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[2012] ZASCA 190
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Justice Alliance of South Africa and Another v National Minister of Safety and Security and Others (646/2011) [2012] ZASCA 190; [2013] 2 All SA 15 (SCA) (30 November 2012)
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THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case no: 646/2011
In the matter between
JUSTICE ALLIANCE OF
SOUTH AFRICA
.............................................
First
Appellant
FALSE BAY GUN CLUB
....................................................................
Second
Appellant
and
NATIONAL MINISTER OF
SAFETY AND
SECURITY
...........................................................................................
First
Respondent
NATIONAL COMMISSIONER
OF THE SOUTH
AFRICAN POLICE SERVICE
(REGISTRAR OF
FIREARMS
.....................................................................................
Second
Respondent
APPEAL BOARD OF
FIREARMS
....................................................
Third
Respondent
NATIONAL MINISTER OF
FINANCE
.............................................
Fourth
Respondent
Neutral citation:
Justice Alliance of SA & another v National Minister of
Safety and Security & others
(646/2011)
[2012] ZASCA 190
30
November 2012)
Bench:
PONNAN,
CACHALIA, BOSIELO, THERON and
PETSE JJA
Heard: 22 NOVEMBER
2012
Delivered: 30 NOVEMBER
2012
Corrected:
Summary:
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000
– whether guidelines
published by the Minister pursuant to
s 137(5)
ultra vires
.
___________________________________________________________________
ORDER
___________________________________________________________________
On appeal from
:
Western Cape High Court (Cape Town) (Saldanha J
sitting as court of first instance):
The appeal is dismissed
with costs including those consequent upon the employment of two
counsel.
___________________________________________________________________
PONNAN JA
(
CACHALIA, BOSIELO, THERON and PETSE JJA
concurring)
[1] The Firearms Control
Act 60 of 2000 (the new Act), which came into force on 1 July 2004,
repealed and replaced the Arms and
Ammunitions Act 75 of 1969 (the
old Act). It, like its predecessor,
regulates the
possession of firearms. In doing so, it recognises, as recorded in
its preamble,
the store that our Constitution
places on the right of every person to life and security,
as
also,
its logical corollary that the increased
availability and abuse of firearms has contributed significantly to
the high levels of
crime in our society. Section 3 of the new Act
prohibits any person from possessing a firearm unless he or she holds
for that firearm
a licence, permit, authorisation
or registration certificate. The purpose of the new Act is to prevent
the proliferation of illegally
possessed firearms and to improve the
control of legally possessed firearms.
[2] The new Act restricts
the number of licences that may be issued to any person in respect of
particular sorts of firearms (ss
13-15) and prohibits the issuance of
a licence to any person who is not in possession of a relevant
competency certificate (s 6(2)).
As many thousands of people held
firearm licences under the old Act, a transitional scheme was created
in terms of Schedule 1 of
the new Act whereby licences granted under
the former remained valid for five years. During those five years
persons holding licences
could apply to have them renewed under the
new Act.
1
Once such an application
had been made the licence would remain valid until the application
was either granted or rejected.
2
If an application for the
renewal of a licence was rejected or if a licence otherwise
terminated
3
the firearm had to be
disposed of within 60 days. Failure to do so constituted a criminal
offence.
4
The result is that
certain persons who lawfully possessed firearms under the previous
regulatory regime in terms of the old Act
may not have been able to
secure a licence, permit or authorisation in terms of the new Act. In
that event they had to either:
(a) sell or donate the firearm to
another qualified person; (b) deactivate the firearm; (c) destroy the
firearm; or (d) surrender
the firearm to the State. This appeal
concerns the last category - voluntarily surrendered firearms, more
particularly whether
persons who have voluntarily surrendered their
firearms are entitled to compensation for them in circumstances where
they are not
retained by the State.
[3] Chapter 19 of the new
Act headed ‘Compensation’ provides:
'
134 Circumstances where no
compensation is payable in respect of firearms and ammunition
forfeited to State
No compensation is payable to a person
in respect of a firearm or ammunition forfeited to the State in terms
of this Act−
(a)
if the relevant licence,
permit or authorisation was cancelled in terms of this Act because
the holder of the licence had contravened
or not complied with a
provision of this Act or a condition specified in that licence,
permit or authorisation; or
(b)
if the holder of the
licence, permit or authorisation became or was in terms of section
102 or 103 declared unfit to possess a firearm.
135 Circumstances where no
compensation is payable in respect of firearms and ammunition seized
by State
(1) No compensation is payable to a
person from whom a firearm or ammunition was seized by the State if-
(a)
no licence, permit or
authorisation had been issued for such firearm or ammunition to that
person in terms of this Act; or
(b)
the firearm or ammunition
was for any other reason unlawfully in the possession of that person.
(2) The lawful owner of a firearm or
ammunition lost or stolen as a result of his or her negligence is not
entitled to claim compensation
if such firearm or ammunition is
subsequently seized by the State from another person.
136 No compensation payable where
firearms or ammunition are destroyed by State
(1) The Registrar may in respect of
any firearm or ammunition seized by, surrendered to or forfeited to
the State, issue a notice
in the
Gazette
stating that it is
the intention of the State to destroy that firearm or ammunition.
(2) Any person who has a valid claim
to the relevant firearm or ammunition may, within 21 days after the
publication of the notice
in the
Gazette
, make representations
to the Registrar as to why the firearm or ammunition should not be
destroyed.
(3) If the Registrar is satisfied,
after consideration of any representations contemplated in subsection
(2), that a valid claim
to the relevant firearm or ammunition has not
been proved, the firearm or ammunition may be destroyed and no
compensation will
be payable to anyone in respect thereof.
137 Application for compensation
(1) A person whose firearm has been
surrendered or forfeited to the State in circumstances other than
those referred to in sections
134, 135 and 136 may apply to the
Registrar for compensation in respect of that firearm in the
prescribed form.'
Subsection 2 of s 137
empowers the National Commissioner of Police in his capacity as the
Registrar of Firearms (s 123) to decide
whether compensation is
payable and, if so, to attempt to agree with the applicant for
compensation,
the amount of such compensation or
where no agreement can be reached to determine the amount of
compensation to be paid. Subsections
3 and 4 provide for an appeal to
the Appeal Board against a decision of the Registrar as to the amount
of compensation to be paid.
And s 137(5), which lies at the heart of
this appeal, reads:
'The Minister must, with the approval
of the Minister of Finance, establish guidelines for the payment of
compensation, taking into
account the−
(a)
financial constraints on
the State and its ability to meet actual and anticipated claims for
compensation; and
(b)
interests of persons who
have applied or may in the future apply for compensation.'
[4] Section 149 contains
the only reference to compensation in the New Act aside from the
above-mentioned sections. It reads:
'
149 Compulsory destruction of
firearms, muzzle loading firearms and ammunition
(1) A firearm or muzzle loading
firearm may only be destroyed as prescribed.
(2) Any firearm, muzzle loading
firearm or ammunition forfeited to the State in terms of this Act−
(a)
must be destroyed by the
State within six months of the date of the forfeiture or after all
possible appeals have been concluded
or the last date on which any
appeal could have been noted has passed without an appeal having been
noted, whichever occurs last;
and
(b)
remains the property of the
owner thereof until its destruction.
(3)
(a)
Despite subsection (2),
the State may retain any firearm, muzzle loading firearm or
ammunition forfeited to the State, which the
Registrar deems to be of
special value.
(b)
Any firearm, muzzle loading
firearm or ammunition retained by the Registrar in terms of paragraph
(a)
becomes the property of the State when the Registrar
informs the former owner of the firearm, muzzle loading firearm or
ammunition
of that fact.
(c)
Subject to Chapter 19, the
former owner of any firearm, muzzle loading firearm or ammunition
which becomes the property of the
State in terms of paragraph
(b)
may apply for compensation in terms of this Act.
(4)
(a)
Subject to subsection
(1) no person, including the State, may destroy a firearm or muzzle
loading firearm without the prior written
permission of the
Registrar.
(b)
The Registrar must only
consent to the destruction of a firearm, muzzle loading firearm or
ammunition with due regard to and in
compliance with the provisions
of the National Heritage Resources Act, 1999 (Act 25 of 1999), and
any condition which may be imposed
by the South African Heritage
Resources Agency or their nominated agents.'
[5] The Minister of
Safety and Security (or more accurately his predecessor, the Minister
of Police) (the Minister) failed to timeously
establish the
guidelines envisaged by s 137(5) of the new Act. As a consequence two
non-profit voluntary associations, the first
appellant, the Justice
Alliance of South Africa,
and the second
appellant, the False Bay Gun Club, acting in the interests of firearm
owners nationwide, approached the Western Cape
High Court for
declaratory relief against the Minister,
the
National Commissioner of the South African Police Services,
in
his capacity as the Registrar of Firearms (the Registrar),
and,
the Appeal Board of Firearms
(established in terms of s 128), as the second and third respondents,
respectively. The high court (per Traverso DJP) issued
the following order:
'1. It is declared that the failure to
establish guidelines as contemplated by section 137(5) of the
Firearms Control Act No 60
of 2000 ("the
Firearms Control Act"
;)
is unlawful and inconsistent with the Constitution.
2. The Minister of Police is ordered
to establish guidelines as contemplated by
section 137(5)
of the
Firearms Control Act within
90 days of this order and to inform this
Court by way of an affidavit by the Minister within 120 days of this
order that he has
done so; and
3. The Minister of Police is to pay
the Applicants' costs of suit, which costs are to include the costs
attendant upon the employment
of two counsel.'
[6] In support of that
application Mr John Jackson Smyth, the honorary director of the first
appellant, stated:
'17. This scheme appears efficient on
paper, but the reality was very different. The infrastructure created
by the Respondents could
not cope with the deluge of applications,
including new applications by people seeking to buy new firearms. As
a result, many applications
were either greatly delayed or simply
disappeared. . . .
18. As a result of these difficulties,
many persons chose to hand in their firearms to the State rather than
become illegal possessors
of firearms. It cannot be stressed enough
that these people acted out of a respect for the law, even when it
meant giving up their
own property.
19. Many of these people then sought
compensation from the State, despite the fact that they were often
told by police officers
that they did not qualify for compensation
because they had "voluntarily" surrendered their firearms.
20. However, the guidelines for
compensation that section 137(5) of the Act required the Second
Respondent to establish did not
exist, more than nine years after the
Act was promulgated. Section 137(5) provides:
"The Minister [of Safety and
Security] must, with the approval of the Minister of Finance,
establish guidelines for the payment
of compensation, taking into
account the –
(a)
financial constraints on
the State and its ability to meet actual and anticipated claims for
compensation; and
(b)
interests of persons who
have applied or may in the future apply for compensation."'
[7] On 10 November 2009
and ostensibly in compliance with the order of Traveso DJP the
Minister promulgated the guidelines envisaged
in s 137(5). The
guidelines provide:
5
'2. These guidelines are not
applicable to firearms which have been voluntary surrendered for
destruction to the South African Police
Service in the period between
1 July 2004 and 30 June 2009−
(a) by the lawful owners of such
firearms, in accordance with Regulation 94 of the Firearms Control
Regulations, 2004; and
(b) by virtue of a choice made by the
person involved to have the firearm destroyed and not to sell, donate
or otherwise dispose
of the firearm involved.
3. These guidelines shall apply to
firearms referred to in
section 149(3)
of the
Firearms Control Act,
2000
. Notwithstanding paragraph 2 above, I hereby determine that if
the Registrar decides that a particular firearm needs to be kept
by
the South African Police Service for forensic- and other training,
research or heritage reasons; and will therefore not be destroyed,
that the owner whose firearm was voluntarily surrendered for
destruction must be compensated in accordance with these guidelines.
In such a case the Registrar must notify the person concerned of the
intention not to destroy the firearm and provide the person
with the
prescribed application form for compensation. Any application for
compensation pursuant to a notification by the Registrar,
as referred
to in this paragraph, must be submitted to the Registrar within 30
working days from the date of notification by the
Registrar.
4. I will appoint a Panel of at least
three independent valuators. The Registrar must have the firearms in
respect of applications
where the applicant is not satisfied with the
flat rate valuated by the Panel. Such applicant for compensation
shall be entitled
to compensation in accordance with the valuation
determined by the Panel, subject to the maximum amount of
compensation determined
in these guidelines for the relevant category
of firearm. The costs incurred to obtain such valuation must be
deducted from the
compensation payable to the applicant.
5. Taking into account the −
(a) Financial constraints on the State
and its ability to meet actual and anticipated claims for
compensation; and
(b) interests of persons who have
applied or may in future apply for compensation,
6. I hereby determine that the flat
rate and the maximum amount of compensation paid in respect of a
particular firearm may not
exceed the following:
(a) In the case of a handgun (pistol
or revolver) – R 600.00;
(b) in the case of a rifle
(combination, single shot, semi-automatic/fully automatic); shotgun
(combination, single shot, semi-automatic
or automatic), or of any
other firearm not mentioned above – Flat rate – R 1
200.00.
7. The maximum amount of compensation
which may be aid in respect of any firearm, irrespective of an
evaluation by the Panel, shall
be the following:
(a) In the case of a handgun (pistol
or revolver) – R 1 000.00;
(b) in the case of a rifle
(combination, single shot, semi-automatic/fully automatic); shotgun
(combination, single shot, semi-automatic
or fully automatic), or of
any other firearm not mentioned above – R 2 000.00.
8. In the case where compensation is
to be paid, such payment must be effected from the allocated budget
of the Department of Police.
9. The payment must be effected within
90 (ninety) working days from the date of determination by the
Registrar of the amount
of compensation, or within the
same period after an appeal has been upheld.'
Those guidelines were
approved by the Minister of Finance, who in due course came to be
joined as the fourth respondent in the matter.
[8] During February 2010
the appellants once again approached the Western Cape High Court.
This time they sought an order:
'1. Declaring that the guidelines
issued by the First Respondent in Government Notice 1071 in
Government Gazette 32701 of 10 November
2009 are
ultra vires
,
inconsistent with
section 137
of the
Firearms Control Act 60 of 2000
and the Constitution, 1996, and invalid;
2. Directing the First Respondent to
issue new guidelines under
section 137(5)
of the
Firearms Control Act
60 of 2000
by 17 June 2010, taking into account:
2.1 the right of persons who
voluntarily surrender their legal firearms to the State to receive
compensation; and
2.2 the right of persons who receive
compensation to receive just and equitable compensation that takes
into account the market
value of the surrendered firearms'.
[9] Mr Smyth, who again
deposed to the affidavit in support of the application, alleged:
'6. The guidelines are flawed in a
number of aspects and accordingly do not comply with the order.
7. First, the guidelines do not permit
persons who voluntarily submitted their legal firearms to the
government to claim compensation.
By doing so, the guidelines are
ultra vires
and inconsistent with section 137 of the Firearms
Control Act 60 of 2000 ("the Act" or "the new Act").
Were
section 137 to be interpreted as the guidelines imply, it would
turn the section into a dead letter.
8. Furthermore, the refusal to grant
compensation to persons who surrender their legal firearms to the
State undermines the compensatory
aims of the Act, read in the light
of the Constitution, and unjustly penalises certain firearm owners.
9. Secondly, the maximum amounts
allowed for compensation in terms of the guidelines are
disproportionately below the fair market
value of most firearms. To
add insult to injury, persons seeking to get even the maximum amount
of compensation allowed by the
guidelines must pay for the process of
such valuation.'
[10] That application
came before Saldanha J, who made the following order:
'(i) The provision of Paragraph 4 of
the Guidelines published by the respondents which provides that the
costs incurred in obtaining
the valuation must be deducted from the
compensation payable to an applicant is declared unlawful.
(ii) That the fourth respondent is to
take appropriate steps within 60 days of this order for the deletion
of item 2 and the clearing
up of any confusion caused by item 3 in
the Guidelines.
(iii) Save for the above, the relief
sought by the applicants is dismissed.
(iv) No order is made as to costs.'
The learned judge
subsequently granted leave to the appellants to appeal to this Court.
The order of the high court plainly lacks
the intelligibility,
clarity and certainty that are the essential attributes of an order
of court. But, it would appear that in
framing paragraphs (i) and
(ii) as he did, the learned Judge had in mind the following
concessions by Director Bothma in his affidavit
filed on behalf of
the First and Second Respondents in opposition to the relief sought
by the appellants:
'17. To the extent that item 2 of the
guidelines suggests that those who surrender their firearms for
destruction outside of the
1 July 2004 – 30 June 2009 period;
and outside of the situations referred to in item 2(a) and (b) of the
guidelines, may
make use of these guidelines to obtain compensation,
I am advised to clarify that this is not the case. In accordance with
section
136 of the Act, no person who surrenders his or her firearm
for destruction is entitled to compensation unless such firearm is
retained by the State.
18 To the extent that it may be
necessary to remove any confusion arising from item 2 I am advised
that, since this item is superfluous,
the Minister is willing to
agree to facilitate an amendment to the guidelines which will involve
the deletion of item 2';
and
'45. To the extent that paragraph 3 of
the guidelines may be construed as limiting the compensation
provisions of section 137 to
the firearms forfeited in section 149(3)
I am advised that the Minister will deal with such potential
confusion by agreeing to
amend this paragraph accordingly; including
the deletion of any reference suggesting that compensation is
restricted exclusively
to the circumstances described in section
149(3).'.
[11] The appellants
eschewed reliance on a constitutional challenge to the validity of
any provision of the Act having recorded
in their replying affidavit:
'16. . . . The Applicants do not bring
a constitutional challenge against any section of the Act in this
application'.
That notwithstanding one
of the issues identified by the high court as requiring determination
was: ‘[w]hether the constitutionality
of any of the relevant
provisions of the Act should
mero motu
be considered and
determined by this court’. In the result the judgment, as also
the heads of argument filed on behalf of
the parties in this court,
addressed a range of constitutional issues. At the hearing of the
appeal, however, the appellants restricted
themselves to the relief
sought in their notice of motion that on a proper interpretation of
the new Act, the guidelines issued
by the Minister are
ultra vires
s 137.
[12] Sections 134 and 135
appear on the face of it to pose no real difficulty in this case. The
former deals with firearms that
have been forfeited to the State and
the latter to those seized by the State. Both sections plainly
pertain to those situations
where the possession or continued
possession of the firearms would for the range of reasons provided
there not be lawful. It thus
would follow logically that in those
circumstances compensation could hardly come into the reckoning.
Section 136 caters for what
follows upon the seizure or forfeiture
envisaged in ss 134 and 135, namely destruction. But s 136(1) also
mentions a third category
of firearms - surrendered firearms. The
legislature contemplates that all three categories will suffer a
similar fate - destruction,
unless any person with a valid claim to
the firearm is able to make representations as to why it should not
be destroyed. Section
136(2) permits any person who has a valid claim
to a seized, surrendered or forfeited firearm to make representations
to the Registrar
as to why that firearm should not be destroyed. A
person who has surrendered a firearm in these circumstances is hardly
likely
thereafter to lodge a claim to it. It may however be that
another person has a right to or interest in the surrendered firearm.
The subsection serves the important purpose of providing protection
to such person (a third party) who may have a valid claim to
the
surrendered firearm, which will otherwise be destroyed. The
appellants correctly observe that it is difficult to assess a claim
for compensation in respect of a firearm that has been destroyed.
Section 136(2) creates a mechanism whereby a claim to a firearm
may
be proved before the decision is made to destroy the firearm.
Importantly, the representations to be made are not advanced
in
support of any claim for compensation but as to why the firearm
should not be destroyed. For, once a firearm has been destroyed
no
compensation is payable (s 136(3)).
[13] Section 149 (3),
which must be read subject to Chapter 19, describes when compensation
is payable, namely when the State elects
to retain a firearm
forfeited to it because the Registrar deems it to be of 'special
value'. The firearm then becomes the property
of the State and the
former owner may apply for compensation. Significantly, it is
restricted to forfeited firearms. Section 137
on the other hand
pertains to both forfeited and surrendered firearms. Whether that
difference in language means that compensation
is only payable under
s 149(3) when a firearm is retained by the State after it has been
forfeited or also when surrendered is
fortunately a conundrum that
does not have to be presently resolved. For, the respondents have
adopted the stance that compensation
is also payable when a firearm
is retained by the State after having been voluntarily surrendered by
its owner.
[14] The default position
envisaged by s 149, which is headed ‘[c]ompulsory destruction
of firearms . . .’ is that all
forfeited firearms must be
destroyed by the State save for those retained because the Registrar
deems it to be of special value.
In terms of the new Act a firearm is
forfeited to the State following upon,
inter alia
: (a) the
cancellation of an accreditation (s 8(5)); (b) the termination of a
firearm licence (s 28(5)); (c) the cancellation of
a dealer’s
licence (s 42(5)); or (d) the termination of a manufacturer’s
licence (s 56(5)). In each such instance the
former holder would be
obliged thereafter to surrender the firearm in such manner as may be
determined by the Registrar. A similar
obligation to surrender also
arises when a person is declared to be unfit to possess a firearm (s
104 (2)), is given indemnity
from prosecution following upon amnesty
(s 139(3)) or if the Registrar finds that a licence, permit,
certificate or authorisation
was not validly issued under the old Act
(Item 10(3) Schedule 1 of the new Act). These are all instances of
what may be described
as compulsory (or perhaps more accurately
compelled) surrender, which, according to the appellants, fall to be
distinguished from
instances of voluntary surrender.
[15] The obvious
difficulty that confronts the appellants is that s 136(3) provides in
terms that no compensation is payable in
respect of firearms that
have been surrendered to the State and destroyed. Section 137, which
establishes the compensatory scheme,
underlines that difficulty. It
states that the person who may apply for compensation is a person
whose firearm has been surrendered
to the State in circumstances
other than those referred to in s 136. Section 136 could hardly be
clearer as to when compensation
is not payable, namely: (a) when the
firearm is seized, surrendered or forfeited; (b) no valid claim has
been proved in respect
of the firearm; and (c) the firearm has been
destroyed. In those circumstances according to subsection 3 ‘no
compensation
will be payable to anyone’. In order to avoid this
outcome the appellants contend that the word ‘surrender’
in
s 136 excludes voluntary surrender. In my view there is nothing in
s 136 that supports this contention. Indeed a cursory reading
of the
Act makes it plain that no distinction is drawn between voluntary and
compulsory surrender.
[16] As an additional
string to their bow the appellants contend that the Act envisages two
different forms of financial transactions
– ‘payment’
when the State retains a firearm under s 149 and ‘compensation’
when a firearm is voluntarily
surrendered and destroyed. The
fundamental difficulty with this argument is that s 149, like s 136,
employs the word ‘compensation’
to describe what is
payable. The two sections can hardly, in using the same word in the
context of the same issue, be taken to
refer to different concepts.
That contention, I may add, is advanced in the face of the provisions
of s 136(3) that no compensation
is payable if the firearm is
destroyed. Moreover, the Legislature appears to have been at pains to
stress that compensation is
only payable in circumstances where the
State acquires the firearm. Where the firearm is destroyed the State
does not acquire it
and no compensation is payable. Thus s 149(2)
provides that a firearm that is to be destroyed under s 149 ‘remains
the property
of the owner thereof until destruction’.
[17] In my view the
interpretation proposed by the appellants is tortuous and unduly
strains the language of the legislation. For,
in order to arrive at
the interpretation advanced by them one has to ignore the explicit
provisions of the Act, in particular s
136(3), which states that no
compensation is payable when a firearm is surrendered and destroyed
and also the scheme of the Act
which is to provide for compensation
only when a firearm is retained by the State. The Act does recognize
that when the State retains
a firearm, which is deemed to be of
special value, that value accrues to the State for which the former
owner should be compensated.
It follows that in publishing guidelines
that excluded persons who voluntarily surrendered their firearms (and
whose firearms were
not retained by the State) from the compensatory
scheme, the Minister did not act
ultra vires
the provisions of
the Act. The appeal must accordingly fail.
[18] That leaves costs:
It was submitted on behalf of the appellants that consistent with
what occurred in the high court, each
party should be ordered to pay
their own costs. I cannot agree. As I have already stated the appeal
did not raise any constitutional
issue. There was some attempt to
suggest that the appellants were acting in the public interest but
counsel was constrained to
accept that the appellants were not
motivated by altruism but in the main represent firearm owners who
have a financial interest
in the outcome of these proceedings. There
is thus no warrant for departing from the general rule that the costs
of the appeal
should follow the result.
[19] In the result the
appeal is dismissed with costs including those consequent upon the
employment of two counsel.
_________________
V M PONNAN
JUDGE OF APPEAL
APPEARANCES:
For Appellant: P Hodes SC
D Simonsz
Instructed by:
Gunstons Attorneys
Tokai
Webbers
Bloemfontein
For Respondent: A M Breitenbach SC
H Varney
Instructed by:
The State Attorney
Cape Town
The State Attorney
Bloemfontein
1
Item
11(1)
(a)
of Schedule 1 to the Act.
2
Item
11(1)
(d)
of Schedule 1 to the Act.
3
Section
28.
4
Section
120(1)
(a)
.
5
GN
1071, GG 32701, 10 November 2009.