Fundamo v S [2023] ZAGPPHC 398; CC29/18 (26 May 2023)

80 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Appeal — Application for leave to appeal conviction and sentence — Applicant convicted of murder and robbery — Test for reasonable prospects of success on appeal established — Court found insufficient evidence to support conviction for robbery and questioned the basis of the murder conviction — Application for leave to appeal against conviction granted; application against sentence refused.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The judgment concerned an application for leave to appeal in a criminal matter. The applicant, Costa Fundamo (accused 2 at trial), sought leave to appeal against both his convictions and the sentences imposed by the trial court. The respondent was the State.


The procedural history was that the applicant and a co-accused, Ere Patrick Nhaca (accused 1), were tried in the High Court. They faced three charges, namely housebreaking with intent to commit a crime unknown to the prosecutor, murder (with reference to the minimum-sentence provisions of the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997), and robbery with aggravating circumstances (also with reference to the minimum-sentence provisions). They were acquitted of housebreaking but convicted of murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances. The trial court imposed life imprisonment for murder and 15 years’ imprisonment for robbery, having found no extenuating circumstances and no basis to depart from the applicable minimum sentences.


The application for leave to appeal was heard by Mlotshwa AJ because the trial judge, Bam J, was not available to hear it. The applicant also sought condonation for the late filing of the leave-to-appeal application. The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether there were reasonable prospects of success on appeal against the convictions and sentences, particularly given the nature of the evidence relied upon by the State at trial.


2. Material Facts


The charges arose from an incident on 25 January 2017 at a house in Doornkop, Pretoria, where the deceased, Mr Emmunuel Teto Moyambo, was killed. The State’s case also alleged that the deceased was robbed of his laptop.


A central factual feature relied upon by the court in assessing prospects of success was that the evidence against the applicant (accused 2) was tied to a confession made by accused 1 to Ms D’Ameida, described as a private person. According to Ms D’Ameida, the confession was made in the presence of the applicant, and the applicant allegedly nodded and thereby “agreed” with what accused 1 said.


In addressing the robbery conviction, the court treated as material that there was no evidence led establishing that either accused robbed the deceased of the laptop. The evidence, as characterised in the judgment, went no further than that after the deceased was killed, the laptop was found to be missing, without evidence of when it was last seen at the house or of a proved taking by the accused.


The judgment did not set out a detailed contested factual matrix beyond these points, but it emphasised that the convictions rested on the trial court’s acceptance that the applicant’s presence and alleged conduct during accused 1’s confession linked him to the murder, and that the robbery conviction was not supported by evidence showing an actual robbery.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions were concerned with the threshold for leave to appeal and whether, on the facts and applicable law, a court of appeal could reasonably come to a different conclusion from the trial court.


The application raised, in particular, questions of law and the application of law to fact, namely whether the trial court’s reliance on the applicant’s alleged “agreement” (by nodding or not denying) during a co-accused’s confession could sustain the applicant’s conviction, having regard to the concept of a confession and the rule that a confession by one person is not admissible against another.


It also raised an evidential sufficiency question (application of legal standards to the evidentiary picture) regarding whether the elements of robbery with aggravating circumstances were supported where the only evidence referred to was that a laptop was missing after the killing.


A further issue was whether there were prospects of success on appeal against the sentences, in light of the minimum sentencing framework and the trial court’s finding that there were no substantial and compelling circumstances justifying departure.


Finally, there was the ancillary procedural issue of condonation for the late filing of the leave-to-appeal application, based on the applicant’s explanation that he was ignorant of the process and lacked local family support, only later being assisted by a fellow inmate and his relatives.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter through the established test for leave to appeal, citing Smith v The State, which requires a dispassionate assessment of the facts and law and asks whether a court of appeal could reasonably reach a different conclusion. The court emphasised that the applicant must show prospects that are not remote and have a realistic chance of success, and that more is required than a mere possibility or an arguable case.


On the murder conviction, the court focused on the characterisation of the applicant’s alleged conduct during accused 1’s confession. It observed that it was “not quite clear” what the trial judge meant by stating that the applicant “agreed” with accused 1. The judgment conveyed the impression that the trial court treated the nodding or agreement as effectively constituting a form of confession by the applicant.


The court then applied the legal concept of a confession, citing R v Becker for the proposition that a confession is an unequivocal acknowledgement of guilt, equivalent to a plea of guilty. Against that standard, the court questioned whether a person can be said to have confessed merely because he was present when a co-accused confessed.


In addition, the court relied on section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, which provides that no confession made by any person is admissible against another person, and it referred to S v Banda and S v Molimi in this regard. The State’s argument, advanced by counsel, was that the applicant effectively confessed by not denying what accused 1 said and by his conduct. The court recorded that when it questioned this proposition, the State could not provide authority supporting the idea that a confession by a co-accused can be treated as a confession by the applicant through mere non-denial or nodding, and the court stated that the proposition was not supported by authority.


On the robbery conviction, the court reasoned that the evidence described did not establish that the accused robbed the deceased of the laptop. The absence of evidence about when the laptop was last seen, combined with the fact that the laptop was only shown to be missing after the deceased was killed, led the court to conclude that there did not appear to be sufficient evidence to sustain the robbery conviction, thereby supporting prospects of success on appeal against that conviction.


In relation to sentence, the court’s reasoning differed. It stated that the trial court did consider the applicant’s personal circumstances and correctly found that there were no substantial and compelling circumstances that would permit deviation from the minimum sentences prescribed under section 51 of the Criminal Law Amendment Act. On this basis, the court was not persuaded that there were reasonable prospects of success in an appeal against sentence.


Although the applicant sought condonation for late filing and provided reasons relating to ignorance of procedure and lack of family support in South Africa, the judgment did not set out a separate, detailed analysis of condonation. The court proceeded to determine the leave-to-appeal application and made an order granting leave in part and refusing it in part.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court granted leave to appeal against the convictions on both counts, namely murder (as charged with reference to the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997) and robbery with aggravating circumstances (as charged with reference to section 1 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 and section 51(2) of the Criminal Law Amendment Act).


The court refused leave to appeal against the sentences imposed on both counts, namely life imprisonment for murder and 15 years’ imprisonment for robbery with aggravating circumstances.


The judgment, as provided, did not include a separate costs order (and in criminal matters of this kind, costs were not addressed in the order).


Cases Cited


Smith v The State (475/2011) [2011] ZASCA 15 (15 March 2011).


R v Becker 1929 AD at 171.


S v Banda 1990 (3) SA 466 (B).


S v Molimi 2008 (2) SACR 76 (CC).


Legislation Cited


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 219.


Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, section 1 (as referenced in relation to “robbery with aggravating circumstances”).


Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, section 51(1) and section 51(2), read with Part I and Part II of Schedule 2 (as referenced).


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment as provided.


Held


The court held that the applicant had demonstrated reasonable prospects of success on appeal against the convictions for murder and robbery with aggravating circumstances, principally because the trial court’s approach appeared to treat the applicant’s presence and alleged nodding during a co-accused’s confession as implicating him, despite the requirement that a confession be an unequivocal acknowledgement of guilt and the statutory rule that a confession by one person is not admissible against another. The court further held that the robbery conviction appeared unsupported by evidence establishing the taking of the laptop by the accused.


The court held that there were no reasonable prospects of success on appeal against sentence, because the trial court had considered the applicant’s personal circumstances and correctly found no substantial and compelling circumstances justifying deviation from the prescribed minimum sentences.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A grant of leave to appeal requires a showing of reasonable prospects of success, meaning that on a dispassionate assessment of the facts and law a court of appeal could reasonably arrive at a different conclusion; the prospects must be realistic and not remote, and more than a mere possibility.


A confession is an unequivocal acknowledgement of guilt, equivalent to a plea of guilty, and the mere presence of an accused when a co-accused confesses, even coupled with alleged non-denial or conduct such as nodding, raises a legal concern as to whether it can properly be treated as a confession by the accused.


In terms of section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977, a confession made by one person is not admissible against another person, and reliance on such a confession to implicate a co-accused is legally constrained.


For robbery with aggravating circumstances, the conviction requires evidentiary support that the accused committed the robbery; a finding that an item was missing after the victim’s death, without evidence establishing the taking by the accused, may be insufficient to sustain the conviction.


In sentencing under the Criminal Law Amendment Act 105 of 1997, where minimum sentences apply, an appeal on sentence will not show prospects of success merely because the sentence is severe; the focus is whether there were substantial and compelling circumstances warranting deviation and whether the trial court properly considered the accused’s personal circumstances within that framework.

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[2023] ZAGPPHC 398
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Fundamo v S [2023] ZAGPPHC 398; CC29/18 (26 May 2023)

REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(GAUTENG
DIVISION, PRETORIA)
CASE
NO
:
CC29/1
8
REPORTABLE:
YES
/NO
OF
INTEREST TO OTHER JUDGES:
YES
/NO
REVISED
DATE:
26/05/2023
In
the matter of:
COSTA
FUNDAMO
App
l
icant
And
The
State
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Mlotshwa
AJ:
1.
The applicant was charge with one Ere
Patrick Nhaca (herein after referred to as Accused 1). The applicant
was accused 2 in the
matter
.
2.
The
accused
were
charged
with three
counts
namely:
(i)
House breaking
with the
intent to commit a crime unknown to the
prosecutor;
(ii)
Murder, read with the provisions of
section 51(1) and part 1 of schedule 2, alternatively
section
51(2) and part II of schedule 2 of the
Criminal Law Amendment
Act,
105 of 1997;
(iii)
Robbery with aggravating circumstances
as intended in section 1 of
Act
51 of 1977 and read with the provisions of
section
51(2)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act,
105 of 1997
.
3.
Both
the
applicant and his co-accused were convicted of the charges of murder
and robbery read with the
provisions
of 51(2) of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act,
105 of 1997
. They were acquitted on the
count of house breaking with
intent
to
commit a crime unknown to the prosecutor.
4.
The court found that there were no
extenuating circumstances and sentenced both
the Applicant and his co-accused to life
imprisonment
for
the murder and 15 years imprisonment for the robbery.
5.
The applicant is
seeking leave to appeal both
the conviction and the sentence
imposed
upon
them
by the
Honourable
trial Judge
Barn,
who
is presently not available to hear this
application.
6.
In
order to succeed with
this
application, the applicant will have to show that there are prospects
of success on appeal. In
Smith
v The State
[1]
it
was held that
:
"(7)
What
the
test
of
reasonable
prospects
of
success
postulates
is
a
dispassionate
decision
based
on
the
facts
and
the
law,
that
a
court
of
appeal
could reasonably arrive at a conclusion different to that of the
trial court. In order to succeed therefore,
the
applicant must convince this court on
proper grounds that he has
prospects of
success on appeal and that those
prospects are not remote but have a
realistic chance of succeeding. More is required to be established
than that there is a mere possibility of
success,
that
the case is arguable on appeal or that the case cannot be categorized
as hopeless
.
There must
,
rational basis for the
conclusion that there are
prospects of
success on appear
7.
The Applicant further sought condonation
for the later filing
of
this Application for leave to
Appeal.
8.
His reasons for the late filing of this
application being that he was ignorant of the process nor step needed
to be
followed
to file
the
papers for
appeal
until
he
was helped by
a
fellow inmate and his relatives as he does not
have relatives in South Africa.
9.
The charges
against the
accused arose
out
of
an incident that occurred on 25 January 2017 at a house in Doornkop,
Pretoria. The victim was one Mr
Emmunuel
Teto Moyambo who was killed in his house and allegedly robbed of his
laptop.
10.
The evidence against the accused was a
confession made by Accused 1 to
one
Ms D'Ameida
,
a
private person
.
The
confession was allegedly made in the presence of the
Applicant who according to
Ms D'Ameida nodded and agreed with what
Accused 1 said.
11.
The Honourable trial judge found that
accused found that the State proved beyond reasonable doubt the
applicant killed the deceased
.
The Honourable trial judge found that
the applicant was indeed present when accused 1 confessed and he
nodded and
"
agreed
"
with accused 1 said
.
12.
lt
is
not
quite
clear
what
the
learned
Judge
meant
by
saying
the applicant
"
agreed"
with what accused 1 was saying to
Ms D'Ame
i
da.
The impression is that the applicant
also "confessed" to Ms D'Ameida by nodding
to what accused 1 was saying
to Ms D'Ameida
.
13.
"A
confession is an unequivoca
l
acknowledge
of
guilt, the equivalent of a plea
of
guilty before a
court
of
law"
see R v
Becker
[2]
.
Can
it
be
said that an accused made a confession just because he was present
when his co­ accused confessed? Adv Roos on behalf of
the State
insisted that the applicant did confess by not
denying
what accused 1 was saying to
Ms
D'Ameida. This court asked Adv Roos if
she
is saying the
applicant
confessed by conduct by not denying what Accused 1 said to Ms
D'Ameida. This proposition by Adv Roos is not
supported
by any case law or authorities
and
she could not
relate
to
the
court
of
any
such authority or case law.
14.
ln
fact, Section 219 of the Criminal Procedure Act,
51
of 1977 provides that no confession made by any person shall be
admissible against another person. See also S v Banda
[3]
and
S v Molimi
[4]

15.
ln respect of the charge of robbery with
aggravating circumstances
,
there
was no evidence led during
the
trial
that
the accused robbed the deceased of
the
laptop
.
There was no evidence as to
when last was the
l
aptop
seen at
the
deceased house
.
The only
evidence is that after the decea
s
ed
was killed the laptop was found to be m
i
ss
i
ng
.
It doe
s
not seem that there was enough evidenc
e
to convict the applicant on
this charge as well.
16.
As far as the
sentence is concerned it
does seem that the tr
i
al
court d
i
d
consider the
personal
circumstances
of
the applicant and rightly found that
there were no compelling and sustantial
circumstances
which would have
allowed
the
court
to
deviate
from
impos
i
ng
the
minimum
sentences
in
terms
of
section
51
of
the
Crimi
n
al
Law Amendment
Act
105 of 1997
.
17.
ln
the
circumstanc
e
s
I make the following order:
(1)
The application fo
r
le
a
ve
to appeal
i
n
r
es
pect
of the conviction for
;
(i)
Murder, read with the provisions of
section 51(1) and part 1 of schedule 2, alternatively section 51(2)
and part II of schedule
2 of the
Criminal Law Amendment
Act
,
105 of 1997;
And
(ii)
Robbery with aggravating circumstances
as intended in
section 1
of
Act
51 of 1977 and read with the provisions of
section 51(2)
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act, 105 of 1997
,
is
granted.
(2)
The application for
leave to
appea
l
against
the
sentences
on
the
counts of
:
(a).
Murder
,
read with the provisions of
section
51(1)
and
part 1
of schedule 2, alternatively
section 51(2)
and
part II
of schedule 2
of the
Criminal Law Amendment Act,
105
of 1997
; and
(b)
Robbery w
i
th
aggravating circumstances as intended in
section 1
of Act 51 of 1977
and read with the provisions of
section 51(2)
of the
Criminal Law
Amendment Act
,
105
of 1997
,
is
refused
.
Mlotshwa
AJ
ACTING
JUDGE
OF
THE
HIGH
COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
Appearances
ON
BEHALF OF THE APPELLANT
:
ADVOCATE
KGAGARA
INSTRUCTED
BY
:
LEGAL
AID
SOUTH
AFRICA
ON
BEHALF
OF
THE
RESPONDENT:
ADVOCATE
ROOS
INSTRUCTED
BY
:
THE
DIRECTOR
OF
PUBLIC
PROSECUTIONS
[1]
(475/2011)
[2011]
ZASCA
15
(15
March 2011)
[2]
1
929
A
D
a
t
17
1
[3]
1990
(3) SA
4
66(8)
[4]
2
0
0
8
(
2)
SACR 76(CC)