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[2023] ZAFSHC 104
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Van Greunen and Another v Govern (5395/2022) [2023] ZAFSHC 104 (6 April 2023)
SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been redacted
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FLYNOTES:
DEFAMATION AGAINST ATTORNEY
CIVIL
LAW – Defamation – Interdict – Attorney seeking
interdict against disgruntled debtor – Competing
constitutional rights of freedom of speech and dignity –
Disgruntled client or other person entitled to lay complaints
with
professional bodies or lay charges with police – Not
entitled to make unfounded accusations against legal practitioner
– Interdict granted.
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
FREE
STATE DIVISION, BLOEMFONTEIN
Case
no
5395/2022
Reportable:
NO
Of
Interest to other Judges: NO
Circulate
to Magistrates: NO
In
the matter between:
JOHAN
VAN GREUNEN
1
st
Applicant
VAN
GREUNEN & ASSOCIATES INC
2
nd
Applicant
and
HILDA MC
GOVERN
Respondent
(ID.
[....])
JUDGMENT
BY:
JP
DAFFUE
J
HEARD
ON:
26 JANUARY 2023
DELIVERED
ON:
6 APRIL 2023
This
judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
applicants’ representatives and the respondent personally
by
email, and release to SAFLII. The date and time for hand-down is
deemed to be 13h00 on 6 April 2023.
ORDER
1.
The respondent is interdicted and restrained from publishing any
defamatory statements
regarding or concerning the applicants.
2.
The respondent shall pay 50% of the taxed party and party costs of
the applicants
in respect of this application.
JUDGMENT
INTRODUCTION
[1]
An experienced legal practitioner with some impressive curriculum
vitae is involved in a
fierce battle with a disgruntled person. The
trouble started in 2021. The one may be considered a warrior trying
to play according
to the rules of the game and the other a real
street fighter who does not subvert herself to any rules. On 28
October 2022 the
legal practitioner filed papers out of this court in
order to obtain an interdict and accompanying relief against the
disgruntled
person.
[2]
Having to read application papers in excess of 1 400 pages and
numerous pages of heads of
argument, the matter was eventually heard
by me on 26 January 2023.
[3]
First, an apology. I am accustomed to pronounce judgments
expeditiously, but in this case
it did not materialise. I was on
circuit court for a full four weeks immediately after hearing the
parties’ submissions and
on my return I was the duty judge for
the week from 6 March until 10 March 2023. Consequently, the delivery
of this judgment was
delayed.
THE
PARTIES
[4]
The first applicant is Mr Johan van Greunen, a major male attorney
practising as such as
sole director under the name and style of Van
Greunen & Associates Inc, the second applicant, with business
address situated
in Centurion, Pretoria, Gauteng. The applicants were
represented by Adv F Van Wyk of Pretoria.
[5]
The respondent is Ms Hilda McGovern, a major female business person
residing in Deneysville,
Free State Province. Ms McGovern drafted her
own papers, including the heads of argument, and personally presented
oral submissions.
THE
RELIEF CLAIMED
[6]
The applicants claim the following in their notice of motion:
‘
1.
The respondent is interdicted and restrained from publishing any
defamatory statements regarding or concerning
the applicants;
2.
The respondent is ordered to publish a unequivocal and written
apology, which apology shall;
2.1 be
furnished by the respondent to the applicants within 24 hours of this
order; and
2.2 be
published by the respondent in the Government Gazette, The Beeld
Newspaper and the Sunday Times Newspaper
within two (2) weeks of this
order.
3.
The respondent is ordered to pay the costs of this application on a
scale as between attorney and
own client.’
ISSUES
IN DISPUTE
[7]
Notwithstanding the voluminous documents presented to the court in
this opposed application
and the factual disputes raised, not much is
in dispute in respect of the issues to be adjudicated in the present
application.
[8]
It is in dispute whether:
a.
the alleged defamatory remarks are true or false;
b.
these remarks are in the public interest;
c.
the respondent’s right to freedom of expression and speech
relied upon
by her is sufficient to prevent this court from granting
an interdict against her; and
d.
the applicants are entitled to an apology in accordance with the
draft suggested,
or in any other form, bearing in mind the
authorities to which I shall return.
COMMON
CAUSE FACTS
[9]
The following facts are not in dispute:
a.
in his founding affidavit of 37 pages to which is attached the first
applicant’s
curriculum vitae of 12 pages, he presented evidence
of his extensive experience and attributes;
b.
since October 2021 until October 2022 and just before this
application was issued
the respondent authored several emails and
letters in which the first applicant in particular as well as others
are inter alia
referred to as fraudsters;
c.
the
respondent communicated her defamatory remarks to inter alia the Land
Bank, including its Chief Executive Officer and senior
officials as
well as to courts, police and creditors of K2016128779 (South Africa)
(Pty) Ltd t/a Deneys Swiss Diary (DSD) on several
occasions, although
it is denied by her that her statements were defamatory as these were
the truth;
[1]
d.
the respondent also laid charges against the first applicant with the
Specialised
Commercial Crimes Unit in Johannesburg, the Legal
Practice Council (the LPC) and the South African Restructuring and
Insolvency
Practitioners’ Association (SARIPA), repeating
defamatory remarks;
e.
the
respondent as director of DSD brought about the voluntary liquidation
of this company on 22 July 2020;
[2]
f.
at the time of the liquidation of DSD it owed the Land Bank in excess
of
R16 million and the respondent stood surety for this debt;
g.
on 4
February 2022 the respondent was finally sequestrated;
[3]
h.
the first applicant and his company acted on behalf of Land Bank in
several civil
matters since the voluntary liquidation of DSD;
i.
the respondent has embarked on litigation to have the liquidation of
her
company set aside and the final sequestration order be rescinded;
j.
the respondent did not deal at all with the following allegations of
the
applicants and these are therefore undisputed:
‘
107. The
respondent’s latest attack on the applicants is the proverbial
last straw that broke the camel’s back. 108.
The applicants can
simply not sit back idly and allow the respondent to indefinitely
continue with her personal, unwarranted and
unfounded attacks with
possible far-reaching detrimental consequences to myself, my
professional career, as well as the second
applicant’s business
interests.’
[4]
k.
the respondent’s defence is based on the truthfulness of her
admitted communication
to various entities and persons; and
l.
it is clear from the respondent’s answering affidavit and her
heads
of argument that she will not stop the conduct alleged to be
defamatory.
THE
LAW PERTAINING TO INTERDICTS
[10]
An
interdict is not a remedy to deal with past unlawful action. In terms
of this remedy an order is sought against another to refrain
them
from acting in a specific manner, or directing them to perform in a
particular manner. Thereby, protection is sought against
an ongoing
unlawful interference, or the threatened interference of someone’s
rights.
[5]
In casu the
applicants seek both a final prohibitory as well as a mandatory
interdict as is evident from the notice of motion quoted
above. The
three requirements for the grant of a final interdict are (a) the
applicant must have a clear right, (b) the applicant
must prove that
an injury has actually been committed or is reasonably apprehended
and in this regard the injury must be a continuing
one as the court
will not grant an interdict in respect of an act already committed;
and (c) there is no other remedy. The court
has a limited discretion
to refuse a final interdict.
[11]
In
Economic
Freedom Fighters and Others v Manuel
(Manuel)
the Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the well-known principle that
persons may seek interdicts, interim or final, by way of motion
proceedings against the publication of defamatory statements.
[6]
It agreed with the High Court that Mr Manuel had satisfied the
requirements for final relief.
[7]
However, I shall deal hereunder with the court’s approach to
the court a quo’s award of damages.
[12]
The
approach in
Manuel
was
again confirmed recently by the Supreme Court of Appeal in
NBC
Holdings (Pty) Ltd v Akani Retirement Fund Administrators (Pty) Ltd
(NBC Holdings).
[8]
The court continued as follows:
‘
29…….
However, the entitlement to proceed in that way is constrained by the
fact that in motion proceedings, where
the issue is whether the
defendant has a defence to a claim based on defamation, it cannot be
decided on motion if there is a dispute
as to the applicant's right
to that relief. As Greenberg J said:
'… if the injury
which is sought to be restrained is defamation, then he is not
entitled to the intervention of the Court
by way of interdict,
unless
it is clear that the defendant has no defence
.'
In Hix Networking the
court emphasised that this did not mean that the mere ipse dixit of
the respondent would suffice to establish
a
defence. It must be
based on evidence
.
[30] A respondent wishing
to resist an interdict against the future publication of defamatory
material can do so
by presenting evidence that provides a
sustainable foundation for a defence recognised in law
. This may
be done not only by way of direct evidence, but also by making the
case that at a trial further evidence could be procured
and would be
available to sustain the defence. A plausible claim by a respondent
that, with the advantage of discovery and being
able to subpoena
witnesses and documents, they will be able at trial to produce
evidence to sustain their defence, will ordinarily
suffice to
establish the requisite foundation for the defences raised. This is
well-illustrated by the recent judgment of this
court in Malema v
Rawula where, after analysing the evidence, Schippers JA concluded
that:
'These facts comprise not
only direct information placed before the court, but material showing
other information not in his control
but potentially available at a
trial in due course, such as the EFF’s financial records and
documents relating to receipt
of VBS funds.
All these factors must
be weighed up in order to decide whether there is a dispute of fact
regarding the existence of a defence
.' (Emphasis added)
[13]
Tau v
Mashaba and Others
[9]
is yet another example of the approach of the Supreme Court of Appeal
in respect of interdicts to restrain publication. In that
case the
applicant sought and obtained a retraction and apology from the
respondent and an interdict to prevent him from repeating
his initial
defamatory statements. The appeal against the order of the High Court
succeeded.
[14]
In
Herbal
Zone v Infitech Technologies
[10]
(Herbal
Zone)
the
Supreme Court of Appeal confirmed the principle that an interdict to
prevent a party from making defamatory statements in the
future is
‘only infrequently granted’ as ‘it impinges upon
that party’s constitutionally protected right
to freedom of
speech.’ The court recognised that in our constitutional era
freedom of speech carries greater weight than
it had in the past.
[11]
DEFAMATION
AND THE RIGHT TO AN APOLOGY
[15]
In
Manuel
the
Supreme Court of Appeal dealt extensively with defamation and the
various defences available to a defendant.
[12]
It is not necessary for adjudication of the present dispute to deal
with any of the aspects highlighted by the court, save to refer
to
the award of damages that was set aside, and particularly the
approach to the request that an apology be tendered.
[16]
The
well-known principle that an unliquidated claim for damages must be
pursued by way of action was confirmed in a detailed analysis.
[13]
Motion proceedings are not suited for prosecution and adjudication of
claims for unliquidated damages. This obviously includes
claims based
on the
actio
iniuriarum
for compensation, ie when an injury to dignity and reputation had
been caused.
[17]
The
court proceeded to deal with an apology sought by an aggrieved
litigant as follows:
[14]
‘
The apology
[128] That leads us to
the question whether the apology ordered by the court below was
appropriate. While there might be reservations
concerning the
sincerity of a court-ordered apology, the Constitutional Court in
Le
Roux v Dey
considered remedies provided for in Roman-Dutch
law that had fallen into disuse. These allowed for the retraction of
a defamatory
statement and an apology. The court also had regard to
customary law and tradition and concluded that respect for the
dignity of
others lies at the heart of the Constitution, and that
reconciliation between opposing parties at different levels consists
of
recantation of past wrongs and apology for them. It considered
that the plaintiff in that case was entitled to an apology.
It
must also be borne in mind that the apology in that case was ordered
in conjunction with an award of damages, not separately
from it.
[129] In
McBride
the
Constitutional Court referred to its earlier decision in
Le
Roux v Dey
and reiterated the importance of an apology in
securing redress and 'in salving feelings'. It went on to have regard
to the plaintiff's
contention on appeal, that an apology in that case
was inappropriate and took into account that a media defendant was
involved
and that there were law-reform initiatives afoot in other
countries. Consequently, it was thought that ordering an apology in
those
circumstances was not warranted.
[130]
Neither of these
two judgments suggested that an order for publication of a retraction
and apology on its own and not in conjunction
with an award of
damages would be an adequate remedy
. The High Court's order for
publication of a retraction and apology in this case was made in
conjunction with its order for damages.
We have held that the latter
should not have been made without hearing evidence. The applicants
had suggested in their challenge
to the quantum of damages, that an
apology would be sufficient redress, but that suggestion can only be
considered in conjunction
with the consideration of whether an award
of damages should be made and the quantum of that award.
An
apology has always weighed heavily in determining the quantum of
damages in defamation cases as occurred in
Le Roux v
Dey.
In our view, whether an order for an apology should
be made is inextricably bound up with the question of damages. As the
latter
award falls to be set aside and referred to oral evidence, so
too must the order to publish a retraction and apology be set aside
and referred to the High Court for determination after the
hearing of oral evidence on damages.’ (Footnotes omitted and
emphasis
added.)
EVALUATION
OF THE EVIDENCE AND LEGAL SUBMISSIONS
[18]
Section 16
of the Constitution guarantees the right of freedom of expression and
speech. Human dignity is also guaranteed as specifically
provided in
s 10 of the Constitution. Although the court stated in
Herbal
Zone
that freedom of speech carries greater weight than in the past, this
cannot be interpreted to mean that the right to dignity and
reputation of another person should not be considered at al. In casu,
the applicants are entitled to the protection of their dignity
and
reputation. In
O-Keeffe
v Argus Printing and Publishing Company Co Ltd & Another
[15]
Watermeyer AJ quoted De Villiers, the author of
Injuries,
with approval. Dignity is defined as a ‘valued and serene
condition’ in a person’s social or individual life
which
may be violated, either publicly or privately, by another through
‘offensive and degrading treatment’, or when
the person
‘is exposed to ill-will, ridicule, disesteem or contempt’
.
Currie and De Waal
[16]
are
probably correct by referring to human dignity as ‘perhaps the
pre-eminent value.’ This submission is in line with
the
Constitutional Court’s approach in
Christian
Education in South Africa v Minister of Education.
[17]
[19]
In the event of conflict between two competing constitutional rights,
a balancing act is to be exercised.
No right is absolute and although
the right to human dignity is seen as a central value and even a
pre-eminent value, the facts
and circumstances in each case need to
be considered to established whether the right to dignity should not
be limited. I accept
that people serving the public such as lawyers
and insolvency practitioners, as in casu, must accept that they may
be fiercely
criticised from time to time by others such as creditors,
disgruntled debtors and even the courts. They are not immune to
criticism.
In the preparation of this judgment I take cognisance
hereof.
[20]
A disgruntled client or any other person who is possessed of evidence
that a legal practitioner has acted
unprofessionally, fraudulently or
unethically will always be entitled to lay complaints with the
professional body or bodies of
which such a legal practitioner is a
member and with the South African Police Service in the event of
criminal offences. Such a
right is in the public interest, but there
is an obvious limit. Nobody shall be allowed to make unfounded
accusations against such
a legal practitioner.
[21]
The respondent is of the view that she has a valid defence against
the applicants’ claim that she should
be restrained from
publishing any defamatory statements pertaining to them. It is her
case that her communication, which is not
denied, is the truth and in
the public interest. I am not convinced that any of the serious
remarks made by the respondent are
the truth. I am mindful of the
fact that the rule in
Plascon Evans
applies even in this case
where the respondent has to prove the defences relied upon. She is
obviously dissatisfied with the approach
of all and sundry involved
in the litigation against herself and DSD and the first applicant is
her main target. She has communicated
her dissatisfaction to the
Landbank in October 2021 and if that was the end of the
communication, an interdict could not be ordered.
However, she just
carries on and on regardless by repeating herself as the record
shows. This has to stop. She has already laid
complaints with the
South African Police Service and the aforesaid professional bodies.
She will not be ordered to withdraw those
complaints. These entities
will have to deal with the matters without interference by this
court, but she shall be prohibited from
carrying on making defamatory
remarks.
[22]
There can
be no doubt that the admitted allegations are serious and defamatory
in nature. It is inter alia alleged that the first
applicant together
with others ‘have abandoned all forms of morality and integrity
including their fiduciary duties as legal
professionals…’
[18]
and that the first applicant ‘has continued with fraud,
assisting the liquidator to steal assets and many more criminal
actions.’
[19]
Land Bank,
who has been fed with the respondent’s remarks pertaining to
the first applicant, is one of his biggest clients.
[23]
Before I continue, it is recorded as follows:
a.
the notice of motion and annexures thereto comprise of 206 pages;
b.
the answering affidavit and annexures thereto comprise of 1028 pages;
and
c.
the replying affidavit and annexures comprise of 107 pages.
The respondent attached
225 annexures to her answering affidavit, the last of which is the
first page only of one of her answering
affidavits in another matter,
instead of the full affidavit as alleged.
[20]
She expected the court to trawl through these voluminous annexures
without specifying the relevance pertaining to specific paragraphs
in
the various documents. It made adjudication of the application
extremely difficult although I eventually have to agree with
the
applicants’ view point that the vast majority of the documents
presented by the respondent is irrelevant to the present
application.
Over and above the voluminous application papers, the respondent also
attached several other documents to her heads
of argument which she
regarded to be in response to the replying affidavit. I did not
consider this for the obvious reason that
she did not have a right to
act accordingly.
[24]
I agree
with the applicants’ observation in reply that it is clear from
the respondent’s version that ‘she admits
that the truth
of her numerous statements have not yet been proved, despite their
widespread publication to all and sundry, which
baseless publications
and the potential repercussions thereof on myself, my firm and its
employees, form the crux of this application.’
[21]
A clear impression is created when considering the history of the
litigation that every time legal steps had been taken against
the
respondent, she continued with her strategy of publishing defamatory
statements. The record speaks for itself and I do not
intend to quote
each and every occurrence.
[25]
It is
unnecessary to deal with all the litigation, but there can be no
doubt that the respondent is a disgruntled debtor who has
embarked on
a process to make life as difficult for the applicants as possible by
especially making serious defamatory allegations
against them and
others. Notwithstanding the fact that DSD was placed in voluntary
liquidation and that the debt owing to the Land
Bank was admitted at
that stage, the respondent has embarked upon litigation to rescind
her final sequestration order as well as
the voluntary liquidation of
the company. Mr Van Wyk on behalf of the applicants submitted during
oral evidence that particular
emphasis should be given to annexures
FA14 to FA16.
[22]
[26]
Contrary to
Mr Van Wyk’s oral submissions that the court should merely
consider the defamatory remarks contained in annexures
FA14 to FA16,
it is apparent from the founding affidavit that the respondent did
not stop defaming the applicants during October
2021. If those were
the only remarks made by the respondent, there would be no
entitlement to an interdict. On 31 August 2022 the
respondent
directed further correspondence to the Land Bank wherein she once
again accused the first applicant personally of fraud
and theft.
[23]
Further letters wherein the same averments were made followed in
September and October 2022.
[24]
The respondent did not specifically deal with the contents of
paragraphs 101 to 103 of the founding affidavit, but stated with
reference to paragraph 104 thereof that all the statements are
substantiated with proof and continued with the following averment:
‘The applicant must believe that if he ignores the proof it
will somehow cease to exist.’
[25]
[27]
Insofar as the applicants indicated that they have complied with the
requirements for a final interdict,
the respondent made the following
allegation:
‘
Ref paragraph 112:
the respondent has freedom of speech. It was proven that the
statements made by the respondent were not false.
The applicant can
not seek protection from this Honourable Court, to prevent the
respondent from exposing the applicant for what
he has done and who
he is.’
[26]
The
respondent failed to present evidence to substantiate her
allegations.
[28]
The
applicants’ submission that the second requirement to obtain a
final interdict, has been met is correct. Not only has
an injury been
committed already, but it is also reasonably apprehended to be
repeated.
[27]
Clearly, the
respondent has embarked upon a road of no return. She will not desist
from defaming the applicants, unless restrained
by a court order.
[29]
I am mindful of the dicta in
NBC Holdings
and
Herbal Zone.
The respondent’s defence of the truth is not based on any
evidence and she has also failed to present evidence that provides
a
sustainable foundation for her defence. The applicants’ do not
have any other satisfactory remedy, than to approach the
court for an
interdict they have proven all three requirements in order to obtain
a final interdict in paragraph 1 of the notice
of motion. Therefore,
I am satisfied that the applicants are entitled to an interdict
restraining the respondent from publishing
any defamatory statements
regarding or concerning them.
[30]
The
applicants pointed out that the respondent is hopelessly insolvent
and that even if successful in a claim for damages, they
would not be
able to recover any meaningful amount from her. Therefore, they seek
an order directing her to publish an unequivocal
and written apology
in three newspapers. They provided the court with a draft apology
which is extremely widely worded. In terms
thereof the respondent
should unreservedly withdraw every word in all communications to the
various entities and admit that there
was never any foundation for
any of the charges which she had laid. She must also undertake to pay
the costs of the application
on a scale as between attorney and
client.
[28]
Insofar as I am
not in a position to consider directing an apology to be made in
light of the case law quoted, it is not necessary
to consider the
contents of the apology any further.
[31]
The authorities are clear. The applicants are not entitled to the
relief claimed in motion proceedings for
the reasons set out in the
judgments which I do not intent to repeat. If the applicants want to
claim damages based on defamation,
they shall proceed by way of
action procedure.
CONCLUSION
[32]
The applicants have proven that they are entitled to an interdict as
prayed for in paragraph 1 of the notice
of motion. However, based on
the authorities quoted above, they are not entitled to damages in the
form of an apology as sought
in paragraph 2 of the notice of motion.
The applicants are partially successful and it may even be argued
that they have obtained
substantial success and are therefore
entitled to the costs of the application. Having said this, the
applicants should have appreciated
that they could not in motion
procedure obtain relief in the form of an apology. The first
applicant has acted as a judge in the
High Court in the past and he
is an experienced senior attorney. He was represented by an
experienced counsel. The judgments referred
to above were delivered
some time before this application was launched and they should have
been well aware thereof. I also take
into consideration that the
first applicant has made use of his own firm of attorneys, to wit the
second applicant, to represent
him in the application, although they
made use of local attorneys in Bloemfontein, to wit Badenhorst
Attorneys, as their correspondents.
In the exercise of my discretion
I have decided not to adhere to the request for a punitive costs
order and also not to allow the
applicants all their costs on a party
and party scale. In the circumstances the respondent shall be ordered
to pay 50% of the taxed
party and party costs of the applicants.
ORDER
[33]
The following order is issued:
1.
The respondent is interdicted and restrained from publishing any
defamatory statements
regarding or concerning the applicants.
2.
The respondent shall pay 50% of the taxed party and party costs of
the applicants
in respect of this application.
J.P.
DAFFUE J
On
behalf of the applicants: Adv
F van Wyk
Van Greunen &
Associates Inc
c/o Badenhorst Attorneys
BLOEMFONTEIN
On
behalf of the respondent: Mrs
H Mc Govern
(In
Person)
[1]
Answering affidavit paras 3 & 5.3, volume 3 pp 278 & 279.
[2]
Annexure
FA3, volume 1 p 54, read with para 31 of the founding affidavit p
14.
[3]
Annexure
FA11, volume 1 p 93, read with para 48 of the founding affidavit p
18.
[4]
Founding affidavit, paras 107 & 108, volume 1 p 37.
[5]
Van Loggerenberg et al, Erasmus Superior Court Practice RS 17, 2021,
D6 - 1.
[6]
2021 (3) SA 425
(SCA) para 111.
[7]
Ibid
,
89.
[8]
(299/2020)
2021 ZASCA 136
(6 October 2021) paras 29 & 30.
[9]
2020 (5) SA 135
(SCA) paras 20 & 28.
[10]
(204/2016)
[2017] ZASCA 8
(10 March 2017) para 36.
[11]
Ibid
,
para 40.
[12]
Manuel
loc cit
,
paras 30 – 86,
[13]
Ibid,
paras
91 – 127.
[14]
Ibid
,
paras 128 – 130.
[15]
1954
(3) SA 244
(CPD) at 247.
[16]
The
Bill of Rights Handbook 5
th
e p 272.
[17]
[2000] ZACC 11
;
2000
(4) SA 757
(CC) para 15.
[18]
A
nnexure
FA14, volume 2 p 130.
[19]
Annexure FA22, volume 3 p 263.
[20]
Volume 12 p 1121.
[21]
Volume 12 para 9 p 1144 in response to the respondent’s
statement in para 3 of her answering affidavit.
[22]
Volume
2 pp 130 – 179.
[23]
Annexure
FA22, volume 3 p 263 and para 101 p 35 of the founding affidavit.
[24]
Annexure
FA23 and FA24, volume 3 pp 264 & 267 respectively as well as
paras 102 & 103 of the founding affidavit pp 35
& 36.
[25]
Answering
affidavit, volume 3 para 39 p 287.
[26]
Answering
affidavit, volume 3 para 43 p 288.
[27]
Founding
affidavit, volume 1 para 112.2.1 p 38.
[28]
Annexure
FA1 to the founding affidavit, volume 1 p 41, read with paras 2 &
3 of the notice of motion.