misconduct, as reflected in NWP v MHP case no. A201/2013 (unreported).


Applying these principles, the court held that the 1st defendant had not discharged the onus resting upon him to establish the specific patrimonial benefits that the plaintiff would receive. The court considered it insufficient that the 1st defendant merely identified the existence of assets such as a home and a pension interest without providing evidence of their value or quantification. Because the court was “completely in the dark” as to the specifics of the joint estate and the pension benefits, it could not determine the threshold question of whether the plaintiff would be unduly benefited if forfeiture were not ordered.


The court therefore concluded that the counterclaim for forfeiture had to fail at the first stage of the enquiry. Having reached that conclusion, the court granted the divorce and made the consequential proprietary and registration orders that were either agreed or flowed from the plaintiff’s pleaded relief.


Outcome and Relief


The court granted a decree of divorce dissolving the customary marriage between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant. It declared the customary marriage concluded on or about 6 December 1980 to be a valid marriage in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998, and ordered the Department of Home Affairs to register it accordingly.


The court declared the civil marriage entered into between the 1st and 2nd defendants on 12 March 2020 null and void ab initio, and directed the Department of Home Affairs to remove its registration from official records. The court ordered a division of the joint estate of the plaintiff and the 1st defendant, expressly including the 1st defendant’s pension funds held with the SALA Pension Fund.


The 1st defendant’s counterclaim for forfeiture was dismissed. The 1st defendant was ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs in the main action, and the counterclaim was dismissed with costs.


Cases Cited


Engelbrecht v Engelbrecht 1989 (1) SA 597 (CPD)


Wijker v Wijker 1993 (4) SA 720 (AD)


NWP v MHP case no. A201/2013 (unreported)


Lesia v Lesia case no. 450/2013 (unreported)


Legislation Cited


Divorce Act 70 of 1979, section 9(1)


Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120 of 1998


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the customary marriage between the plaintiff and the 1st defendant was valid and subsisting, and that the later civil marriage between the 1st and 2nd defendants was null and void ab initio. It held further that a decree of divorce should be granted and that the joint estate, including the 1st defendant’s pension interest held with the SALA Pension Fund, should be divided.


On the forfeiture counterclaim, the court held that the 1st defendant bore the onus to prove the requirements for forfeiture under section 9(1) of the Divorce Act. The 1st defendant failed to establish the specific patrimonial benefits the plaintiff would receive upon dissolution, because he provided no evidence enabling the court to quantify or identify the nature and extent of the alleged benefit. In the absence of such proof, the court could not determine whether the plaintiff would be unduly benefited, and the forfeiture counterclaim was therefore dismissed with costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


Section 9(1) of the Divorce Act 70 of 1979 requires a court considering forfeiture of patrimonial benefits to be satisfied, having regard to the duration of the marriage, the circumstances giving rise to the breakdown, and any substantial misconduct, that without forfeiture one party will be unduly benefited relative to the other.


In a marriage in community of property, the existence of unequal contributions does not, without more, justify forfeiture. The party seeking forfeiture must prove the nature and extent of the benefit the other party would receive upon dissolution; without proof of the specific benefit, a court is not in a position to decide whether the benefit would be undue.


The enquiry proceeds in two stages. The first stage is whether the party against whom forfeiture is sought will in fact be benefited by the patrimonial consequences of the marriage. Only if that is established does the second stage arise, namely whether the benefit is undue in light of the statutory factors. Where the claimant fails to establish the specific benefits at the first stage, it is unnecessary to proceed to the second stage or to adjudicate alleged misconduct.

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[2023] ZAFSHC 247
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P.M.M v T.N.M and Others (282/2021) [2023] ZAFSHC 247 (22 June 2023)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
FLYNOTES:
FAMILY – Divorce – Forfeiture – Parties
lived separately for 22 years – Plaintiff seeks divorce and

division of joint estate – Customary marriage between
defendant and plaintiff is valid – Subsequent civil marriage

between first and second defendant is null and void –
Whether defendant established specific benefits – Failure
to
establish specific benefits – Counterclaim for forfeiture
cannot succeed – Division of the joint estate including

defendant’s pension funds granted –
Divorce Act 70 of
1979
,
s 9(1).
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA,
FREE STATE
DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case number:
282/2021
REPORTABLE: YES/NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES: YES/NO
CIRCULATE TO MAGISTRATES:
YES/NO
In the matter between:
P[…]
M[…] M[…]
Plaintiff
And
T[…]
N[…] M[…]
1
st
Defendant
N[…]
L[…] M[…]
2
nd
Defendant
DEPARTMENT
OF HOME AFFAIRS
3
rd
Defendant
SALA
PENSION FUND
4
th
Defendant
CORAM:
LOUBSER, J
HEARD
ON:
30, 31 MAY and 2
nd
JUNE 2023
JUDGEMENT
BY:
LOUBSER, J
DELIVERED
ON:
The judgment
was handed down electronically by circulation to the parties’
legal representatives by email and released to
SAFLII on 22 JUNE
2023. The date and time for hand-down is deemed to be 22 JUNE 2023 at
15:00
[1]
This is a divorce action where the plaintiff, mrs. P. M. M[…],
claims a decree of divorce
and division of the joint estate,
including the pension funds held with the 4
th
defendant,
from her husband, the 1
st
defendant. The 2
nd
defendant is the purported new wife of the 1
st
defendant.
Whereas the matter initially seemed to be quite straight-forward, it
soon appeared to be more complicated when the 1
st
defendant filed a counterclaim to the plaintiff’s summons,
claiming an order for forfeiture of patrimonial benefits against
the
plaintiff. During the course of the trial, four witnesses testified
under oath, including the plaintiff and the 1
st
defendant.
[2]
Before the commencement of the trial proceedings, the parties reached
agreement to the following effect:
2.1.
That the customary marriage between the 1
st
defendant and
the plaintiff is a valid customary marriage in terms of the
Recognition of Customary Marriages Act.
2.2.
That the said marriage still subsists.
2.3.
That the subsequent civil marriage between the 1
st
and 2
nd
defendant in March 2020 is null and void.
2.4.
That the only issue remaining for adjudication by the court would be
the question of the division of the
joint estate.
2.5.
That the only issue would then be the question of forfeiture of
matrimonial benefits.
[3]
The evidence before the court provides a reflection of the hardships
many black families had to
endure during the 1980’s and the
1990’s. These hardships existed in poor socio-economic
circumstances, unemployment
and little opportunities, that caused
many fathers and husbands to work on the mines far away from home, or
as migrant workers
in other areas of employment. Sadly, this was also
the fate of the M[…] family. The 1
st
defendant had
to leave the plaintiff and their three daughters at his parental home
in Sterkspruit while he went to work on the
mines at Orkney. In 1995
he left the mines to return to Sterkspruit. Around 1998 the plaintiff
made her way to Bloemfontein to
find employment, leaving the children
and the 1
st
defendant behind in Sterkspruit with her
mother-in-law. Not long thereafter the 1
st
defendant also
moved to Bloemfontein, where he eventually found employment. The
marriage relationship was not destined to survive
such adverse
circumstances, and for the next 22 years the plaintiff and the 1
st
defendant lived in Bloemfontein, but not under the same roof. They
lived completely separated. As the children grew up, they one
by one
also came to Bloemfontein, where they lived with their farther.
[4]
Since the 1
st
defendant carried the onus to prove that a
forfeiture order should be made, he was the first witness to testify.
He testified that
he and the plaintiff became husband and wife in a
traditional marriage ceremony in 1980. When he came back from the
mines in 1995,
he bought a vehicle to transport people. The plaintiff
was unemployed. When he came home some day in 1998, he found that the
plaintiff
had left. He did not know where she had gone. She had left
the children behind with his mother. They were at school. The next
year
he moved to Bloemfontein, where he found employment with the
municipality as a driver. He did not know the plaintiff’s
whereabouts,
she did not tell him. Later on, the children came to
live with him, and he became responsible for their schooling and
their upbringing.
The plaintiff never came to visit the children at
his place, he testified. The children are now adults. According to
him, he saw
the plaintiff again for the first time here in court
after all the years. He went on retirement at the municipality in
2021.
[5]
In cross-examination the 1
st
defendant testified that his
assets consist of his home. He obtained his pension money in 2021.
The plaintiff never contributed
to the upbringing of the children, he
testified. He denied that the plaintiff helped him to find employment
in Bloemfontein, or
that she had visited the children from time to
time.
[6]
The plaintiff testified that she never deserted the 1
st
defendant and the children. She came to Bloemfontein to find
employment because the 1
st
defendant failed to provide
adequately for her and the children. In Bloemfontein she found
employment as a domestic worker with
a mr. S[…], who is a CEO
at the “Glaspaleis”, meaning the municipality. She has
her own quarters on the premises
of mr. S[…], where she lives.
She denied that she had ever deserted the children. She had
contributed funds and clothes
for the children and for the 1
st
defendant’s mother through the years. She earns R3 500.00
per month. Through the assistance of mr. S[…], she
obtained
employment for the 1
st
defendant at the municipal library
as a driver. He was later transferred to the fire department. A
number of years ago the 1
st
defendant acquired a house in
a place called Mafura outside Bloemfontein. She used to see him there
when she went there to visit
the children on a regular basis. She
regard this house as her home, she testified. Since 2018 there was no
longer any relationship
between her and the 1
st
defendant,
and he got married again in 2020. When she visited the children at
Mafura, she always took groceries for the children.
She even
contributed to the building of the house in Mafura by cooking food
for the builders and providing them with water. She
did not
contribute to the 1
st
defendant’s pension fund.
[7]
The next witness was the first daughter of the plaintiff and the 1
st
defendant, B[…] Mb[…]. She is now 41 years old and
married. She denied that the plaintiff had disappeared from their

lives in 1998. While working in Bloemfontein, the plaintiff often
come to visit her and her younger sisters. After the year 2000,
when
the witness moved to Bloemfontein to live with the 1
st
defendant in Mafura, the plaintiff came to see her on a regular
basis, and provided her with clothes and money to take to school.
In
giving testimony, she was adamant that her mother, the plaintiff, was
always present in the lives of her children, and that
she had never
abandoned them.
[8]
The last witness was P[…] M[…], the next daughter of
the plaintiff and the 1
st
defendant. She is now 36 years
old. She testified that after her mother had left Sterkspruit to work
in Bloemfontein, she came
to visit her children every holiday. She
then bought them school uniforms, clothes and food. When she later
lived with the 1
st
defendant in Mafura, the plaintiff
visited her children there on a regular basis and continued to
support them, she testified.
[9]
I now turn to the legal principles
applicable to the forfeiture of patrimonial benefits when a decree
of
divorce is granted. In this respect
section 9(1)
of the
Divorce
Act
>
[1]
provides
as follows: “ When a decree of divorce is granted on the ground
of the irretrievable break-down of a marriage the
court may make an
order that the patrimonial benefits of the marriage be forfeited by
one party in favour of the other, either
wholly or in part, if the
court, having regard to the duration of the marriage, the
circumstances which gave rise to the break-down
thereof and any
substantial misconduct on the part of either of the parties is
satisfied that, if the order for forfeiture is not
made, the one
party will in relation to the other be unduly benefited.”
[10]
Through the years, our courts have pronounced itself in clear terms
how the provisions of
section 9(1)
should be approached and applied.
As early as 1989 the Cape High Court pointed out in
Engelbrecht
v Engelbrecht
[2]
that
joint ownership of another party’s property is a right which
each of the spouses acquires on concluding a marriage in
community of
property. Unless the parties make precisely equal contributions, the
one that contributed less shall on dissolution
of the marriage be
benefited above the other if forfeiture is not ordered. The court
went on to state that
section 9
does not give the greater contributor
the opportunity to complain about this. He can only complain if the
benefit was undue. At
601H of the judgement the court stated that,
unless it is proved what the nature and extent of the benefit was,
the court cannot
decide if the benefit was undue or not. Only if the
nature and ambit of the benefit is proved, is it necessary to look to
the factors
which may be brought into consideration in deciding on
the inequity thereof. Here the court obviously referred to the three
factors
mentioned in
section 9
that the court has to consider.
[11]
This approach has been endorsed by the Supreme Court of Appeal
[3]
and
followed by courts of this division
[4]
on a
number of occasions. In the Wijker-case it was stated
[5]
that
the first step is to determine whether or not the party against whom
the order is sought, will in fact be benefited.
Once that has
been established the court must determine, having regard to the
factors mentioned in the section, whether or not
that party will in
relation to the other be unduly benefited if a forfeiture order is
not made. In the NWP-matter, the court of
appeal stated the
following:
[6]

The
court
a
quo
,
having regard to the approach set out in the Wijker-matter, found
that the appellant’s counterclaim and evidence failed
to
establish the specific
benefits
of the marriage in
community
of property and that it was therefore not necessary to proceed to the
second step of determining whether or not the respondent
would be
unduly benefited. As a result, the court
a
quo
did
not consider the evidence of the alleged misconduct of the
respondent. In my view the court
a
quo
cannot
be faulted in this regard.”
[12]
In the present matter, the question is then
whether the 1
st
defendant has managed to establish the
specific benefits of the marriage in community of property, in order
to enable the court
to decide whether the plaintiff will be unduly
benefited if a forfeiture order is not made, having regard to the
three factors
mentioned in
section 9.
[13]
Unfortunately the 1
st
defendant failed to establish the
specific benefits. All that he could say, was that his home
represented an asset in the marriage
in community of property, but he
did not give any evidence as to the value of that home. He also did
not provide any information
regarding the value of his pension fund,
the amount that was paid out to him from that fund in 2021, if any,
and the amount of
the funds that are still available in the pension
fund. The court is therefore completely in the dark as far as the
specifics of
the benefits in the marriage in community of property is
concerned. It follows that the court is not in a position to
establish
whether the plaintiff will be unduly benefited if an order
of forfeiture is not granted against her. The counterclaim for
forfeiture
therefore cannot succeed.
[14]    On
the other hand, there can be no doubt that a decree of divorce should
be granted, as prayed for by the
plaintiff. The 1
st
defendant does not take issue with this aspect of the plaintiff’s
claim. I can also find no reason why the remaining prayers
contained
in the summons should not be granted.
[15]    In
the premises, the following orders are made:
1.
The plaintiff’s customary marriage to the 1
st
defendant on or about 6 December 1980, is declared a valid marriage
in terms of the Recognition of Customary Marriages Act 120
of 1998.
2.
The 3
rd
defendant is ordered to register the marriage
between the plaintiff and the 1
st
defendant as such.
3.
The marriage entered into between the 1
st
and 2
nd
defendants on 12 March 2020 is declared null and void
ab initio
,
and the 3
rd
defendant is ordered to remove the
registration of such marriage from its records.
4.
A decree of divorce in the marriage between the plaintiff and the 1
st
defendant is hereby granted.
5.
A division of the joint estate of the plaintiff and the 1
st
defendant is hereby ordered, which joint estate includes the 1
st
defendant’s pension funds held with the 4
th
defendant.
6.
The 1
st
defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s
costs in the main action.
7.
The 1
st
defendant’s counterclaim is dismissed with
costs.
P. J. LOUBSER, J
For
the Plaintiffs:
Mr.
A. C. Mlozana
Instructed
by:
Mlozana
Attorneys, Inc.
Bloemfontein
For
the Defendant:
Mr.
N. W. Phalatsi
Instructed
by:
N.
W. Phalatsi and Partners
Bloemfontein
[1]
Act
70 of 1979
[2]
1989(1)
SA 597 (CPD)
[3]
Wijker
v Wijker
1993 (4) SA 720
(AD)
[4]
See
for instance NWP v MHP case no. A201/2013 (unreported) and Lesia v
Lesia case no. 450/2013 (unreported)
[5]
At
727 E of the judgement
[6]
At
par 17 of the judgement