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[2012] ZASCA 169
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Road Accident Fund v Duma, Road Accident Fund v Kubeka, Road Accident Fund v Meyer, Road Accident Fund v Mokoena (202/2012, 64/2012, 164/2012, 131/2012) [2012] ZASCA 169; [2013] 1 All SA 543 (SCA); 2013 (6) SA 9 (SCA) (27 November 2012)
THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF
SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
REPORTABLE
In
the matter between:
Case No: 202/2012
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
................................................................................
APPELLANT
and
THOKOZANE
DUMA
...................................................................................
RESPONDENT
Case No: 64/2012
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
................................................................................
APPELLANT
and
MTHUNZI GIFT KUBEKA
.............................................................................
RESPONDENT
Case No: 164/2012
ROAD
ACCIDENT FUND
................................................................................
APPELLANT
and
ADRIANA
JOHANNA MEYER
.....................................................................
RESPONDENT
Case No: 131/2012
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
................................................................................
APPELLANT
and
THABO RICHARD MOKOENA
....................................................................
RESPONDENT
HEALTH PROFESSIONS COUNCIL OF
SOUTH AFRICA
......................................................................................
AMICUS
CURIAE
Neutral citation:
Road
Accident Fund v Duma (202/12) and three related cases (Health
Professions Council of South Africa as Amicus Curiae)
[2012]
ZASCA 169
(27 November 2012).
Coram:
Brand, Mhlantla,
Leach JJA, Plasket and Saldulker AJJA
Heard:
6 November 2012
Delivered: 27 November 2012
Summary:
Road Accident Fund Act 56
of 1996
read with Regulations promulgated under the Act –
‘serious injury’ to be determined in accordance with
procedure
prescribed in the Regulations – until third party had
complied with prescribed procedure – claim for general damages
premature – not for court to decide whether injury ‘serious’.
___________________________________________________________________
ORDER
___________________________________________________________________
On appeal in all four matters from
:
South Gauteng High Court, Johannesburg. The following judges sitting
as court of first instance:
Road Accident Fund v Duma –
Nicholls J;
Road Accident Fund v Kubeka –
Trisk AJ;
Road Accident Fund v Meyer –
Coetzee AJ; and
Road Accident Fund v Mokoena –
Mbha J
1. The appeals in all four matters are
upheld with no order as to costs.
2. The terms of the orders are fully
set out in paragraph 42.
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
BRAND JA
(MHLANTLA, LEACH
JJA, PLASKET and SALDULKER AJJA CONCURRING):
[1] The appellant in these four
appeals is the Road Accident Fund (the Fund) established in terms of
the
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996
. The four appellants as
plaintiffs (the plaintiffs) instituted separate actions against the
Fund in the South Gauteng High Court,
Johannesburg, for the damages
they suffered as a result of motor vehicle accidents. It is not in
dispute that their injuries were
sustained in circumstances which
rendered the Fund liable to compensate the plaintiffs as third
parties in terms of the Act. The
only remaining issues on appeal
relate to the plaintiffs’ entitlement to general damages. These
issues arise from the provision
in
s 17(1)
of the Act which
limits the Fund’s liability to compensate a third party for
general damages – or non-pecuniary loss,
as it is called in the
section – to instances where he or she suffered ‘serious
injuries’ within the meaning
of
s 17(1A)
of the Act. In
each of the four cases the High Court held that the plaintiffs had
suffered ‘serious injury’ and awarded
general damages to
them.
[2] The appeals against these
judgments are, in each instance, with the leave of the court a quo.
The contention of the Fund on
appeal is, in broad outline, that the
High Court should have held in each case that the issue whether the
plaintiff had suffered
‘serious injury’ had not been
determined by the method prescribed by the regulations promulgated
under the Act and
that the High Court should therefore not have
awarded general damages. The issues that arose from these contentions
will be best
understood, first in the context of the history as well
as the matrix of the legislative scheme and, secondly, against the
background
of the underlying facts. With regard to some of these
issues, the Health Professions Council of South Africa sought and was
granted
leave to make submissions as an
amicus curiae.
I found
these submissions of material assistance, for which I express my
appreciation.
History and matrix of the
legislative scheme
[3] As to the history of the
legislative scheme, the provisions of
sections 17
and
17
(1A)
that I have referred to were introduced into the Act by the
Road
Accident Fund Amendment Act 19 of 2005
which took effect on 1 August
2008. Prior to these amendments, the Act allowed victims of motor
accidents to claim their general
damages from the Fund in full. The
problem that arose was that the income derived by the Fund from the
levy charged to motorists
on the fuel they purchased did not match
the liabilities incurred by the Fund. For decades this funding
deficit kept growing despite
the rapid increases in the fuel levy
year after year. Eventually the predicament gave rise to the
appointment of a commission of
inquiry that became known as the
Satchwell Commission. In its report of 2002 the Satchwell Commission
made many far reaching recommendations.
(For a more detailed account
of these, see eg
Law Society of South Africa v Minister for
Transport
2011 (1) SA 400
(CC) paras 41
et seq
(referred
to as ‘
Law Society’
)
.
) Most significant
amongst these, for present purposes, was the recommendation that the
Fund’s liability for general damages
be limited to those
victims who suffered ‘serious injury’. General damages,
so the Commission found, tended to be paid
out to persons who
suffered light or moderate injuries and who claimed no damages for
medical costs or loss of earnings. In addition,
these general damages
claims for relatively minor injuries put a substantial administrative
burden on the Fund. By limiting awards
of general damages to those
who suffered serious injuries, so the Commission concluded, the total
liability of the Fund could be
reduced by almost 40 per cent (see
Law
Society
para 42).
[4] The
Road Accident Fund Amendment
Act, and
the Regulations subsequently promulgated under the amended
Act in 2008, substantially adopted the recommendations of the
Satchwell
Commission. The Law Society of South Africa challenged the
constitutional validity of various provisions of the Act and the
regulations,
including those dealing with general damages and the
assessment of serious injuries, in the North Gauteng High Court,
Pretoria
(see
Law Society of South Africa v Minister of Transport
2010 (11) BCLR 1140
(GNP) paras 35-36 and 54-76). The High Court
dismissed these challenges. While the Law Society lodged an appeal
against this judgment
to the Constitutional Court on a number of
other issues, it did not appeal against the dismissal of the
challenges to provisions
pertinent to this appeal (see
Law Society
paras 2 and 3).
[5] The general provision of
s 17(1)
of the Act has always been that the Fund is liable to compensate
claimants for loss arising from bodily injury sustained in motor
vehicle accidents. In terms of the Amendment Act in 2005, the
all-important limitation on the Fund’s liability for general
damages was introduced as a proviso in s 17(1) that ‘the
obligation of the Fund to compensate a third party for non-pecuniary
loss shall be limited to compensation for serious injury as
contemplated in subsection (1A) . . .’ Yet, neither s 17(1)
nor s 17(1A) provides any objectively determinable content or
substance to the central concept of what injury would qualify
as
‘serious’. All s 17(1A) adds is that the assessment
of whether or not a particular injury meets the threshold
requirement
of ‘serious’ must be carried out by someone registered as
a medical practitioner under the Health Professions
Act 56 of 1974
and on the basis of a ‘prescribed method’. The latter
term is defined in s 1 of the Act to mean
‘prescribed
under s 26’. Section 26(1) of the Act completes the
picture by saying that the Minister of Transport
may make regulations
regarding any matter that shall be prescribed in terms of the Act. To
avoid any possible uncertainty, s 26(1A),
which was introduced
by the Amendment Act of 2005, goes on to say that the Minister may
make regulations regarding, inter alia,
the method of assessment to
determine whether, for purposes of s 17, a serious injury has
been incurred and the resolution
of disputes arising from any matter
provided for in the Act.
[6] Pursuant to s 26, the Road
Accident Fund Regulations of 2008 were then promulgated by the
Minister through publication
in the Government Gazette of 21 July
2009. Regulation 3 prescribes the method contemplated in s 17(1A)
for the determination
of 'serious injury'. As a starting point it
provides in 3(1)(a) that a third party who wishes to claim general
damages ‘shall
submit himself or herself to an assessment by a
medical practitioner in accordance with these Regulations’. In
terms of 3(3)(a)
a third party who has been so assessed, ‘shall
obtain from the medical practitioner concerned a serious injury
assessment
report’. This report is defined in regulation 1 as
‘a duly completed form RAF 4, attached hereto as annexure D . .
.’. For the sake of brevity I propose to refer to the serious
injury assessment report, which takes centre stage in what follows,
as the RAF 4 form.
[7] The RAF 4 form itself, read with
regulation 3(1)(b), requires the medical practitioner to assess
whether the third party’s
injury is ‘serious’ in
accordance with three sets of criteria:
(a) In terms of regulation 3(1)(b)(i)
the Minister may publish a list of injuries which do not qualify as
serious. If the third
party’s injury falls within that
description it shall not be assessed as serious. Though the Minister
has not yet published
such list, a draft has been circulated for
comment in the Government Gazette of 22 August 2012.
(b) Conversely, regulation 3(1)(b)(ii)
provides that the third party’s injury must be assessed as
‘serious’ if
it ‘resulted in 30 per cent or more
Impairment of the Whole Person as provided in the AMA Guides’,
which is defined
in regulation 1 as the ‘American Medical
Association’s
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent
Impairment
, Sixth Edition.’
(c) If an injury does not qualify as
‘serious’ in terms of regulation 3(1)(b)(ii), it may
nonetheless be assessed as
serious under the so-called ‘narrative
test’ provided for in regulation 3(1)(b)(iii) if that injury
resulted in a serious
long-term impairment or loss of a body
function; constitutes permanent serious disfigurement; and so forth.
[8] In terms of regulation 3(3)(c) the
Fund is only liable for general damages ‘if a claim is
supported by a serious injury
assessment report submitted in terms of
the Act and these Regulations and the Fund is satisfied that the
injury has been correctly
assessed as serious in terms of the method
provided for in these Regulations.’ If the Fund is not so
satisfied, it must,
in terms of regulations 3(3)(d), either:
(i) reject the third party’s RAF
4 form and give its reasons for doing so, or
(ii) direct that the third party
submits himself or herself to a further assessment at the Fund’s
expense by a medical practitioner
designated by the Fund in
accordance with the method prescribed in regulation 3(1)(b).
[9] As to what then happens,
regulation 3(4) provides that, if the third party disputes the Fund’s
rejection of the RAF 4
form (under regulation 3(3)(d)(i)) – or
if either the third party or the Fund wishes to challenge the
assessment by the medical
practitioner designated by the Fund (under
regulation 3(3)(d)(ii)) – the aggrieved party must formally
declare a dispute
by lodging a prescribed dispute resolution form
(RAF 5) with the registrar of the Health Professions Council within
90 days of
being informed of the rejection or the impugned
assessment. Regulation 3(5)(a) then goes on to say that if this is
not done, the
rejection of the RAF 4 form or the assessment by the
Fund’s designated medical practitioner, as the case may be,
shall become
final and binding.
[10] If a dispute is declared,
regulation 3(8) provides for it to be determined by an appeal
tribunal of three independent medical
practitioners with expertise in
the appropriate area of medicine, appointed by the registrar of the
Health Professions Council.
In terms of regulation 3(13) the
determination by the appeal tribunal is final and binding. A
procedure by which the appeal tribunal
enquires into the dispute is
laid down in substantial detail by regulations 3(4) to 3(13). It
includes the following features:
(a) Both sides may file submissions,
medical reports and opinions.
(b) The appeal tribunal may hold a
hearing for the purpose of receiving legal argument by both sides and
seek the recommendation
of a legal practitioner in relation to the
legal issues arising at the hearing.
(c) The appeal tribunal has wide
powers to gather information, including the power to direct the third
party to submit to a further
assessment by a medical practitioner
designated by the tribunal; to do its own examination of the third
party’s injury; and
to direct that further medical reports be
obtained and placed before it.
Factual background
[11] This brings me to the background
facts. The four plaintiffs were represented in the High Court by the
same firm of attorneys.
So was the Fund. Not surprisingly in the
circumstances, the procedure adopted in the four cases display many
similar features.
So, for instance, action was instituted in three of
the four cases before the RAF 4 form was delivered to the Fund. The
only exception
in this regard was
Meyer
, where the RAF 4 form
preceded the service of summons. In
Mokoena
, the RAF 4 form
was delivered before the Fund filed its plea, but in
Duma
and
Kubeka
it was only submitted after the close of pleadings. In
all four cases the RAF 4 form, declaring the plaintiff’s injury
to
be ‘serious’, was signed by a psychiatrist, Dr Braude,
in circumstances to which I shall presently return. In all four
cases
the Fund filed special pleas in which it pleaded in different ways
that the plaintiff had not complied with regulation 3
and that his or
her claim for general damages was therefore not competent,
alternatively, premature. In all four cases the Fund
subsequently
rejected the RAF 4 form in terms of regulation 3(3)(d)(i) by means of
a letter from its attorneys. Not only were these
letters almost
identical in wording, they also showed other common features,
including the fact that they were written in every
case at least one
year – and in some cases almost two years – after the RAF
4 form had been delivered to the Fund and
very shortly – in
some cases a few days – before the commencement of the trial
proceedings.
[12] The RAF 4 form in each case
comprised of three parts: a main report in the prescribed form signed
by Dr Braude, but apparently
completed by an occupational therapist,
Ms Marks; an AMA evaluation in annexures A, B and C to the prescribed
form, which were
completed and signed by Ms Marks; and miscellaneous
hospital records annexed to the report. Paragraph 4 of the main
report appears
under the heading ‘AMA Impairment Rating: to be
completed if injury is not on list of non-serious injuries’.
Paragraph
4.5 requires the medical practitioner’s ‘conclusion
regarding physical examination’ to which Dr Braude responded
in
each case that he had not examined the patient and that he relied
instead on the hospital records annexed to the report. Despite
this
acknowledgement Dr Braude, in each case, described the ‘current
symptoms and complaints’ of the plaintiff in paragraph
4.3;
gave a diagnosis of the plaintiff’s injury in paragraph 4.4;
and stated in paragraph 4.10 that the plaintiff had reached
MMI,
which stands for ‘maximal medical improvement’ within the
meaning of the AMA Guides.
[13] Dr Braude’s approach to RAF
4 forms was best illuminated in
Meyer
, the only case in which
he actually testified. In his testimony Dr Braude confirmed that he
did not examine Ms Meyer and that he
did not complete the report. It
was completed by Ms Marks and Dr Braude merely signed it, so he said,
after he had checked it against
the medical reports that were
annexed. He never consulted any of the medical practitioners who
prepared these reports. Though Dr
Braude stated in para 4.10 that Ms
Meyer had reached MMI, (as contemplated in the AMA Guide) he conceded
that none of the medical
reports he relied on referred to this
question and that, in fact, he did not know what MMI meant, because
he was not acquainted
with the AMA Guide. It also transpired that,
although Dr Braude described Ms Meyer’s ‘current symptoms
and complaints’
in para 4.3 of the report as ‘shortness
of breath, chest pain, depression’, he based this answer on the
treating surgeon’s
report which was more than seven months old
and a psychiatrist’s report which was older than 20 months.
The reasoning in the High Court
[14] In all four cases the Fund’s
contentions in the High Court were, in broad outline, that the
plaintiffs’ RAF 4 forms
did not comply with the requirements of
regulation 3, in the main, because Dr Braude had failed to do a
physical examination of
the plaintiffs and Ms Marks was not a medical
practitioner; that, in any event, the RAF 4 forms had been rejected
by the Fund,
as envisaged in regulation 3(3)(d)(i); that the
plaintiffs’ remedy was therefore to declare a dispute in terms
of regulation
3(4); and that in the circumstances, the court could
not entertain the claims for general damages.
[15] However, in all four cases these
contentions did not find favour with the High Court for reasons that
essentially went along
the following lines: the RAF 4 forms were in
fact compliant with regulation 3 and, in any event, it was
apparent from the
medical evidence presented at the trial that the
plaintiffs did indeed suffer serious injuries as contemplated by the
regulations.
Moreover, the Fund’s rejection was invalid for one
or both of two reasons and should thus be disregarded. The first
reason
was that the Fund had failed to reject the RAF 4 forms within
a reasonable time and its right to do so had therefore expired. The
second was that since the Fund had given insufficient or invalid
reasons for its rejection, it did not constitute a proper rejection
in terms of regulation 3(3)(d)(i). The antecedent enquiry, so it
seems to me, is whether the High Court was right in deciding,
for
either of the two reasons given, that the Fund’s rejection of
the RAF 4 forms should be disregarded. If it were, the
merits of the
rejection seem to be of little consequence. Conversely, if the
rejections cannot be disregarded, the fact that the
rejection was
without merit would again be of little consequence. It is therefore
to that antecedent enquiry I now turn.
[16] For the proposition that, because
the Fund had failed to reject the RAF 4 forms within reasonable time,
its right to do so
had expired or lapsed, the High Court found
authority in
Louw v Road Accident Fund
2012 (1) SA 104
(GSJ)
paras 77-88. According to that judgment the period of 60 days within
which the Fund may object to a third party’s initial
claim in
terms of s 24(5) of the Act, also governs or at least serves as
a guideline for a period within which the Fund must
reject a third
party’s RAF 4 form in terms of regulation 3(3)(d)(i). A
proper evaluation of this reasoning requires
s 24(5) to be read
in the context of s 24 as a whole. That section deals with the
third party’s initial claim which
must be set out in the
prescribed form, RAF 1, and prescribes the procedures for the
completion and lodging of that form. Section
24(5) then goes on to
say that:
‘
If
the Fund . . . does not, within 60 days from the date on which a
claim was sent by registered post or delivered by hand to the
Fund .
. . object to the validity thereof, the claim shall be deemed to be
valid in law in all respects.’
[17] Although it was recognised, in at
least some of the judgments of the High Court under consideration,
that s 24(5) has
no direct application to the RAF 4 form, it was
held that the section provides a guideline as to what would
constitute a reasonable
period within which the Fund should take its
decision in terms of regulation 3(3)(d). For the further
consideration which found
favour with the High Court, namely that,
unless the Fund provides proper reasons for its rejection, it can be
disregarded, the
judgments on appeal relied primarily on the
unreported decision by CJ Claasen J in the South Gauteng High Court,
Johannesburg in
Smith and Ngobeni v Road Accident Fund
case no
47697/2009, dated 29 April 2011. Claasen J’s underlying
reasoning that emerges from that judgment broadly went as
follows: if
the Fund does not dispute that the third party’s injury is
serious, the court can proceed to decide whether it
is serious or
not. If the court decides that question in the affirmative, it can
proceed to entertain the claim for general damages.
If the Fund
rejects the RAF 4 form, without giving any legal or medical basis for
doing so, that rejection is purely obstructive
and does not raise a
genuine dispute. In that event the position is no different from
where the Fund raised no dispute at all.
Evaluation of the High Court’s
reasoning
[18] Consideration of the High Court’s
judgments in the four cases on appeal and those upon which they rely,
all seem to set
out from the premise that it is ultimately for the
court to decide whether the plaintiff’s injury was ‘serious’
so as to satisfy the threshold requirement for an award of general
damages. Proceeding from that premise, these decisions assume
that if
the Fund should fail to properly or timeously reject an assertion to
that effect by the third party, the rejection can
be ignored. If the
medical evidence before the court then shows that, on balance, the
plaintiff was indeed seriously injured, the
court can proceed to
decide the issue of general damages.
[19] That approach, I believe, is
fundamentally flawed. In accordance with the model that the
legislature chose to adopt, the decision
whether or not the injury of
a third party is serious enough to meet the threshold requirement for
an award of general damages
was conferred on the Fund and not on the
court. That much appears from the stipulation in regulation 3(3)(c)
that the Fund shall
only be obliged to pay general damages if the
Fund – and not the court – is satisfied that the injury
has correctly
been assessed in accordance with the RAF 4 form as
serious. Unless the Fund is so satisfied the plaintiff simply has no
claim for
general damages. This means that unless the plaintiff can
establish the jurisdictional fact that the Fund is so satisfied, the
court has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim for general damages
against the Fund. Stated somewhat differently, in order for
the court
to consider a claim for general damages, the third party must satisfy
the Fund, not the court, that his or her injury
was serious.
Appreciation of this basic principle, I think, leads one to the
following conclusions:
(a) Since the Fund is an organ of
State as defined in s 239 of the Constitution and is performing
a public function in terms
of legislation, its decision in terms of
regulations 3(3)(c) and 3(3)(d), whether or not the RAF 4 form
correctly assessed the
claimant’s injury as ‘serious’,
constitutes ‘administrative action’ as contemplated by
the Promotion
of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA). (A
‘decision’ is defined in PAJA to include the making of a
determination.)
The position is therefore governed by the provisions
of PAJA.
(b) If the Fund should fail to take a
decision within reasonable time, the plaintiff’s remedy is
under PAJA.
(c) If the Fund should take a decision
against the plaintiff, that decision cannot be ignored simply because
it was not taken within
a reasonable time or because no legal or
medical basis is provided for the decision or because the court does
not agree with the
reasons given.
(d) A decision by the Fund is subject
to an internal administrative appeal to an appeal tribunal.
(e) Neither the decision of the Fund
nor the decision of the appeal tribunal is subject to an appeal to
the court. The court’s
control over these decisions is by means
of the review proceedings under PAJA.
The Fund’s decision to be
taken within a reasonable period
[20] To recapitulate; if the Fund
rejects the RAF 4 form – with or without proper reasons –
it means that the requirement
that the Fund must be satisfied that
the injury is serious has not been met. In that event the plaintiff
cannot continue with its
claim for general damages in court. The
court simply has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim. The
plaintiff’s remedy is
to take the rejection on appeal in terms
of regulation 3(4). It follows that the rejection cannot be ignored
merely because it
was not raised within a reasonable time. This does
not mean, as was suggested, for instance, in
Louw v Road Accident
Fund
(supra) at para 82, that the Fund can avoid and frustrate
every claim against it indefinitely by simply not taking a decision
either
way. The solution is to be found in s 6(2)(g) read with
s 6(3)(a) of PAJA. These sections provide that if an
administrative
authority unreasonably delays to take a decision in
circumstances where there is no period prescribed for that decision,
an application
can be brought ‘for judicial review of the
failure to take the decision’. Though PAJA sees this as a
‘ground
of review’ it is really no different from the
time honoured common law remedy of
mandamus
(see eg
Cape
Furniture Workers’ Union v McGregor NO
1930 TPD 682
at
685-6).
[21] In argument the plaintiffs’
objection to this solution was that it requires claimants against the
Fund, who are frequently
indigent, to incur even further legal
expenses. I believe there are more than one answer to this objection.
First, an application
may often not be necessary. The Fund may very
well react to a letter of demand and, all things being equal, should
do so. Incidentally,
in none of the four cases on appeal, did the
plaintiff seem to consider a resort to this rather obvious and
inexpensive solution.
Secondly, the application to compel need not be
an elaborate and expensive one. It will require two allegations only:
that the
Fund had failed to take a decision and that a reasonable
time had lapsed. Thirdly, unless the Fund was to present a plausible
explanation
for its unreasonable delay there is no reason why it
should not be mulcted in attorney and client costs or worse (see eg
Mlatsheni v Road Accident Fund
2009 (2) SA 401
(E) para 18;
Bovungana v Road Accident Fund
2009 (4) SA 123
(E) para 7). If
this happens on a number of occasions, the Fund may mend its ways.
Finally, if this
mandamus
solution proves to be unaffordable,
the answer may lie in an approach to the legislative authorities or
perhaps a constitutional
challenge of the regulation. What is plain,
however, is that it cannot justify a deviation from the procedure
pertinently prescribed
by regulation 3.
[22] As to what would constitute a
reasonable time for the Fund’s decision, it is clear to me that
little, if any, guidance
can be derived from s 24(5). The two
situations under consideration are too dissimilar. Section 24 only
deals with the procedural
validity of the claimant’s initial
claim. All the Fund therefore has to decide under the section is
whether or not the correct
procedure had been followed by the
claimant. It is to that situation that the deeming provision of
s 24(5) pertains. Under
regulations 3(3)(c) and (d), on the
other hand, the Fund must not only determine the procedural validity
of the RAF 4 form. It
must also determine the substantive issue as to
whether or not the report correctly assessed the claimant’s
injuries as serious.
To insist that the Fund take a decision before
it is ready to do so will serve little purpose other than to compel
it to reject
the RAF 4 form. (That, of course, is not to suggest that
the Fund may drag its heels.)
[23] In the circumstances, any
determination of the period within which the Fund should reasonably
take that decision must depend
on the facts of each case. This, I
believe, is borne out by the silence of regulation 3 in specifying
any time period within which
the Fund must take its decision under
regulations 3(3)(c) and (d). What renders the silence significant is
that the regulation
prescribes the time within which most other steps
of the prescribed method must be taken and the consequences of not
making those
decisions. I understand this as an indication of
appreciation on the part of the legislative authority that it is not
possible
to determine the time period within which the Fund must make
its decision on the basis of ‘one size fits all’. That
period can only be determined with reference to the facts of the
particular case. Lest I be misunderstood, I do not suggest that
the
period of more than one year that the Fund has taken in each of the
four cases on appeal could conceivably be described as
reasonable.
They were clearly not. But that does not mean, as I have said, that
the Fund’s right to reject had lapsed. Even
though the Fund’s
decision to reject the RAF 4 forms was only taken after the expiry of
a reasonable period, these rejections
must therefore prevail.
Rejection of the RAF 4 forms
without proper reasons
[24] Recognition that the Fund’s
decision to reject the plaintiffs’ RAF 4 forms constituted
administrative action, dictates
that until that decision was set
aside by a court on review or overturned in an internal appeal, it
remained valid and binding
(see eg
Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v
City of Cape Town
2004 (6) SA 222
(SCA) para 26). The fact that
the Fund gave no reasons for the rejection; or that the reasons given
are found to be unpersuasive
or not based on proper medical or legal
grounds, cannot detract from this principle. The same holds true for
the respondents’
argument that it appeared from the medical
evidence presented by them at the trial that the Fund was wrong in
deciding that their
injuries were not serious. Whether the Fund’s
decisions were right or wrong is of no consequence. They exist as a
fact until
set aside or reviewed or overturned in an internal appeal.
It was therefore not open to the High Court to disregard the Fund’s
rejection of the RAF 4 forms on the basis that the reasons given were
insufficient; or that they were given without any medical
or legal
basis; or that they were proved to be wrong by expert evidence at the
trial.
[25] To the extent that the High
Court’s overriding of the Fund’s decision may be regarded
as – or was intended
to be – a review (which is doubtful
in the extreme) its approach would fly in the face of the provision
in s 7(2) of
PAJA, that no court shall entertain a review of an
administrative decision unless and until any internal appeal provided
for had
been exhausted. Regulation 3(4) created the mechanism of an
internal appeal against the Fund’s decision that an injury is
not serious to a tribunal of medical specialists. It is true that
s 7(2)(c) of PAJA allows the internal appeal procedure to
be
circumvented ‘in exceptional circumstances and on application
by the person concerned’. But apart from the fact
that there
was no application to this effect in any of the matters on appeal, I
can detect no exceptional circumstances that could
warrant this
departure. This is of particular significance in the light of the
recent Constitutional Court decisions that placed
strong emphasis on
the need for internal remedies to be pursued and particularly those
that lie to specialised appeal tribunals.
Thus it was pointed out by
Mokgoro J in
Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs (Lawyers for Human
Rights as Amicus Curiae)
2010 (4) SA 327
(CC) paras 35-37:
‘
Internal
remedies are designed to provide immediate and cost-effective relief,
giving the executive the opportunity to utilise its
own mechanisms,
rectifying irregularities first, before aggrieved parties resort to
litigation. Although courts play a vital role
in providing litigants
with access to justice, the importance of more readily available and
cost-effective internal remedies cannot
be gainsaid.
First,
approaching a court before the higher administrative body is given
the opportunity to exhaust its own existing mechanisms
undermines the
autonomy of the administrative process. It renders the judicial
process premature, effectively usurping the executive
role and
function. . . .
Once
an administrative task is completed, it is then for the court to
perform its review responsibility, to ensure that the administrative
action or decision has been performed or taken in compliance with the
relevant constitutional and other legal standards.
Internal
administrative remedies may require specialised knowledge which may
be of a technical and/or practical nature. The same
holds true for
fact-intensive cases where administrators have easier access to the
relevant facts and information. Judicial review
can only benefit from
a full record of an internal adjudication, particularly in the light
of the fact that reviewing courts do
not ordinarily engage in
fact-finding and hence require a fully developed factual record.’
(See also
Bengwenyama
Minerals (Pty) Ltd v Genorah Resources (Pty) Ltd
2011
(4) SA 113
(CC) para 50.)
[26] As to the Fund’s obligation
to provide reasons for its decision, it is true that it is
pertinently constrained to do
so by regulation 3(3)(d)(i). But, as I
have said, the Fund’s failure to comply with this obligation
cannot render the decision
invalid per se. As a matter of principle,
I suppose, the claimant can compel the Fund to give reasons in terms
of s 5 of PAJA.
Yet, in practice, a claimant whose medical
experts maintain that his or her injury is indeed serious as
contemplated in regulation
3(1)(b), would clearly be better advised
to proceed directly on appeal to the appeal tribunal. I say this
because the appeal tribunal
is in any event not bound by the reasons
given by the Fund. In the exercise of its wide investigative and
fact-finding powers,
the appeal tribunal can establish for itself
whether or not to assess the injury as serious, whatever the reasons
of the Fund might
have been. The appeal created by the regulations
appears to be ‘an appeal in the wide sense’, that is a
complete rehearing
of, and fresh determination on the merits with
additional evidence or information if needs be (see eg
Tikly
& others v Johannes NO
1963
(2) SA 588
(T) at 590G-H).
Did the RAF 4 forms meet the
requirements of regulation 3(1)
[27] In view of my conclusion that the
High Court had no authority to interfere with the Fund’s
decision to reject the RAF
4 forms, the correctness of the Fund’s
reasons for doing so are of no real consequence. Yet we have been
asked by the Fund
and by the
amicus
curiae
to provide some
guidance on the interpretation of regulation 3(1) on the issues that
arose with regard to that interpretation. I
believe we should accede
to this request. First, because the Fund has on several occasions
been penalised by the High Court for
its interpretation of the
regulation, which was held to be wrong, by awards of attorney and
client costs. Secondly, because the
members of the
amicus
curiae
are bound to give
effect to the regulation.
[28] In all four cases on appeal the
Fund rejected the RAF 4 forms, mainly on three grounds, to wit that:
(a) Dr Braude, who purported to assess
the plaintiffs’ injuries as serious, did so without physically
examining them;
(b) the AMA evaluation contemplated in
regulation 3(1)(b)(ii) was done by an occupational therapist, Ms
Marks, who is not a medical
practitioner as contemplated by the
regulation; and
(c) an assessment in terms of the
narrative test laid down in regulation 3(1)(b)(iii) cannot be
conducted without first doing the
Whole Person Impairment Assessment
in terms of the AMA Guides, referred to in regulation 3(1)(b)(ii).
With reference to all three of these
grounds the High Court held that they rested on a wrong
interpretation by the Fund of regulation
3(1). In considering the
correctness of these findings, I propose to deal with the three
grounds separately.
Must a medical practitioner
physically examine the claimant for purposes of the assessment
[29] It is common cause that Dr
Braude, who signed all four RAF 4 forms involved, did not physically
examine any of the plaintiffs,
but relied instead for his assessments
on the hospital records annexed to the reports. Regulation 3(1)(a)
provides that a claimant
‘shall submit himself or herself to an
assessment by a medical practitioner’. In finding that
‘assessment’
as used in regulation 3(1)(a) is not to be
equated with ‘physical examination’, the High Court
referred to several
instances where the term ‘assessment’
is used in the rest of regulation 3(1) as a synonym for ‘evaluate’
or ‘estimate’ or ‘determine the nature or quality
of’. In support of this proposition reference was made,
by way
of example, to the concept of ‘assessment of an injury’
used in regulation 3(1)(b)(iii) and to the expression
‘assessing
the degree of impairment’ in regulation 3(1)(b)(v). I have no
doubt that ‘assessment’ can have
these meanings and that
it does in fact bear those meanings in the given examples. My problem
with this approach is, however, that
it takes the term ‘assessment’
out of the context of regulation 3(1)(a). This regulation requires
that the claimant
must ‘submit himself or herself to an
assessment’. In my view it simply cannot be said by any stretch
of the imagination
that a claimant, who merely sent his hospital
records to a medical practitioner has ‘submitted himself’
to an assessment
by that practitioner.
[30] The same point is illustrated by
regulation 3(3)(d)(ii). It provides that, if the Fund is not
satisfied with the claimant’s
RAF 4 form, it may direct that
the claimant ‘submit himself or herself . . . to a further
assessment to ascertain whether
the injury is serious . . . by a
medical practitioner designated by the Fund.’ It is clearly not
open to a third party who
has been directed to submit to such a
further assessment, merely to send his or her medical records to the
medical practitioner
designated by the Fund. He or she must submit to
a physical examination by the Fund’s medical practitioner.
Moreover, paragraph
4.5 of the RAF 4 form – which is part of
the regulations – requires medical practitioners to give their
‘conclusion
regarding physical examination’. This can in
the context only mean that medical practitioners must consult with
the claimant
and must give their own conclusion based on their own
physical examination of the claimant.
[31] As I see it, the assessment in
regulation 3(1) plays an important role in the legislative scheme. It
serves as a measure of
control to prevent claimants and the Fund from
incurring costs in establishing whether injuries qualify as serious
when a medical
practitioner has assessed them to be so after a proper
physical examination of the claimant. There is no reason to think
that medical
practitioners employed by claimants are in a better
position than those employed by the Fund to evaluate medical records.
Conclusions
based merely on the interpretation of these records,
would therefore be of little more assistance to the Fund than the
submission
of the records themselves. Self-evidently the legislative
authority did not regard the submission of medical records in itself
as sufficient to provide the required measure of control. What is
more, superficial assessments like those that were encountered
in the
four matters on appeal, that were made without even examining the
claimants are not likely to attract the Fund’s confidence.
The
predictable result is that in the end even deserving claimants whose
injuries were prima facie serious – like those of
the plaintiff
in
Kubeka
, who broke his neck – are compelled to follow
the long route through an internal appeal. I therefore conclude that
regulation
3(1)(a) requires a medical practitioner to physically
examine a claimant.
Can the assessment be done by an
occupational therapist
[32] Both s 17(1A) of the Act and
regulation 3(1) require an assessment by a medical practitioner
registered as such under
the Health Professions Act 56 of 1974. The
latter Act does not per se define a medical practitioner either, save
to say that it
is a person registered as such under that Act.
However, the Health Professions Act distinguishes a ‘medical
practitioner’
from a ‘health practitioner’ and
defines the latter term as any person, including a student,
registered with the Health
Professions Council in a profession
registrable under that Act.
[33] There are twelve professions,
each with its own professional board, registered under the Health
Professions Act. One of these
is the Medical and Dental Council.
Another is the Occupational Therapy and Medical Orthotics or
Prosthetics (see eg 17
Lawsa
2 ed part 2 para 6). In the
circumstances it is clear to me that ‘medical practitioner’
envisages by s 17(1)(a)
and regulation 3(1) are those
practitioners that are registered under the Medical and Dental
Profession. In consequence it excludes
health practitioners, such as
occupational therapists, dieticians, oral hygienists, and so forth
who are registered under other
professions. It follows that, in my
view, the Fund rightly decided that Ms Marks, who is an occupational
therapist, did not qualify
as a medical practitioner within the
meaning of regulation 3(1)(a).
Can an assessment in terms of
regulation 3(1)(b)(iii) be conducted without first performing the
assessment in terms of regulation
3(1)(b)(ii)
[34] It will be remembered that
regulation 3(1)(b) sets out three criteria. The first, referred to in
regulation 3(1)(b)(i) relates
to those injuries which are
disqualified from being assessed as serious because they appear on
the Minister’s list to be
published. For present purposes these
can be excluded. The other two are formulated as follows in
regulation 3(1)(b)(ii) and (iii):
‘
(ii)
If the injury resulted in 30 per cent or more Impairment of the Whole
Person as provided in the AMA Guides, the injury shall
be assessed as
serious.
(iii)
An injury which does not result in 30 per cent or more Impairment of
the Whole Person may only be assessed as serious if that
injury:
(aa)
resulted in a serious long term impairment or loss of a body
function;
(bb)
constitutes permanent serious disfigurement;
(cc)
resulted in severe long term mental or severe long term behavioural
disturbance or disorder; or
(dd)
resulted in loss of a foetus.’
[35] With reference to these
provisions, it is clear from the Road Accident Fund forms that Dr
Braude did not rely on the criteria
formulated in 3(1)(b)(ii) but on
the narrative test laid down in regulation 3(1)(b)(iii) as the basis
for his assessment that the
plaintiffs’ injuries were
‘serious’. The Fund’s contention was, however, that
he was not allowed to do
so. On a proper interpretation of the
regulation, so the Fund contended, a Whole Person Impairment
Assessment (WPI) rating of below
30 per cent is a prerequisite before
the narrative test can be performed. Since Dr Braude did not assess
the plaintiffs for WPI
under the AMA Guides at all, so the Fund
contended, he could not have applied the narrative test.
[36] In those of the judgments on
appeal that considered this issue, the Fund’s contention was
rejected, in short, on the
basis that the regulations contemplate a
disjunctive test where a claimant has to meet the requirements of one
or the other. In
other words, that it is open to the medical
practitioner to evaluate the question of seriousness either by way of
the AMA/WPI test
or by way of the narrative test. A reading of
regulation 3(1)(b) in isolation seems to lend support to anyone of
these rival constructions.
It is therefore truly ambiguous. Yet
regulation 3(1)(b)(vi) seems to favour the interpretation contended
for by the Fund. In terms
of this regulation:
‘
The
Minister may approve a training course in the application of the AMA
Guides by notice in the Gazette and then the assessment
must be done
by a medical practitioner who has successfully completed such a
course.’
[37] It was common cause before us
that until now the Minister has not approved the envisaged training
course. Nonetheless, the
intent emerging from this regulation is
clearly that, once the course had been approved, assessment will be
reserved for those
doctors who have successfully completed the
course. This seems to indicate that all assessments require knowledge
of the AMA Guides,
which in turn leads to the inference that a
medical practitioner cannot avoid the AMA Guide by opting for the
narrative test. But
a more weighty consideration in favour of the
Fund’s interpretation, as I see it, derives from the contents
of the RAF 4
form itself, which is incorporated in the regulations as
annexure D. In broad outline the report is divided in five
paragraphs.
Paragraph 1 requires the personal details of the
claimant, while paragraph 2 calls for the particulars of the medical
practitioner
responsible for the assessment. Paragraph 3 requires an
indication of injuries observed by the medical practitioner that
cannot
be assessed as serious because they appear on the Minister’s
list contemplated in regulation 3(1)(b)(i). Paragraph 4 then
deals
with the AMA Impairment Rating contemplated in regulation
3(1)(b)(ii), while paragraph 5 refers to the narrative test in
regulation 3(1)(b)(iii). Of significance, in my view, is that
paragraph 4 really contains the nub of the report. If paragraph 4
were to be left uncompleted, the report would be of little substance.
In sum the inevitable inference to be drawn from the contents
of the
report is that it was never intended that an assessment could bypass
the AMA/WPI test.
[38] I am mindful of the argument by
the plaintiffs that this interpretation may create difficulties for
indigent claimants in rural
areas where medical practitioner are
unable to apply the AMA Guides. However, I can find no direct
evidence to support this assumption
of inability on the part of rural
doctors. The mere fact that Dr Braude does not know how to apply the
AMA Guides does not elevate
this to a generality. After all, Ms
Marks, who is an occupational therapist, apparently had little
difficulty in performing the
AMA Impairment Evaluation. But, be that
as it may, the assumed inability of doctors in rural areas to perform
the AMA test, cannot
change the clear meaning of the regulations.
Perhaps this may be a good reason for the Minister to expedite the
establishment of
the training course envisaged in regulation
3(1)(b)(vi), particularly in rural areas. It may even lay the basis
for a constitutional
challenge of regulation 3(1). But it cannot
justify a deviation from the clear meaning of the regulation.
[39] The reference to a constitutional
challenge is not illusory, in that the plaintiffs did indeed launch a
wide ranging constitutional
challenge of regulation 3(1) which was
based on sections 9, 10, 33 and 34 of the Constitution. But they only
did so belatedly,
on appeal to this court, and without joining the
Minister of Transport as the executive authority responsible for the
administration
of the regulations, in compliance with the requirement
of Uniform Rule 10A. This approach flies in the face of
Constitutional Court
decisions in two respects. Firstly, it is in
conflict with those decisions which emphasised that parties who wish
to challenge
the constitutional validity of a statutory provision
must raise that challenge at the time when they institute legal
proceedings
in the court of first instance (See eg
Prince v
President, Cape Law Society
[2000] ZACC 28
;
2001 (2) SA 388
(CC) para 22).
Secondly, it runs counter to those decisions which underscored the
importance of compliance with Rule 10A (see eg
Van der Merwe v
Road Accident Fund (Women’s Legal Centre Trust as Amicae
Curiae
)
[2006] ZACC 4
;
2006 (4) SA 230
(CC) para 7;
Road Accident Fund v
Mdeyide (Minister of Transport Intervening)
[2007] ZACC 7
;
2008 (1) SA 535
(CC)
para 27). In addition, as I have said by way of introduction,
virtually the same constitutional challenge of regulation 3
by the
Law Society was found wanting by the High Court and not pursued as
part of the appeal to the Constitutional Court. In this
light counsel
for the plaintiffs, wisely in my view, did not proceed with their
constitutional challenge.
Ancillary matters
[40] What remains are ancillary
matters pertaining, firstly, to the further conduct of the four
matters on appeal and, secondly,
to issues of costs. The import of
the conclusions I have reached thus far is that the special pleas
raised by the Fund should have
been upheld by the High Court. It will
be remembered that these special pleas rested on the contention that
the plaintiffs’
claims for general damage were premature in
that they had failed to establish that their injuries were serious in
accordance with
the method prescribed in regulation 3. In
consequence, the Fund’s prayer in these special pleas was that
the claims for general
damages be dismissed, alternatively, that
these claims be stayed, pending the compliance by the plaintiffs with
regulation 3. What
the Fund sought on appeal – quite fairly, I
believe, in view of the uncertainty that surrounded the application
of regulation
3 – is not that the plaintiffs’ claims for
general damages be dismissed, but for an order pursuant to their
alternative
prayer.
[41] Moreover, it appears that in all
four cases the quantum of the plaintiffs’ general damages had
since the dismissal of
the special pleas been determined, either by
agreement between the parties or by the court. In this light, the
position taken by
the Fund on appeal, again, quite fairly, was that
if the plaintiffs’ injuries should eventually be assessed as
serious in
accordance with the procedure prescribed by regulation 3,
it would not be necessary for the plaintiffs to re-establish the
quantum
of their claims for general damages. Hence the order I
propose to make provides that in that event the awards of general
damages
will stand. As to the issue of costs, it is clear that the
plaintiffs were ultimately unsuccessful, both in their opposition to
the special pleas and on appeal. Normally costs would follow that
outcome. However, in the light of the uncertainty that existed
about
the interpretation and application of regulation 3, it would be
equitable, in my view, not to make any costs order against
the
plaintiffs.
[42] In this light the following
orders are made in the four matters on appeal:
In the matter of Road Accident Fund
v Kubeka: Case No 64/2012
1. The appeal is upheld, with no order
as to costs.
2. The order of the High Court is set
aside and replaced with the following:
‘
(a) The
defendant is to make payment to the plaintiff of an amount of
R408 276 for loss of earnings.
(b) The defendant is to furnish an
undertaking in terms of
section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund
Act 56 of 1996
for future medical expenses incurred by the plaintiff.
(c) The first and third special pleas
raised by the defendant are upheld.
(d) The plaintiff’s claim for
general damages is postponed
sine die.
(e) The plaintiff may dispute the
defendant’s rejection of the plaintiff’s serious injury
assessment report in terms
of regulation 3(4) of the Road Accident
Fund Regulations, 2008 within 90 days of the date of this order.
(f) In the event that the appeal
tribunal determines that the plaintiff’s injury constitutes a
‘serious injury’,
the defendant is to make payment to the
plaintiff of the amount of R300 000 for general damages.
(g) There is no order as to costs in
relation to the defendant’s special pleas and the plaintiff’s
claim for general
damages.
(h) Save as aforesaid, the defendant
is to pay the plaintiff’s costs, including the costs of the
following experts: Dr Barlin,
Ms Marks, Ms van Zyl and Mr Rolland.’
3. The period of 90 days referred to
in paragraph 2(e) above is to be calculated from the date of this
court’s order.
In the matter of Road Accident Fund
v Mokoena: Case No 131/2012
1. The appeal is upheld, with no order
as to costs.
2. The order of the High Court is set
aside and replaced as follows:
‘
(a) The
defendant is to furnish an undertaking in terms of
section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996
for future medical expenses
incurred by the plaintiff.
(b) The special pleas raised by the
defendant are upheld.
(c) The plaintiff’s claim for
general damages is postponed
sine die
.
(d) The plaintiff may dispute the
defendant’s rejection of the plaintiff’s serious injury
assessment report in terms
of regulation 3(4) of the Road Accident
Fund Regulations, 2008 within 90 days of the date of this order.
(e) In the event that the appeal
tribunal determines that the plaintiff’s injury constitutes a
‘serious injury’,
the defendant is to make payment to the
plaintiff of the amount of R80 000 for general damages.
(f) There is no order as to costs in
relation to the defendant’s special pleas and the plaintiff’s
claim for general
damages.
(g) Save as aforesaid, the defendant
is to pay the plaintiff’s costs, including the costs of the
following experts: Dr Barlin,
Mr White and Ms Marks.’
3. The period of 90 days referred to
in paragraph 2(d) above is to be calculated from the date of this
court’s order.
In the matter of Road Accident Fund
v Duma: Case No 202/2012
1. The appeal is upheld, with no order
as to costs.
2. The order of the High Court is set
aside and replaced as follows:
‘
(a) The
defendant is to furnish an undertaking in terms of
section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996
for future medical expenses
incurred by the plaintiff.
(b) The special pleas raised by the
defendant are upheld.
(c) The plaintiff’s claim for
general damages is postponed
sine die
.
(d) The plaintiff may dispute the
defendant’s rejection of the plaintiff’s serious injury
assessment report in terms
of regulation 3(4) of the Road Accident
Fund Regulations, 2008 within 90 days of the date of this order.
(e) In the event that the appeal
tribunal determines that the plaintiff’s injury constitutes a
‘serious injury’,
the defendant is to make payment to the
plaintiff of the amount of R130 000 for general damages.
(f) There is no order as to costs in
relation to the defendant’s special pleas and the plaintiff’s
claim for general
damages.
(g) Save as aforesaid, the defendant
is to pay the plaintiff’s costs, including the costs of the
following experts: Mr White
and Ms Marks.’
3. The period of 90 days referred to
in paragraph 2(d) above is to be calculated from the date of this
court’s order.
In the matter of Road Accident Fund
v Meyer: Case No 164/2012
1. The appeal is upheld, with no order
as to costs.
2. The order of the High Court is set
aside and replaced with the following:
‘
(a) The
defendant is to make payment to the plaintiff of an amount of
R777 600 for loss of earnings.
(b) The special plea raised by the
defendant is upheld.
(c) The plaintiff’s claim for
general damages is postponed
sine die
.
(d) The plaintiff may dispute the
defendant’s rejection of the plaintiff’s serious injury
assessment report in terms
of regulation 3(4) of the Road Accident
Fund Regulations, 2008 within 90 days of the date of this order.
(e) In the event that the appeal
tribunal determines that the plaintiff’s injury constitutes a
“serious injury”,
the defendant is to make payment to the
plaintiff of the amount of R150 000 for general damages.
(f) There is no order as to costs in
relation to the defendant’s special pleas and the plaintiff’s
claim for general
damages.
(g) Save as aforesaid, the defendant
is to pay the plaintiff’s costs, including the costs of the
following experts: Ms Weiner,
Dr Barlin and Ms Marks.’
3. The period of 90 days referred to
in paragraph 2(d) above is to be calculated from the date of this
court’s order.
_____________________
F D J BRAND
JUDGE OF APPEAL
APPEARANCES:
For
Appellant: S BUDLENDER
R
LATIB
Instructed
by: LINDSAY KELLER ATTORNEYS-
ROSEBANK,
JOHANNESBURG
Correspondents:
MATSEPES INC
BLOEMFONTEIN
For
Respondent: B ANCER SC
D
GOODENOUGH
Instructed
by: NORMAN BERGER & PARTNERS INC
HIGHLANDS
PARK
JOHANNESBURG
Correspondents:
LOVIUS BLOCK ATTORNEYS
BLOEMFONTEIN
For
the
Amicus
Curiae:
N
H MAENETJE SC
P
G SELEKA