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[2024] ZAKZPHC 7
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Aheer and Another v Govender (7098/2020P; 7136/2020P) [2024] ZAKZPHC 7 (8 February 2024)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
KWAZULU-NATAL
DIVISION, PIETERMARITZBURG
CASE
NO:
7098/2020P and 7136/2020P
In
the matter between:
KAJAL
AHEER
FIRST PLAINTIFF
VINESH
GOKUL
AHEER
SECOND PLAINTIFF
and
DEBORAH
GOVENDER
DEFENDANT
ORDER
The
following order is made:
(a)
The defendant is ordered to pay the first plaintiff the sum of
R4 992 778.61.
(b)
The defendant is ordered to pay the second plaintiff the sum
of R540 000.00.
(c)
The defendant is ordered to pay interest on the above amounts
at the applicable legal rate of interest calculated from the date of
judgment to date of final payment.
(d)
The defendant is to pay the plaintiffs’ costs of suit,
such costs are to include:
(i)
all costs previously reserved;
(ii)
the costs of the plaintiffs’ experts,
costs of their reports and court attendances; and
(iii)
the costs of two counsel where both senior
and junior counsel have been so employed.
(e)
The Registrar is directed to bring this
judgment to the attention of the National Director of Public
Prosecutions for consideration
of instituting possible criminal
proceedings against the defendant.
JUDGMENT
Delivered on 08
February 2024
Sibisi AJ
Introduction
[1]
The plaintiffs instituted two different actions against
the
defendant, Ms Deborah Govender, for the recovery of money that they
paid her. On 4 August 2021, the two actions were consolidated
to
proceed as one action.
[2]
The second plaintiff is the father of the first plaintiff. The first
plaintiff’s
mother died suddenly in July 2015 due to a heart
attack. The first plaintiff was heartbroken and as a result thereof,
engaged the
services of the defendant who described herself as a
psychic. Various amounts were paid for these services and later the
defendant
started blackmailing the first plaintiff, and the first
plaintiff paid substantial amounts for the silence of the defendant.
[3]
The second plaintiff made various payments to the defendant on the
understanding
that they were for the purchase of the first
plaintiff's beauty salon equipment. It, however, later emerged that
such payments
were not due to the defendant.
[4]
The plaintiffs are now claiming the repayment of these amounts
against
the defendant on the grounds of unjust enrichment.
Issues
[5]
The parties were not able to have a meaningful pre-trial conference
on
21 April 2022 due to the non-attendance by the defendant. The
defendant’s legal representative, who attended the conference
on 28 September 2021, was not in a position to engage meaningfully in
the conference as she had not had an opportunity to fully
familiarise
herself with the matter. At least three different law firms have
represented the defendant in the past. At the commencement
of the
trial, the defendant appeared in person. A summary of issues prepared
by the plaintiffs’ attorneys dated 6 December
2021 identifies
the following as issues for determination (in that document Kajal
Aheer is incorrectly referred to as the second
plaintiff and Vinesh
G. Aheer as the first plaintiff):
‘
2.
Whether the Second Plaintiff was
at any time indebted to the Defendant, and, if so, the
extent of such
alleged indebtedness.
3.
Whether the Defendant misrepresented to to the First Plaintiff that
the Second
Plaintiff was indebted to the Defendant in the amount of
R540,000.00.
4.
Whether such representation on the part of the Defendant was intended
to induce
the First Plaintiff to act thereon and to conclude an
agreement with the Defendant whereby he would accept liability for
the Second
Plaintiff’s alleged indebtedness and to pay to the
Defendant the amount of R540,000.00 in settlement of such alleged
indebtedness.
5.
Whether the First Plaintiff was induced by such representation on the
part of
the Defendant to:
(a)
Conclude an oral agreement with the Defendant in terms of which he
accepted
liability for the Second Plaintiff’s alleged
indebtedness in the sum of R540,000.00;
(b)
Pay an amount of R540,000.00 to the Defendant in accordance with such
oral agreement concluded.
6.
Whether any such oral agreement was in fact concluded between the
First Plaintiff
and the Defendant.
7.
Whether the First Plaintiff assumed liability for the Second
Plaintiff’s
alleged indebtedness to the Defendant in the amount
of R540,000.00 or any other amount freely, of his own accord and
without any
undue influence being exerted upon him.
8.
Whether the First Plaintiff effected payment of the amount of
R540,000.00 or
any other amount to the Defendant.
9.
Whether the First Plaintiff suffered damages by reason of the
aforesaid misrepresentation
on the part of the Defendant to him.
10.
In the
alternative
, whether any payments made by the First
Plaintiff to the Defendant were made in the
bona fide
and
reasonable but mistaken belief that the Second Defendant (sic) was
indebted to the Defendant in the amount of R540,000.00, which
indebtedness the First Plaintiff accepted liability for.
11.
Whether the Defendant was unjustifiably enriched at the expense of
the First Plaintiff and
the First Plaintiff impoverished in the
amount of R540,000.00 by reason of the Defendant having accepted
payment which was not
owing to her.
12.
Whether during or about 2017 and at or near Greytown the Second
Plaintiff and the Defendant
concluded an oral agreement in terms of
which:
(a)
The Second Plaintiff would make payments of varying amounts to the
Defendant
as requested by the Defendant from time to time, either
directly to the Defendant or to such third parties as nominated by
the
Defendant;
(b)
Such payments made by the Second Plaintiff to or on behalf of the
Defendant
would constitute compensation for the Defendant not
divulging and/or publishing private and personal information
regarding the
Second Plaintiff which was within the Defendant’s
knowledge;
13.
Whether such oral agreement concluded between the Second Plaintiff
and
the Defendant is illegal and null and void by reason of:
(a)
The purported transaction forming the subject matter of the agreement
amounts to extortion,
alternatively
blackmail of the Second
Plaintiff on the part of the Defendant;
(b)
It being against public policy and/or good morals.
14.
Whether the Second Plaintiff is entitled to restitution of any and/or
all such amounts paid
from time to time to the Defendant and to third
parties as nominated by the Defendant.
15.
Whether payments made by the Second Plaintiff to or on behalf of the
Defendant were made:
(a)
By reason of the Second Plaintiff having engaged the services of the
Defendant
to perform services as a clairvoyant, which involved tarot
card readings;
(b)
For services rendered by the Defendant to the Second Plaintiff to
conduct
spells, rituals and reasons at the request of the Plaintiff
(sic);
(c)
As payment for amount(s) agreed upon between the parties.
16.
Whether the Defendant complied with any requests for such services on
the part of the Second
Plaintiff and whether the Defendant was paid
by the Second Plaintiff for such services rendered.
17.
Whether the Defendant has been unjustifiably enriched by such
payments made by the Second
Plaintiff to her or to third parties
nominated by her.
18.
Whether the Second Plaintiff made payment to or on behalf of the
Defendant in accordance
with the oral agreement referred to above in
the total amount of R5,172,678.00.
19.
In the
alternative
, whether any payments made by the Second
Plaintiff to the Defendant were made in the
bona fide
and
reasonable but mistaken belief that she was obliged to make such
payments and indebted to the Defendant for not divulging and/or
publishing private and personal information about her which was
within the Defendant’s knowledge.
20.
Whether the Defendant was unjustifiably enriched at the expense of
the Second Plaintiff
and the Second Plaintiff impoverished in the
amount of R5,172,678.00 by reason of the Defendant having accepted
payments made to
her or on her behalf and which were not owing to
her.
21.
Whether the Second Plaintiff and the Defendant at any time concluded
an oral agreement in
terms of which:
(a)
The Second Plaintiff leased salon space from the Defendant where she
would
render beauty services to members of the public;
(b)
The Second Plaintiff would order beauty products from the Defendant
which
she would then sell to members of the public, the cost of which
the Second Plaintiff would be liable for;
(c)
The Second Plaintiff leased storage space at the Defendant’s
home where she would store furniture and some of her personal
belongings.
22.
Whether the Second Plaintiff was indebted to the Defendant in the
amount of R290,000.00
pursuant to such oral agreement.
23.
Whether the First Plaintiff assumed liability for any indebtedness on
the part of the Second
Plaintiff to the Defendant pursuant to any
such oral agreement.
24.
Whether any amount paid by the First and/or Second plaintiffs’
to the Defendant was
pursuant to the Second Plaintiff’s alleged
indebtedness to the Defendant in terms of such oral agreement.’
[6]
The trial initially came before Rasool AJ. Mr Pammenter and Ms Franke
appeared for both plaintiffs and the defendant appeared in person.
The defendant unsuccessfully applied for a postponement of the
trial.
After the refusal of the application for a postponement, the
defendant applied for the recusal of the judge on the grounds
that
she belongs to the same group of advocates as Mr Pammenter. The judge
recused herself and this matter came before me.
Application
for postponement
[7]
When the trial commenced before me, and despite the fact that the
postponement
application had been dealt with, the defendant made a
fresh application for a postponement on the grounds that she was not
able
to deal with the trial. This application was opposed by the
plaintiffs.
[8]
On 11 April 2023, the trial which had been set down for
29, 30 and 31
August 2023, was postponed
sine die
, and time limits were set
for the appointment of expert witnesses, in the event that the
defendant elected to do so. The defendant
was directed to pay the
wasted costs. This matter was granted preference for the trial to
proceed on 6, 7, 8 and 9 November 2023.
[9]
In
National
Police Service Union and others v Minister of Safety and Security and
others
[1]
it was held as follows:
‘
The
postponement of a matter set down for hearing on a particular date
cannot be claimed as of right. An applicant for a postponement
seeks
an indulgence from the Court. Such postponement will not be granted
unless this Court is satisfied that it is in the interests
of justice
to do so. In this respect the applicant must show that there is good
cause for the postponement. In order to satisfy
the Court that good
cause does exist, it will be necessary to furnish a full and
satisfactory explanation of the circumstances
that give rise to the
application.
’ (Footnote omitted.)
[10]
The defendant failed to support her application for a postponement
and
accordingly, I refused it.
[11]
In the plea, the defendant alleges,
inter alia
, that the first
plaintiff was indebted to her and denies the amounts claimed by both
plaintiffs.
[12]
The defendant was present in court on the first day of trial. On the
second day of trial,
I was advised by Mr Pammenter that the defendant
reported via an anonymous caller, who made contact with a member of
the court
staff, that the defendant had fallen ill. No further
details were provided. The matter stood down for the plaintiffs’
attorneys
to investigate the whereabouts of the defendant. On
resumption, I was advised that the plaintiffs’ attorney, Mr S
Pillay,
attempted to communicate with the defendant. Mr Pillay
testified under oath on his investigations, namely that he sent a
WhatsApp
message to the defendant and made a phone call to her. Mr
Pillay sought to find out from the defendant the details of her
reported
illness. Furthermore, Mr Pillay provided documentary
evidence of his attempts in the form of images of the WhatsApp
message that
he sent on 7 November 2023 at 09:54 and phone calls made
thereafter.
[13]
After
hearing the evidence of Mr Pillay and the submissions made on behalf
of the plaintiffs, I ordered that the trial should proceed
in terms
of the provisions of Uniform rule 39(1) in the absence of the
defendant and ordered the plaintiffs to lead evidence.
[2]
In the absence of an appearance by the defendant, she was regarded as
being in default.
Evidence
[14]
The first plaintiff testified that during 2017, she was living in
Greytown with her father,
the second plaintiff, and that her mother
had passed away in July 2015. The first plaintiff had a close
relationship with her late
mother and she regarded her as a friend
and a confidant. On the other hand, the first plaintiff had an ‘on
and off’
relationship with the second plaintiff, which could be
described as ‘bumpy’. She testified that she had one
sibling.
The first plaintiff completed her matric in 2010, and then
studied at Varsity College where she obtained her degree in business
principles and practice in 2013. After she had completed her degree,
she studied beauty therapy and qualified in 2016. The first
plaintiff’s mother passed away suddenly due to a heart attack.
She had no opportunity for bid farewell and her heart was
broken. The
first plaintiff battled to cope with the death of her mother and in
2017, she saw an advertisement by the defendant
offering psychic
services, on Gumtree, responded to it and started to communicate with
the defendant. The advertisement described
the defendant as being
able to connect with the dead. The defendant represented to her that
she was able to connect with the first
plaintiff’s mother and
that she could communicate with her. The first plaintiff desperately
wanted those services because
she wanted closure and felt that she
did not get a chance to say goodbye to her late mother. The first
plaintiff and defendant
both follow the Hindu religion. The first
plaintiff believed that the defendant had supernatural powers, which
enabled her to pray
to a deity and connect with the dead. The
defendant’s fees were, at best, loosely discussed.
[15]
After establishing contact with the defendant, the first plaintiff
relocated from Greytown
to Durban in order to be closer to the
defendant.
[16]
The first plaintiff was not present when the defendant communicated
with her late mother.
She received updates on these communications
from the defendant. At some stage in the beginning of their
relationship, the defendant
advised the first plaintiff that her late
mother was very happy that she was in contact with her and forming a
relationship with
the defendant. The first plaintiff felt a sense of
relief when she received updates from the defendant and she commenced
making
various payments. According to the first plaintiff, she was
happy to pay the defendant in the initial stages of their
relationship
but not after 20 October 2017, which was when the
defendant started blackmailing the first plaintiff. The first
plaintiff believed
that the defendant was communicating with her late
mother. The defendant told the first plaintiff that there were people
who wanted
to harm her. The first plaintiff testified that the
defendant offered a solution and assured her that she will stop
people from
harming her by putting a spell on them. The defendant
then demanded money from the first plaintiff for protection. The
defendant
indicated to the first plaintiff that she was going to
connect with the first plaintiff’s deceased mother when no one
was
present.
[17]
At some stage, the defendant went behind the first plaintiff’s
back and bought a beauty salon, La Vida Spa, which the first
plaintiff had intended to purchase. The first plaintiff was operating
as a beauty therapist at La Vida Spa. After the purchase, the first
plaintiff became the defendant’s tenant and paid monthly
rentals to her.
[18]
The first plaintiff testified on the various entries in exhibit ‘C’,
being
the various amounts of money that she paid to the defendant
using her bank accounts and/or bank accounts of other people, as
directed
by the defendant. Exhibit ‘C’ also documents
certain entries with amounts not forming part of the claim. The
amounts
listed in exhibit ‘C’ correspond with various
entries in the first plaintiff’s bank statements.
[19]
The first plaintiff also testified about a payment to an entity
called ‘Ford’.
According to her, it was a payment
demanded by the defendant which she made for the purchase of a Ford
Mustang on behalf of the
defendant.
[20]
The testimony of the first plaintiff dealt with the details of the
relevant transactions
that appear below, which have been taken from
exhibit ‘C’. The exhibit has dates for the various
transactions, describes
the nature of each transaction, the amounts
involved, explanations (in which the parties are referred to by their
first names)
and the corresponding page numbers in the bundle. Those
transactions that have been specifically waived by the first
plaintiff,
and those before 20 October 2017, have been excluded. The
first plaintiff persists with the entries quoted below:
Date
Transaction
Amount
Explanation
Trial bundle page
number
06/11/2017
Cash withdrawal
R30 000.00
Deborah began
demanding more money and threatening to expose information and
pictures of Kajal, if Kajal did not pay her
Vol
1: Page 69
15/11/2017
Cash withdrawal
R20 000.00
Deborah forced Kajal
to withdraw cash and threatened to ruin her reputation if she did
not give her the money
Vol
1: Page 72
01/12/2017
Cash withdrawal
R40 000.00
Deborah extorted
Kajal, forcing her to withdraw the cash
Vol
1: Page 75
01/12/2017
Cash withdrawal
R40 000.00
Deborah extorted
Kajal, forcing her to withdraw the cash
Vol
1: Page 75
08/12/2017
Internet bank transfer
R122 400.00
Deborah extorted
Kajal, forcing her to transfer the cash
Vol
1: Page 77
14/12/2017
Eldorado Jewellers
R21 720.00
Deborah blackmailed
Kajal and threatened to expose her, if she did not purchase
jewellery, in the form of gold bangles
Vol
1: Page 78
18/12/2017
Internet bank transfer
R100 000.00
Deborah knew that
Kajal was expecting money from her late mother’s estate and
she forced Kajal to transfer the money
to her bank account
Vol
1: Page 79
13/01/2018
Cash withdrawal
R50 000.00
Deborah demanded that
Kajal withdraw the cash and pay same to her or she will expose her
and ruin her life
Vol
1:
Page 81
13/01/2018
Internet bank transfer
R25 000.00
Deborah threatened to
expose Kajal’s personal information and demanded that she
make the internet bank transfer if she
did not comply (sic)
Vol
1: Page 81
13/01/2018
Internet bank transfer
R25 000.00
Deborah threated to
expose Kajal’s information and demanded that she make the
internet bank transfer if she did not
comply (sic)
Vol 1:
Page 81
13/01/2018
Internet bank transfer
R25 000.00
Deborah threatened to
expose Kajal’s personal information and demanded that she
make the internet bank transfer if she
did not comply (sic)
Vol
1: Page 81
13/01/2018
Internet bank transfer
R25 000.00
Deborah threatens to
expose Kajal’s personal information and demanded that she
make the internet bank transfer if she
did not comply (sic)
Vol
1: Page 81
16/01/2018
Eldorado Jewellers
*Annexure “A”
R10 000.00
R10 000.00
Deborah blackmailed
Kajal and threatened to expose her, if she did not purchase
jewellery, in the form of a gold chain
Vol
1: Page 83
This entry changed
during the evidence from R18 800.00 to R10 000.00 when
the first plaintiff admitted that she
was not claiming R8 800.00
in this entry
20/01/2018
Internet bank transfer
R50 000.00
[R25 000.00 +
R5000.00+R20 000.00]
Deborah was aware that
money came from Kajal’s trust account and demanded various
payments
Vol
1:
Page 85
22/01/2018
Cash withdrawal
R50 000.00
Deborah was aware the
money came from Kajal’s trust account and demanded various
cash withdrawals
Vol
1:
Page 85
16/02/2018
Cash withdrawal
R146 000.00
Deborah was aware that
money came from Kajal’s trust account and demanded a large
cash withdrawal, she threatened to
ruin Kajal’s life if
Kajal did not comply
Vol
1:
Page 90
24/03/2018
Cash Withdrawal
R400 000.00
Deborah blackmailed
Kajal and forced her to withdraw the cash. She threatened to ruin
her life if she did not comply
Vol
1:
Page 98
07/04/2018
Internet Bank Transfer
R20 000.00
Deborah threatened to
expose Kajal’s personal information should she not satisfy
her demands for money. She also demanded
that the transfers be
done to separate bank accounts
Vol
1:
Page 100
07/04/2018
Internet Bank Transfer
R23 500.00
Deborah threatened to
expose Kajal’s personal information should she not satisfy
her demands for money. She also demanded
that the transfers be
done to separate bank accounts. Deborah had two separate bank
accounts
Vol 1:
Page 100
07/04/2018
Internet Bank Transfer
R20 000.00
Deborah threatened to
expose Kajal’s personal information should she not satisfy
her demands for money. She also demanded
that the transfers be
done to separate bank accounts. Deborah had two separate bank
accounts
Vol
1:
Page 100
07/04/2018
Internet Bank Transfer
R20 000.00
Deborah threatened to
expose Kajal’s personal information should she not satisfy
her demands for money. She also demanded
that the transfers be
done to separate bank accounts. Deborah had two separate bank
accounts
Vol 1:
Page 100
25/05/2018
Interbank Bank
Transfer
R12 000.00
Vol
2:
Page 110
07/06/2018
Internet Bank Transfer
R700 000.00
Vol
2:
Page 109
12/06/2018
Internet Bank Transfer
R450 000.00
Deborah demanded that
Kajal withdraw money from a Policy that she had and make two
payments to her
Vol
2:
Page 110
12/06/2018
Internet Bank Transfer
R6 000.00
Vol
2:
Page 110
12/06/2018
Internet Bank Transfer
R51 758.61
Vol
2:
Page 110
12/06/2018
Cash Withdrawal
R400 000.00
Deborah demanded that
one payment be made via EFT and the other be a cash withdrawal
Vol 2:
Page 110
22/08/2018
Internet Bank Transfer
R16 000.00
Vol
2:
Page 123
06/09/2018
Internet Bank Transfer
R6 700.00
Vol
2:
Page 126
07/12/2018
La Vida
R6 700.00
Vol
2:
Page 145
12/12/2018
La Vida
R20 000.00
Deborah blackmailed
Kajal into transferring various amounts of money to the Spa owned
by Deborah – La Vida
Vol
2:
Page 145
01/02/2019
La Vida
R6 000.00
Deobrah demanded
constant payments of R6 000.00 into two separate La Vida bank
accounts (she had two bank accounts for
the Spa she owned –
La Vida)
Vol
2:
Page 154
08/02/2019
La Vida
R6 700.00
Deborah knew that
Kajal collected this amount as her monthly interest from
Investment, Deborah demanded that this amount be
paid to the Spa
that Deborah owned – called La Vida
Vol
2:
Page 155
25/02/2019
La Vida
R6 000.00
Deborah demanded
constant payments of R6 000.00 into two separate La Vida bank
accounts, (she had two bank accounts for
the Spa she owned –
La Vida)
Vol
2:
Page 158
07/03/2019
La Vida
R6 700.00
Deborah knew that
Kajal collected this amount as her monthly interest from
Investment, Deborah demanded that this amount be
paid to the Spa
that Deborah owned – called La Vida.
Vol
2:
Page 160
09/03/2019
La Vida
R50 000.00
Deborah demanded Kajal
pay larger sums of money into La Vida bank account, from her trust
monies
Vol
2:
Page 160
11/03/2019
Internet Bank Transfer
R10 000.00
Deborah was aware that
money came from Kajal’s trust account and demanded various
payments
Vol
2:
Page 160
19/03/2019
La Vida
R30 000.00
Deborah demanded Kajal
pay larger sums of money into La Vida Bank account, from her trust
monies
Vol
2:
Page 163
19/03/2019
La Vida
R20 000.00
Deborah demanded Kajal
pay larger sums of money into La Vida Bank account, from her trust
monies
Vol
2:
Page 163
19/03/2019
La Vida
R100 000.00
Deborah demanded Kajal
pay larger sums of money into La Vida Bank account, from her trust
monies
Vol
2:
Page 163
19/03/2019
Internet Bank Transfer
R1 000 000.00
Deborah demanded money
to purchase a vehicle
Vol
2:
Page 163
20/03/2019
La Vida
R30 000.00
Deborah demanded Kajal
pay larger sums of money into La Vida Bank account, from her trust
monies
Vol
2:
Page 163
20/03/2019
La Vida
R20 000.00
Deborah demanded Kajal
pay larger sums of money into La Vida Bank account, from her trust
monies
Vol
2:
Page 163
22/03/2019
Internet Bank Transfer
R200 000.00
Deborah blackmailed
Kajal into transferring money to her bank accounts and threatened
to ruin her life if she didn’t
comply
Vol
2:
Page 163
25/03/2019
La Vida
R6 000.00
Deborah demanded
constant payments of R6 000.00 into two separate La Vida bank
accounts,(she had two bank accounts for
the Spa she owned –
La Vida)
Vol
2:
Page 165
26/04/2019
La Vida
R6 000.00
Deborah demanded
constant payments of R6 000.00 into two separate La Vida bank
accounts, (she had two bank accounts for
the Spa she owned –
La Vida)
Vol
2:
Page 168
24/05/2019
La Vida
R10 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R50 000.00 be made by way of R10 000.00
payments into La Vida’s two separate bank
accounts
Vol
2:
Page 176
24/05/2019
La Vida
R10 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R50 000.00 be made by way of R10 000.00
payments into La Vida’s two separate bank
accounts
Vol
2:
Page 176
24/05/2019
La Vida
R10 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R50 000000 be made by way of R10 000.00 payments
into La Vida’s two separate bank accounts
Vol
2:
Page 176
24/05/2019
La Vida
R10 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R50 000.00 be made by way of R10 000.00
payments into La Vida’s two separate bank
accounts
Vol
2:
Page 176
24/05/2019
La Vida
R10 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R50 000.00 be made by way of R10 000.00
payments into La Vida’s two separate bank
accounts
Vol
2:
Page 176
06/06/2019
Cash withdrawal
R100 000.00
Deborah blackmailed
Kajal into paying her large sums of money. She promised Kajal that
she would stop demanding payments,
but continued to do so and
continued to extort Kajal
Vol
2:
Page 179
26/06/2018
La Vida
R6 000.00
Deborah demanded
constant payments of R6 000.00 into two separate La Vida bank
accounts, (she had two bank accounts for
the Spa she owned –
La Vida)
Vol
2:
Page 182
27/07/2019
La Vida
R6 000.00
Vol
2:
Page 188
31/08/2019
La Vida
R6 000.00
Vol
2:
Page 194
30/09/2019
La Vida
R6 000.00
Deborah demanded
constant payments of R6 000.00 into two separate La Vida bank
accounts, (she had two bank accounts for the
Spa she owned –
La Vida)
Vol
2:
Page 199
03/10/2019
La Vida
R15 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R50 000000 be made by way of smaller payments into La
Vida’s two separate bank accounts
Vol
2:
Page 200
03/10/2019
La Vida
R20 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R50 000.00 be made by way of small payments into
La Vida’s two separate bank accounts
Vol
2:
Page 200
03/10/2019
La Vida
R15 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R50 000.00 be made by way of smaller payments into
La Vida’s two separate bank accounts
Vol
2:
Page 200
03/10/2019
Interbank Bank
Transfer
R100 000.00
Deborah blackmailed
Kajal into paying her large sums of money. She promised Kajal that
she would stop demanding payments,
but continued to do so and
continued to extort Kajal.
Vol
2:
Page 200
30/10/2019
La Vida
R6 000.00
Deborah demanded
constant payments of R6 000.00 into two separate La Vida bank
accounts (she had two bank accounts for
the Spa she owned –
La Vida)
Vol
3:
Page 205
30/11/2019
La Vida
R6 600.00
Deborah demanded
constant payments of R6 000.00 into two separate La Vida bank
accounts, (she had two bank accounts for
the Spa she owned –
La Vida)
Vol
3:
Page 211
06/12/2019
Eldorado Jewellers
R106 900.00
Deborah blackmailed
Kajal into paying her large sums of money. She promised Kajal that
she would stop demanding payments,
but continued to do so and
continued to extort Kajal
Vol 3:
page 212
07/12/2019
La Vida
R15 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R45 000000 be made way of smaller payments into La
Vida’s two separate bank accounts
Vol
3:
Page 213
17/12/2019
La Vida
R20 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R45 000.00 be made by way of smaller payments into
La Vida’s two separate bank accounts
Vol
3:
Page 215
22/12/2019
22/12/2019
La Vida
La Vida
R8 000.00
R 2 000.00
Deborah demanded
payment of R45 000.00 be made by way of smaller payments of
La Vida’s two separate bank accounts
Deborah demanded
payment of R45 000.00 be made by way of smaller payments into La
Vida’s two separate bank accounts
Vol
3:
Page 216
Volume
3
Page 216
27/12/2019
La Vida
R4 000.00
Vol
3:
Page 217
31/12/2019
La Vida
R6 600.00
Deborah knew that
Kajal collected this amount as her monthly interest from
Investment, Deborah demanded that this amount be
paid to the Spa
that Deborah owned – called La Vida
Vol
3:
Page 217
01/01/2020
La Vida
R11 000.00
Vol
3:
Page 217
10/01/2020
La Vida
R10 000.00
Deborah demanded Kajal
pay various sums of money into La Vida Bank accounts, and
threatened to ruin her if she did not comply
Vol
3:
Page 218
10/01/2020
La Vida
R5 000.00
Deborah demanded Kajal
pay various sums of money into La Vida bank accounts, and
threatened to ruin her if she did not comply
Vol
3:
Page 218
10/01/2020
La Vida
R5 000.00
Deborah demanded Kajal
pay various sums of money into La Vida Bank accounts, and
threatened to ruin her if she did not comply
Vol
3:
Page 219
10/01/2020
Cash withdrawal
R25 000.00
Deborah demanded a
cash payment of R30 000.00
Vol
3:
Page 219
10/01/2020
Cash withdrawal
R5 000.00
Deborah demanded a
cash payment of R30 000.00
Vol
3:
Page 219
20/06/2020
La Vida
R1 500.00
Deborah continued to
blackmail Kajal into making payments into her La Vida bank
accounts.
Vol
3
Page 228
04/07/2020
La Vida
R1 000.00
Deborah continued to
blackmail Kajal into making payments into her La Vida bank
accounts
TOTAL AMOUNT DEALT
WITH IN EVIDENCE
R4,992,778,61
[21]
There were repeated demands for payment by the defendant. On 6
December 2019, on the instruction
of the defendant, the first
plaintiff bought jewellery for the defendant from Eldorado Jewellers
for R106 900.00. The defendant
did not want the jewellery. The
first plaintiff pawned it and received R15 000.00, which she
paid to the defendant via her
La Vida account on 7 December 2019. On
the same date, she made a further payment of R20 000.00 to the
defendant. The transactions
mentioned above amount to R4 992 778.61.
Whenever the first plaintiff had money, it was met with a demand for
payment from the
defendant. In the last stages, the first plaintiff
borrowed money from her brother in order to silence the defendant,
which she
paid over to the defendant. Under pressure from the
defendant, the first plaintiff was also forced into a situation where
she had
to lie to her father that she needed money in order to make
payments for the beauty salon. The last two payments were for
R1 500.00
and R1 000.00 and this, according to the first
plaintiff, was the point when she had exhausted all her funds,
including her
investments.
[22]
The first plaintiff then confessed everything to her brother and then
approached her current
attorneys of record in order to take action
against the defendant. The first plaintiff was terrified after she
instructed her attorneys,
as she continued to receive approaches from
the defendant. A protection order was obtained by the first plaintiff
which was allegedly
violated by the defendant.
[23]
The first plaintiff testified that she had shared the most intimate
details of her relationship
with her boyfriend and other
relationships that she was involved in with the defendant. The first
plaintiff trusted the defendant,
she went as far as sending the
defendant her explicit photographs that she would have sent to her
boyfriend. The first plaintiff
was afraid that the exposure of the
information by the defendant was going to disgrace her conservative
family, who were respected
by society. The defendant had information
and details of relationships that the first plaintiff had during the
times when she had
broken up with her boyfriend, which she threatened
to expose. After a number of payments aimed at ensuring that the
defendant did
not divulge the hidden harmful details, the defendant
divulged the information to the first plaintiff’s boyfriend and
this
led to their breakup. The disclosure of the harmful details
happened at the time when they were engaged to be married.
[24]
During her testimony, the first plaintiff was able to explain and
point
out that the photographs showing the defendant wearing pieces
of jewellery and a pendant with a Krugerrand coin. The pendant
belonged
to the first plaintiff and it previously belonged to her
late grandmother. The evidence of the keychain belonging to the first
plaintiff, being worn by the defendant, was also led, so too was the
evidence of earrings, gold watch (which was given to the first
plaintiff by her father’s former partner) and a Ford Mustang
that she was forced to buy or contribute towards.
[25]
The first plaintiff also pointed out that there were repeated threats
made by the defendant
to the effect that the first plaintiff was
going to be harmed, that she was going to die in an accident and that
her explicit photographs
were going to be exposed.
[26]
The first plaintiff’s father, the second plaintiff, also
testified. He testified
that he was based in Greytown where he was
running a cash and carry, which he described as very successful. He
confirmed that his
wife, the first plaintiff’s mother, passed
away in 2015 and that at the time of her death, they were separated.
He also confirmed
that his relationship with the first plaintiff was
strained. The second plaintiff testified that he received a phone
call from
the defendant who advised him that the first plaintiff was
indebted to the defendant in the sum of R540 000.00 and that he
had to settle the debt. The defendant also threatened that she was
going to take action if payment was not made. He did not want
his
daughter to be blacklisted and thus ended up making payments
totalling R540 000.00 at various stages. When he testified,
the
second plaintiff referred to the bank statements and pointed out the
transactions that he made in favour of the defendant.
[27]
Mr Clive Willows, a clinical psychologist, testified on the three
reports that he compiled,
which were delivered in terms of the
provisions of Uniform rule 36(9)
(b)
. Mr Willows testified that
he consulted with the first plaintiff on her relationship with the
defendant. He noted that the description
offered by the first
plaintiff demonstrates that she was under duress in the relationship
because the defendant posed a threat
to her safety, and had
information that she had threatened to make public which would have
negatively affected her personal, professional
and public image. The
information had the potential to cause her to be alienated by her
family, and tarnish her reputation and
integrity within the
community. It was the opinion of Mr Willows that the first plaintiff
perceived the threat made by the defendant
to be real, that there was
a likelihood that the defendant would act on her verbal threats, and
that such actions would result
in physical and/or psychological
damage to the first plaintiff. Furthermore, Mr Willows found that the
defendant’s threat
of disclosure enabled the defendant to
pressurise the first plaintiff into making payments for services
which may or may not have
been provided. It was evident to the first
plaintiff that she received no benefit from the defendant’s
services, apart from
some initial reassurances. The first plaintiff
was trapped in a traumatic relationship in which she was forced to
pay for services
that she did not want or face physical harm or
reputational damage. It was the finding of Mr Willows that the first
plaintiff could
not escape this entrapment without the risk of
exposing herself to the defendant’s threats. Mr Willows noted
that when the
first plaintiff initially responded to the defendant’s
advert, she was emotionally vulnerable, her childhood history was
such that she had a close and dependent relationship with her late
mother. When her mother died suddenly and unexpectedly on 23
July
2015, the first plaintiff did not have an opportunity to bid farewell
and to view her body. It was her wish to find closure
for her grief
by communicating through the defendant with her late mother.
[28]
Mr Willows again assessed the first plaintiff on 6 August 2021, when
he administered the
MMPI-2 personality test and scored the first
plaintiff. The results of the personality test reinforced the
opinions arising from
the clinical interviews which are expressed in
his report of 26 April 2021, and these results were not contradicted.
It is the
finding of Mr Willows that the personality feature of
‘dependency’ would contribute to an understanding why the
first
plaintiff was vulnerable to efforts to dominate or manipulate
her. It was found that the first plaintiff’s vulnerability was
accentuated by her tendency to be sensitive to the opinions that
others may have of her resulting in either an attempt to be compliant
or the harbouring of a hostile and resentful attitude. Mr Willows
explained that the first plaintiff was caught between the fear
to
remain in a relationship with the defendant versus the fear of the
consequences as a result of disclosure of what she had shared
with
the defendant. Mr Willows testified that because of trauma bonding,
the first plaintiff became vulnerable and open to abuse
by the
defendant.
[29]
Mr Michael John Irving, a forensic document examiner, testified that
the acknowledgement
of debt in favour of the defendant, which was
allegedly signed by the first plaintiff, was not signed by her. Mr
Irving testified
about the steps taken in order to deal with the
purported signature of the first plaintiff on the acknowledgement of
debt. He was
satisfied that he had a range of documents which he
could use to compare the signature of the first plaintiff. The
respondent did
not file any expert reports in order to deal with the
findings of Mr Irving.
The
law
[30]
Rule 39(1) of the Uniform Rules of Court reads:
‘
(1)
If, when a trial is called, the plaintiff appears and the defendant
does not appear, the
plaintiff may prove his claim so far as the
burden of proof lies upon him and judgment shall be given
accordingly, in so far as
he has discharged such burden: Provided
that where the claim is for a debt or liquidated demand no evidence
shall be necessary
unless the court otherwise orders.’
[31]
It is trite that:
‘
A
defendant who appears when the hearing of a trial action starts, but
thereafter withdraws and absents himself from the remainder
of the
proceedings, is regarded as being in default.’
[3]
[32]
In
National
Police Service Union and Others v Minister of Safety and Security and
Others
,
[4]
the court set out factors that need to be taken into account in an
application for a postponement:
‘
The
postponement of a matter set down for hearing on a particular date
cannot be claimed as of right. An applicant for a postponement
seeks
an indulgence from the Court. Such postponement will not be granted
unless this Court is satisfied that it is in the interests
of justice
to do so. In this respect the applicant must show that there is good
cause for the postponement. In order to satisfy
the Court that good
cause does exist, it will be necessary to furnish a full and
satisfactory explanation of the circumstances
that give rise to the
application. Whether a postponement will be granted is therefore in
the discretion of the Court and cannot
be secured by mere agreement
between the parties. In exercising that discretion, this Court
will take into account a number
of factors, including (but not
limited to): whether the application has been timeously made, whether
the explanation given by the
applicant for postponement is full and
satisfactory, whether there is prejudice to any of the parties and
whether the application
is opposed.
’
[5]
(Footnotes omitted.)
[33]
The court has a discretion on whether to
grant a postponement:
‘
The
legal principles applicable to an application for the grant of a
postponement by the court are as follows:
(a) The
court has a discretion as to whether an application for a
postponement should be granted or refused. Thus,
the court has a
discretion to refuse a postponement even when wasted costs are
tendered or even when the parties have agreed
to postpone the
matter.
’
[6]
[34]
The essential allegations for a claim based on fraud are the
following:
‘
(a)
A representation by the representor to
the representee. The representation usually concerns a
fact but may
relate to the expression of an opinion said to be held but which is
in fact not held.
Non-disclosure
can amount to a representation.
(b)
Fraud (i.e. that the representor
knew the representation to be false).
It
is not sufficient to allege that the representation was “false”,
because this word implies no more than that the
representation was
untrue. The mental element must be alleged.
The
representor must intend that the representee will act on the
representation.
(c)
Causation (i.e. the
representation must have induced the representee to act in response
to it).
(d)
If damages are claimed, it must
be alleged that the representee suffered damages because
of the
fraud.
(e)
If reliance is placed on fraudulent non-disclosure, facts giving rise
to the duty
to disclose must be set out. It is also necessary to show
that the breach of the duty to disclose was deliberate and intended
to
deceive.’
[7]
(References omitted.)
[35]
In
Ruto
Flour Mills (Pty) Ltd v Adelson
,
[8]
the court held the following:
‘
Generally
speaking fraud is proved when it is shown that a false representation
has been made, (i) knowingly or, (ii) without belief
in its truth or,
(iii) recklessly careless whether it be true or false. If there is an
honest belief in the truth of the false
statement then fraud is not
established. Negligence or unreasonableness in itself, however gross,
does not constitute an absence
of honest belief in questions of
fraud;
R v Myers
,
1948
(1) SA 375
(AD) at pp. 382 - 384. In the ordinary case of fraud,
apart from such factors as materiality and inducement, a plaintiff
has
to prove,
(a)
a
false representation or misrepresentation and,
(b)
the
state of mind of the defendant in respect of such representation. In
the present case, however, the alleged false representation
or
misrepresentation itself relates to the state of mind of the
defendant at the relevant time or times when the representation
was
made. A false representation about one's own state of mind can only
be made with knowledge of such falsity and it can hardly
be said that
the false representation was made in an honest belief in its truth.
There is, in my view, no room for an investigation
whether such a
false representation was made,
(a)
without
belief in its truth or,
(b)
recklessly
careless whether it be true or false.
’
[36]
Extortion
is ‘committed when a person unlawfully and intentionally
obtains some advantage, which may be … patrimonial
[in]
nature, from another by subjecting the latter to pressure which
induces her to hand over the advantage’.
[9]
The threat or pressure may ‘be express or implied by words or
deeds’.
[10]
‘The
threat or intimidation must have been exercised unlawfully’.
[11]
[37]
The author,
Jonathan Burchell in
Principles
of Criminal Law
,
[12]
suggests that it must be unlawful to use the pressure for the purpose
for which it is used and this depends on the nature and circumstances
of the threat and he gives an example in instances of blackmail. The
mere revelation of information that may be embarrassing to
another is
not self-evidently unlawful. It only becomes unlawful if the
objective of the threat is to exact some advantage which
is not due
to the extortioner.
[13]
Analysis
[38]
Given the fact that the first plaintiff cannot explain in great
detail the reasons for
her conduct during the subsistence of her
relationship with the defendant, she relied on the evidence of Mr
Clive Willows, a clinical
psychologist. The evidence by Mr Willows is
not contradicted by any other expert evidence. This expert was able
to explain the
reasons that led to the first plaintiff’s
behaviour, which in turn led her to make numerous payments to the
defendant. Mr
Willows also explained,
inter alia
, the concept
of trauma bonding and the first plaintiff’s vulnerability after
she lost her mother and in her pursuit of finding
closure. Mr
Willows, in explaining the concept, made reference to other forms of
known abusive relationships.
[39]
According to the papers made available, the defendant sought to rely
on an acknowledgement
of debt dated 30 April 2018 which documents,
inter alia,
that the first plaintiff is indebted to the
defendant in the sum of R2 500 000.00 and refers to a laser
liposuction machine
and household goods. In order to deal with the
acknowledgement of debt, the first plaintiff led the evidence of Mr
Irving, the
forensic document examiner. He concluded that the
signature affixed on the acknowledgement of debt was not that of the
first plaintiff
and that the signature was written by the writer of
the handwritten portion of the acknowledgement of debt. The defendant
did not
file any expert report in order to deal with the findings of
Mr Irving.
[40]
The second plaintiff testified about how he was led to believe that
the first plaintiff
owed the defendant an amount of R540 000.00.
During his testimony, the first plaintiff was able to prove the
transactions
that he made in favour of the defendant and explained
how he later learnt that the transactions were not legitimate. The
second
plaintiff was misled by the defendant into making the
payments, when it was misrepresented to him by the defendant that the
first
plaintiff was indebted to the defendant in respect of the
beauty salon.
[41]
The allegations made by the plaintiffs are supported by the evidence
presented. Had the
defendant carried on with her defence, she would
have had a more difficult case to argue.
[42]
For the most part, the first plaintiff kept a minimum balance in her
bank account. There
is a pattern in the manner in which withdrawals
were made from the first plaintiff’s investments. Bigger
amounts would be
deposited into the first plaintiff’s bank
account from the investment account, and would immediately be
withdrawn and/or
transferred to the defendant and/or persons with
links to the defendant.
[43]
With regard to the first plaintiff, there are two distinct contracts
that she had entered
into with the defendant. The first was for the
services of a psychic and the second was for the defendant to keep
quiet.
[44]
There was no evidence led which suggested that the payments made
before 20 October 2017
were improper and that they were induced by
means of fraudulent misrepresentations and/or extortion.
[45]
Part of the
requirements for fraudulent misrepresentation is that the
misrepresentation must be material.
[14]
[46]
There are
divergent views on what test to use to determine if the
misrepresentation was material. In
Lourens
en ‘n ander v Genis
[15]
it was held that the plaintiff had acted at his own risk in believing
the defendant, and that an objective test was to be applied.
Otto
en ‘n Ander v Heymans
[16]
and
Orville
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Sandfontein Motors
[17]
disagreed with
Lourens
and held that a subjective test is to be applied.
[47]
The first plaintiff and the defendant share the same religious
beliefs. The first plaintiff
sought closure and wanted to establish
some contact with her late mother. The defendant matched the profile
of someone who could
help in this regard. Mr Willows dealt with the
first plaintiff’s state of mind before coming into contact with
the defendant.
There is nothing wrong, in my view, with the first
contract. There is no evidence of anything untoward before 20 October
2017,
and the first plaintiff clearly pointed out when she testified
that there was nothing wrong with her relationship with the defendant
before that date.
[48]
The second
contract is, however, a very different matter, and points towards
extortion.
[18]
[49]
Extortion,
aimed at obtaining an advantage in the form of payment ,offends the
rights of the first plaintiff. The author, J R L
Milton
[19]
uses the example of an extortionist threatening to assault his victim
unless a due debt is paid. The requirements of wrongfulness
and
intention should be looked at. If the act is regarded as unlawful (as
judged by the
boni
mores
of society), and the wrongdoer is shown to have made the threat or
exerted pressure with the knowledge of wrongfulness, the offence
is
committed. If no advantage is obtained, the wrongdoer will only be
guilty of attempted extortion.
[50]
The second contract was, accordingly, entered into for an illegal
purpose and it is thus
illegal. The first plaintiff is entitled to
restitution.
[51]
The misrepresentations made to the second plaintiff by the defendant
induced him to make
payments totalling R540 000.00. If it was
not for the misrepresentations, it is unlikely that the defendant
would have received
any payments from the second plaintiff. These
payments came directly after the first plaintiff had ran out of
money. It is clear
that the defendant preyed on the plaintiffs
because she knew that they had the financial resources.
[52]
The facts of this matter reveal the possible commission of a crime.
It is accordingly prudent
for this judgment to be referred to the
National Director of Public Prosecutions to consider whether to
institute criminal proceedings
against the defendant.
Interest
and costs
[53]
In the particulars of claim, each of the plaintiffs seek interest on
the claimed amounts
‘...from date of judgment to date of full
and final payment’. The plaintiffs did not seek any amendments
in this regard
and no argument was advanced on their behalf to the
effect that interest should be applied differently.
[54]
There is no reason to depart from the general rule that a successful
party should be awarded
costs. In the circumstances of this case, the
order for costs should also include all those costs which have been
reserved.
[55]
The issues
arising in these consolidated matters are complex and the nature of
the evidence presented by the experts added to the
burden of
responsibility undertaken by counsel.
[20]
It appears to have been a wise and reasonable precaution to employ
more than one counsel.
Order
[56]
The probabilities favour the evidence of the plaintiffs and the
experts. In the circumstances,
the first and second plaintiffs’
claims against the defendant should succeed. I accordingly grant
judgment in the following
terms:
(a)
The defendant is ordered to pay the first plaintiff the sum of
R4 992 778.61.
(b)
The defendant is ordered to pay the second plaintiff the sum
of R540 000.00.
(c)
The defendant is ordered to pay interest on
the above amounts at the applicable legal rate of interest calculated
from the date
of judgment to date of final payment.
(d)
The defendant is to pay the plaintiffs’ costs of suit,
such costs are to include:
(i)
all costs previously reserved;
(ii)
the costs of the plaintiffs’ experts,
costs of their reports and court attendances; and
(iii)
the costs of two counsel where both senior
and junior counsel have been so employed.
(e)
The Registrar is directed to bring this
judgment to the attention of the National Director of Public
Prosecutions for consideration
of instituting possible criminal
proceedings against the defendant.
Sibisi
AJ
Appearances:
Counsel
for the first and second
plaintiffs:
Mr Pammenter SC and
Ms Franke
Attorney
for the first and second
plaintiffs:
Grant and Swanepoel
Attorneys
Suite 1, The Mews
Redlands Estate
1 George MacFarlane
Lane
Pietermaritzburg
Tel:033 342 0375
Fax: 086 501
0102
Email:
reial@gsalaw.co.za
Ref: R Mahabeer/S
Pillay/
05A002220
Counsel for the
defendant:
In person
Dates of hearing:
6, 7 and 8 November
2023
Date of judgment:
8 February 2024
[1]
National
Police Service Union and others v Minister of Safety and Security
and others
[2000] ZACC 15
;
2000 (4) SA 1110
(CC);
2001 (8) BCLR 775
(CC) para
4.
[2]
Uniform rule 39(1) provides as follows:
‘
39
Trial
(1)
If, when a trial is called, the plaintiff appears and the
defendant does not appear, the plaintiff may prove his claim so far
as the burden of proof lies upon him and judgment shall be given
accordingly, in so far as he has discharged such burden: Provided
that where the claim is for a debt or liquidated demand no evidence
shall be necessary unless the court otherwise orders.’
[3]
D
E Van Loggerenberg Erasmus: Superior Court Practice (RS 21, 2023) at
D1-527. See also
Katritsis
v De Macedo
1966
(1) SA 613
(A) and
Hayes
v Baldachin and others
1980 (2) SA 589
(R).
[4]
National
Police Service Union and others v Minister of Safety and Security
and others
[2000] ZACC 15
;
2000 (4) SA 1110
(CC);
2001 (8) BCLR 775
(CC) para
4.
[5]
See
also
Lekolwane
and another v Minister of Justice and Constitutional Development
[2006] ZACC 19
;
2007 (3) BCLR 280
(CC) para 17.
[6]
D
E van Loggerenberg
Erasmus:
Superior Court Practice
(RS 21, 2023) at D1-553.
[7]
L
T C Harms
Amler’s
Precedents of Pleadings
9
ed (2018) at 204.
[8]
Ruto
Flour Mills (Pty) Ltd v Adelson
1959
(4) SA 120
(T) at 122G–123A.
[9]
S
V Hoctor
Snyman’s
Criminal Law
7
ed (2020) at 369.
[10]
Ibid
at 370.
[11]
Ibid
at 371.
[12]
J
Burchell
Principles
of Criminal Law
5
ed (2016) at 738-739.
[13]
See
R
v Mahomed
1929 AD 58
at 67; and
S
v Mntoninthsi
1970 (2) SA 443
(E).
[14]
See
Novick
and Another v Comair Holdings Ltd and others
1979
(2) SA 116
(W) at 149G and
Quartermark
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mkhwanazi and another
[2013] ZASCA 150
;
2014 (3) SA 96
(SCA) para 14.
[15]
Lourens
en ‘n ander v Genis
1962
(1) SA 431
(T) at 433E-H.
[16]
Otto
en ‘n ander v Heymans
1971
(4) SA 148 (T).
[17]
Orville
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Sandfontein Motors
2000
(2) SA 886 (T).
[18]
See the definition for extortion earlier in the judgment. See also J
R L Milton
South
African Criminal Law and Procedure (Volume II) Common-law Crimes
3 ed (1996) at 681:
‘
Extortion
consists in obtaining from another some advantage by unlawfully and
intentionally subjecting him to pressure which induces
him to submit
to the taking.’
[19]
Ibid at 689.
[20]
Henry v
AA Mutual Insurance Association Ltd
1979
(1) SA 105
(C).