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[2012] ZASCA 172
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Meintjes v Government of the Republic of South Africa (305/2011) [2012] ZASCA 172 (28 November 2012)
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THE SUPREME COURT OF
APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Reportable
Case no: 305/2011
In the matter between
STEPHANUS JACOBUS
MEINTJES
................................................
Appellant
and
THE GOVERNMENT OF THE
REPUBLIC OF
SOUTH AFRICA
............................................................................
Respondent
Neutral citation:
Meintjes v The Government of the Republic of South Africa
(305/2011)
[2012] ZASCA 172
(28 November 2012)
Bench:
LEWIS,
PONNAN, MHLANTLA and SHONGWE JJA and ERASMUS AJA
Heard:
2
NOVEMBER 2012
Delivered: 28 NOVEMBER
2012
Summary:
Restitution of Land Rights Act 22 of 1994
–
s 2(1)
–
right in land – dispossession of.
___________________________________________________________________
ORDER
___________________________________________________________________
On appeal from
:
Land Claims Court (Mia AJ sitting with an
assessor as court of first instance):
The appeal is dismissed.
______________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________________
PONNAN JA (
LEWIS,
PONNAN, MHLANTLA and SHONGWE JJA and
ERASMUS
AJA
concurring)
[1] The appellant, Mr
Stephanus Jacobus Meintjes, and his business associate since the
early 1960s, Mr Phillip Jooste – both
of whom are now
octogenarians – shared an interest in the development of nature
reserves. Having established a successful
game reserve in Letaba,
they turned their attention to other properties with similar
potential in the Lowveld. They identified
three farms belonging to H
L Hall and Sons Ltd (Hall & Sons), namely, Andover 210KU,
Leamington 207KU and Burlington 217KU,
which were situated in a
released area immediately adjacent to the Kruger National Park. The
effect of their inclusion in a released
area is that they were liable
to be expropriated in terms of s 13(1) of the Bantu Trust and Land
Act 18 of 1936 for the settlement
of Black people in furtherance of
the State’s racially discriminatory land policies.
[2] On 11 March 1971 the
appellant wrote to Hall & Sons:
'… I hereby in my capacity as
Chairman of a syndicate wish to make you an offer of R70.00 (seventy
rand) per morgen for the
farms in question.
Should this offer be acceptable to you
I would require a three months option period to enable us to make the
necessary arrangements.'
The response that the
offer elicited from the managing director of Hall & Sons was:
'I have to advise that your offer is
acceptable to us and I enclose herewith an option for the period of
90 days duly signed.'
The option was not
exercised within the stipulated 90 days. The parties thereafter
concluded what they termed an 'agreement for
extension of option'. In
terms of that agreement Hall & Sons agreed, against payment of
the sum of R10 000, to extend the option
until 5pm on 30 September
1971.
[3] Whilst the option was
in place, the appellant and Mr Jooste actively went about finding
what they described as potential '
medekopers
'.
In this respect two others who were initially identified as being
interested in the transaction were Dr P W A Pieterse and Mr
L D J
Erasmus. And through their efforts four additional persons, namely,
Mr Albert Wessels, Mr J H Smit, Mr W J Krös and
Mr T J P
Ebersohn were also identified. Written commitments were obtained from
those persons. In giving those commitments they
made it clear that:
they would not be taking transfer of the properties in question in
their own names but in the names of companies;
and, the written
undertakings which they gave did not constitute deeds of sale in
themselves but that the arrangement would be
formalised in later
written agreements.
[4] On 30 September 1971
and as foreshadowed in the option the parties concluded a deed of
sale. In that agreement the purchaser
was described as
'STEPHANUS
JACOBUS MEINTJES − on behalf of a Company or companies to be
formed or as the duly authorised representative of
an existing
company or companies − (hereinafter referred to as the
Purchaser)'.
Because the farm Burlington provided a place to
which the workers of the farms Andover and Leamington could be
forcibly removed
without disturbing the labour arrangements of Hall &
Sons, it was decided that it was not desirable at that stage to
acquire
it. The deed of sale was thus restricted to only two of the
three farms mentioned in the option, namely Andover and Leamington.
[5] To the extent here
relevant the deed of sale provided:
'1.
It is a condition precedent of this
agreement that the sale of the aforesaid properties shall be one and
indivisible.
2.
The purchase price will be the sum of
R580 343.00 (FIVE HUNDRED AND NINETY THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND FORTY
THREE RAND) payable
free of bank exchange, as follows:
a) Against signing of this Deed of
Sale, an amount of R58 055.00. The sum of R10 000.00 already paid by
the purchaser as option
money, will be refunded to the purchaser
forthwith;
b) The balance of R522 308.00 will be
paid by the purchaser to the sellers against registration of transfer
of the aforesaid properties
in the name of the purchaser and for this
amount a suitable and acceptable banker's guarantee will be furnished
to the sellers
within 10 days from date hereof.
. . .
11.
This sale will be subject to all the
terms and conditions as set out in the sellers' title deeds of the
properties concerned.
. . .
13.
During the subsistence of this
agreement the purchaser shall not cede, assign, transfer or make over
any of his rights under this
agreement, nor shall he sell, alienate,
lease or in any other way deal with the property hereby sold without
the written consent
of the sellers, which consent shall not
unreasonably be withheld.
14.
Should the purchaser decide to take
transfer in the name of a company to be formed, such company or
companies shall be registered
within 30 days from the date hereof.
The company or companies shall have as one of its or their objects
the adoption and ratification
of this agreement and all members of
the company shall bind themselves jointly and severally towards the
seller for the due implementation
of the obligations of the purchaser
under this Deed of Sale. The requirement of personal guarantees by
members of companies shall
also apply in the event of transfer being
taken in the name of companies already registered.
15.
Inasmuch as the purchaser has given
the assurance that the aforesaid properties are not situate in a
controlled area as envisaged
by the Physical Planning Act, he may, if
he so decides, take transfer of the properties in undivided shares in
the name of various
transferees. The risk in this regard will be the
risk of the purchaser and the sellers give no guarantee whatsoever
that the purchaser
will be entitled to take transfer in undivided
shares.
The purchaser binds himself to advise
the sellers' attorneys before the 15
th
October 1971 of the
names of the transferee companies.
16.
In regard to the farm Burlington No.
217, K.U., district Pilgrims Rest, measuring 3974 morgen 542 square
roods, the sellers undertake
to refer any future bona fide offer for
the purchase of this farm to Mr S.J. Meintjes personally who will be
entitled to a right
of first refusal on any future sale of this farm.
Should he decide to buy the farm on the same terms and conditions
offered by
an interested buyer, he will be entitled to do so.
This right of first refusal in favour
of Mr S.J. Meintjes will be valid for a period of three years from
date hereof.
17.
The parties finally agree that no
variation of, or addition to, the terms of this agreement shall be
binding on either of them,
unless first reduced to writing above
their respective signatures, or the signatures of their duly
authorised representatives.'
[6] In the meanwhile the
appellant, who was well-connected to members of the then political
elite and a major contributor to the
coffers of the Nationalist
Party, had been making representations to amongst others the Deputy
Minister of Bantu Administration
and Development, Mr A G
Raubenheimer, to secure permission for the subdivision of the farms.
The appellant's intention, so it was
asserted, was to divide the
farms and transfer those subdivided portions to four other interested
parties. On the very day that
the deed of sale was signed by the
parties, the appellant was informed by the administrative secretary
of the Ministry of Bantu
Administration and Development that a
subdivision of the farms would not be favourably considered by Mr
Raubenheimer.
[7] During May 1971 and
in order to ensure that there were companies in place to take up the
rights provided for in the deed of
sale three of the companies were
formed and further necessary steps were taken with the Registrar of
Companies to reserve names
for the remaining five companies. And in
order to ensure that the rights and obligations of the respective
companies
inter se
were
properly regulated Attorneys Werksmans were instructed to prepare
draft agreements to give effect to the transaction as between
the
participating companies and their shareholders. Mr Jooste, who was a
registered surveyor, prepared a sketch plan of the farms.
And in
accordance with that sketch plan, the two companies to be formed by
Mr Smit and Mr Wessels were to be allocated the western
portion of
Andover and the companies of which Mr Krös and Mr Ebersohn were
to be shareholders, the western portion of Leamington.
[8] On 19 October 1971
and in purported compliance with clause 15 of the deed of sale
Olivier & Van Vuuren, who had been appointed
the conveyancing
attorneys in terms of the deed of sale, wrote to Hall & Sons:
'With reference to the above matter,
we have to advise you that the purchasers have now decided in which
companies the properties
are to be registered.
We have drawn an addendum to the Deed
of Sale and we enclose it herein in triplicate for your signature and
return to us'.
I say purported
compliance because in terms of clause 15 of the deed of sale Hall &
Sons ought to have been advised before 15
October 1971 of the names
of the transferee companies.
[9] The draft addendum
provided:
'1.
a) The farm Andover No. 210, K. U.,
district Pilgrims Rest, measuring 4226 morgen 320 square roods are
hereby sold to Stephanus
Jacobus Meintjes as trustee for the
following four companies namely:
Tussen Bome (Eiendoms) Beperk
Botent Investments (Proprietary)
Limited
Vaalbos Beleggings (Eiendoms) Beperk
Waterbok Beleggings (Eiendoms) Beperk.
…
c) This farm Andover will thus be
registered in the names of the four abovementioned companies, each
company to have an undivided
one-quarter share in the property.
2.
a) The farm Leamington No. 207, K. U.,
district Pilgrims Rest, measuring 4064 morgen 55 square roods is sold
to Stephanus Jacobus
Meintjes as trustee for a company to be
registered under the name of Eberwil Wildplaas (Eiendoms) Beperk, and
to Raasblaar Beleggings
(Eiendoms) Beperk, Wildevy Beleggings
(Eiendoms) Beperk, and Boerboon Beleggings (Eiendoms) Beperk.
b) The purchase price will be R280
343.00 of which amount the seller acknowledges that it has received
R28 035.00 and the balance
of R252 308.00 will be paid and guaranteed
to the seller as indicated in paragraph 2(b) of the Deed of Sale of
the 30
th
September 1971.
c) The farm Leamington will thus be
registered in the names of the four abovementioned companies, each
company to have an undivided
one-quarter share in the property.
3.
Until such time as the properties have
been transferred to the various purchasers who hereby purchase the
said properties, Stephanus
Jacobus Meintjes will remain personally
responsible towards the seller for the due implementation of the Deed
of Sale of the 30
th
September 1971, read with this
Addendum thereto.'
[10] On 22 October 1971
the appellant had yet a further meeting with Deputy Minister
Raubenheimer. After that meeting and apparently
to avoid paying more
for the properties in due course should the sale be finalised, Mr
Raubenheimer took a decision to expropriate
all three farms. Mr Pine
Pienaar, a junior official in the employ of the Department drove to
Nelspruit with the expropriation notice.
The expropriation notice,
which had been drafted earlier that day, was served on Hall &
Sons that evening. The expropriation
was effected in terms of s 13(1)
of the Bantu Trust and Land Act 18 of 1936 read with the
Expropriation Act 55 of 1965. Thus although
the draft addendum was
signed on behalf of Hall & Sons on 21 October 1971 the
expropriation intervened and it never came to
be signed on behalf of
the purchasers.
[11] The farms, after the
expropriation, were registered in the name of the South African Bantu
Trust. Although no offer for compensation
was made at the date of the
expropriation, the State later offered Hall & Sons an amount
equivalent to the purchase price that
had been fixed in the deed of
sale, namely R70 per morgen, as compensation. On 23 May 1972 Hall &
Sons issued summons against
the State. Prior thereto, on 12 February
1972, Hall & Sons ceded to the appellant any claim that it may
have had against the
State in excess of the amount of R877 689.23
arising from the expropriation of the three farms. On 6 May 1974 the
expropriation
claim was settled with the State agreeing to pay to
Hall & Sons the amount of R1 000 580. It is common cause that of
that sum
an amount of R120 500 was paid to the appellant's then
attorney, Dyason, on 9 May 1974.
[12] Fast forward two
decades to a changed political landscape based upon the supremacy of
the Constitution, which envisaged in
s 25 a restitutionary land
reform design and ushered in its wake the Restitution of Land Rights
Act 22 of 1994 (the Act) which
provides for the restitution of rights
in land to persons or communities dispossessed of such rights after
19 June 1913 as a result
of past racially discriminatory laws or
practices. Asserting that he was such person, the appellant launched
a claim with the Commission
on the Restitution of Land Rights on 14
August 1995.
[13] As required by the
provisions of s 14 of the Act, on 18 April 1999 the Regional Land
Claims Commissioner referred the claim
to the Land Claims Court (LCC)
for adjudication. In his amended statement of claim filed with the
LCC, the appellant alleged:
'10.
The effect of the aforesaid
expropriation was to dispossess plaintiff of his rights in the
property, being the right to take transfer
of the property upon
payment of the purchase price, and the right to occupy and develop
the property, including the right to proceed
with the sales of
undivided shares in the property referred to in paragraph 5.4 above.
11.
11.1 Plaintiff received no
compensation or other consideration in respect of the dispossession
of his rights as aforesaid;
…
13.1 The plaintiff no longer claims
restoration of the two farms, but claims equitable redress in the
form of financial compensation.
Any competing claims that may have
been lodged in respect of the same property are therefore irrelevant
to the adjudication of
the plaintiff's claim and any remaining
claimants whose claims have not been rejected by the Commission, are
no longer interested
parties in the present action.
13.2 The rights (property) of which
the plaintiff was dispossessed as a result of the expropriation, were
not registered or recorded
against the title deed thereof and the
State was accordingly not obliged to pay any compensation for such
rights at the time of
dispossession.
13.3 Had section 25 of the
Constitution been enacted at the time of the dispossession, the
applicable legislation at the time would
have been unconstitutional
and the plaintiff would have been entitled to full compensation for
the dispossession of his rights
in land.
13.4 Neither the definition of a right
in land in the Restitution Act nor section 25(2) and (3) of the
Constitution, distinguish
between registered and unregistered rights
in land.
13.5 The compensation to which the
plaintiff would have been entitled at the time of dispossession, was
the value of those rights
in the hands of the plaintiff compared to
the price paid by the State upon expropriation, plus the direct
losses suffered by the
plaintiff as a result of the expropriation.
…
13.8 Had just and equitable
compensation been paid to the plaintiff at the time of dispossession,
he would have been entitled to
payment of the amount of R525 382.50.'
[14] The appellant
accordingly sought an order against the respondent, the Government of
the Republic of South Africa, that he is
entitled to: (i)‘restitution
of his rights in land in terms of the provisions of section 2(1)
(a)
of the Act as a result of the dispossession
during October 1971 of his rights in land in respect of the farms
Andover 210 KU and
Leamington 207 KU’; and, (ii)‘equitable
redress in the form of financial compensation in the amount of R525
382.50
as at the time of dispossession, adjusted to present day
value, being R19 890 981,45’.
[15] The appellant
claimed compensation under the Act. To found such a claim he had to
prove that: (a) he had a right in land; (b)
of which he was
dispossessed; (c) after 19 June 1913; (d) as a result of a past
racially discriminatory law or practice; (e) where
the claim for
restitution was lodged not later than 31 December 1998; and (f) no
just and equitable compensation was received (
Department
of Land Affairs & others v Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits (Pty) Ltd
[2007] ZACC 12
;
2007 (6) SA 199
(CC) para 28).
[16] It was common cause
before the LCC that there had been an expropriation of land in terms
of a past racially discriminatory
law or practice and that a claim
for compensation had been lodged prior to 31 December 1998. Moreover,
at a pre-trial conference
the parties had agreed:
'3 The questions of –
3.1 whether the appellant received
just and equitable compensation at the time of the alleged
dispossession (in which event a claim
is excluded by section 2(2) of
the Restitution Act); and,
3.2 if not, how much should be paid to
him now, have been separated for later determination.’
The hearing before the
LCC (per Mia AJ sitting with an assessor) thus focussed on whether
the appellant by virtue of the expropriation
had indeed been
dispossessed of a right in land and whether as a consequence he
therefore had a valid claim under s 2(1) of the
Act. Mia AJ concluded
that he had not. She accordingly dismissed the appellant’s
claim and made no order as to costs but
granted leave to the
appellant to appeal to this court.
[17] Clause 1 of the deed
of sale provided that: ‘It is a condition precedent of this
agreement that the sale of the aforesaid
properties shall be one and
indivisible’. That clause accordingly required that where, as
here, a number of companies were
to take equal and undivided shares
in the farms the conditions required for each company to be bound
would have had to have been
fulfilled in the case of each and every
one of those companies. Clause 14 required, in addition, the
fulfilment of the following
further conditions before the contract
became binding: (a) the companies yet to be formed had to be
registered within 30 days of
the date of signature of the deed of
sale; (b) upon registration the companies had to have as one of their
objects the adoption
and ratification of the deed of sale; (c) the
members of each of the companies were required to bind themselves
jointly and severally
in favour of the seller for the due
implementation of the obligations of the purchaser under the deed of
sale; and (e) personal
guarantees had to be provided by the members
of the companies already in existence. At the time of the
expropriation on 22 October
1971 none of these conditions had been
fulfilled. Five of the companies had not yet been registered. Nor had
any of the guarantees
been provided.
[18] It follows that the
agreement was inchoate and pending fulfilment of those conditions the
exigible content of the contract
was suspended (
Mia v Verimark
Holdings (Pty) Ltd
[2010] 1 All SA 280
(SCA) para1). That, one
may have thought, would have been the end of the matter. But, as I
understood the argument advanced on
behalf of the appellant,
notwithstanding the fact that no agreement of sale there and then
came into existence, the agreement nevertheless
created ‘a very
real and definite contractual relationship between the parties’
(
Palm Fifteen (Pty) Ltd v Cotton Tail Homes (Pty) Ltd
1978 (2)
SA 872
(A) at 887C-D), which, but for the expropriation, would have
ripened into a contract of sale in terms of which the appellant would
have acquired a ‘right’ to the properties.
[19] In
Gardner
v Richardt
1974 (3) SA 768
(C) at 769H-770A,
which was approved by this court in
Nine
Hundred Umgeni Road (Pty) Ltd v Bali
1986 (1)
SA 1
(A) at 6D-E, Friedman AJ stated:
'In
McCullogh's
case the
Appellate Division held that a contract by a trustee for a company in
the course of formation is in essence a contract
for the benefit of a
third party, namely the company. That being so, until such time as
the company on its formation accepts the
contract so concluded for
its benefit, the trustee is entitled, in his personal capacity, to
exercise such rights as are necessary
in order to hold the other
contracting party to the contract and to keep intact the rights of
the company as the ultimate beneficiary.
Thus the trustee could in
his own name obtain an interdict, preventing the other party to the
contract from doing anything which
has the effect of nullifying his
undertaking pending the decision of the company (see
African
Universal Stores Ltd v Dean
1926 CPD 360
at p 395).'
[20] Whether in addition
to those rights a person in the position of the appellant also
acquires the right to sue for specific performance
on the contract in
his personal capacity – an issue to which I presently turn −
must be answered by reference to the
terms of the particular contract
under consideration (
Nine Hundred Umgeni Road
at 6D-F). For, as Friedman AJ later observed
(
Gardner v Richardt
at
772 E-F):
'… it does
not follow as a matter of law that, because a trustee incurs
obligations under a contract such as this, he therefore
has the right
to sue on the contract for specific performance. If he had such a
right and exercised it, it could result in the
company for whose
benefit he so contracted, being deprived on its formation of the
benefit intended for it. (CF
Mutual Life
Insurance Co of New York v Hotz
1911 AD
566
;
Byworth v Stevenson
(1902)
19 SC 18.)'
[21] In my view the deed
of sale is perfectly straightforward. Neither it nor the earlier
option to purchase or the subsequent draft
addendum provides for a
sale from Hall & Sons to the appellant in person and thereafter a
subsequent sale or sales from the
appellant to any of the other
individuals or juristic entities. Instead they provide for a sale
directly from Hall & Sons to
companies formed or to be formed,
with each company to receive an equal undivided one-quarter share in
either Andover or Leamington.
The identificatory heading of the deed
of sale does not refer to the appellant personally as the purchaser
but to third parties
who were to benefit under the agreement. In
signing the agreement the appellant did so on behalf of two
categories of potential
transferees: the first, being companies
already in existence; and, the second, notional entities that were to
be created in due
course. That description of the purchaser thus left
no room for the appellant to nominate himself or any other natural
person to
benefit under the agreement.
[22] The words
'hereinafter referred to as the purchaser' determined that whenever
the word 'purchaser' is employed in the agreement
it must be read as
referring to the appellant in his representative capacity on behalf
of the two categories of potential transferees.
And any reference to
'the purchaser' can thus only be a reference to that term as defined
in the identificatory heading. That this
must be so is strengthened
when regard is had to clause 16 where reference is made to 'Mr S J
Meintjes personally'. The purpose
of clause 16 is to confer upon the
appellant an option in respect of the farm Burlington. It also refers
to a 'right of first refusal
in favour of Mr S J Meintjes'.
Accordingly, where the agreement wishes to confer additional rights
upon the appellant personally,
beyond those designed to keep the
agreement alive for the benefit of the ultimate beneficiaries, it
does so.
[23] Both clauses 14 and
15 of the agreement make plain that the potential categories of
transferees in terms of the agreement were
companies either formed or
to be formed. The initial part of clause 14 regulates the position
where transfer is to be taken by
the purchaser in the name of that
notional abstraction a company (or companies) to be formed. It
stipulates that such company shall
be registered within 30 days and
that it shall have as its objects the adoption or ratification of the
agreement and that all members
of that company shall bind themselves
jointly and severally in favour of the seller for the implementation
of the obligations of
the purchaser. The latter part of clause 14
regulates the position in the event of the purchaser deciding to take
transfer in the
name of existing companies. In that event personal
guarantees are required to be furnished by members of those
companies. There
are thus only two scenarios catered for in the deed
of sale. Neither of these contemplates the appellant taking transfer
in his
own name.
[24] Plainly what was
envisaged is that once the companies in due course accepted the
benefits under the agreement, the appellant
personally would have
fallen out of the contract completely. Pending the decision by those
companies to either accept or reject
the contract, there is nothing
in the agreement to suggest that the appellant personally acquired
the rights or incurred the obligations
that had been reserved for
those companies. Nor, as
Gardner v Richardt
(at
773 H) points out, is there any: 'rule of law entitling a person who
contracts as trustee for a company to be formed, to claim
transfer of
property into his own name, merely by reason of the fact that the
company has not been formed’.
It follows that the
appellant was not personally entitled to exact the performance which
was stipulated for those companies and
that the LCC was correct in
its conclusion that the appellant had failed to prove that he had any
right in land of which he was
dispossessed by the expropriation.
Absent any right in land he failed to satisfy the requirements for a
valid claim set out in
s 2(1)
(a)
of the Act. In the result the
appeal must fail.
[25] That leaves costs:
Mia AJ made no order as to costs in the LCC. Nor was any order sought
on behalf of the Government in that
regard on appeal in this court.
No doubt that approach was informed by
the general
principle laid down by Harms JA in
Haakdoornbult
Boerdery CC & others v Mphela & others
2007
(5) SA 596
(SCA) para 76 that ‘in cases such as this there
should not be any costs orders on appeal absent special
circumstances’.
I baulk at the generosity displayed by the
Government to the appellant. For, as Moseneke DCJ explained in
Goedgelegen Tropical Fruits
(para
68), a claim such as this, is reparative and restitutionary in
character. The learned Deputy Chief Justice added: ‘It
is
neither punitive in the criminal law sense nor compensatory in the
civil law sense. Rather, it advances a major public purpose
and uses
public resources in a manifestly equitable way to deal with egregious
and identifiable forms of historic hurt.' Viewed
holistically I
cannot discern any ‘egregious’ or ‘historic hurt’
suffered by the appellant and thus cannot
fathom why the national
fisc should have to bear these costs. On the contrary, to my mind the
claim of the appellant, who appears
on the evidence before us to have
benefitted from the past race-based spatial development policies of
the State because he was
well-connected politically, may well be
cynical and opportunistic. Thus if the evidence were to be
scrutinised with a critical
eye the facts encountered here may indeed
bring the matter within the purview of the expression ‘special
circumstances’
as employed in
Haakdoornbult
Boerdery
. Whether that be so is
fortunately not necessary for me to decide. For although I entertain
grave misgivings as to whether the
core character of the claim is
truly restorative in purpose, I can hardly refrain from endorsing the
approach (namely, that no
order as to costs would be sought in the
event of it succeeding) that the Government has adopted since the
inception of the matter.
[26]
In the result the appeal
is dismissed.
_________________
V M PONNAN
JUDGE OF APPEAL
APPEARANCES:
For Appellant: H S Havenga SC
Instructed by:
Erasmus Jooste Incorporated
c/o Pieter Moolman Attorneys
Bryanston
Symington & De Kok
Bloemfontein
For Respondent: A D Dodson SC
Instructed by:
The State Attorney
Johannesburg
The State Attorney
Bloemfontein