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[2024] ZAECQBHC 2
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Moshabane v Mtshagi and Others (70/2022) [2024] ZAECQBHC 2 (25 January 2024)
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Certain
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IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN
CAPE DIVISION, GQEBERHA)
Case
no: 70/2022
In
the matter between:
THANDIWE
ANGEL MOSHABANE
Applicant
and
PAMELA
NOSIPHO MTSHAGI
First
Respondent
(KAVE)
REMAX
ESTATE AGENT
Second
Respondent
XHANTI
MTONGANA
Third
Respondent
ZONKE
BUDAZA INC.
Fourth
Respondent
ZONKE
BUDAZA
Fifth
Respondent
SIMON
JONKER
Sixth
Respondent
MASTER
OF THE HIGH COURT
Seventh
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Noncembu
J
[1]
This matter concerns the validity of a will, hence being presided
over by two judges.
[1]
Primarily
the applicant seeks an order disqualifying the first respondent from
inheriting as a beneficiary from the will of the
late Nomfundo Ivy
Kave (the testatrix) dated 11 June 2018.
[2]
In the alternative, she seeks an order revoking the aforementioned
will and declaring it as null and void in terms of
section 2(1)
(a)
of the
Wills Act 7 of 1953
on account of forgery on the part of the
first respondent. Ancillary relief consequent upon the granting of
the aforementioned
orders is also sought against the second to the
seventh respondents.
Preliminary aspects
[2]
The circumstances surrounding the application present an interesting
legal quagmire. In addition,
the papers in the court file were
prepared in such a haphazard manner that it took studious effort to
be able to decipher them.
To put things in context, the following
timeline gives a clearer perspective on how things unfolded in the
matter.
[3]
On 8 March 2022 an order for substituted service was granted against
the first respondent by Zietsman
AJ of this division.
[4]
In terms of this order, the papers in the main application were to be
served on the first respondent
via WhatsApp message and by a
publication in The Herald Newspaper in English and in isiXhosa. The
first respondent was also given
ten days within which to file her
notice of intention to oppose the application.
[5]
It seems however, and this is not disputed by the applicant, that
service was only effected via
WhatsApp message on the first
respondent, and in that message the court order itself was not
included. What was included in the
message was a notice of motion in
the main application, indicating that same would be heard on 8 March
2022 (same date on which
the message was sent) and an application for
substituted service which was said to be set down for 17 April 2022,
a date which
manifestly fell on a Sunday.
[6]
The message also stated that the first respondent had ten days within
which to file her notice
of intention to oppose the application.
[3]
Following upon the said message, the first respondent (through her
attorney) filed her notice to oppose the substituted service
application on 14 April 2022, unbeknown to her that the said
application had already been granted. It can therefore not be
gainsaid
that there was non-compliance with the court order of
Zietsman AJ regarding the substituted service.
[7]
On 23 March 2022 the applicant filed a notice of set down, unopposed,
with the registrar of this
Court, setting the matter down for 12
April 2022. The matter, however, was struck off the roll on the day
in question by Rugunanan
J as there had been no proper service on the
respondents.
[8]
The matter was again set down before Ah Shene AJ on 7 June 2022 where
it was postponed until 10
August 2022 for two judges to preside over
it
[4]
and for the office of the
state attorney and the Master of the High Court to be served. On 10
August 2022 the matter served before
myself and Bands AJ (as she then
was).
[9]
On this date the applicant, an admitted attorney and an officer of
the court, appeared in person
and the first respondent was
represented by Mr Jaco Hattingh. The applicant is the stepdaughter of
the testatrix. The testatrix
was married to her late father (Mzingisi
Gladstone Khave) who had predeceased the testatrix. The two were
married out of community
of property on 19 November 1983.
[5]
[10] No
opposing papers had been filed by the first respondent at that stage
whilst the sixth and the seventh respondents
had filed a notice to
abide. Noting discrepancies in the matter, specifically, the fact
that there were other beneficiaries to
the impugned will who were not
joined as parties; the fact that the applicant was the stepdaughter
of the testatrix and not a beneficiary
in the will; as well as the
absence of opposing papers, we asked the parties to address us on
these issues.
[11] This
apparently infuriated the applicant who was adamant that she was
ready to proceed with the matter. In a fit
of anger, she made
spurious allegations against everybody in the building, including the
court, as well as previous judges who
had presided over the matter
of,
inter alia
, siding with and favouring the first
respondent. She thereafter stormed out of the court whilst the court
was still trying to address
her.
[12]
Mr Hattingh informed the court that the first respondent had not been
given proper notice of set down of
the matter in accordance with the
joint rules of practice of this division, hence no opposing papers
were filed for the first respondent.
On the papers before court there
was no proof that there was proper service on the first
respondent.
[6]
[13]
The matter was thus postponed
sine die
in the absence of the
applicant with a directive that the first respondent was to file her
opposing papers, if any, within 15 days
of the order.
[14]
The main application was argued before my brother Malusi J and I on
20 April 2023 after having been
set down by the first
respondent. This was to facilitate finalisation of the matter seeing
as the applicant had taken no further
steps since its postponement on
10 August 2022. The matter was initially set down for February 2023,
but was postponed to 20 April
2023 on application by the applicant
who deposed to an affidavit stating
inter alia
, that she had
not been informed of the date of set down.
[15] At
the hearing, the matter ran for just short of two hours in which time
it was mainly the applicant who
was addressing the court. Most of her
address pertained to spurious allegations of unfair treatment she had
received from court
officials at the office, respondent’s
representatives and the various judges who had presided over the
matter. Towards the
end of the court day, she alleged that she was
not in a position to continue with her argument and that she would
also not be available
the next day. At that time counsel for the
first respondent had not had an opportunity to address the court in
answer to the applicant’s
contentions nor to set out the first
respondent’s submissions on the application.
[16]
The Court then directed the parties to file written submissions, with
deadlines set as follows: the applicant’s
submissions
supplementing her argument in court were to be filed by 12 May 2023;
and counsel for the first respondent was to file
by 19 May 2023. On
realising, after receipt of the first respondent’s written
submissions, that the applicant had not been
afforded an opportunity
to reply to the first respondent’s submissions, I caused my
registrar
to send her an email advising
her of same and affording her the opportunity to exercise her right
of reply.
[17]
When no response was received from her, my registrar contacted
her telephonically on 20 June 2023 to establish if she had received
the email and whether or not she intended to make written submissions
in reply. The response received from her was that she had
seen the
email, she had no intention of opening it nor of replying to
anything. It was only at that point that the Court was able
to start
with the judgment in the matter.
The
main application
[18]
The applicant was the stepdaughter of the testatrix formerly married
to her late father, Mzingisi Gladstone
Khave in his lifetime. The
applicant’s father passed away intestate on 11 March 2013.
[19]
The first respondent was appointed by the sixth and seventh
respondents as the executrix of the deceased
estate of the late
Nomfundo Ivy Khave (the testatrix). In her papers she identifies
herself as the biological daughter of the testatrix.
This is disputed
by the applicant.
[20]
The main asset in the impugned will is a house situated at 1[…]
C[…] Street, Sherwood, Gqeberha,
which has been placed on the
market by the second and third respondents. The second respondent is
an estate agency and the third
respondent is an estate agent under
the employ of the agency (the second respondent). The second
respondent has been given a mandate
to sell the property in question
which currently has an offer pending. One of the ancillary orders
sought by the applicant in the
notice of motion is that she be handed
the title deed of the house which is currently in possession of the
second and third respondents.
[21]
The fourth respondent is a firm of attorneys responsible for the
winding up of the deceased estate of the
testatrix and the fifth
respondent is the director at the firm.
[22]
The sixth respondent is the Deputy Master of the High Court. The
sixth and seventh respondents accepted the
impugned will and granted
the first respondent an appointment letter as the executrix of the
deceased estate. The applicant is
also seeking withdrawal of the said
acceptance and a revocation of the letter appointing the first
respondent as the executrix.
[23] In
her founding affidavit, the applicant alleges that the first
respondent signed as a witness to the will
and as such she is
disqualified from benefitting therefrom in terms of
section 4A
of the
Wills Act. This
she bases on the apparent signature on the will where
the witness signed as P Mtshage, contending that such refers to the
first
respondent (
Pamella
Nosipho Mtshage). (Emphasis
intended.) No other evidence is tendered to support this allegation
other than the corresponding initials.
[24]
Further, the applicant alleges that the will in question is
fraudulent as the signature of the testatrix
as reflected therein
does not correspond with her signature as reflected on other
documents she previously signed. Nothing more
is tendered in the form
of any evidence of her personal knowledge of the testatrix’s
signature other than the documents she
appended to her papers to
support this claim.
[25]
She also challenged the veracity of Mr Gordon Anthony Parry, a
non practising attorney who assisted
the testatrix in drafting
the impugned will. She alleged that Mr Parry’s practice closed
down in 2013 and that he had moved
to Cape Town, therefore, the
circumstances under which he drafted the testatrix’s will were
suspicious. Notably, in her written
submissions she states that the
said practice was closed in 2019.
[26] In
answer, the first respondent denies that she signed the will as a
witness as alleged in the applicant’s
papers. In support
thereof she appended an affidavit deposed to by one Phathiswa
Mtshage, who claims to be the person who signed
as a witness on the
impugned will. Mr Parry also deposed to a supporting affidavit where
he states,
inter alia
, that he used to have a practice in
Kabega, Gqeberha until August 2019 when he moved his name to the roll
of non-practising attorneys.
[27]
He contends that the testatrix was his client when he was a
practising attorney and that he had drafted several
wills for her,
the last one of those having been signed on 19 January 2018,
[7]
and the amended version thereof signed on 11 June 2018 when her
son, Andile had passed on.
[8]
In
terms of the said will he was nominated as the executor of the
testatrix’s estate, which nomination he renounced when
he
ceased practising.
[9]
[28] In
further opposition of the matter, the first respondent also raised a
point
in limine
of non-joinder. She submitted that the other
nominated beneficiaries in terms of the will; Inaminkosi Buwa and
Nontsikelelo Francis
Mabangula, who have a direct and substantial
interest in the matter were not joined as parties in the proceedings.
She contended
that this was dispositive of the matter.
[29]
During argument in court, counsel for the first respondent, however,
did not persist with this point
in limine
when it became
apparent that the applicant did not seem to comprehend the legal
point being taken, repeatedly stating that the
first respondent
should have joined those parties.
[30] At
the hearing of the matter, in an effort to try and curtail the
already protracted proceedings (as evidenced
above) where history of
the matter had proved a tendency of being shambolic, the court
identified three main issues to be addressed
by the parties in their
submissions. These were:
30.1
Locus
standi
;
30.2 Hearsay
evidence; and
30.3 Material
disputes of facts.
[31]
It behoves me to mention that for an admitted attorney, the conduct
of the applicant during the proceedings
was found to be vastly
wanting. On the issue of
locus standi
, despite being directed
by the court time and again, she continuously attacked the
locus
standi
of Ms Phathiswa Mtshage and Mr Parry who both deposed to
affidavits in support of the first respondent’s defence. At no
point
did she address the issue of her
locus standi
, nor that
of hearsay evidence and the disputes of facts raised by the first
respondent. These were also not addressed in her replying
affidavit,
also filed out of time.
[32]
Instead, together with her written submissions she filed a
supplementary affidavit for which she did not
seek the leave of the
Court. No basis or reasons were advanced for the late filling of the
supplementary affidavit, or why the
issues canvassed therein were not
placed before Court earlier. This is highly improper and no doubt
highly prejudicial to the first
respondent who was never given an
opportunity to deal with the issues raised therein. For those reasons
therefore, the supplementary
affidavit will be disregarded for
purposes of this application.
[33]
The issues in this matter are quite crisp. They are: (a) whether or
not the applicant has the requisite
locus standi
to bring the
current application, (b) whether or not the non-joinder of the other
beneficiaries is dispositive of the matter; and
(c) whether or not
she has made out a case for the relief she seeks in the notice of
motion.
The
locus standi
of the applicant
[34]
As mentioned above, the applicant was the stepdaughter of the
testatrix who was married to her late father
on 19 November 1983. In
her founding affidavit she submitted that the two were married in
community of property. She conceded in
argument however, that the
marriage was out of community of property as evidenced by the
appended marriage certificate. This is
also in accordance with the
relevant provisions of the Black Administration Act
[10]
in terms of which all black marriages at the time were out of
community of property.
[35]
The applicant is not a nominated beneficiary in terms of the impugned
will. She avers that the house in question
was part of her late
father’s estate and that she was the only daughter and legal
heir to her late father’s estate.
She denies that the first
respondent was the daughter of her late father and the testatrix.
[36]
The first respondent, on the other hand, contends that the late Mr
Khave and Mrs Khave (the testatrix) were
her parents and that the
persons listed as her parents in her baptismal certificate were
actually her grandparents with whom she
was staying when she was
baptised. In my view, the real question in this regard is whether or
not the applicant stands to inherit
intestate in the event that the
will is declared null and void. In other words, does she have the
requisite
locus standi
to bring the current application.
[37]
To that end she referred this court to the decision in
Sithole
and Another v Sithole and Another
[11]
where
the Constitutional Court made the declaration that all marriages
which were out of community of property under section 22(6)
of the
Black Administration Act were automatically deemed to be in community
of property from the date of the order (with no limitation
on
retrospectivity).
[38]
This judgment, however, does not avail the applicant for the reasons
that follow. The order by the Constitutional
Court was subject to a
proviso that it would not affect the legal consequences of any act or
omission existing in relation to a
marriage before the order was
made. The second proviso was that the order would not undo completed
transactions in terms of which
ownership of property belonging to any
of the affected spouses had since passed to third parties.
Furthermore, the order was made
on 14 April 2021. The testatrix died
on 23 January 2021, with Mr Khave having predeceased her on 11
March 2013, prior to the
Constitutional Court order being made. There
was therefore no marriage in existence to be deemed in community of
property at the
time the order was made.
[39]
I agree with counsel for the first respondent that the applicant does
not appear to attack the legal consequences
of her late father’s
intestate death. Furthermore, the consequences of the marriage out of
community of property in respect
of that estate appear to have
crystallised, thus rendering the matter to fall under the exclusions
contemplated in the
Sithole
decision. The applicant therefore
cannot find recourse relying on
Sithole
. She has therefore
failed to satisfy this Court that she is clothed with the requisite
locus standi
to bring the current application. In my view,
that becomes dispositive of the matter.
Discussion
on the merits
[40]
For the sake of completion, and in the event that I am wrong on the
finding above, I now deal with the merits
of the matter.
[41]
The applicant alleged in her founding affidavit that the first
respondent signed the will as a witness and
is therefore disqualified
from benefitting therefrom. She also alleged that the will in
question is fraudulent as it was forged
and should therefore be
declared null and void.
[42]
In answer the first respondent has denied that the witness signature
on the impugned will is hers or that
she signed the will as a witness
as alleged by the applicant. In support of her denials two witnesses
including an attorney, have
deposed to affidavits stating that they
were present when the will was signed and confirming the
circumstances surrounding the
signing thereof, thus confirming that
the will was not fraudulent or forged. Mr Gordon Parry confirmed that
he drafted the will
in question at a time when he was still a
practising attorney. This was not gainsaid. Ms Phathiswa Mtshagi
confirmed that she signed
as a witness when the will in question was
drafted. Both witnesses confirmed that the first respondent was not
present during this
process.
Prima facie
this appears to
a material dispute of fact.
[43]
In terms of the Plascon-Evans rule, when factual disputes arise in
motion proceedings final relief can be
granted to the applicant only
if the facts stated by the respondent, together with the admitted
facts in the applicant’s
affidavits, justify the order. The
only exception to this rule is where the allegations or denials are
so far-fetched that the
court is justified in rejecting them on the
papers.
[12]
[44]
This rule was again affirmed by the SCA in
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[13]
where the following was held:
‘
Motion
proceedings, unless concerned with interim relief, are all about the
resolution of legal issues based on common cause facts.
… It
is well established under the Plascon-Evans Rule that where in motion
proceedings disputes of facts arise on the affidavits,
a final order
can be granted only if the facts averred in the applicant’s (Mr
Zuma’s) affidavits which have been admitted
by the respondent
(the NDPP), together with the facts alleged by the latter, justify
such order. It may be different if the respondent’s
versions
consist of bold or un-creditworthy denials, raises fictitious
disputes of fact, is palpably implausible, far-fetched,
or so clearly
untenable that the court is justified in rejecting them merely on the
papers.’
[45]
The Uniform Rules make provision for circumstances when there are
genuine disputes of fact in rule 6(5)(g)
which states:
‘
Where an
application cannot properly be decided on affidavit the court may
dismiss the application or make such order to it seems
meet with a
view to ensuring a just and expeditious decision. In
particular, but without affecting the generality of the
aforegoing,
it may direct that oral evidence be heard on specified issues with a
view to resolving any dispute of fact and to that
end may order any
deponent to appear personally or grant leave for him or any other
person to be subpoenaed to appear and be examined
and cross-examined
as a witness or it may refer the matter to trial with appropriate
direction as to pleadings or definition of
issues, or otherwise.’
[46]
It has been held that where a litigant avers a dispute of fact on the
papers which is said to be incapable
of resolution on the papers, a
court must first establish whether there exists a genuine or real
dispute of fact.
[14]
It
has been stated that the proper approach is not to accept at face
value an averment that there is a dispute of fact.
‘
Thus, while the
court should be circumspect in its approach, ‘if on the papers
before court, the probabilities overwhelmingly
favour a specific
factual finding, the court should take a robust approach and make
that finding.’
[15]
The court should
closely scrutinize the alleged dispute of fact in order to decide
whether there is indeed a real dispute of fact
that cannot
satisfactorily be determined without the aid of oral evidence.
[47]
The applicant relies on bald, unsubstantiated allegations regarding
signature and fraud issues. No
explanation or evidence is
provided as averted earlier in this judgment. The answer
provided by the first respondent is detailed
and supported by cogent
evidence.
[48]
In my view the ineluctable conclusion on the probabilities favour the
first respondent’s version as
true. There is no genuine
dispute of fact on the papers. The bald assertions by the
applicant have been convincingly
rebutted with concrete evidence.
The circumstances require a robust approach. The only rational
finding from the facts
is that the applicant’s assertions must
be rejected on the papers as being without any merit.
[49]
In the premises, the applicant has clearly failed to make out a case
for the relief she seeks. Her application
therefore cannot succeed.
Costs
[50]
The first respondent has brought an application seeking leave of this
Court to file a supplementary affidavit
in terms of which she seeks a
punitive cost order against the applicant. The application was served
on the applicant. The
Court not only gave her an opportunity to
file her reply thereto, but she was also called to assert her right
of reply and to ascertain
if she intended to exercise said right when
the requisite time period had expired with no response forthcoming
from her. She made
it categorically clear that she did not intend to
reply.
[51]
The application in question was therefore not opposed. In the absence
of opposition therefore, and on the
grounds raised for the
application, I am inclined to grant the application.
[52] At
the core of the application is the conduct of the applicant as an
admitted attorney and an officer of
the court. Counsel for the first
respondent contends that the applicant took various further steps in
the matter which constitute
vexatious proceedings, such conduct being
prejudicial to the first respondent and unbecoming of an officer of
the court, thus calling
for censure.
[53]
Such steps include;
inter alia
, the late delivery of her
replying affidavit without explanation for the lateness; attack on
the integrity and credibility of the
first respondent’s
witnesses without any proper factual foundation to base such attacks
(including the baseless allegation
imputing fraudulent conduct and
perjury); the totally baseless attacks upon the presiding judges,
alleging bias and unfairness;
the baseless and unacceptable personal
attacks upon the attorney and counsel of the first respondent in open
court; and the totally
unfounded submissions to the Court and
persistence therewith, despite being directed that such submissions
were bad in law.
[54]
In addition to the above, the applicant sought reasons and leave to
appeal against a cost order granted against
her by Norman J pursuant
to a postponement application she had lodged seeking the indulgence
of the court. What is striking and
of material relevance to these
proceedings in this regard, is that the applicant submitted that her
erstwhile attorney had failed
to inform her of the date of set down
of the matter.
[16]
This she
detailed in an email which she sent to her erstwhile attorney, after
the costs order was granted, alleging that her erstwhile
attorney
should pay the costs. Other than her erstwhile attorney, the email
was also directed to various other persons including
Van Zyl DJP
(through his secretary) and the registrar of this Court.
[55] In
replying to the email, her erstwhile attorney also copied all the
recipients of the initial email
to
. In the email,
the attorney stated to the applicant that he had informed her of the
set down shortly after it was received, and
also attached the email
he had sent to her containing the set down shortly after it was
served, as well as her response to the
email, confirming receipt of
same.
[56] It
is thus contended that the applicant’s erstwhile attorney
exposed the applicant as having lied to
the court and thereafter
again having been untruthful in the email which she directed to the
numerous recipients.
[57]
The applicant submitted to court that her erstwhile attorney breached
the attorney-client privilege when
he distributed the abovementioned
email to the aforementioned persons. I cannot agree with this
submission. The legal requirements
for privilege to apply were aptly
set out by the Constitutional Court in
Thint
(Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others; Zuma
v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others.
[17]
They are:
57.1 The
attorney must have acted in a professional capacity, for example the
attorney must have been paid a fee;
57.2 The
client must have consulted with the attorney in confidence. A
communication (written or oral not intended to
be confidential,
cannot be privileged;
57.3 The
client must have sent the communication (oral or written) for the
purposes of obtaining legal advice from the
attorney;
57.4 The
advice must have been legal advice and not advice to help somebody to
commit a crime of any kind, even if the
attorney is completely
unaware of the crime.
[58]
The communication
in casu
pertained to the applicant’s
confirmation of her receipt of the notice of set down and can in my
view, never be said to constitute
legal advice.
[59]
Whilst I agree that the conduct of the applicant in this matter
requires some serious censure, I am not persuaded
that a punitive
cost order is the appropriate mechanism to deal with such on the
circumstances of this matter. Not only is the
applicant an admitted
attorney, she is also an officer of the court. How she conducts
herself in that capacity therefore has very
serious ramifications.
Her conduct in these proceedings raises some serious questions on her
fitness to practice as a legal practitioner.
I am therefore of the
view that this is one matter where a referral to the Legal Practice
Council for an investigation into her
fitness to remain on the roll
of legal practitioners is warranted.
Order
[60] In
the result therefore, the following order shall issue:
(a)
The application is
dismissed with costs.
(b)
This judgment and order shall
be forwarded to the Legal Practice Council to conduct an
investigation on the fitness of the applicant
to practice as a legal
practitioner.
V P NONCEMBU
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
I
agree
T
MALUSI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
For
the applicant
In
Person
For
the first respondent
P
T Marais
Instructed
by
Jaco
Hattingh
Newton
Park
Gqeberha
For
the second to the seventh
No
appearances
respondents
Date
of hearing
20
June 2023
Date
judgment delivered
25
January 2024
[1]
In
terms of rule 19
(b)
(iv)
of the Eastern Cape Practice Rules.
[2]
The
application is in term of
sections 2(1)
(a)
2
>
,
4 and
4A
of the
Wills Act. Reference
to
section 5
is taken to have
been in error as the said provision was repealed by Act 43 of 1992.
[3]
See
Annexure ‘K2’ at 31 of the first index.
[4]
See above footnote 1.
[5]
In
accordance with the relevant provisions of the Black Administration
Act 38 of 1927, as was applicable at the time.
[6]
See
order dated 10 August 2022 at 140 of the index.
[7]
Index;
p 108, annexure ‘GAP1’.
[8]
Index;
p109, Annexure ‘GAP2’.
[9]
Index;
p 120, Annexure ‘GAP3’.
[10]
Act
38 of 1927.
[11]
Sithole
and Another v Sithole and Another
[2021]
ZACC 7; 2021 (5) SA 34 (CC); 2021 (6) BCLR 597 (CC).
[12]
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984
(3) SA 623
(A).
[13]
National
Director of Public Prosecutions v Zuma
[2009] ZASCA 1
;
2009
(2) SA 277
(SCA);
2009
(4) BCLR 393
(SCA)
para
26.
[14]
Dorbyl
Vehicle Trading & Finance Co (Pty) Ltd v Northern Cape Tour and
Chater Service CC
[2001] 1 All SA 118
(NC) at 123H,
Firstrand
Bank of Southern Africa Ltd v Pretorius & Another
2002 (3) SA 489
(C) at 497D-E.
[15]
South
Peninsula Municipality v Evans & Others
2001
(1) SA 271
(C) at 283E-H;
Soffiantini
v Mould
1956
(4) SA 150
(E) at 154G-H.
[16]
This
formed part of the reasons submitted by the first respondent in her
application for filling a further affidavit.
[17]
Thint
(Pty) Ltd v National Director of Public Prosecutions and Others,
Zuma and Another v National Director of Public Prosecutions
and
Others
[2008] ZACC 13
;
2009 (1) SA 1
(CC);
2008 (12) BCLR 1197
(CC).