Commissioner for South African Revenue Services v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (503/11) [2012] ZASCA 103; 2012 (5) SA 344 (SCA); [2012] 3 All SA 367 (SCA) (1 June 2012)

75 Reportability

Brief Summary

Tax Law — Value-Added Tax — Definition of 'imported services' — The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service assessed De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd for VAT on services rendered by a foreign advisory firm, claiming these constituted 'imported services' under the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 — De Beers contended that the services were utilized for making taxable supplies and thus not 'imported services' — The Tax Court upheld De Beers' appeal, leading to the Commissioner’s appeal. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the Tax Court erred in its interpretation of 'imported services' and ruled that the advisory services did constitute 'imported services' and that the VAT on local services did not qualify as deductible input tax, thereby overturning the Tax Court's decision.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This judgment concerns an appeal and a cross-appeal arising from value-added tax (VAT) assessments issued under the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991. The proceedings were heard in the Supreme Court of Appeal of South Africa (SCA) following a decision of the Tax Court, Cape Town (Davis J sitting with two assessors).


The Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service (the Commissioner) was the appellant in the main appeal. De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited (DBCM) was the respondent in the main appeal and the cross-appellant in the cross-appeal. The dispute arose from DBCM’s engagement of foreign and local professional advisors in connection with a complex corporate transaction that resulted in De Beers “effectively” ceasing to be listed (described in evidence as having “went private”).


The procedural history was that, after the transaction was implemented, the Commissioner issued assessments (18 October 2004) determining that certain foreign advisory services constituted “imported services” attracting VAT in terms of s 7(1)(c), and further determining that VAT charged by local service providers did not qualify as deductible input tax. DBCM objected (1 February 2005), the objection was disallowed (8 September 2005), and DBCM appealed to the Tax Court (notice of appeal: 14 October 2005). The Tax Court upheld DBCM’s appeal on the “imported services” issue, largely disallowed input tax on local services but allowed a partial deduction in relation to one firm (WWB) subject to apportionment. The Commissioner appealed to the SCA with leave of the Tax Court, and DBCM cross-appealed against the disallowance of the remaining local input tax.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was the VAT treatment of advisory and professional services (foreign and local) obtained to evaluate, structure, and implement a takeover and restructuring transaction, and specifically whether such services were acquired and consumed for the purpose of making taxable supplies in the course or furtherance of DBCM’s enterprise.


2. Material Facts


DBCM carried on the mining and international sale of diamonds. Prior to the transaction, DBCM’s shares were linked to depository receipts representing an interest in shares issued by a Swiss company, De Beers Centenary AG (DBAG). A DBCM share plus its linked depository receipt constituted a “linked unit” listed on multiple exchanges including the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), the London Stock Exchange (LSE), and the Swiss exchange (SWX). DBCM also held a substantial shareholding in Anglo American PLC (Anglo) (and another group company held additional Anglo shares), creating significant cross-shareholding features relevant to the transaction’s structure.


In November 2000, a consortium comprising Anglo, Central Holdings Ltd SA (CHL), and Debswana Diamond Company (Pty) Ltd (Debswana) proposed a transaction under which independent unit holders’ interests would be eliminated and a new Luxembourg company, DB Investments (SA) (DBI), would become the holding company of DBCM and DBAG. To evaluate whether the consortium’s proposals were fair and reasonable to independent unit holders, the boards established an Independent Committee of Directors (ICD). The ICD was authorised to appoint NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd (NMR), a London-based financial advisor, as independent financial advisors. DBCM also appointed various South African advisors and service providers (including attorneys and other professional firms) to assist in finalising and implementing the transaction.


After negotiations, a final improved offer was made on 30 April 2001, which NMR considered fair and reasonable to independent unit holders. The ICD advised the boards accordingly, and the independent unit holders accepted the offer at a scheme meeting convened under a scheme of arrangement pursuant to s 311 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973. The scheme was sanctioned by the court on 18 May 2001 and implemented shortly thereafter. The structure included a “buy back” leg (DBCM acquired 1% of shareholders’ shares and distributed Anglo shares and a dividend pro rata) and a “cancellation” leg (the balance of shares held by independent unit holders were cancelled for cash and additional Anglo shares). The result was that the listed linked units ceased and all the shares in DBCM and DBAG became owned by DBI, whose shareholders were Anglo (45%), CHL (40%), and Debswana (15%).


On 7 June 2001, after the transaction had been realised, NMR issued an invoice to DBCM for US$19 895 965, which DBCM paid at a rand cost of R161 064 684. Between March 2001 and January 2002, the local suppliers rendered invoices including VAT, which DBCM treated as input tax in its VAT returns.


The Commissioner assessed DBCM on 18 October 2004, determining that NMR’s services were “imported services” and assessing R22 549 055.76 VAT payable under s 7(1)(c). The Commissioner also disallowed R7 021 855.48 of input tax relating to local services. These assessments, and the characterisation of the services for VAT purposes, formed the basis of the dispute.


To the extent that the place of utilisation/consumption was argued, the court recorded that only two of five substantive ICD meetings occurred in London, while the DBCM board meetings where recommendations were received and decisions taken occurred in Johannesburg, and the scheme of arrangement was approved and implemented in South Africa. The Tax Court did not decide the “place of consumption” point because it held that the services were not imported services on the “purpose” leg.


3. Legal Issues


The central questions before the SCA concerned the correct application of statutory definitions in the VAT Act to the facts, and in particular the interaction between the definitions of “enterprise”, “taxable supply”, “imported services”, and “input tax”.


On the main appeal, the primary legal issue was whether NMR’s foreign advisory services fell within the definition of “imported services”, which depended on whether the services were utilised or consumed in South Africa otherwise than for the purpose of making taxable supplies. This required determination of DBCM’s relevant purpose in acquiring the services, and (in addition) whether the services were utilised or consumed in the Republic.


On the cross-appeal (and part of the main appeal), the issue was whether VAT charged by South African service providers was deductible as input tax, which depended on whether the local services were acquired wholly or partly for the purpose of consumption, use or supply in the course of making taxable supplies, and if partly, whether apportionment under s 17 was permissible.


The dispute was primarily one of application of law to fact: the statutory tests were not treated as uncertain in the abstract, but their correct application depended on identifying (factually) what DBCM’s “enterprise” consisted of and what the advisory services were acquired to achieve.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The SCA approached the matter by emphasising that liability for VAT on imported services and entitlement to input tax deductions are both governed by the statutory requirement that the relevant services be acquired and used for the purpose of making taxable supplies in the course or furtherance of an enterprise as defined. The court treated it as essential first to identify DBCM’s enterprise for VAT purposes and then to examine the relationship between that enterprise and the services acquired.


In interpreting “imported services”, the SCA focused on the definitional element that imported services are those utilised or consumed in the Republic otherwise than for the purpose of making taxable supplies. The court accepted that the relevant “purpose” is the purpose of the acquirer (DBCM) in obtaining the services, and evaluated that purpose against the factual context of the transaction. It rejected DBCM’s contention that NMR’s services were acquired as an overhead expense inherently connected to its ongoing mining and diamond-selling activities because DBCM was a listed company with legal obligations to shareholders.


The court drew a distinction between, on the one hand, an enterprise and its ordinary overheads, and, on the other, special duties imposed on a public company as a takeover target in the interests of shareholders in consequence of the corporate form and listing regime. It held that, in the circumstances of this case, the services were too remote from the advancement of the VAT enterprise of mining and selling diamonds to characterise them as acquired for the purpose of making taxable supplies. The court accepted the Commissioner’s submission that NMR was retained because DBCM was the target of a takeover by related parties and because the board had duties (arising from the regulatory and listing framework referred to in argument) to procure independent financial advice and report to independent unit holders on whether the offer was fair and reasonable. On this reasoning, the services were directed at enabling the board to comply with those obligations and to facilitate the transaction, rather than at producing or enhancing taxable supplies in the diamond business.


DBCM attempted to show that the transaction and NMR’s work produced operational advantages for the diamond business, including the alleged usefulness of valuation modelling, improved governance or image, and benefits from de-listing and elimination of cross-shareholdings. The SCA was not persuaded on the basis recorded in the judgment, including concessions that the model was not provided for the purpose of making taxable supplies and that other strategic operational reviews existed independently of the takeover advisory work. The court also rejected the suggestion that DBCM’s holding of Anglo shares constituted an “enterprise” activity integral to the diamond business for VAT purposes, holding that (unless operating as an investment company) investments cannot conceivably be regarded on their own as constituting an enterprise within the meaning of the Act, and that DBCM’s late interpretive argument seeking to split the definition of “enterprise” into two categories based on the word “including” was without merit.


On the place of consumption of NMR’s services, the SCA applied what it described as a practical approach. It reasoned that DBCM’s head office was in Johannesburg; the ICD resolved there to acquire advisory services; the DBCM board met there to receive the ICD’s recommendations and decide; and the scheme of arrangement was approved and implemented in South Africa. The fact that some meetings with NMR were held outside South Africa was treated as insufficient to shift consumption outside the Republic. The “compelling conclusion” was that NMR’s services were consumed in South Africa.


Turning to input tax, the SCA cited the general VAT rationale that a taxpayer may obtain credit for an appropriate proportion of input tax on overheads that cannot be directly linked to outputs, referencing the formulation in Customs and Excise Commissioners v Redrow Group plc [1999] 2 All ER 1 (HL). However, it treated the statutory gateway as decisive: input tax is deductible only where the services are acquired wholly or partly for the purpose of consumption, use or supply in the course of making taxable supplies, and apportionment under s 17 is only relevant once that threshold is met.


Applying the same reasoning used in relation to NMR’s services, the SCA held that the local professional services were likewise acquired for the purposes of dealing with and implementing the consortium proposal and discharging the associated obligations, not for the purpose of making taxable supplies in DBCM’s diamond-mining and selling enterprise. The judgment reviewed the functions performed by the local suppliers (including WWB’s work on the scheme of arrangement and related regulatory and tax matters, and other advisors’ roles connected to implementation and approvals) and concluded that they were directed at ensuring the transaction materialised. On that basis, the SCA overturned the Tax Court’s partial allowance in relation to WWB: because the services were not acquired for making taxable supplies, the premise for any apportionment and deduction fell away.


The SCA addressed the parties’ reliance on foreign income tax authorities (a Canadian decision and an Australian decision) and held that such reliance was misplaced because those cases turned on different statutes and tests (income tax deductibility), involved different facts, and did not determine the VAT questions posed by the South African Act.


5. Outcome and Relief


The SCA upheld the Commissioner’s appeal and dismissed DBCM’s cross-appeal. It set aside the Tax Court’s order and substituted it with an order that DBCM’s appeal against the Commissioner’s assessments is dismissed.


The effect was that NMR’s services were treated as imported services for which VAT was payable by DBCM under s 7(1)(c), and the VAT charged by the local service providers did not qualify as deductible input tax (including the previously partially allowed WWB-related input tax).


Costs were awarded against DBCM in both the appeal and the cross-appeal, including the costs attendant upon the employment of two counsel.


Cases Cited


BJ Services Company Canada v The Queen 2003 (TCC) 900


FCT v The Swan Brewery Co Ltd (1991) 22 ATR 295 (FCA)


Customs and Excise Commissioners v Redrow Group plc [1999] 2 All ER 1 (HL)


Legislation Cited


Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991


Companies Act 61 of 1973


Income Tax Act 113 of 1993


Rules of Court Cited


No rules of court were cited in the judgment.


Held


The Supreme Court of Appeal held that the foreign advisory services supplied by NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd to De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited were utilised or consumed in the Republic and were not acquired for the purpose of making taxable supplies in the course or furtherance of DBCM’s VAT enterprise. Accordingly, the services fell within the statutory definition of “imported services”, with VAT payable by DBCM under s 7(1)(c) of the VAT Act.


The court further held that VAT charged by South African service providers in connection with the transaction did not qualify as deductible input tax, because those services were likewise not acquired wholly or partly for the purpose of making taxable supplies in DBCM’s enterprise. The Tax Court’s partial allowance relating to one firm (WWB) and its referral for apportionment was therefore not sustained.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The judgment applied the principle that classification of services as “imported services” under the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 depends centrally on whether the services are utilised or consumed in South Africa otherwise than for the purpose of making taxable supplies, requiring identification of the acquirer’s purpose in obtaining the services and an assessment of the connection between the services and the vendor’s VAT enterprise.


It further applied the principle that the scope of a vendor’s “enterprise” for VAT purposes is a factual enquiry determined by the statutory definition, and that the word “including” in the definition is illustrative rather than creating multiple categories of enterprise. Activities such as holding shares (where the vendor is not a dealer or investment business in shares) do not, on the judgment’s reasoning, constitute an enterprise activity for VAT purposes merely because they form part of a company’s broader corporate affairs.


Finally, the judgment applied the principle that input tax is deductible only where the goods or services are acquired wholly or partly for the purpose of consumption, use or supply in the course of making taxable supplies, and that apportionment under s 17 becomes relevant only once that threshold requirement is satisfied. Services obtained to comply with takeover-related duties and to implement a restructuring transaction were held, on the facts, to be too remote from the making of taxable supplies in the relevant enterprise to qualify as deductible input tax.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Supreme Court of Appeal
>>
2012
>>
[2012] ZASCA 103
|

|

Commissioner for South African Revenue Services v De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (503/11) [2012] ZASCA 103; 2012 (5) SA 344 (SCA); [2012] 3 All SA 367 (SCA); 74 SATC 330 (1 June 2012)

Links to summary

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT
Case no
: 503/11
Reportable
In the matter between:
Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service
….....................
Appellant
and
De Beers Consolidated Mines Limited
…............................................
Respondent
Neutral
citation:
Commissioner
for SARS v De Beers
(503/2011)
[2012] ZASCA 103
(1
June 2012)
Coram:
Navsa, Van Heerden, Leach JJA and McLaren and Southwood
AJJA
Heard:
7 May 2012
Delivered:
1 June 2012
Summary:
Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 – meaning of
‘enterprise’ – meaning of ‘imported services’

whether foreign advisory services utilized or consumed in the
Republic for ‘the purpose of making taxable supplies’

whether tax on local advisory services qualifies for deduction as
‘input tax’.
______________________________________________________________
ORDER
On appeal from the Tax Court, Cape Town (Davis J sitting with two
assessors as court of first instance):
The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs, attendant upon
the employment of two counsel.
The cross appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs
attendant upon the employment of two counsel.
The order of the court below is set aside and substituted as
follows:

The appeal against the assessments made by
the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service is dismissed
with costs, including
the costs of two counsel.’
______________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
______________________________________________________________
NAVSA and VAN HEERDEN JJA (LEACH JA and McLAREN and SOUTHWOOD AJJA
concurring)
[1] The respondent, De Beers Consolidated Mines Ltd (DBCM), mines for
and sells diamonds internationally. It is one of the world’s

best known diamond producers and sellers. During November 2000, a
consortium approached DBCM and proposed a complex transaction,
in
terms of which a new company to be established by the consortium
would become the holding company of DBCM as well as of a linked
Swiss
company, De Beers Centenary AG (DBAG). Effectively, the newly
established company would become the new owners of De Beers’

diamond operations and all associated holdings. The complexities of
the transaction will be dealt with in due course.
[2] In considering the proposal by the consortium, DBCM engaged the
services of NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd (NMR), a London-based
company,
as independent financial advisors, in order to advise its board on
whether the consortium’s offer was fair and reasonable.
At the
same time DBCM appointed a range of South African advisors and
service providers, including attorneys, to assist in finalizing
the
proposed transaction.
[3] On 7 June 2001, after the transaction referred to above had been
realised, NMR issued an invoice in the amount of US$19 895
965.00 for
the services rendered by it to DBCM, which was settled by the latter
at a Rand cost of R161 064 684.00. Over the period
March 2001 to
January 2002, the local suppliers of services in connection with the
transaction rendered their invoices. They included
value-added tax
(VAT), in terms of the Value-Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (the Act),
which DBCM treated as input tax in making its
own VAT returns.
[4] In an assessment of 18 October 2004, the
appellant, the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service
(the Commissioner),
determined that NMR’s services were
‘imported services’ in terms of the Act and assessed the
sum of R22 549 055.76
to be payable by DBCM as VAT in terms of
section 7(1)
(c)
of
the Act, which reads as follows:

Subject
to the exemptions, exceptions, deductions and adjustments provided
for in this Act, there shall be levied and paid for the
benefit of
the National Revenue Fund a tax, to be known as the value-added tax –
(c)
on the supply
of any imported services by any person on or after the commencement
date,
calculated at the rate of 14 per
cent on the value of the supply concerned or the importation, as the
case may be.’
Furthermore, the Commissioner determined that the VAT charged by
local service providers did not qualify as input tax and raised

assessments, thereby, in effect, disallowing input tax in the amount
of R7 021 855.48.
[5] On 1 February 2005, DBCM lodged an objection against these
assessments. The objection was disallowed by the Commissioner on
8
September 2005. It was against that decision that DBCM lodged an
appeal on 14 October 2005 in the tax court held in Cape Town.
[6]
In the Tax Court the following orders
were made by Davis J, sitting with two assessors:

[T]he
appeal against the assessments is upheld and the following order is
made.
1. The assessments of respondent
as set out in its letter of 18 October 2004 are set aside.
2. A revised assessment must be
issued on the following basis:
2.1 The services provided by NMR
do not constitute imported services because they were utilized and
consumed by appellant for the
purpose of making taxable supplies; in
the course or furtherance of its enterprise of mining and selling of
diamonds, being a service
legally required of a listed company
carrying on a continuing enterprise, in the circumstances faced by
the appellant, and in light
of a statutory obligation of providing
advice to the independent unit holders, which advice thus constituted
an activity performed
in the course or furtherance of appellant’s
enterprise.
2.2 The VAT paid by appellant in
respect of the local services is not a deductible input tax, save
insofar as the services of WWB
[Webber Wentzel Bowens] are concerned.
In this case, this part of the assessment is referred back to the
respondent in order to
determine the appropriate ratio pursuant to
which a percentage of these services will constitute a deductible
input tax.’
[7] The present appeal is before us with the leave of the Tax Court.
Before us the Commissioner appeals against:
(a) the finding of the Tax Court that the services rendered by NMR to
DBCM did not constitute ‘imported services’;
and
(b) the finding of the Tax Court that a part of the VAT on local
services rendered by WWB to DBCM constituted deductible ‘input

tax’ in DBCM’s hands.
DBCM cross-appeals against the finding of the Tax Court that the VAT
charged to it by the providers of local services did not constitute

deductible ‘input tax’. Thus the question before us is
whether the conclusions by the Tax Court set out in the preceding

paragraph are correct.
[8] As will become evident the facts of the present case are unique
and hardly likely to be duplicated. In any event, the conclusions

reached are based on the curious facts of this particular case.
[9] The detailed background culminating in the present appeal is
usefully set out in the judgment of Davis J as follows:

. . .
Prior to the implementation of the relevant transactions in May/June
2001, the shares in appellant were linked to depository
receipts
representing an interest in shares issued by De Beers Centenary Ag
(“DBAG”), a Swiss company. A share in appellant
and a
depository receipt to which it was linked constituted a so-called
linked unit. The linked units were listed on various exchanges

including the Johannesburg Stock Exchange (JSE), the London Stock
Exchange (LSE) and the Swiss exchange (SWX).
By way of summary, appellant’s
main trading activities were the mining and selling of diamonds from
South Africa. DBAG and
its subsidiaries owned diamond mining
interests elsewhere in the world. The main trading activities of
appellant were thus the
mining and selling of diamonds. However, its
subsidiaries operated further diamond businesses and also held an
investment of 117
086 985 shares in Anglo American PLC (“Anglo”),
an English company whose shares were and still are listed on the JSE,

LSE and the SWX. It appears that another company in the De Beers
group, Felton Holdings, owned a further 27 196 890 Anglo shares.
This
cumulative shareholding constituted approximately 35.4% of the issued
share capital of Anglo.
Among the De Beers linked unit
holders were Anglo, Central Holdings Ltd SA (“CHL”) a
company incorporated in Luxembourg
and Debswana Diamond Company (Pty)
Ltd (“Debswana”), a company incorporated in Botswana.
These three companies held
32.3%, 2.6% and 5% respectively of the
shares in appellant. Their combined stake of 39.8% represented 159
395 536 shares in appellant.
The remaining 240 563 239 shares (60.2%)
were held by a large number of institutional and other investors.
In November 2000 Anglo, CHL and
Debswana proposed, as a consortium, that appellant enter into a
transaction in terms whereof the
other unit holders in appellant and
DBAG would have their interests in appellant eliminated and a new
company, to be established
by the consortium, would become the
holding company of both appellant and DBAG. This new company DB
Investments (SA) (DBI) was
to be incorporated in Luxembourg.
In November 2000, the boards of
both De Beers companies resolved to establish an Independent
Committee of Directors (“ICD”)
to consider and advise the
boards as to whether the consortium’s offer was fair and
reasonable to independent unit holders
and to assist in negotiations
with the consortium. The ICD were authorised to appoint and consult
with NM Rothschild and Sons Ltd
(“NMR”) as independent
financial advisors, NMR being an English advisory services company.
At the same time, various
advisors in South Africa were appointed, including HSBC Investment
Services (Africa) (Pty) (Ltd) (“HSBC”),
the firms of
attorneys known as Webber Wentzel Bowens (“WWB”) and
Edward Nathan and Friedland (“ENF”) together
with the
auditing and advisory firm Deloitte and Touche Advisory Services
(“Deloittes”). All of these parties were
referred to
during the dispute as the local suppliers of local services.
After months of negotiations, on
30 April 2001 the consortium made a final and improved offer. NMR
considered that this offer was
fair and reasonable to independent
unit holders. The ICD then advised the boards, that, in its opinion,
the offer was fair and
reasonable and the boards accordingly advised
the independent unit holders.
In essence the final offer
constituted the following:
The shareholding of the
independent unit holders in De Beers (approximately 60.2%) would be
eliminated through a distribution to
them of Anglo shares, being all
of the shares held by appellant in Anglo, together with some
additional Anglo shares and cash,
such that for each linked unit, the
holder would receive 0.446 of an Anglo share, $15.35 in cash plus a
further cash amount of
$1.30 which constituted the final dividend of
Anglo for the year ending 31 December 2000.
This final offer reflected an
assumed total value of De Beers of $18.7 billion, of which $9.4
billion was attributed to the 35.4%
shareholding in Anglo and the
balance of $9.3 billion to De Beers’ remaining assets.
The transaction was implemented
through a scheme of arrangement pursuant to
s 311 of the Companies Act 61 of
1973 (“the Companies Act”). The court granted leave to
convene a scheme meeting on
3 April 2001 and the offer, as improved,
was accepted by the requisite majority of independent unit holders at
the scheme meeting
on 4 May 2001. The scheme was then sanctioned by
the court on 18 May 2001 and implemented shortly thereafter.
In effect, the scheme
constituted a buy back leg and a cancellation leg. Briefly these can
be described thus:
1. In terms of the buy back leg,
appellant acquired from all unit holders including the consortium 1%
of their shares in appellant
in consideration for which it
distributed to them pro-rata 130 380 071 Anglo shares plus
a dividend of $1.30 per share
which was attributable to the Anglo
shares.
2. In terms of the cancellation
leg, the balance of the shares in appellant held by independent unit
holders were cancelled in consideration
for which the latter received
$15.35 in cash together with a further allocation of Anglo shares,
such that each unit holder received
inclusive of the Anglo shares
received under the buy back leg, 0.446 Anglo shares per linked unit.
It is not necessary to traverse
the mechanics of the calculations
used to determine the shares so allocated. Suffice to say, the
additional shares were in the
amount of 28 872 400.
On 7 June 2001, NMR issued an
invoice to appellant in the amount of $19 895 965 for the
services rendered by it in connection
with the transaction. This
constituted a portion of NMR’s total charges, in that the
balance was invoiced to DBAG. Appellant
settled this invoice at a
rand cost of R161 064 684.
In the assessment of 18 October
2004 respondent determined that the NMR services were imported
services in terms of the Act and
assessed the sum of R22 549 055.76
to be payable by appellant as VAT in terms of s 7(1)
(c)
of the Act. Over the
period of March 2001 to January 2002, the local suppliers rendered
invoices to appellant for services rendered
in connection with the
transaction. These suppliers included VAT in their invoices and
appellant treated this VAT as input tax
in making its own VAT
returns. In the assessment of 18 October 2004 respondent determined
that the VAT did not qualify as input
tax and raised assessments,
thereby, in effect, disallowing input tax in the amount of
R7 021 855.48.
Appellant lodged an objection
against these assessments in a letter of 1 February 2005, which
objection was disallowed by respondent
on 8 September 2005. It was
against these decisions that appellant noted an appeal on 14 October
2005.’
[10] It must be assumed that when the transaction was conceived and
the consortium came into being, what was being sought was the

acquisition of the whole of De Beers at the most advantageous price
to the consortium. What complicated matters was the
inter-relationship
between certain of the negotiating parties. This
is even more evident from the following further facts set out in the
heads of
argument filed on behalf of the Commissioner:

3. To
the facts summarised in paragraphs 3 to 13 of the judgment we add the
following. CHL was a company controlled by the Oppenheimer
family.
The Oppenheimer family, apart from its 2.6% stake in De Beers through
CHL, held about 8% of the shares in Anglo. Debswana
was a company in
which 50% of the shares are held by the Government of Botswana and
50% by DBAG.
4. The end result of the
transaction was [a] that all the shares in DBCM and DBAG became owned
by DBI [b] the listing of linked
units in DBCM and DBAG ceased and
[c] DBI had as its shareholders Anglo (45%), CHL (40%) and Debswana
(15%). The transaction amounted
to a takeover of De Beers by a
consortium headed by Anglo with the backing of the Oppenheimer family
(CHL) and the Government of
Botswana (Debswana).
5. The buyback leg of the
transaction (judgment § 13.1) eliminated the cross-shareholdings
between De Beers and Anglo and was
essentially an unbundling of the
greater part of the Anglo shares held by De Beers. The cancellation
leg (judgment § 13.2)
was the means whereby the consortium
bought out the independent unit holders’ interest in what
remained of De Beers’
businesses after the unbundling of the
Anglo shareholding.’
[11] An important factor is that the company to be established which
would effectively succeed De Beers would not be a listed company.
Mr
Kell, a director of DBCM and a member of the ICD, described the
effect of the transaction by stating that DBCM ‘effectively

went private’.
[12] Another feature of the proposal by the consortium was that it
had not put any specific price for the acquisition of De Beers
on the
table. Consequently, the Independent Committee of Directors (ICD)
engaged NMR and other London-based financial advisors,
namely UBS
Warburg, who had previously advised Anglo American PLC on its listing
on the London stock exchange. This engagement
was aimed at
establishing a price that could be put to the De Beers board and the
shareholders as being fair and reasonable. Furthermore,
the buyback
leg of the convoluted transaction where DBCM acted as a conduit for
payment to shareholders and assumed obligations
in that regard was
designed to utilise s 311 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 to give it
legitimacy and for the additional reasons
set out hereafter. The
object of the exercise was to obtain high court approval for a scheme
of arrangement in terms of s 311.
In the unbundling leg the
acquisition of 1 per cent shares in DBCM appears to have been
necessary so as to to bring the shareholders
into the arrangement as
parties and to cut down on tax payable in the USA at that time. The
percentage buyback is illustrative
of the artificiality of the
scheme, which nevertheless was approved by the high court. It also
enabled the transaction to avoid
legal consequences in relation to
Anglo American PLC shareholders in the USA.
[13] In addition, by resorting to a scheme of arrangement in terms of
section 311 of the Companies Act, a lower threshold of shareholder

approval was required namely, 75 per cent, as opposed to 90 per cent.
[14] Another feature worth mentioning in relation to the transaction
is set out hereafter. The ICD had at one stage resolved, after
taking
advice from NMR, that the minimum asking price for DBCM’s
diamond business was the amount of $6.5 billion. The following
is
recorded in relation to a discussion held by the ICD about this
recommended minimum price:

We
believe that this minimum level is defensible opposite the 60%
outside shareholders. But it will not be without criticism given
the
exit multiples on the diamond business are not generous. Below this
level it will be impossible to defend given that the original
$7.1
billion was in itself a very conservative value.’
In response the consortium was not willing to pay more than $6.25
billion. The ICD’s chairperson was mandated to attempt
to
extract a further $600 000 000.00. When these efforts failed the ICD,
notwithstanding their prior emphatic resolution, nonetheless

recommended to DBCM’s board that the consortium’s offer
of $6.25 billion be accepted. When three large institutional

shareholders of DBCM indicated their dissatisfaction, the consortium
without any prior indication increased their offer significantly.
[15]
It is necessary to record that from the
outset, when the bid was first tabled, WWB’s services were
immediately engaged. All
the of the other actors, including HSBC (the
sponsoring brokers), but excepting Deloittes, were appointed in
anticipation at the
first meeting of the ICD in Johannesburg.
Deloittes were appointed thereafter. Their collective purpose was to
ensure that the
transaction materialised without impediment. This
they ensured.
[16] The features of the transaction referred to in the preceding
five paragraphs, in our view puts the transaction in proper
perspective and points to the real reason for the appointment of the
foreign and local service providers.
[17] One of DBCM’s objections to the imposition of VAT on the
NMR transaction is based on what it considers to be the place
at
which the NMR services were consumed. Put differently, if it could
rightfully be contended, on the basis of the definition of
‘imported
services’ – dealt with in paragraph 19 hereafter - that
the place of consumption was outside South
Africa, the conclusion
would follow that they could not be categorised as imported services.
DBCM contended that since a number
of meetings at which financial
advice was received from NMR took place outside South Africa, VAT
could, at the very least, not
be imposed in respect of the proportion
of the services related to those meetings. At this stage it is
necessary to record when
and where relevant meetings took place. Only
two of the five substantive ICD meetings took place in London. DBCM’s
board
met in South Africa to receive the ICD’s recommendations
as backed up by the NMR advice and to take decisions on the strength

thereof. There were three such meetings, all held at Johannesburg.
Because the court below had held that NMR’s services were
not
imported services because they were consumed in the course of making
taxable supplies, it was unnecessary for Davis J to consider
and
decide this issue.
[18] The first issue for decision is whether NMR’s services
were utilised or consumed by DBCM for the purpose of making taxable

supplies in the course or furtherance of DBCM’s enterprise of
buying and selling diamonds. In this regard it is necessary
to
consider definitions and certain key concepts provided for in the
Act. The definitions all appear in s 1.
[19] It will be recalled that the court below had held that the
services provided by NMR do not constitute ‘imported services’

because they had been used by the appellant for the purpose of making
taxable supplies, namely in the course of furthering its
enterprise
of mining and selling diamonds. It is necessary first to consider the
definition of ‘imported services’:

a
supply of services that is made by a supplier who is resident or
carries on business outside the Republic to a recipient who is
a
resident of the Republic to the extent that such services are
utilized or consumed in the Republic
otherwise
than for the purpose of making taxable supplies
.’
(Emphasis added.)
[20] The court below had held that the services were required in the
furtherance of DBCM’s mining and diamond selling enterprise.
It
is thus necessary to consider the concept ‘enterprise’,
which is defined as follows:

(a)
in the
case of any vendor, any enterprise or activity which is carried on
continuously or regularly by any person in the Republic
or partly in
the Republic and in the course or furtherance of which goods or
services are supplied to any other person for a consideration,

whether or not for profit, including any enterprise or activity
carried on in the form of a commercial, financial, industrial,

mining, farming, fishing, municipal or professional concern or any
other concern of a continuing nature or in the form of an association

or club;
(b)
without limiting the
applicability of paragraph
(a)
in respect of any activity
carried on in the form of a commercial, financial, industrial,
mining, farming, fishing or professional
concern –
. . .
Provided that –
. . .
(v) any activity shall to the
extent to which it involves the making of exempt supplies not be
deemed to be the carrying on of an
enterprise.’
[21] In turn, ‘taxable supply’ means any supply of goods
or services which is chargeable with tax under the provisions
of
section 7(1)(
a
), including tax chargeable at the rate of zero
per cent under s 11.
[22] Considering ‘the purpose’ referred to in the
definition of ‘imported services’, set out in paragraph

19 above, the primary question is whether NMR’s services were
acquired for the purpose of making taxable supplies.
[23] It was contended on behalf of DBCM that the provision of the
services by NMR were necessarily attached to and accordingly
a
concomitant of appellant’s mining or commercial enterprise as a
public company. As the appellant had chosen to conduct
its business
as a public company which, while conducting its operations, had
certain statutory obligations, it was submitted that
these services
were directly linked to its making of ongoing supplies. Thus, so it
was argued, since these supplies can rightly
be said to have been
wholly utilised or consumed in the making of supplies, in the course
or furtherance of appellant’s mining
or commercial enterprise,
they did not fall within the definition of imported services. It was
submitted that the Commissioner’s
attitude embodied a
restrictive approach in construing DBCM’s ‘enterprise’,
limiting it to the nuts and bolts
of the operational diamond business
and excluding statutory duties imposed on the company in the interest
of shareholders. Put
simply, it was contended that NMR’s
services were acquired in the furtherance of DBCM’s mining and
diamond business.
[24] Furthermore, it was contended that DBCM acquired NMR’s
services as a necessary input giving rise to an overhead expense.
The
following extract from DBCM’s heads of argument is relevant:

[NMR’s]
services were utilised and consumed by [DBCM] for the purpose of
making taxable supplies in the course of its enterprise
because, once
faced with this consortium offer, DBCM could not realistically
continue to operate its enterprise, however widely
or narrowly
construed, without complying with its legal obligation to acquire the
NMR services.’
[25] On behalf of the Commissioner it was submitted that the purpose
in question is the purpose of the acquirer of the service
and that,
by its nature, the test is subjective. DBCM’s reason for
engaging NMR, so it was contended, was to acquire advice
in relation
to a take-over by parties to which it was related. Accordingly, its
board had a duty to report to the independent unit
holders as to
whether the offer was fair and reasonable and to obtain independent
financial advice in that regard. Those duties
were imposed by the
Securities Regulation Code pursuant to s 440C of the 1973 Companies
Act and by the Listing Requirements of
the JSE.
[26] The argument on behalf of the Commissioner continued as follows.
The fact that this was the reason for DBCM’s engagement
of NMR,
rules out, as a relevant purpose, any of the incidental benefits
which DBCM thought it might derive from the transaction.
Whether
DBCM’s senior management thought that DBCM’s diamond
business would be better or worse after the takeover,
did not affect
their obligation to engage and obtain advice from NMR. In this regard
the Commissioner urged us to take into account
the peculiar features
of how the transaction was structured and eventually implemented. Put
simply, the Commissioner contended
that NMR’s services were
unrelated to DBCM’s core activities, which was the mining and
sale of diamonds. NMR was not
providing services directed at making
any of DBCM’s businesses better or more valuable. It was the
interest of DBCM’s
departing shareholders and investors, rather
than the interest of DBCM itself, that formed the focus of NMR’s
services. The
Commissioner criticised the approach of the court
below, namely that anything which a company is legally obliged to do
by virtue
of being a company is necessarily used as overhead
expenses.
[27] In the case of a public company there is a clear distinction
between:
(a) the enterprise with its attendant overhead expenses, and
(b) the special duties which are imposed on the company in the
interest of its shareholders as individuals in consequence of the

fact that a choice has been made to conduct an enterprise in a
corporate form.
The duty imposed on a public company that is the target of a
take-over is too far removed from the advancement of the VAT
enterprise
to justify characterising services acquired in the
discharge of that duty as services acquired for purposes of making
taxable supplies,
especially in the circumstances of this case.
[28] In our view the submissions on behalf of the Commissioner, set
out in the preceding paragraphs, are undoubtedly correct. The

reliance by DBCM on a Canadian decision, namely
BJ Services
Company Canada v The Queen
2003 (TCC) 900 is misplaced. In that
case a company had taken financial and legal advice in response to a
hostile take-over bid.
It was held that the expenses incurred in
relation thereto were deductible for income tax purposes. First, it
is an income tax
case which fell to be decided on domestic income tax
legislation and not specifically value-added tax. Second, the primary
question
before us focuses on the question of what the ‘purpose’
was of the acquisition of the services. Lastly, the facts were

different.
[29] The same applies to an Australian case relied on by the
Commissioner namely, the decision by the full court of the Federal

Court of Appeal in
FCT v The Swan Brewery Co.
Ltd
(1991) 22
ATR 295
(FCA). In that case the issue was the deductibility for
income tax purposes of expenditure incurred by a trading company in
obtaining
professional services to enable the company to advise its
shareholders in respect of a take-over offer of which it was the
target.
The court there was dealing with income tax legislation which
required the expenses to be incurred in gaining or producing
assessable
income. It held that it could not be said that the
expenditure in question could be relevant or incidental to that
purpose, rather
it was directed to duly informing the shareholders of
the corporation of the true worth of their shares and the adequacy of
the
offer to acquire their capital interest in the corporation.
[30] In the present appeal we are enjoined to interpret and apply the
legislation in question to the facts before us.
[31] DBCM attempted to persuade us that, on the evidence presented in
the court below, a natural outflow of the protracted negotiation

process were real advantages that redounded to the benefit of the
diamond business. In this regard they pointed to a financial
model,
that had been produced by UBS Warburg and taken over by NMR, to value
the diamond business, which they submitted was a useful
management
tool for DBCM prospectively. Furthermore, they indicated that the
increased involvement of the Oppenheimer family would
be an obvious
and marked advantage, which would boost morale and image. In
addition, they submitted that the metamorphosis, from
a listed
company to a private one, would allow for less disclosure and greater
flexibility with consequent advantages over competitors.
It was also
urged upon us to consider, in favour of DBCM, the negative effect of
the cross-shareholdings between Anglo American
PLC and DBCM. It was
pointed out that, because of this, DBCM was under valued, which was a
disincentive for its management. The
transaction in question, so it
was contended, negated that effect. These submissions were not only
intended to persuade us that,
overall, the transaction was for the
purposes of making taxable supplies, but also, alternatively for the
purpose of partially
avoiding value added tax – in other words,
apportionment of taxation.
[32] For the following reasons we are unpersuaded. First, it was
conceded on behalf of DBCM that the financial model was not provided

to it for the purpose of making taxable supplies. Second, preceding
the transaction, DBCM had already commissioned and received
a study
into its operations which had formulated a strategy aimed at greater
efficiency. It was common cause that the study referred
to during
evidence as the Bain Review and input received by DBCM’s
management were used extensively by NMR during the negotiations.

Third, it was conceded by counsel on behalf of DBCM that it could
scarcely be contended that the Oppenheimers had not been fully

committed to Anglo American PLC and DBCM before the transaction. It
can hardly be gainsaid that the Oppenheimers have always been

publicly associated with DBCM. Fourth, management of an
internationally renowned and successful company such as DBCM can
surely
not be said to lack incentive and suffer from low morale.
Fifth, the disclosure by DBCM as a public company was, in any event,
as demonstrated by the evidence in the court below, extremely
limited.
[33] It is now necessary to deal briefly with the contention on
behalf of DBCM, that the advice obtained from NMR in large part

related to shares held by DBCM in Anglo American PLC, which
shareholding was integral to the diamond business enterprise. The
object of this contention was to persuade this court that the advice
therefore was directly related to DBCM’s business operations.

Evidence was led in the court below that bankers with whom DBCM had
to interact, in pursuing its business ends, took great comfort
from
DBCM’s Anglo American PLC shareholding. DBCM submitted that it
did not have a discrete non-enterprise activity of holding
Anglo
shares for investment, separate in any way from its diamond business.
[34] We are unconvinced that DBCM, with its international reputation
and historical track record, required the comfort of the Anglo

American PLC shareholding. Furthermore, in evidence before us, its
officials could not point to any instance in which it required

substantial borrowing on a short or long term basis. Additionally,
unless one conducts business as an investment company, the
investments one holds cannot conceivably be regarded on their own as
constituting an enterprise within the meaning of that term
in the
Act.
[35] DBCM, in attempting to persuade us on this aspect, belatedly and
tentatively suggested that, in considering the definition
of
‘enterprise’
1
referred
to in paragraph 20 above, we should consider that there were two
categories of enterprise encapsulated in paragraph
(a)
of the
definition, the first of these being defined in that part of
paragraph
(a)
which concludes with the word ‘profit’,
while the second is to be found in that part of paragraph
(a)
commencing with the word ‘including’. It was argued that
once a vendor falls within the ambit of the definition of

‘enterprise’ (regardless of whether in the first or in
the second category), any activity whatsoever of that enterprise

forms an integral part and parcel of the enterprise, unless such
activity is excluded in terms of paragraph (v) of the proviso

thereof.
_____________________
Although we have already given this definition, we cite
it again for ease of reference, as follows:

(a)
in the case of any vendor, any enterprise or activity which is
carried on continuously or regularly by any person in the Republic
or
partly in the Republic and in the course or
furtherance of which goods or services are supplied to
any other person for a consideration, whether or not for profit,
including
any enterprise or activity carried on in the form of a
commercial, financial, industrial, mining, farming, fishing,
municipal or
professional concern or any other concern of a
continuing nature or in the form of an association or club;
(b)
without limiting the applicability of
paragraph
(a)
in respect of any activity carried on in the
form of a commercial, financial, industrial, mining, farming, fishing
or professional
concern
. . .
Provided that –
. . .
any activity shall to the extent to which it involves
the making of exempt supplies not be deemed to be the carrying on of
an
enterprise.’
[36] The submission is wholly without merit. The word ‘including’
indicates that what follows is illustrative of what
precedes it.
There is no room for an interpretation that two categories of
‘enterprise’ are envisaged. Even though
a company can
engage in a number of different activities, the discrete ‘investment
category’ sought to be relied upon
in relation to DBCM’s
Anglo
American PLC shareholding is, for the reasons stated above,
untenable.
[37] We now turn to one of the other bases of objection to the
Commissioner’s assessment, namely place of consumption. What
is
required is a practical approach to that question. DBCM was a South
African company, with its head offices situated in Johannesburg.
That
is where the ICD met initially and resolved to acquire the services
of NMR and the local service providers. That is where
the full board
of DBCM finally met to receive and approve the recommendation by the
ICD. The s 311 scheme of arrangement, without
which the transaction
could not have been executed, was approved and implemented in South
Africa. The fact that some meetings were
held with NMR outside of the
country can hardly be used to justify the conclusion that the
services were not consumed in South
Africa. On the contrary, the
compelling conclusion is that NMR’s services were consumed in
South Africa.
[38] We now turn to deal with s 1 of the Act where ‘input tax’
is defined thus:

tax
charged . . . on the supply of goods or services made . . . to the
vendor . . . where the goods or services concerned are acquired
by
the vendor wholly for the purpose of consumption, use or supply in
the course of making taxable supplies or, where the goods
or services
are acquired by the vendor partly for such purpose, to the extent (as
determined in accordance with the provisions
of section 17) that the
goods or services concerned are acquired by the vendor for such
purpose.’
[39] At this stage, it is necessary to set out the
rationale behind and method of application of VAT. On this aspect we
can do no
better than to cite an English case which deals directly
with this aspect in
Customs and Excise
Commissioners v Redrow Group plc
[1999]
2 All ER 1
(HL) at 9g-h:

These
provisions entitle a taxpayer who makes both taxable and exempt
supplies in the course of his business to obtain a credit
for an
appropriate proportion of the input tax on his overheads. These are
the costs of goods and services which are properly incurred
in the
course of his business but which cannot be linked with any goods or
services supplied by the taxpayer to his customers.
Audit and legal
fees and the cost of the office carpet are obvious examples.’
These considerations apply equally to the VAT regime in this country
and in other comparable jurisdictions.
[40] In line with the provisions of the Act and the authority above,
technically three question arise, namely:
(a) Were the local services acquired by DBCM ‘for the purpose
of consumption, use or supply in the course of making taxable

supplies’ at all;
(b) If so, were they acquired ‘wholly’ for that purpose;
(c) If so acquired, but not wholly, to what extent they were acquired
for such purpose, having regard to the provision of s 17
of the Act?
Where a vendor acquires goods or services partly for use in making a
taxable supply and partly for use in a non-taxable supply,
s 17(1)
dictates an apportionment based on the ratio which the former
intended use bears to both intended uses.
[41] On this issue the same questions arise as with the primary
question dealt with at the outset. It is necessary to recount the

identity of the providers of local services utilised by DBCM in
realising the transaction in question and to indicate the role
played
by each. WWB’s services related to legal advice on the
transaction almost from its inception. They were instrumental
in
formulating and seeing through the s 311 scheme of arrangement. They
advised and obtained tax rulings that the unbundling of
the Anglo
shares would benefit from the relief contained in section 60 of the
Income Tax Act 113 of 1993, concerning the stamp
duty implications of
the 1 per cent buyback of DBCM’s shares, and in relation to the
exchange control requirements for the
distribution of the unbundled
Anglo shares. Deloittes gave advice on much the same matters. There
is scant evidence about what
HSBC actually did and how its fee was
arrived at. As brokers (SA sponsors and UK sponsors) HSBC had to
‘interface’
with the JSE. ENF, a firm of attorneys, were
required to provide a chairperson for the meeting of shareholders
under the section
311 scheme of arrangement.
[42] The same reasoning in relation to NMR’s services applies
in respect of the provider of local services. In short, the
services
were acquired for the purposes of dealing with the proposal by the
consortium. In regard to the special features of the
transaction in
question, as set out in paragraphs 10 to 15 above, it is worth
reiterating that, from the outset, the intention
was to ensure that
the scheme conceived by Mr Oppenheimer materialised.
[43] In light of the conclusions set out above, the following order
is made.
The appeal is upheld with costs, including the costs attendant upon
the employment of two counsel.
The cross appeal is dismissed with costs, including the costs
attendant upon the employment of two counsel.
The order of the court below is set aside and substituted as
follows:

The appeal against the assessments made by
the Commissioner for the South African Revenue Service is dismissed
with costs, including
the costs of two counsel.’
______________________________
M S NAVSA
JUDGE OF APPEAL
_____________________________
B J VAN HEERDEN
JUDGE OF APPEAL
SOUTHWOOD AJA (LEACH JA and McLAREN AJA concurring)
[44] I have had the advantage of reading the judgment of my
colleagues Navsa and Van Heerden JJA and I agree with the order
proposed
in their judgment. My reasoning is closely aligned with that
of my colleagues but emphasises the interaction between the
definitions
in the Value Added Tax Act 89 of 1991 (the Act) and the
necessity of applying these definitions to the facts of the case. In
order
to decide this case it is fundamental that both the services
rendered and the enterprise be identified and that the court make
factual findings as to what the services and the enterprise consist
of. Once this is done the questions raised become capable of
a clear
answer.
[45] The Act provides for the imposition of VAT on goods and services
and contains a number of definitions, which must be borne
in mind
when the Act is applied. The charging provision is s 7, the relevant
parts of which read as follows:

(1) Subject to the
exemptions, exceptions, deductions and adjustments provided for in
this Act, there shall be levied and paid for
the benefit of the
National Revenue Fund a tax, to be known as the valued-added tax–
on
the supply by any vendor of goods and services supplied by him on or
after the commencement date in the course or furtherance
of any
enterprise carried on by him;
on
the importation of any goods into the Republic by any person on or
after the commencement date; and
on
the supply of any imported services by any person on or after the
commencement date,
calculated
at the rate of 14 percent on the value of the supply concerned or the
importation, as the case may be.
(2) Except as otherwise provided
in this Act, the tax payable in terms of paragraph (a) of subsection
(1) shall be paid by the vendor
referred to in that paragraph, the
tax payable in terms of paragraph (b) of that subsection shall be
paid by the person referred
to in that paragraph and the tax payable
in terms of paragraph (c) of that subsection shall be paid by the
recipient of the imported
services.’
The Act therefore creates in s 7(1) three categories of persons
liable for VAT: the vendor described in paragraph (a) of subsection

(1); the person who imports goods into the Republic; and the
recipient of ‘imported services’. As will appear later,

if the recipient of ‘imported services’ is a ‘vendor’
and utilizes or consumes the services in the course
of making
‘taxable supplies’, no VAT liability is incurred. In
terms of s 10 the value of the goods or services supplied
is the
consideration for such goods which is usually the cash amount paid
for the goods or services.
[46] For purposes of s 7(1)
(a)
it must be determined who a
‘vendor’ is and what an ‘enterprise’ is. In
terms of the definition, ‘a
vendor’ is a person who is
required to be registered under the Act and in terms of s 23 every
person who carries on an ‘enterprise’,
and is not
registered, becomes liable to be registered at the end of the month
where the total value of taxable supplies made by
that person in the
prescribed period has exceeded R1 million or at the commencement of
the month where there are reasonable grounds
for believing that the
total value of the taxable supplies to be made by that person in the
prescribed period will exceed R1 million.
The relevant parts of the
definition of ‘enterprise’ read as follows:

Enterprise means–
in
the case of any vendor, any enterprise or activity which is carried
on continuously or regularly by any person in the Republic
or partly
in the Republic and in the course or furtherance of which goods or
services are supplied to any other person for a
consideration,
whether or not for profit, including any enterprise or activity
carried on in the form of a commercial, financial,
industrial,
mining, farming, fishing, municipal or professional concern or any
other concern of a continuing nature or in the
form of an
association or club.
Provided that–

(v) any activity shall
to the extent to which it involves the making of exempt supplies not
be deemed to be the carrying on of an
enterprise’
[47] Once registered as a vendor, a person becomes obliged in terms
of s 27 and s 28 to furnish returns to the Commissioner for
each
relevant period and to calculate and pay over to the Commissioner the
VAT which has become payable under the Act for that
period. The Act
provides in s 16 how the VAT is to be calculated and specifically for
the deduction of ‘input tax’.
For present purposes ‘input
tax’ means the tax charged under s 7 and payable in terms of
that section by a supplier
on the supply of goods or services made by
that supplier to that vendor

where the goods or
services concerned are acquired by the vendor wholly for the purpose
of consumption, use or supply in the course
of making taxable
supplies or, where the goods or services are acquired by the vendor
partly for such purpose, to the extent (as
determined in accordance
with the provisions of s 17) that the goods or services concerned are
acquired by the vendor for such
purpose’.
A ‘taxable supply’ is ‘any supply of goods or
services which is chargeable with tax under the provisions of s

7(1)
(a)
, including tax chargeable at the rate of zero percent
under section 11.’
[48] To be entitled to deduct ‘input tax’ in the
calculation of his VAT payable, a vendor must be registered in terms

of the Act, must be carrying on an ‘enterprise’ and must
have paid VAT on goods or services which the vendor acquired
wholly
for the purpose of consumption, use or supply in the course of
supplying goods or services which are chargeable with tax
under the
provisions of s 7(1)
(a)
of the Act (i.e. goods or services
supplied in the course or furtherance of the ‘enterprise’).
The Act also provides
in s 17 for the method whereby the deductible
‘input tax’ is calculated where the goods or services are
acquired partly
for consumption, use or supply in the course of
making taxable supplies.
[49] As far as VAT on ‘imported services’ is concerned, s
7(1)
(c)
and s 7(2) simply provide that the recipient of the
imported services must pay the VAT. Liability for VAT is obviously
dependent
upon whether the services concerned fall within the
definition of ‘imported services’ in the Act: i.e.
whether it is

a supply of services that
is made by a supplier who is resident or carries on business outside
the Republic to a recipient who is
a resident of the Republic to the
extent that such services are utilized or consumed in the Republic
otherwise than for the purpose
of making taxable supplies.’
Thus, if the services are not utilized or consumed in the Republic,
or, if utilized or consumed in the Republic they are utilized
or
consumed for the purpose of making ‘taxable supplies’,
the services would not be imported services. Accordingly,
a vendor
who acquires ‘imported services’ for the purpose of
making ‘taxable supplies’ will not be liable
for VAT on
the cost of the ‘imported services’.
[50] This means that the same question must be answered in both the
appeal and the cross-appeal; i.e. whether the services acquired
by
DBCM were required for the purpose of consumption, use or supply in
the course of making ‘taxable supplies’, which
means
supplying goods or services in the course or furtherance of the
‘enterprise’. In addition, the appeal requires
a
consideration of whether the ‘imported services’ were
utilized or consumed by DBCM in the Republic.
[51] The primary question requires that there be clarity as to the
nature of the ‘enterprise’ because the purpose of

acquiring the services and whether they were consumed or utilized in
making ‘taxable supplies’ can only be determined
in
relation to a particular ‘enterprise’. What the
‘enterprise’ consists of is a factual question. There

must be a particular activity which complies with all the
requirements in the definition. There is no doubt that DBCM’s
‘enterprise’ consisted of mining, marketing and selling
diamonds. DBCM contends however that the ‘enterprise’

includes any other activity in which it was involved, including
holding shares in its subsidiaries and its portfolio of listed
shares
such as the Anglo shares. DBCM also contends that the definition of
‘enterprise’ incorporates two separate definitions
which
would mean that it would provide for two categories of ‘enterprise’.
According to the argument, these are to
be found in paragraph (a) of
the definition. The first concludes with the word ‘profit’
and the second commences with
the word ‘including’. This
belated and somewhat tenuous argument (raised for the first time in
oral argument) is clearly
without merit. The purpose of the words
following ‘including’ is to make certain that the
specific categories of activity
referred to are included in the
definition of ‘enterprise’.
[52] In the circumstances of this case, where DBCM is not a dealer in
shares, the holding of shares and receipt of dividends by
DBCM does
not fall within the definition of ‘enterprise’ and this
must therefore be disregarded. It must be found that
DBCM’s
‘enterprise’ for the purposes of the Act, consisted of
mining, marketing and selling diamonds.
[53] The question to be answered therefore is whether NMR’s
services were acquired for the purpose of making ‘taxable

supplies’ in that ‘enterprise’. The answer is
clearly no. DBCM acquired NMR’s services because DBCM was
the
target of a take-over by parties to whom it was related and DBCM’s
board had a duty to report to independent unit holders
as to whether
the consortium’s offer was fair and reasonable and to obtain
independent financial advice in that regard. In
order to do this NMR
was obliged to determine the value of DBCM’s diamond business
and then express an opinion that the consideration
offered for the
shares was fair and reasonable in the light of that evaluation. Such
services were not acquired to enable DBCM
to enhance its VAT
‘enterprise’ of mining, marketing and selling diamonds.
The ‘enterprise’ was not in
the least affected by whether
or not DBCM acquired NMR’s services. They could not contribute
in any way to the making of
DBCM’s ‘taxable supplies’.
They were also not acquired in the ordinary course of DBCM’s
‘enterprise’
as part of its overhead expenditure as
argued by DBCM. They were supplied simply to enable DBCM’s
board to comply with its
legal obligations.
[54] The parties’ reliance on foreign precedent in this regard
is misplaced. DBCM relied on
B J Services Company Canada v The
Queen
2003 (TC) 900 and SARS relied on
FCT v The Swan Brewery
Co Ltd
(1991) 22 ATR 295
(FCA) which reached conflicting
conclusions on substantially the same issue but in relation to
provisions of the Canadian and Australian
income tax statutes. The
tests to be applied in terms of the relevant statutes differ from
those of the Act; the facts differed
from the facts of the present
case and the cases did not deal with VAT or its equivalent in the two
countries. The answer in the
present case must be obtained by
applying the provisions of the Act to the facts.
[55] The same reasoning regarding the making of ‘taxable
supplies’ applies to the VAT paid on the services provided
by
the South African service providers. The services were provided for
multiple purposes which included: enabling DBCM to comply
with its
statutory obligations to its unit holders; providing DBCM with tax
advice on the implementation of the transaction; and
obtaining the
necessary court and unit holder approval in terms of s 311 of the
Companies Act. The services were not acquired for
the purpose of
making ‘taxable supplies’ by an ‘enterprise’
which mines, markets and sells diamonds.
[56] I therefore agree with the order of my learned colleagues.
______________________________
B R SOUTHWOOD
ACTING JUDGE OF APPEAL
APPEARANCES:
FOR APPELLANT: O L Rogers SC
Instructed by
The State Attorney,
Cape Town
The State Attorney,
Bloemfontein.
FOR RESPONDENT: T S Emslie SC (with him M W Janisch)
Webber Wentzel Attorneys,
Cape Town
Symington & de Kok,
Bloemfontein.