Mlotshwa v Minister of Police and Another (34336/16) [2023] ZAGPPHC 663 (10 August 2023)

78 Reportability

Brief Summary

Delict — Unlawful arrest and detention — Plaintiff claiming damages for unlawful arrest and detention by police — Arrest made without a warrant based on complainant's identification — Court finding that arresting officer did not have reasonable suspicion as required by section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 — Plaintiff's detention deemed unlawful, warranting compensation for damages.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


These were action proceedings for delictual damages arising from an alleged unlawful arrest and detention. The plaintiff, Mr Bongane Mlotshwa, sued the Minister of Police (first defendant) and Sergeant Montu Nicholas Siphiwe Twala (second defendant), who was identified as the arresting officer.


The claim concerned damages said to flow from the plaintiff’s arrest without a warrant and his subsequent detention in police holding cells. The plaintiff alleged that the arresting officer lacked a reasonable basis to arrest him and failed properly to exercise any discretion to arrest, thereby rendering both the arrest and ensuing detention unlawful.


As to the procedural history, the court recorded that condonation for late service of a statutory notice under the Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002 had been granted on 26 January 2022. At a pre-trial conference the parties agreed to a separation of issues, with the matter proceeding on merits only (liability), and the defendants accepted that they bore the duty to begin. The judgment determined only whether the arrest and detention were unlawful, and also addressed the factual dispute about the duration of detention.


2. Material Facts


On 30 December 2014 at about 22h30, a complainant (whose details were redacted) made a statement to the police alleging that she had been raped and robbed while walking to see her boyfriend. In her statement she alleged that she encountered a man she referred to as “Chako”, who grabbed her, placed a knife on her neck, took her cell phone, and then sexually violated her while they were standing near an electric pole. The complainant thereafter went to her boyfriend, who, according to his statement, found her crying and reporting that she had been raped. He stated that she was not certain of the perpetrator’s name but indicated she knew him by sight and would be able to point him out. The judgment also records that the complainant told the doctor who completed the J88 that she knew the perpetrator.


On 31 December 2014 at about 12h00, Sergeant Twala (attached to visible policing at the time) interviewed the complainant. During the interview she indicated that she knew the suspect and that they lived not far apart. The complainant then took Sergeant Twala and other police officers to a tuckshop next to a tavern, where she pointed out the plaintiff, who was sitting with companions. Sergeant Twala arrested the plaintiff immediately, without a warrant.


It was common cause that a member of the SAPS arrested the plaintiff without a warrant, and that the plaintiff was kept in the police holding cells at Ladysmith police station for some days (Besters/Berstas being without detention facilities).


The plaintiff’s version (insofar as it was material to the issues decided) was that he was indeed pointed out at the tuckshop and arrested there, but he denied the allegations against him and stated it was his first time seeing the complainant. He alleged that he was detained in poor cell conditions and that he was detained for five days, contending he was released from custody only on 5 January 2015.


The defendants’ evidence, accepted by the court, was that the plaintiff was arrested on 31 December 2014, that 1 January 2015 was a public holiday, and that he was released in court on 2 January 2015 at his first appearance. The judgment placed weight on an entry in the investigation diary dated 2 January 2015 referring to the docket being sent to court for first appearance and recording that the accused was in custody and bail was opposed.


The docket also contained subsequent forensic information: buccal swabs were obtained from the plaintiff on 21 January 2015, and a forensic laboratory report dated 14 August 2015 excluded the plaintiff as the donor of DNA on certain exhibits. The judgment recorded the later withdrawal of the criminal case, stating that it was due to the complainant not wanting secondary trauma and losing interest because the matter dragged, and not because the merits were adjudged insufficient.


Where disputes of fact were material, the court rejected as not credible the plaintiff’s attempt (raised for the first time during testimony) to suggest there were other suspects, noting that this allegation was absent from the pleadings, absent from the docket, and not put to the arresting officer.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the plaintiff’s warrantless arrest and the detention that followed were unlawful. This required the court to determine whether the statutory requirements for a lawful arrest without a warrant were satisfied, and whether the arresting officer had a reasonable suspicion (objectively assessed) justifying an arrest for the relevant offence(s).


A related issue concerned the duration of detention: whether, on the evidence accepted, the plaintiff was detained for five days as he alleged, or for a shorter period. This aspect involved a factual dispute resolved by reference to the material before the court (including documentary entries in the docket) and the absence of corroborating detention records.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of law to fact, namely the application of the requirements for a lawful warrantless arrest to the information the police possessed at the time of arrest, together with a factual evaluation of the plaintiff’s version against the defendants’ version on the period of detention.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court set out the statutory framework for warrantless arrest under section 40 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, focusing on section 40(1)(b), which authorises a peace officer to arrest without a warrant a person whom the officer reasonably suspects of having committed an offence referred to in Schedule 1. The court relied on the formulation in Duncan v Minister of Law and Order 1988 (2) SA 805 (A) for the jurisdictional facts for section 40(1)(b), namely that the arrester must be a peace officer, must entertain a suspicion, the suspicion must relate to a Schedule 1 offence, and the suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds.


In evaluating “reasonable suspicion”, the court adopted an objective test, referring to S v Nel and Another 1980 (4) SA 28 (E). The question was whether a reasonable person in the arresting officer’s position, with the same information, would have considered that there were good and sufficient grounds for suspecting the plaintiff of the offences.


The court contextualised the enquiry by noting the constitutional importance of personal liberty and dignity and referred to Mahlangu and Another v Minister of Police 2021 (2) SACR 595 (CC) for the proposition that public policy is informed by constitutional values and that the right to freedom and security of the person is central.


The judgment also recorded that the onus rests on the arresting officer (and thus the defendants) to prove the lawfulness of the arrest and detention. In setting out the contours of police decision-making, the court referred to authority indicating that the existence of reasonable suspicion does not compel an arrest in every case; rather, there is a discretion that must be exercised properly with regard to prevailing circumstances, with reference to Sandle Biyela v Minister of Police [2022] ZASCA 36 (1 April 2022). The court further referred to guidance that a reasonable officer should critically assess the quality of information and not act lightly on suspicion, with reference to Kubeka v The Minister of Police and Another (63675/2016) [2022] ZAGPPHC 298 (4 May 2022), and it ultimately concluded (with reference to Mabona and Another v Minister of Law and Order and Others 1988 (2) SA 654 (SE)) that the arresting officer had objectively assessed the facts.


Applying these principles to the evidence, the court placed emphasis on the fact that the complainant made a report soon after the incident, that she indicated she knew the suspect as “Chako”, and that she physically pointed out the plaintiff to the police the next day. The court accepted that, on the information available at the time, there was no evidential basis showing that the complainant was uncertain about the suspect’s identity or that other suspects were being pursued. The court treated the plaintiff’s denial as a bare denial and noted that he did not, on the court’s reading, distance himself from the nickname “Chako” or meaningfully engage with whether he lived near the complainant, and that no alibi was raised.


As to the DNA exclusion, the court did not treat the later forensic result as demonstrating that the arresting officer lacked reasonable suspicion at the time of arrest. The judgment reasoned that there could be explanations for exclusion, including the complainant’s account that the perpetrator withdrew and urinated, the nature and location of samples, and the fact that the complainant washed before later sexual intercourse, which the court described as interference with the “scene” before samples were taken. On this reasoning, the court held that the DNA result did not negate the need to investigate the allegations nor undermine the reasonableness of suspicion at the time of arrest.


The court also addressed the plaintiff’s claim that he was detained for five days. The court relied on the investigation diary entry showing that the docket was sent for the accused’s first court appearance on 2 January 2015 and found that, apart from the plaintiff’s say-so, there was no other evidence substantiating a five-day detention period. The court considered the absence of corroborating detention documents (such as a cell register or court records) and concluded that the evidence supported a finding that the plaintiff was in custody for two nights before release on 2 January 2015, with the intervening public holiday explaining why an earlier appearance did not occur.


On the totality of the accepted evidence, the court concluded that the jurisdictional requirements for a lawful warrantless arrest were met and that the arresting officer had reasonable grounds for the arrest. The court therefore found the arrest and ensuing detention lawful.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed the plaintiff’s claim in its entirety on the merits. The action was dismissed with costs.


The judgment therefore refused the delictual relief sought for unlawful arrest and detention, including claims framed as damages for deprivation of liberty, dignity, and reputation, because the court found the arrest and detention were not unlawful.


Cases Cited


Duncan v Minister of Law and Order 1988 (2) SA 805 (A)


S v Nel and Another 1980 (4) SA 28 (E)


Mahlangu and Another v Minister of Police 2021 (2) SACR 595 (CC)


Barnard v Minister of Police and Another 2019 (2) SACR (ECG)


Sandle Biyela v Minister of Police [2022] ZASCA 36 (1 April 2022)


Kubeka v The Minister of Police and Another (63675/2016) [2022] ZAGPPHC 298 (4 May 2022)


Mabona and Another v Minister of Law and Order and Others 1988 (2) SA 654 (SE)


Legislation Cited


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 40(1)(b), Schedule 1, and Schedule 5 (as referenced in relation to the charge)


Institution of Legal Proceedings against Certain Organs of State Act 40 of 2002


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, sections 1 and 12


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that the plaintiff’s warrantless arrest was lawful because it was effected by a peace officer who, after interviewing the complainant and being taken to the plaintiff and having him pointed out, had an objectively reasonable suspicion that the plaintiff had committed serious offences (including rape and robbery).


The court further held that the plaintiff failed to prove that he was detained for five days, and that the evidence supported a finding that he was detained for approximately two nights, being arrested on 31 December 2014 and appearing in court on 2 January 2015 when he was released.


Because the arrest and detention were held to be lawful, the plaintiff’s delictual claim for damages was dismissed, and the plaintiff was ordered to pay costs.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A warrantless arrest under section 40(1)(b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 requires the existence of the jurisdictional facts identified in Duncan v Minister of Law and Order 1988 (2) SA 805 (A), including that the arrestor is a peace officer who forms a suspicion on reasonable grounds that the suspect committed a Schedule 1 offence.


Whether a suspicion is “reasonably entertained” is assessed by an objective test, namely what a reasonable person in the arresting officer’s position, possessed of the same information, would have concluded as to the existence of sufficient grounds for suspicion, as reflected in S v Nel and Another 1980 (4) SA 28 (E).


The judgment reaffirmed that the onus to justify the lawfulness of an arrest and detention rests on the defendant once arrest and detention are established, and it located the enquiry within constitutional values protecting freedom, dignity, and security of the person, with reference to Mahlangu and Another v Minister of Police 2021 (2) SACR 595 (CC).


Even where reasonable suspicion exists, arrest is a discretionary power rather than a mechanical consequence; the discretion must be exercised properly in light of the circumstances, as referenced through Sandle Biyela v Minister of Police [2022] ZASCA 36 (1 April 2022), together with the requirement that the quality of information grounding suspicion be assessed critically, as discussed with reference to Kubeka v The Minister of Police and Another (63675/2016) [2022] ZAGPPHC 298 (4 May 2022) and applied by the court in concluding that the arresting officer’s assessment was objectively justified.

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[2023] ZAGPPHC 663
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Mlotshwa v Minister of Police and Another (34336/16) [2023] ZAGPPHC 663 (10 August 2023)

SAFLII
Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG DIVISION,
PRETORIA
CASE
NO: 34336/16
(1)
REPORTABLE: YES/
NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO OTHERS JUDGES: YES/
NO
(3)
REVISED
DATE:
10/08/2023
SIGNATURE
In
the matter between:
BONGANE
MLOTSHWA
Plaintiff
And
THE
MINISTER OF POLICE

1
st
Defendant
MONTU
NICHOLAS SIPHIWE
TWALA                                             2
nd
Defendant
JUDGMENT
Mogotsi
DD
[1]
The Plaintiff has instituted action proceedings against the first and
second Defendants
for delictual damages arising from his arrest and
detention.
[2]
Condonation of late filing of a notice of intention to institution
Legal Proceedings
against certain organs of the State in terms of Act
40 of 2002 was granted by the court on the 26th January 2022.
Background
[3]
The investigating and arresting officers testified. A case docket
having
inter alia
a statement of Ms N[...] (the complainant)
was handed as exhibit by agreement between the parties. She made a
statement to the
police at Besters wherein she alleged that she got
raped at about 22h30pm on the 30
th
December 2014.She got
sexually violated while walking to see her boyfriend. She briefly
stated that she came across the Plaintiff
whom she referred to as
‘Chako’. The Plaintiff grabbed her put a knife on her
neck and pulled her from the street to
where it was dark. He robbed
her a cell phone. Thereafter he lifted her skirt, shifted her panty
to the side and penetrated her
private part with his penis while the
two were standing against the electric pole. The plaintiff made up
and down movements. Thereafter,
he withdrew his penis from her
private part, “urinated” on the ground and walked away.
[4]
She thereafter went to her boyfriend’s place. The boyfriend
told her to wash
her private part before they had sexual intercourse.
[5]
The victim’s boyfriend made a statement in which he stated that
she was crying
while reporting rape to him. She was not certain about
the perpetrator’s name but she reported that she saw him at the
time
he was removing a sim card from her phone. She further informed
him that the perpetrator was known to her by sight, and she will
be
able to point him out if she can see him. The complainant also told
the doctor who completed a J88 form that she knows the perpetrator.
[7]
The arresting officer is Sergeant Twala, a member of the South Africa
Police services who
was attached to the visible  policing unit
at that time of this incident. His evidence is that on the day in
question he was
doing patrol and crime prevention duties. After
receiving a complaint, he interviewed the Complainant on 31
st
December
2014, at 12h00. As he was interviewing her ,she realised that she
knew the suspect and further that the two were not staying
far apart
in Watersmith. Pursuant to the interview, the victim took sergeant
Twala together with other police officers to a tuckshop
which was
next to a tavern. They found the Plaintiff sitting in between his two
companions and the victim pointed him out as a
suspect.
[8]
Sergeant Twala immediately arrested the Plaintiff. He says the arrest
was effected
in terms of section 40 (1) (a) - (q) Act 51 of
1977
[1]
(as amended) (CPA) as he
deemed the nature of the offenses committed serious. He felt that
there was no need for the identification
parade to be held under the
given circumstances. He went on to say that in those kind of
circumstances should the police have delayed
to arrest the Plaintiff,
the community would have resorted to mob justice. They did that
before.
[10]
The Plaintiff was kept at Ladysmith police station as there were no
detention facilities at Berstas.
The arresting officer only effected
the arrest. He does not know for how long was the Plaintiff detained.
[11]
Constable Mazibuko was allocated a case docket shortly thereafter as
she was on standby. She felt that the
Plaintiff should not be
released because he was known to the complainant
albeit
by a
nickname. Identity was not an issue. Secondly, he was charged with a
schedule 5(CPA) offence.
[12]
The Plaintiff was arrested on the 31
st
December 2014, the
1
st
December2014 was a public holiday and he got released
on the 2
nd
January 2015 in court on his first appearance.
[13]
Only the Plaintiff testified. His version is that the complainant
pointed him out -while he was sited with
others at a tuck shop. He
confirmed the date and the place of his arrest. He further stated
that it was his first time to see the
victim. He got arrested and
assaulted on his back while boarding a police van.
[14]    He got
locked up with about ten detainees in a filthy cell at Ladysmith
police station. They were not provided
with amenities of life like a
bathing cloth and soap. He was given a soiled blanket.
[15]
He denied the allegations against him and elected to remain silent in
his warning statement dated the 30
th
December 2014.He got
released from  custody on the 5
th
January 2015 .The
Plaintiff maintains  that he was detained for a period of five
(5)days.
[16]
Buccal swabs were obtained from the Plaintiff on the 21
st
January 2015 and sealed in the exhibit bag 13DBAF9115.The forensic
science laboratory report dated 14th August 2015 excluded the

Plaintiff as the donor of the DNA on the exhibits (PAD000262281Q).
[17]
It is the contention of the Plaintiff that the Defendant failed to
read the case docket before
he could affect the arrest. He therefore
could not have had a reasonable suspicion when he arrested the
Plaintiff. The arresting
officer also did not exercise his discretion
properly.
Common
cause
[18]
It is common cause that a member of the SAPS arrested the Plaintiff
without a warrant of arrest. It is further
admitted that the
Plaintiff was kept in the police holding cells at Ladysmith police
station for some days.
Issue
[19]
The issue is whether or not the arrest of the
Plaintiff by a member of the South African Police Services and the
subsequent detention
thereafter was unlawful or not. Also, whether
the Plaintiff was as a result of that arrest kept in the holding
cells for a period
of five (5) days as he alleges or less.
Separation of
Issues.
[20]
The parties agreed during a pre-trial conference that the merits will
be separated from the quantum
and as a result, the matter proceeded
on the merits only. The defendant further accepted that he had a duty
to begin.
The
Law
[21]
Section 40 of the CPA provides for the arrest by a peace officer
without warrant and it provides
as follows;
(1)
A peace officer may without warrant
arrest any person-
(b) Whom he reasonably
suspects of having committed an offence   referred to in
schedule 1, other than the offence of
escape from lawful custody.
The legal position
regarding justification of a warrantless arrest in terms of section
40(1) (b) of the CPA was dealt with in the
case of Duncan v Minister
of Law and Order
[2]
.

The
so-called jurisdictional fact which must exist before the power
conferred by section 40 (b) are as follows;
(1)
The arrester must be a peace
officer.
(2)
He must entertain a suspicion.
(3)
It must be a suspicion that the
arrestee committed a offence referred to in scedule 1of the Act(other
than one particular offence)
(4)
That [the] suspicion must rest on
reasoable grouds.If the jurisdictioal requiremets are satisfied ,the
peace officer may invoke
the power conferred by the subsection i.e he
may arrest te suspect.
[22]
The test of whether a suspicion is reasonably
entertained  within the meaning of section 40(1)(b) is

objective,see
S
v Nel and Another
[3]
and
that is, Would a reasonable man in the position of the
defendant possessing the same information considered that there
were
good and sufffdicient,grounds for suspecting that the Plaintiff is
guilty of the offences of rape and robbery.
[23]
A person’s freedom and security are sacrosanct and are
protected by our Constitution. Tshiqi
J in the matter of
Mahlangu
and Another v Minister of Police
[4]
said
that

It
is now that public policy is informed by the Constitution. Our
Constitution values freedom, understandably so when regard is
had as
to how, before the dawn of democracy, freedom for the majority
was close to non-existence .The primacy of human
dignity ,the
achievement of equality and the advancement of human rights and
freedoms “is recognised in the founding values
contained in
section 1 of the Constitution…These constitutional provisions
and the protection in section12 of the
right
of freedom and security of the person are at the heart of public
policy consideration.”
[24]
It is trite that the
onus
rests on the arresting officer to prove the lawfulness of the arrest
and detention. In
Barnard
v Minister of Police and Another
[5]
,
the
court said a police officer should investigate an exculpatory
statement offered by a suspect before they can have reasonable

suspicion  for the purpose of a  lawful arrest. The court
in Sandle
Biyela
v Minister of Police
[6]
held at para [36] that the arresting officer is not obliged to arrest
based on a reasonable suspicion because he or she has a discretion.

The discretion to arrest must be exercised properly after taking all
the prevailing circumstances into consideration.
In
the matter
Kubeka
v The Minister of Police and Another
[7]

It
seems to me that in  evaluating his information a reasonable man
would bear in mind that the section authorises drastic
police
action.It authorises  an arrest on the strength of a suspicion
and without the need to swear out a warrant,i.e something
which
otherwise  would be an invasive of private rights and personal
liberty.The reasonable man willl therefore analyse
and asses
the “quality of the information at his disposal critically,and
he will not accept it lightly or without checking
it where it can be
checked....This is not to say the information at his disposal must be
of  sufficiently high quality
and cogency to engender  in
him a conviction that the suspect is infact guilty.The section
requires  suspicion but not
certainty.However,the suspicion must
be base upon solid grounds.Otherwise it will be  flighty or
arbitrary,an not a reasonable
suspicion.”
Application
[25]
The Plaintiff is claiming damages in an amount of R425000-00, being a
global amount for the unlawful arrest,
detention, deprivation of
freedom and liberty, damage to dignity and reputation. “It is
the contention of the Plaintiff that
the Defendant were acting within
the course and scope of their employment with the first Defendant.
[26]
The complainant in the sexual assault case laid a charge almost
immediately. She knew the Plaintiff as ‘Chako’.
From the
time of the arrest till the date of the court there were no other
statements from the Plaintiff’s side for the defendant
and or
this court’s consideration. It has only been the defendant’s
allegation and the Plaintiffs’ bare denial
of the allegations.
The Plaintiff did not distance himself from that name Chako.
[27]
When the Plaintiff testified he came with new evidence. He for the
first time informed the court
that the complainant suspected other
people. The Plaintiff’s counsel added that there was another
dark coloured suspect with
red eyes. That assertion cannot be
credible. It is intended to mislead the court. Firstly, it is not
contained in the Plaintiff’s
pleadings. Secondly the defence
counsel adds ‘red eyes” to the given description.
Something not in the evidence. Thirdly,
this is allegedly what was
said by members of the community, which makes it hearsay ad the
counsel does not say why should the
court accept hearsay evidence.
The allegation is not in the case docket. Furthermore, it was never
taken up with the arresting
officer.
[28]
The day following the incident, the Plaintiff took the police to
where the Plaintiff was and
pointed him out to the arresting officer.
The Plaintiff was charged within three and half hours of being
arrested. There is no
evidence to suggest that there were other
suspects who were looked for or she was not sure about the identity
of the suspect. There
is also no
alibi
raised by the
Plaintiff.
[29]
There could be a reason or reasons why the forensic report excluded
the Plaintiff as the donor in the samples
submitted. One such reason
could be what the complainant said in her statement that during the
alleged sexual violation, the plaintiff
who was not using a condom,
withdrew and “urinated” on the ground. The results may be
influenced by a number of factors.
For example, the type  and
the locality of  the samples taken from the complainant. Also,
the fact that her boyfriend
told her to bath her private part before
having sexual intercourse with her. Her body, which could be referred
to as part of the
scene of crime was interfered with before the
samples could be taken for analysation.
[30]
All that happened immediately after she was sexually violated cannot
be interpreted to have nullified the
alleged sexual assault ad or
robbery with aggravating circumstances. These allegations had to be
investigated.
[31]     A
withdrawal of the case, was because the complainant felt that she did
not want to be subjected to a secondary
trauma. She lost interest as
the matter was dragging and she had other problems. Not that she was
not sexually violated and robbed
of her cell phone by the Plaintiff.
The case was not withdrawn by the State because of the merits.
[32]
Coming to the alleged five days period of detention, a case docked
was handed in as an exhibit by consent
between the parties. When the
Defendants counsel referred to the dates therein, the Plaintiff’s
counsel requested the court
to ignore the evidence of a cell register
and a J7 form, as it was not discovered in terms of the court rules.
[33]
There is an entry in the investigation diary dated 2d January 2015
which states as follows;

1, Herewith,
docket for court first appearance.
2. Accused is in
custody-Bail is opposed.
3. Please remand this
case for further investigations “
The
entry is signed E.M Buthelezi, the investigating officer. The date of
the Plaintiff’s first appearance in court is clear.
[34]
Except what the plaintiff as a single witness is alleging, there is
no other form of evidence
that he was in custody for the alleged
period of five days. A copy of a cell register, charge sheet, J7 or
court book were not
discovered or exhibited. The evidence before the
court shows that the Plaintiff was basically in custody for two
nights before
his release by the court. He could not have appeared on
any other day before the 2
nd
because of the public
holidays.
[35]
The Plaintiff chose not to admit or deny that he is known as Chako.
He also chose to remain silent
on whether they stay far apart or not.
[36]
Under cross examination the Plaintiff’s lawyer put it to
sergeant Twala that the Plaintiff was arrested
because he was known
by the victim. The counsel felt that it is the Police who somehow,
failed the victim. There is no suggestion
that complainant in the
case of rape may have not been honest about the offence. Meaning the
offence may have taken place but the
police did not perform their
duties well. Also, after the defence counsel’s admission that
the Plaintiff was known to the
complainant in the rape matter, there
was not much left on the question of Identity. Consequently, if there
is an allegation of
rape committed by a person known to the
complainant, there would be nothing wrong with the arrest and
detention
per se
.
Conclusion
[37]
The plaintiff was arrested by a peace officer, Sergeant Twala who
after interviewing the victim had a reasonable
suspicion that the
offence of sexual violation was committed by the plaintiff as
identified by the complainant. He objectively
assessed the facts.
See
Mabona and another v Minister of Law Order and Others
[8]
.
The
arresting officer had reasonable grounds to effect the warrantless
arrest. It is my well-considered view that the jurisdictional
factors
have been met.
Judgment
The
Plaintiff’s action is dismissed with costs.
MOGOTSI
D.D
Acting
Judge of the High
Court,
Pretoria
Date
of Hearing: 14 March 2023
Date
of Judgment: 10 August 2023
APPEARANCES
Counsel
for the Plaintiff:
Adv.
T.C. Kwinda
Instructing
Attorneys:
Mr
Sello Makhafola
Counsel
for the Defendant:
Adv.
T. Chavalala
Instructing
Attorneys:
Mr S
Zulu
[1]
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977(as amended).
[2]
Duncan v Minister of Law and Order
1988 (2) SA 805
(A) at 818 G-H
.
[3]
S
v Nel and Another
1980 (4) SA 28(E)
at 33 H.
[4]
Mahlangu
and Another v Minister of Police 2021 (2) SAC 595 (CC) at para.
[43].
[5]
Barnard
v Minister of Police  and Another 2019 (2) SACR (ECG).At
para.[25].
[6]
Sandle
Biyela v Minister of Police
[2022] ZASCA 36
(1 April 2022)
[7]
Kubeka
v The Minister of Police and Another  the court
said(63675/2016)[2022]ZAGPPHC 298 (4 May 2022).
[8]
Mabona
ad Another v Minister of Law  Order and Others 1988 (2) SA
at 654 (SE) at 258 E-H).