Boshego v Correction Supervision and Parole Board: Kgosi Mampuru II and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 409; 40175/2021 (7 June 2023)

80 Reportability
Criminal Procedure

Brief Summary

Parole — Special Parole Dispensation — Review of decision not to consider applicant for parole — Applicant contending eligibility under Special Parole Dispensation — Dispute over calculation of Minimum Detention Period — Applicant sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for multiple counts, with effective sentence of 15 years — Applicant's Minimum Detention Period calculated as 1 March 2025 based on special remission — Respondents calculating Minimum Detention Period as 26 February 2026 — Court finding that the special remission applies to the determination of the maximum sentence period, impacting eligibility for parole — Decision of the Parole Board reviewed and set aside, directing consideration for parole.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned an opposed application for review relief in the High Court of South Africa, Gauteng Division, Pretoria. The applicant, Nnyadi Boitumelo Lydia Boshego, sought to have reviewed and set aside decisions of the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board: Kgosi Mampuru II (the first respondent) relating to her eligibility for consideration for parole under the Special Parole Dispensation linked to the President’s grant of special remission of sentences announced in December 2019 and implemented during 2020.


The remaining respondents were the Case Management Committee: Kgosi Mampuru II (second respondent), the National Commissioner: Correctional Services (third respondent), and the Minister of Correctional Services and Constitutional Development (fourth respondent). The respondents opposed the application through the State Attorney.


Procedurally, the case came before Nel AJ as a motion-court review application. The applicant primarily challenged (a) the Parole Board’s decision to refer her profile report back to the Case Management Committee and (b) the Parole Board’s failure/refusal to consider her for parole. In the alternative, the applicant sought declaratory relief that clause 5.3.1 of Circular 13 of 2019/20 (dealing with the granting of special remission of sentence amnesty) was irrational and unlawful to the extent that it applied to her.


The general subject-matter was the calculation of the applicant’s minimum detention period for parole eligibility in the context of the special remission of sentence and the consequent Special Parole Dispensation, and whether an incorrect calculation led to an unlawful refusal to consider her for parole.


2. Material Facts


The applicant was convicted on 22 counts, including fraud, corruption, racketeering, and money laundering. She received sentences of 15 years’ imprisonment on 21 counts and 10 years’ imprisonment on one count, with the sentencing court ordering the sentences to run concurrently, yielding an effective sentence of 15 years’ imprisonment. She commenced incarceration at Kgosi Mampuru II Correctional Facility on 30 August 2018.


Against the background of the President’s grant of special remission and the associated parole measures, correctional facilities began implementing the Special Parole Dispensation around 25 May 2020. The Case Management Committee compiled the applicant’s profile report and advised her that she qualified for the Special Parole Dispensation and would be considered for parole. The profile report was submitted to the Parole Board, which was to consider her on 29 May 2020.


On 29 May 2020, the applicant was advised that she would not be considered for parole because, in the Parole Board’s view, she did not qualify for the Special Parole Dispensation. The Parole Board attributed this to an asserted error by the Committee in calculating the applicant’s minimum detention period. The Parole Board’s position was that the Committee should not have deducted 24 months from the applicant’s effective sentence; rather, it should have pro-rated the 24-month remission across the multiple counts (despite concurrency), which on its approach yielded a minimum detention period expiring in February 2026 (one date mentioned was 13 February 2026).


The parties were in agreement that the applicant fell within a category of offenders that would entitle her to a 24-month remission. The dispute was not about entitlement to a 24-month remission in principle, but about how that remission affected the calculation of the applicant’s minimum detention period for purposes of parole consideration under the special dispensation.


The applicant contended that her minimum detention period would expire on 1 March 2025, which would place her within the qualifying window for the special dispensation. The respondents contended that it would expire in February 2026, outside the qualifying window, and also advanced a contention that the dispensation would apply only to offenders whose minimum detention period would arise on or before 8 May 2025.


On 24 February 2021, the Parole Board met with the applicant to explain its interpretation and why it considered the special dispensation inapplicable to her.


3. Legal Issues


The central questions the court was required to determine were whether the applicant qualified for consideration for parole under the Special Parole Dispensation and whether the Parole Board acted on an incorrect methodology in deciding that she did not qualify and consequently failing to consider her for parole.


This required determination of two closely related issues. The first was the threshold date for application of the “within five years” criterion referenced in the special dispensation framework. The second was the correct calculation of the applicant’s minimum detention period in light of the 24-month special remission and the applicant’s effective sentence.


Although the application initially appeared to involve interpretation of clause 5.3.1 of Circular 13 of 2019/20, the court treated the decisive issue as the minimum detention period calculation and, relatedly, whether clause 5.3.1 was applicable to the applicant at all.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of legal rules to facts (how statutory parole eligibility rules and the remission mechanism should be applied to an effective concurrent sentence), rather than factual disputes about what sentences were imposed or when incarceration commenced.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court located the Special Parole Dispensation in the President’s power under section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa read with section 82(1)(a) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, and noted that the dispensation was implemented for purposes including combatting the spread of Covid-19 in correctional facilities. The court accepted that special remission of sentence could affect parole eligibility by bringing forward dates for consideration.


On the threshold date, the court held that the relevant “within five years” period was to be calculated from 27 April 2020, resulting in a threshold date of 26 April 2025 for applying a convicted offender’s minimum detention period. In doing so, the court rejected the respondents’ suggestion that the threshold should be tied to 8 May 2025.


Turning to parole eligibility mechanics, the court applied section 73(6) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, which provides that an offender serving a determinate sentence of more than 24 months may not be placed on parole until serving either a stipulated non-parole period or, if none is stipulated, half of the sentence. Because no non-parole period was stipulated in the applicant’s case, the minimum detention period was to be calculated as half of the applicable sentence period.


The key reasoning step was how the court treated the 24-month special remission. The respondents’ approach treated the remission as not affecting the sentence in the relevant way (and was associated with an attempt to pro-rate the remission across multiple counts despite concurrency). The court considered this inconsistent with the clear wording and purpose of the Circular, which indicated that the special remission was intended as a 12- or 24-month remission of sentence and that it should be deducted from an offender’s original sentence expiry date to produce a recalculated sentence expiry date.


The court relied on the approach adopted in Smith v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others (an unreported decision) to the effect that the minimum detention period calculation is affected by the remission’s impact on the offender’s sentence. The court agreed with that approach and held that the remission period (whether 12 months or 24 months) must be deducted from the full incarceration period before determining the applicable minimum detention period.


Applying that method to the applicant’s circumstances, the court accepted the applicant’s calculation: deducting the 24-month remission from the 15-year effective sentence produced an incarceration period of 13 years, half of which is six years and six months. Adding six years and six months to the incarceration commencement date of 30 August 2018 yielded a minimum detention period expiring at the end of February 2025, which the applicant expressed as 1 March 2025. The court concluded that this was the correct calculation and that the Parole Board’s February 2026 date was incorrect.


On that basis, the court found that the Parole Board erred in its methodology in determining eligibility and therefore erred in failing to consider the applicant for parole. The court indicated that, given the order it intended to make, the separate decision to refer the profile report back to the Committee would become irrelevant, as an updated profile report would likely have to be prepared.


As to the further relief sought, the court declined to order the Parole Board to accept the existing profile report, reasoning that such an order would inappropriately interfere with the Parole Board’s functions and that an updated report would likely be required. However, the court held it was competent to order the Parole Board to consider the parole application afresh within a defined period, while emphasising that this would not infringe the Parole Board’s discretion whether to grant or refuse parole.


Regarding the alternative constitutional/administrative challenge, the court held that clause 5.3.1 of the Circular did not apply to the applicant, because her matter involved one effective sentence of 15 years to be taken into account and did not require separate determination per count in the manner contemplated. The court stated that clause 5.3.1 (the judgment also refers to clause 5.2.1 in this context) would apply where an offender was convicted of more than one offence at different times and under separate warrants of sentence. Because the clause was found inapplicable, the court held there was no basis to declare it irrational or unlawful.


On costs, the court noted that all respondents opposed the application and applied the ordinary principle that costs follow the result, making a costs order against all respondents jointly and severally.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court set aside the decision of the Parole Board not to consider the applicant for parole. It ordered the Parole Board to take the steps necessary to consider the applicant for parole within 30 days of the order.


In reconsidering parole, the Parole Board was directed to accept that the applicant qualifies for the Special Parole Dispensation and that her minimum detention period date is 1 March 2025. The court refused to grant relief compelling acceptance of the existing profile report and refused the alternative declaratory relief impugning clause 5.3.1 of the Circular.


The respondents were ordered, jointly and severally, to pay the costs of the application.


Cases Cited


Smith v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services and Others (unreported, Gauteng Division, Pretoria, case no 35658/2021, Strydom J).


Legislation Cited


Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, section 84(2)(j).


Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, section 82(1)(a).


Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998, section 73(6).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, for purposes of determining eligibility for consideration for parole under the Special Parole Dispensation, the offender’s minimum detention period must be calculated by first deducting the applicable special remission period from the offender’s full incarceration period (effective sentence) and then applying the statutory minimum detention requirement (in this case, half the sentence under section 73(6) where no non-parole period is stipulated).


On the facts, the court held that the applicant’s minimum detention period date was 1 March 2025, placing her within the qualifying period ending 26 April 2025. The Parole Board’s refusal to consider her for parole was therefore based on an incorrect methodology and was set aside. The court further held that clause 5.3.1 of Circular 13 of 2019/20 was not applicable to the applicant, and accordingly declined to declare it irrational or unlawful.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that where a special remission of sentence is granted in terms of the relevant executive and statutory framework, its effect must be reflected in the recalculated sentence duration/expiry, and that recalculated position must then inform subsequent statutory computations relevant to parole, including the minimum detention period.


The judgment applied section 73(6) of the Correctional Services Act 111 of 1998 to a determinate sentence with no stipulated non-parole period, confirming that the minimum detention period is half of the sentence. In the context of special remission, the “sentence” for this purpose was treated as the sentence as affected by the remission, rather than the pre-remission effective term.


The judgment further applied a restraint principle concerning remedial orders: while a court may set aside an unlawful refusal to consider parole and may order fresh consideration within a timeframe, it should avoid orders that impermissibly trench upon the Parole Board’s discretion regarding parole outcomes or its operational processes (such as directing acceptance of a particular profile report), particularly where an updated report may be required.

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[2023] ZAGPPHC 409
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Boshego v Correction Supervision and Parole Board: Kgosi Mampuru II and Others [2023] ZAGPPHC 409; 40175/2021 (7 June 2023)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE NO: 40175/2021
(1)
REPORTABLE: NO
(2)
OF INTEREST TO
OTHER JUDGES: NO
(3)
REVISED: YES
[7 JUNE 2023]
SIGNATURE:
In the matter between:
NNYADI BOITUMELO LYDIA
BOSHEGO
Applicant
and
THE CORRECTIONAL
SUPERVISION AND PAROLE
BOARD: KGOSI MAMPURU
II
First Respondent
THE CASE MANAGEMENT
COMMITTEE:
KGOSI MAMPURU
II
Second Respondent
THE NATIONAL
COMMISSIONER: CORRECTIONAL
SERVICES
Third Respondent
THE MINISTER OF
CORRECTIONAL SERVICES AND
CONSTITUTIONAL
DEVELOPMENT
Fourth Respondent
JUDGMENT
NEL
AJ
[1]
This is an opposed application in terms of which the Applicant seeks,
inter alia
, an order reviewing the decision of the First
Respondent (the Correctional Supervision and Parole Board of the
Kgosi Mampuru II
Correctional Facility) (“Parole Board”)
to refer the Profile Report of the Applicant back to the Second
Respondent
(the Case Management Committee of the Kgosi Mampuru II
Correctional Facility) (“the Committee”), and reviewing
the
decision of the Parole Board’s failure to consider the
Applicant for parole.
[2]
In the alternative to the review relief sought, the Applicant seeks
the
declaration of clause 5.3.1 of Circular 13 of 2019/20: Granting
of Special Remission of Sentence Amnesty (“the Circular”)

as being irrational and unlawful.
[3]
The Applicant also seeks an order directing the Parole Board to
accept
the Profile Report of the Applicant and to consider the
Applicant for parole.
[4]
At first glance it appears that a crucial aspect of this Application
relates
to the interpretation of clause 5.3.1 of the Circular.
However, for the reasons I set out below, the determination of the
applicable
Minimum Detention Period plays a far greater role that an
interpretation of clause 5.3.1.
THE
SPECIAL PAROLE DISPENSATION
[5]
On 16 December 2019 the President of the Republic of South Africa
announced
the grant of a special remission of sentences for certain
categories of incarcerated offenders. The remission of sentences, up
to a maximum of 24 months for the qualifying offenders, was intended
to, and did, impact on the eligibility of certain offenders
for
parole, and the release of certain prisoners on parole, earlier than
the offenders would have been entitled to, but for the
remission of
sentences.
[6]
In terms of Section 84(2)(j) of the Constitution of the Republic of
South
Africa, as read with Section 82(1)(a) of the Correctional
Services Act, No. 111 of 1998 (“the
Correctional Services
Act&rdquo
;), and for the purposes of combatting the spread of the
Covid 19 virus in correctional service facilities, the President
authorised
the consideration for parole, and the placement on parole,
of qualifying incarcerated offenders, who were incarcerated as at 27

April 2020. The special authorisation of the remission of sentences,
and the effect on the granting and consideration of parole
is
referred to herein as the Special Parole Dispensation.
[7]
On 8 May 2020, the Minister of Justice and Correctional
Services
(“the Minister”) announced the authorisation by the
President of consideration for parole for “
selected low risk
qualifying sentenced offenders who have or will reach their minimum
detention period within five years
”.
[8]
The Minister emphasised in the relevant press release
that the
process is different to a normal remission of sentence and entails
the bringing forward of the period of incarcerated
offenders’
date for consideration for parole, and does not alter the sentence of
any convicted offenders.
[9]
It appears that this statement led to some confusion
within the
Correctional Services as to how the Special Parole Dispensation
should be applied.
THE
RELEVANT SUBMISSIONS
[10]
The Applicant submits that the Special Parole Dispensation announced
by the President was to be applied to those incarcerated offenders
who qualified for the special remission, whose Minimum Detention

Period dates would arise on or before 26 April 2025.  The
Respondents are in agreement with such contention but disagree with

the Applicant as to the Applicant’s Minimum Detention Period
date.
[11]
The parties were in agreement that the offences of which the
Applicant
was convicted, would entitle her to a remission of 24
months, but as already indicated above, the parties were in dispute
as to
how such remission period should be applied.
[12]
The Applicant submits that the Minimum Detention Period applicable to

her would expire on 1 March 2025, and that she therefore qualifies
for the special remission, and should be considered for parole.
[13]
The Respondents contend that the Applicant’s Minimum Detention
Period will expire on 26 February 2026, which falls outside the
remission threshold period, and that she therefore does not qualify

for the special remission.
[14]
The Respondents contend that the Special Parole Dispensation would
only
be applied to those incarcerated offenders, whose minimum
detention period would arise on or before 8 May 2025.
[15]
It is accordingly necessary to determine the threshold date of the
remission
period, and the Applicant’s Minimum Detention Period,
prior to considering the grounds of review in order to determine
whether
the Applicant qualified for the Special Parole Dispensation.
BRIEF
RELEVANT BACKGROUND
[16]
The Applicant was found guilty on 22 counts of different offences,
including
fraud, corruption, racketeering and money laundering.
In respect of 21 of the counts the Applicant was sentenced to 15
years
imprisonment for each count, and in respect of one of the
counts, the Applicant was sentenced to an imprisonment term of 10
years.
[17]
The High Court ordered that the sentences are to be served
concurrently,
with an “
Effective sentence of 15 years
imprisonment
”.
[18]
The Applicant commenced her incarceration period at the Kgosi Mampuru

II Correctional Facility on 30 August 2018.
[19]
On 25 May 2020, and after the implementation of the Special Parole
Dispensation
as announced by the President and the Minister, the
various Correctional Facilities commenced the process of giving
effect to the
announcements.
[20]
The Committee, after compiling the Applicant’s Profile Report,
advised her that she qualified for the Special Parole Dispensation,
and accordingly qualified for consideration for parole.
[21]
The Committee submitted the Applicant’s Profile Report to the
Parole
Board, which was to consider the Applicant for parole on 29
May 2020.
[22]
However, on 29 May 2020, the Applicant was advised that she would not

be considered for parole, as she did not qualify for the Special
Parole Dispensation.
[23]
The Parole Board submitted that the Committee erred in calculating
the
Applicant’s Minimum Detention Period, in that the Committee
ought not to have deducted a period of 24 months from the Applicant’s

sentence period, but ought rather to have pro-rated the 24-month
period over the 21 counts of 15 years each, which would equate
to one
month and 21 days for each of the 15-year sentences running
concurrently.
[24]
On such basis the Parole Board determined that the Applicant’s
Minimum Detention period would expire on 13 February 2026, and that
accordingly the Applicant could not benefit from the Special
Parole
Dispensation.
[25]
On 24 February 2021, the Parole Board met with the Applicant, in
order
to explain the Parole Board’s interpretation of the
Special Parole Dispensation, and to explain to the Applicant why the
Parole Board was of the view that the Special Parole Dispensation was
not applicable to the Applicant.
THE
APPLICANT’S MINIMUM DETENTION PERIOD
[26]
The date from which the 60-month period referred to in the
Dispensation
is to be calculated is 27 April 2020, and accordingly
the threshold date for applying a convicted offender’s minimum
detention
period is 26 April 2025.
[27]
In terms of
Section 73(6)
of the
Correctional Services Act, a
sentenced offender serving a determinate sentence of more than 24
months, may not be placed on parole until such sentenced offender
has
server either the stipulated non-parole period, or if no non-parole
period was stipulated, half of the sentence.
[28]
In respect of the Applicant a non-parole period was not stipulated,
and
accordingly the Applicant’s Minimum Detention Period would
equate to half of her effective sentence.
[29]
The Applicant calculates her Minimum Detention Period date as being 1

March 2025.  Such date is calculated by deducting the 24-month
sentence remission period from the effective sentence of 15-years,

and then dividing such period of 13-years in half, which equates to
six years and six months.  If the period of six years
and six
months is added to the Applicant’s incarceration commencement
date of 30 August 2018, the Applicant’s Minimum
Detention
Period would expire as at the end of February 2025, and it is
presumably for such reason that the Applicant calculated
her Minimum
Detention Period date as being 1 March 2025.
[30]
The Respondents have calculated the Applicant’s Minimum
Detention
Period date as being February 2026. There is some conflict
as to the precise date in February 2026 that the Respondents contend

for, but the conflict is of no relevance.
[31]
The Respondents’ calculation of the Applicant’s Minimum
Detention
Period date appears to simply be the calculation of half of
the effective sentence of 15 years, being 7 years and six months,
which
period is then added to the commencement date of the
Applicant’s incarceration on 30 August 2018. Despite the
reference to
the apportionments on a pro rata basis of the 24 moth
period over the 21 counts of 15 years each, it appears that such
period has
not been included in the Respondents’ calculation.
[32]
It appears that the Respondents have considered the views expressed
by
the Minister, particularly those pertaining to the Special Parole
Dispensation not being a remission of sentence quite literally,

without carefully considering the purpose and effect of the granting
of the special remission of sentence.
[33]
It is clear from the Circular that the President granted a special
remission
of sentence in respect of certain categories of sentenced
offenders.
[34]
It is also clear from the Circular that what was intended was a 12
month
or 24-month remission of sentence (depending on the category of
incarcerated offender), and that the applicable period should be

deducted from the offender’s original sentence expiry date, in
order to determine a recalculated sentence expiry date taking
into
account the special remission period.
[35]
The Profile Report prepared by the Committee in respect of the
Applicant
determined the Applicant’s Minimum Detention Period
date as 28 February 2025, based on the special remission of 16
December
2019.
[36]
The Respondents contend that the 24-month remission period applies
only
to parole, and not to a sentence.  Such contention is
however in conflict with the clear wording of the remission period as

contained in the Circular, and there is no explanation as to how a
period of 24-months as referred to in the Circular would apply
to
parole, when it is clearly intended to apply to a determination of
the maximum sentence period of an incarcerated offender.
[37]
In the
unreported matter of
Smith
v Minister of Justice and Correctional Services & Others
[1]
,
which I
was referred to by the Applicant’s legal representatives
,
it was
held at paragraph [7] of the Judgment that the calculation of the
minimum detention period is affected by the effect that
the 24 months
remission of sentence had on the incarcerated offender’s
sentence.
[38]
It is accordingly clear, and I am in agreement with Strydom J (the
Judge
in the
Smith
matter) in such regard, that the remission
of sentence period, whether it be 12-months or 24-months, must be
deducted from the
full incarceration period, prior to the applicable
minimum detention period being determined.
[39]
I am accordingly of the view that the Applicant’s calculation
of
her Minimum Detention Period date is the correct calculation, and
that the Parole Board’s calculation, being to the effect
that
the Applicant does not benefit from the Special Parole Dispensation,
as her Minimum Detention period would only expire in
February 2026,
is not correct.
[40]
In the circumstances I must find that the Parole Board erred in its
methodology
of determining whether or not the Applicant was eligible
for consideration for parole, and in failing to consider the
Applicant
for parole.
THE
NATURE OF THE RELIEF SOUGHT
[41]
in paragraph 1 of the Notice of Motion the Applicant seeks an order
for the review and
setting aside of the decision of the Parole Board
to refer the Profile Report of the Applicant back to the Committee
and/or the
Parole Board’s decision to not consider the
Applicant for parole.
[42]
For the reasons already set out above, I am satisfied that the Parole
Board erred in failing
to consider the Applicant for parole, and I
accordingly intend to set aside such decision.
[43]
The decision of the Parole Board to refer the Applicant’s
Profile Report back to
the Committee will become irrelevant, having
regard to the Order I intend to make, as I can only assume that the
Committee will
have to prepare an updated Profile Report for the
Applicant.
[44]
In paragraph 2 of the Notice of Motion the Applicant seeks an order
directing the Parole
Board to accept the Profile Report of the
Applicant and to consider the Applicant for parole within 30 days of
the grant of this
order.
[45]
I am firstly of the view that I would be interfering with the
discretion of the Parole
Board in determining whether or not to grant
a convicted offender parole, by directing the Parole Board to accept
the Profile Report,
and secondly, I am of the view, as already
expressed above, that the Committee will be required to prepare an
updated Profile Report
for the Applicant. I am accordingly of the
view that it would be inappropriate for me to make an order as sought
in paragraph 2
of the Notice of Motion.
[46]
I am however satisfied that I can order the Parole Board to consider
the Applicant’s
parole application afresh, and to give effect
to such order within 30 days of the grant of this Order. Naturally,
such order does
not and cannot in any manner infringe on the Parole
Boards discretion in determining whether or not to grant the
Applicant parole.
[47]
In paragraph 3 the Applicant seeks an order, alternatively to the
relief sought in paragraph
1, that to the extent that clause 5.3.1 of
the Circular applies to the Applicant, that such clause be declared
irrational and unlawful.
[48]
I am satisfied that clause 5.3.1 of the Circular is not applicable to
the Applicant, as
the various counts do not need to be determined
separately, as it is only one sentence, being an effective period of
15-years,
that needs to be taken into account.  Clause 5.2.1 of
the Circular would only apply to convicted offenders who are
convicted
of more than one offence, at different times, and in
respect of separate warrants of sentence.
[49]
In the circumstances, there is no basis for me to declare clause
5.3.1 of the Circular
to be irrational and unlawful, or to order that
the Circular be referred to the Fourth Respondent (the Minister of
Correctional
Services and Constitutional Development) for
reconsideration.
[50]
In paragraph 4 of the Notice of Motion the Applicant seeks an order
for costs as against
any Respondent who opposes the relief sought in
the Application.
[51]
It appears from the Notice of Opposition filed, that all four of the
Respondents opposed
the Application, through the offices of the State
Attorney.
[52]
In the circumstances, any cost order would be applicable to all four
of the Respondents.
[53]
Having regard to the nature of the Order I intend to make, there is
no reason why the normal
costs order of the costs following the
result should not apply.
THE
ORDER
[54]
In the circumstances, I make the following order:
[54.1]
The decision of the First Respondent to not consider the
Applicant
for parole is set aside;
[54.2]
The First Respondent is ordered to take all such steps that
are
necessary in order to consider the Applicant for parole, within
30-days of the granting of this Order:
[54.3]
In considering the Applicant’s entitlement for parole,
the
First Respondent is to accept that the Applicant qualifies for the
Special Parole Dispensation, and that the Applicant’s
Minimum
Detention Period date is 1 March 2025;
[50.3]
The Respondents, jointly and severally, are ordered to pay
the costs
of the Application.
G
NEL
[Acting
Judge of the High Court,
Gauteng
Division,
Pretoria]
Date
of Judgment:
7 June 2023
APPEARANCES
For
the Applicant:
Adv.
H Legoabe
Cell:
078 288 6345
E-mail:
hlarane@gmail.com
Instructed
by:
WADP
Attorneys
For
the Respondent:
Adv.
J Modiba
Cell:
084 857 7962
E-mail:
modibaj43@gmail.com
Instructed
by
The
State Attorney
[1]
Unreported Judgment, case number 35658/2021 (Strydom J).