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2023
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[2023] ZAECQBHC 66
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Zenith Car Rental (Pty) Limited v Valuline Four (Pty) Limited and Others (3041/2023) [2023] ZAECQBHC 66 (20 December 2023)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
[EASTERN CAPE
DIVISION: GQEBERHA]
CASE NO. 3041/2023
In
the matter between:
ZENITH
CAR RENTAL (PTY) LIMITED
Applicant
and
VALULINE
FOUR (PTY) LIMITED
1
st
Respondent
K2015/024023/07
(SOUTH AFRICA) (PTY) LIMITED
2
nd
Respondent
K2016/399064/07
(SOUTH AFRICA) (PTY) LIMITED
3
rd
Respondent
APEX
VEHICLE RENTAL (PTY) LIMITED
4
th
Respondent
JUDGMENT
JOLWANA J:
Introduction.
[1] This application
concerns the enforcement of restraint of trade agreements contained
in a trademark and systems sub-licence
agreement (the sub-licence
agreement) and agency agreements. The restraint of trade
provisions are sought to be enforced
by way of an urgent permanent
interdict. The papers were issued on an urgent basis on the 08
September 2023 with acutely
truncated time frames, the intended date
of hearing being set out as the 3 October 2023. However, the
application was ultimately
heard on 26 October 2023, almost two
months later. Not only is the application opposed but also the
issue of urgency is being
strenuously contested.
The parties.
[2] The applicant is a
well-known player in the vehicle rental business which it conducts
through the vehicle rental trade name
commonly known as Avis.
It acquired the rights to use trademarks and systems of Avis
International as a sub-licensor for
Africa. Its vehicle rental
business includes inter alia, Van Rentals, Avis Rent A Car and Budget
Rent A Car. It conducts
its business as such throughout the
Republic of South Africa by concluding sub-licensing agreements and
agency agreements with
sub-licencees and agents. These
agreements,
inter alia,
provide for the applicant providing
logistical, administrative and financial support to its sub-licencees
and agents. In
turn, the sub-licencees and agents pay the
applicant a portion of the revenue they generate under the banner of
Avis.
[3] The first respondent
conducted its business under the banner of Avis Van Rental, Eastern
Cape with its principal place of business
at no.125 Albert Road,
Walmer, Gqeberha in the Eastern Cape. It was a sub-licencee and
agent of the applicant and carried
on its vehicle rental business as
Avis, East London, Eastern Cape.
[4] The second respondent
traded as Avis Van Rental, Southern Cape with its principal place of
business also at 125 Albert Road,
Walmer, Gqeberha, Eastern Cape.
It was an agent of the applicant and carried on business as a vehicle
rental company as Avis,
George, Western Cape (Southern Cape).
[5] The third respondent
conducted its business as Avis Van Rentals, Winelands and had its
principal place of business at the same
physical address as the first
and second respondents. The third respondent was also an agent
of the applicant. It carried
on its vehicle rental business as
Avis, Paarl, Western Cape.
[6] The fourth respondent
has its principal place of business at Unit 24 Milnerton Business
Park, Corner of Koeberg and Racecourse
Road, Milnerton, Cape Town.
There is no restraint of trade agreement or agency agreement between
the applicant and the fourth
respondent. It therefore has no
restraint of trade agreement with the applicant or any binding
restraint provision.
[7] The applicant shall
continue being referred to as the applicant whereas the first to
third respondents shall be referred to
simply as the respondents.
Where and if it becomes necessary, a specific respondent shall be
referred to individually as either,
the first, second or third
respondent. The fourth respondent shall be referred to simply
as Apex. This will hopefully
make it easy to follow the factual
matrix pertaining to each one of the parties cited in this
application.
The facts.
[8] Some of the facts as
far as could be gleaned from the applicant’s papers are more as
less the following. In April 2018
the applicant concluded a
sub-licence agreement with the first respondent and agency agreements
with the second and third respondents.
The said agreements were to
endure for a period of seven years expiring at the end of April
2025. These agreements also provided
for a cooling off period
of 12 months from the date of termination or expiry during which the
relevant clauses provided for a non-compete,
non-circumvention,
non-association and restraint against the respondents for the
duration of the agreements and for a further 12
months period after
termination thereof.
[9] The applicant says
that the restraint clauses were intended to protect its confidential
information, trade secrets and customer
connections which would be
created by the respondents pursuant to the agreements. This is
because the respondents would acquire
knowledge and insight into its
business and gain influence over its customers.
[10] In January 2023 the
applicant advised all its sub-licencees and agents including the
respondents of its intention to implement
a new model and business
structure from March 2025. That meant that at the termination
of the existing agreements by effluxion
of time, the sub-licencees
and agents would be given an election to either renew the agreements
in accordance with the new business
model or terminate the existing
agreements. On 17 April 2023 the respondents gave notice of
termination of the existing sub-licence
and agency agreements.
The applicant accepted the respondents’ termination notice.
The alleged breach.
[11] In March 2023 the
applicant was informed by one of its customers referred to as
Ericsson that the respondents, acting through
Apex, had approached it
for purposes of securring Ericsson as Apex’s client. In
this regard the applicant refers to
an email it received from
Ericsson which it understood to be Apex soliciting Ericsson by saying
that the applicant was no longer
operating a van rental business and
that Apex was operating a van rental business.
[12] As a result, the
applicant sent a letter to the respondents confronting them with this
information. The respondents,
represented by Mr Du Toit, denied
in writing that they solicited or enticed Ericsson to be the customer
of Apex. In that
correspondence Mr Du Toit also confirmed his
directorship of Apex but denied that Apex conducts the same or
similar business to
that of the applicant. He further indicated
that he was not aware of the conduct of Kim Lockem, an employee of
Apex whom
it was alleged, ostensibly utilized Apex to compete with
the applicant.
[13] The applicant
further alleges that it became apparent to it that when the
respondents gave their notice of termination of the
agreements, it
was after they had been confronted with the evidence of the breach of
the restraint clauses in respect of Ericsson.
Consequent upon
being confronted with the aforesaid breach, Mr Du Toit resigned as a
director of Apex. Ms Lundy who had worked
for the applicant
before was appointed as director of Apex.
[14] The applicant
further alleges that Apex approached its sub-licencees and agents in
the province of Limpopo in Polokwane soliciting
them to Apex’s
vehicle rental business. With all of this information the
inference drawn by it was that Mr Du Toit
engineered the
incorporation of Apex and is working with other sub-licencees and
agents of the applicant to compete, unlawfully
with it in breach of
the restraint provisions. On this basis, alleges the applicant,
the respondents, acting through Apex
are unlawfully competing with it
in breach of their respective restraint provisions contained in their
agreements with it.
[15] The applicant
further alleges that the respondents and Apex all share the same
business and/or registered address. In
further substantiation
of its contentions the applicant alleges that Apex’s business
brochure lists the first respondent’s
current business vehicles
and branches. Apex further uses the respondents’
telephone numbers for its vehicle rental
business which are the same
telephone numbers the respondents utilized when they were operating
its vehicle rental business.
In terms of the agreements, those
telephone numbers were required to have been handed over to the
applicant.
[16] On the basis of all
these allegations the applicant contends that Apex is being used by
the respondents as a conduit to circumvent
their respective restraint
of trade provisions. Its protectable interests including its
operating manual, copies and records
of its customer lists are in the
process, being transferred to Apex. Therefore, Apex is
complicit in the respondents’
breach of their restraint
provisions. Apex is also being used by the respondents as a
springboard to circumvent the said
restraint provisions and in that
way is unlawfully competing with the applicant.
[17] Mr Du Toit deposed
to an answering affidavit on behalf of the respondents indicating
therein that he is the sole director of
all the three respondents.
His exposition of the factual matrix on the basis of which the
respondents opposed the relief
sought by the applicant paints a
completely different picture which is more or less the following.
The respondents were previously
sub-licencee and agents of the
applicant. The first respondent traded out of Gqeberha and East
London. The second respondent
traded out of George in the
Western Cape and the third respondent out of Paarl also in the
Western Cape.
[18] The third
respondent’s agency agreement terminated in March 2022.
The first and second respondents’ agency
agreements terminated
at the end of May 2023. In terms of the agreements the
applicant had with them, the respondents were
entitled to contract
directly with customers under the umbrella of the Avis brand in
respect of van rentals. As a result,
the first respondent owns
a fleet of approximately 286 vehicles, the second respondent 104
vehicles and the third respondent owns
64 vehicles.
[19] With regards to the
decision of the respondents to exit the agency and sub-licence
agreements with the applicant he makes the
following averments.
There was a van rental conference held on 24 to 26 August 2022.
In that conference the applicant
informed all its licencees that it
would be discontinuing the agreements when they expired and indicated
a number of options that
were open to it. A restructuring
proposal was later made to the respondents. They were advised that if
they were not happy
with it the applicant would be willing to discuss
an early termination of the sub-licence agreement with the first
respondent and
the agency agreements with the first to third
respondents. However, no goodwill would be paid to the respondents.
[20] The respondents
elected to exit the agreements early which resulted in their
termination as at the 31 May 2023. The applicant
took over the
second respondent’s staff and premises. The third
respondent’s lease agreement was terminating
as at the 31 May
2023, and it therefore did not renew it. As a result, the
second and third respondents effectively no longer
trade other than
the historical vehicles which are currently on lease to the first
respondent. The first respondent sublet
its East London
premises to the applicant. The applicant chose not to take over
the first respondent’s Gqeberha premises
which were then taken
over by another entity. Currently the first respondent trades
from 4 Reitz Road, Millpark, Gqeberha
and is busy winding up its
business consequent upon the termination of the agreements.
[21] The first
respondent’s remaining fleet of vehicles are leased to the
applicant, two of the applicant’s sub-licencees
and three of
Apex’s franchisees. Mr Du Toit is not only the director
of the respondents but also an indirect shareholder
through a family
trust and an entity known as Peachey Holdings in which his family
trust is a 100% shareholder. Peachey Holdings
is a 50%
shareholder in Apex and the other 50% is held by Katsea Trust.
[22] Apex’s
principal place of business is Unit 24 Milnerton Business Park,
Corner Koeberg and Racecourse Road, Milnerton,
Cape Town. The
address reflected in the brochure referred to in the founding
affidavit is not that of Apex but that of its
franchisees including
the one that trades at 125 Albert Road, Walmer, Gqeberha.
[23] The respondents deny
acting in breach of the restraint of trade and further deny that the
applicant, in any event, has any
protectable interest. This is
because the respondents were merely a conduit for customers wishing
to collect and drop off
vehicles rented from the applicant and the
respondents had no relationship with those customers. The
respondents have no
knowledge of the business of the applicant, its
information, trade secrets and had no customer connections.
Apex is a franchisor
and as such does not carry on the same business
as the respondents. In any event it is not subject to any
restraint of trade
agreement. Mr Du Toit further denies that
Apex approached the applicant’s sub-licencees or agents.
In any event
the email marked as annexure CZR10 was from an employee
of a franchisee of Apex. Furthermore, and in any event, Limpopo
and
Polokwane are not areas in which the respondents are restrained
at all from operating. The respondents deny that Apex utilises
their telephone numbers.
[24] At the termination
of the agreements with the applicant, the lease agreements of the
second and third respondents were expiring,
and the applicant was
advised of the contact details of the relevant landlords so that it
may enter into agreements with them.
As a result, the applicant
took over the premises in George but not the ones in Paarl. In
respect of the East London premises
the applicant has taken over
those premises through a sub-lease with the first respondent.
The applicant has therefore taken
over those telephone lines.
It was offered the Gqeberha premises but declined to take them.
Therefore, the applicant
had an opportunity to take over all four
premises. The telephone numbers in the brochure are those of
the franchisees of
Apex.
The sub-licence
agreement.
[25] It is common cause
that only the first respondent concluded a sub-licence agreement with
the applicant while the second and
third respondents concluded agency
agreements. As earlier indicated, there was no restraint of trade
agreement at all concluded
with Apex which is cited herein not as a
party to any such agreement but for allegedly engaging in what is
said to be an unlawful
competition. I will deal with Apex later
in this judgment.
The terms of the
sub-licence agreement.
[26] The restraints
provisions contained in the sub-licence agreement concluded with the
first respondent read:
“
14.3
Upon termination or expiration of this Agreement neither the
Sub-Licencee, nor its shareholders or its and their Related Entities
may for a period of 12 months from the date of termination or expiry
of this Agreement, directly or indirectly solicit business
from any
Location within the Territory from any person who was, during the
12-month period prior to such termination or expiry
a regular
customer of or in the habit of dealing with the Business. The
foregoing restrictions shall not apply where the
Agreement is
terminated by the Sub-Licencee for reasons related to material breach
of this agreement by the Sub-Licensor.
14.4 The restrictions
imposed on the Sub-Licencee, its shareholders or its and their
Related Entities apply to them acting (i) directly
or indirectly, or
(ii) on their own behalf or on behalf of or in conjunction with, any
firm, company or person.
14.5 Each of the
restrictions in this clause is intended to be separate and
severable. If any of the restrictions are held
to be void but
would be valid if part of the wording were deleted, such restrictions
shall apply with such deletion as may be necessary
to make it valid
or effective.”
[27] As indicated
earlier, the applicant also concluded agency agreements with the
respondents. However, it is common cause
that the agency
agreement concluded with the third respondent expired in March 2022.
Counsel for the applicant pointed out
during the hearing of this
matter that in those circumstances, no relief was sought against the
third respondent which was in fact
being abandoned. The
applicant only persisted with the relief sought against the first and
second respondents regarding the
sub-licence and agency agreements
and against Apex regarding the alleged unlawful competition.
The agency agreements.
[28] The restraint
provisions in the agency agreements which were similarly worded in
respect of all the relevant respondents read
as follows.
“
17.
Restraint
17.1 During the currency
of this Agreement and for a period of 12(twelve) months after the
termination of this Agreement by either
party and for any reason
whatsoever the Operator and his/her immediate family members shall
not:
17.1.1 rent out any
Vehicle in the Area or permit or assist any third party to advertise
promote or carry on a vehicle rental or
any similar business in the
Area;
17.1.2 be or become
directly or indirectly engaged or be concerned or interested in any
other transient rent a car operation, van
rental or truck rental
business;
17.1.3 undertake or
assist in the solicitation of customers for vehicle rental, van
rental or truck rental, with whom it dealt with
during this
agreement;
17.1.4 in any way say
anything adverse about the Avis Budget brand and/or the company.’’
[29]
The applicable legal principles in restraint of trade agreements have
been stated and restated by our courts for some time
now.
Amongst other cases, those principles were restated in
Reddy
[1]
about sixteen years or so ago.
The analysis.
[30]
The applicant’s case is that it entered into restraint
agreements with the respondents to prevent them from communicating
its trade secrets to or utilising its customer connections on behalf
of its rival, Apex. It contends that all it needs to
show is
that there is confidential information which the respondents could
transmit to Apex should they desire to do so.
It does not have
to show that they have in fact utilised the information confidential
to it. It merely has to show that they
could do so. On
this point the applicant relies on,
inter
alia
,
the case of
New
Justfun
Group
[2]
.
In that case Van Niekerk J, in part, had this to say:
“
The
enforcement of a restraint the purpose of which is to protect
confidential information, cannot be defeated by an undertaking
that
the employee will not divulge the information if he or she is
permitted, contrary to the restraint, from entering into employment
with a competitor.
BHT Water
Treatment (Pty) Ltd v Leslie
1993 (1)
SA 47
(W), at 57-58 B. This approach was recently affirmed in
Experian SA (Pty) Ltd v Hayes &
Another
(2013 34 ILJ 529 (GSJ) and by
the Labour Appeal Court in
Ball v
Bambela Bolts (Pty) Ltd & Another
(2013) 34 ILJ 2021 (LAC) where Coppin AJA noted that the fact that an
employee had stated that she did not intend and did not use
confidential information for the benefit of her new employer is
irrelevant in determining whether a restraint is reasonable, or
whether it has been breached. The purpose of a restraint
agreement as the court observed in
Reddy
v Siemens Telecommunications (Pty) Ltd
(2007) 28 ILJ 317 (SCA) is to relieve the applicant of having to rely
on Turner’s bona fides.”
[31] It is indeed so, as
the authorities indicate, that the applicant should not have to rely
on the respondents’ bona fides
and as the applicant put it,
cross its fingers hoping that they would act honourably or abide by
their undertaking. However,
since the Ericsson incident which
is the closest that the applicant has come up with any evidence of an
alleged breach, which remains
disputed, there is no evidence of the
respondents having committed any breach anywhere in the territory as
defined. In the
founding affidavit the applicant indicates that
Mr Du Toit, on behalf of the respondents and Apex denied that those
respondents
acted in breach of the agreements. The
correspondence that the applicant is referring to is dated 7 April
2023. This
is in respect of the alleged Ericsson solicitation
that took place in March 2023. Since then, until September 2023
when these
proceeding were instituted nothing seems to have happened
or been done by the applicant about that alleged solicitation of
Ericsson.
I take the view that the applicant must have chosen
to rely on Mr Du Toit’s undertaking in his correspondence
mentioned earlier
in which he, inter alia, said “
[a]t the
outset, I must record that, subject to what I stated hereunder, I
have and will continue to fulfil all of my obligations
in terms of
the sub-licence agreement
”.
[32] There is a
surprisingly paucity of information or details about the Ericsson
incident. Just at the most elementary level,
there is not even
an affidavit from the applicant’s or its sub-lincencee’s
employee to whom the attempted solicitation
was directed. There
is no evidence of any form of direct communication or even
conversations that that employee had with
Kim Lockem who is alleged
to have utilized Apex to compete with the applicant. This is
important because the onus is squarely
on the applicant to prove the
alleged breach of the restraint provisions, or at the very least, the
attempt to do so. Even the
applicant’s as own affidavit is
sketchy and annexes email chains with no specific direct reference to
the offending part
of the email chain.
[33] There are many other
points raised by the respondent. However, the approach I have adopted
is the one that assumes, without
concluding, that even if there may
have been confidential information that the applicant needed to
protect hence the invocation
of the restraint provisions, the
fundamentals of that evidence are sorely lacking. The approach
adopted by the applicant
seems to be that of not doing much to give
evidence of the nature of this information, trade secrets or customer
connections and
how it came to be that the respondents received it
and how they attempted to use it or how they in fact used it. In
those circumstances
it is difficult to understand how the respondents
used the said information assuming that they have it. The applicant
sought to
rely largely on the restraint clauses as if in and of
themselves are a proof of anything alleged just by their sheer
existence.
[34] In any event other
than the Ericsson incident, there is no evidence of any conduct on
the part of any of the respondents after
that incident which
suggests, even remotely, that the respondents could breach the
restraint provisions. The Ericsson incident
having been dealt
with in April 2023 through written correspondence between the
applicant and Mr Du Toit and appearing to have
been resolved from the
applicant’s own conduct thereafter, I have serious reservations
about the manner it is now being used
in these proceedings.
[35] The only other
incident after Ericsson’s is the so called Landbank incident
which happened in August 2023. In respect
of the Landbank
incident, the respondents and Apex say that a franchisee of Apex
called Apex Vehicle Rental Coastal (Pty) Ltd whose
existence the
applicant was always aware of, did what is alleged to be solicitation
by Apex Vehicle Rental (Pty) Ltd which is the
fourth respondent
herein. I do not think that I need to make a finding on whether
or not what the said franchisee did was
in fact solicitation as it is
not cited. I do not even think that on the facts of this matter
by the conduct that it engaged
in, Apex would have been involved in
unlawful competition with the applicant even if it were to be true
that it was Apex and not
its franchisee who conducted themselves as
alleged. The reason why none of that matters is because there
is no restraint
agreement between the applicant and Apex. Therefore,
Apex is generally entitled to compete openly with the applicant as
are
its franchisees. Furthermore, the respondents would ordinarily
also themselves have been entitled to compete openly with the
applicant
in Limpopo Province if regard is had to the fact that, that
province is outside the territory as defined in the agreements.
[36] To understand this,
one needs look no further than the sublicence and agency agreements
themselves. The sub-licence agreement
entered into between the
applicant and the first respondent reflects the territory as the
Eastern Cape & Winelands. In
the founding affidavit, no
case is made that any of the respondents was not entitled to operate
outside the territory as defined.
The Landbank issue in another
province and outside of the territory is raised without any basis
being laid as to why such an approach
was either in some way in
breach of the agreements by the respondents or Apex or is somehow
tainted by unlawfulness in any way
whatsoever. This creates a huge
disconnect between the Ericsson incident which was dealt with by Mr
Du Toit and the Landbank incident
in another area outside the
territory as defined.
Some
of the evidence in the founding affidavit
.
[37] With regard to the
respondents, the applicant refers to the clauses it relies on for the
relief sought. It specifically
states the prohibited conduct in
the agreements. Thereafter the purpose of the restraint clauses
is stated as being to protect
the applicant’s confidential
information, trade secrets and the customer connections which would
be created by the respondents
pursuant to the agreements. It is
alleged that the respondents would acquire knowledge and insight into
the applicant’s
business and gain influence over its
customers. However, the nature of the alleged confidential
information, the knowledge
that would be acquired, the trade secrets
and the customer connections are almost not mentioned at all save for
the passing reference
here and there.
[38] There is no serious
attempt to indicate in the affidavit what is this confidential
information, what are the trade secrets
and customer connections the
respondents in fact acquired, as a result of their business with the
applicant or evidence of the
actual acquisition. The
significance of this evidence is that the respondents surely are
entitled to know which case they
are required to meet and to deal
with it, a point they raised forth rightly. Insipid allegations
with no evidence whatsoever
and in particular where there is no
allegation in the founding affidavit that the respondents, in
conducting themselves in a specific
and particular way, acted in
breach of the restraint clauses in the agreements makes the
applicant’s case lacking in material
respects which inevitably
leads to its failure to discharge the onus resting upon it.
[39] The affidavit
thereafter moves to deal with Apex. Some allegations are made about
Mr Du Toit and his shareholding in the respondents
and his alleged
involvement in the incorporation of Apex. However, he is, for
some reason, not cited and yet he is alleged
to be the mastermind or
the brains behind the alleged breaches presumably because of his
alleged active involvement in Apex.
No attempt is made to
distinguish between Apex Vehicle Rental (Pty) Ltd, the fourth
respondent and Apex Vehicle Rental Coastal
(Pty) Ltd which is the
fourth respondent’s franchisee, a separate entity which is also
not before court. It appears that
the applicant was under the
impression that the two entities are the same. The Ericsson incident
is dealt with and how Mr Du Toit
dealt with it. What is not dealt
with is in what manner after his undertaking did any of the
respondents act or attempt or somehow
behave in a manner that
indicated an indiscretion or transgression. Thereafter the
allegations haphazardly hop into Mr Du Toit’s
resignation from
Apex and the appointment of Ms Lundy. After that Mr Du Toit is
alleged to have been the brains behind the
incorporation of Apex and
is alleged to be working with the respondents to unlawfully compete
with the applicant and in breach
of their restraint provisions.
Again, I must mention that he is not cited, and these allegations are
made with no attempt
to substantiate them.
[40] Allegations are then
made about the respondents and Apex sharing the same business and/or
registered address and the alleged
use by Apex of the respondents’
telephone numbers and other allegations are thrown into the mix with
no attempt at providing
proper evidence to sustain the said
allegations. Finally, Apex is alleged to be not only complicit
in assisting the respondents’
breach of their respective
restraint provisions. It is further alleged that the respondents are
springboarding Apex to circumvent
the said restraint provisions.
Therefore, Apex is alleged to be, in so doing, competing unlawfully
with the applicant. How
Apex acted as alleged without a clear nexus
and some form of collusion between it and its franchisee at the
behest of the respondents
and/or Mr Du Toit is difficult to
understand.
[41]
In explaining the correct approach to restraint provisions the court
said in
Rawlins
[3]
.
… “
[T]he
‘customer contact’ doctrine depends on the notion that
‘
the
employee, by contact with the customer, gets the customer so strongly
attached to him that when the employee quits and joins
a rival, he
automatically carries the customer with him in his pocket’.
In
Morris (Herbet) Ltd
v Saxelby
[1916] 1 AC 688
(HL) at 709 it was said that the
relationship must be such that the employee acquires
‘
such
personal knowledge of and influence over the customers of his
employer … as would enable him (the servant or apprentice),
if
competition were allowed, to take advantage of his employer’s
trade connection …’
This statement has been
applied in our Courts (for example, by Eksteen J in
Recycling
Industries (Pty) Ltd v Mohammed and Another
1981 (3) SA 250
(E)
at 256 C-F. Whether the criteria referred to are satisfied is
essentially a question of fact in each case, and in many,
one of
degree. Much will depend on the duties of the employee; his
personality; the frequency and duration of contact between
him and
the customers; where such contact takes place; what knowledge he
gains of their requirements and business; the general
nature of their
relationship (including whether an attachment is formed between them,
the extent to which customers rely on the
employee and how personal
their association is); how competitive the rival businesses are; in
the case of a salesman, the type
of product being sold; and whether
there is evidence that customers were lost after the employee left…’”
[42] There is another
matter of concern which is deserving of some comment. This relates to
the applicant’s condonation application
for its late filing of
the supplementary affidavit. The supporting affidavit is supposedly
deposed to by Mr Sibuyi. However, there
is a glaring overwriting that
appears to have been done to what would have been Mr Sibuyi’s
ordinary signature which can
be seen in other affidavits. That
affidavit starts at page 352 and ends at page 356 of the paginated
court documents. His signature
with disconcerting overwriting is at
page 355. Mr Sibuyi’s initials and the signature itself were
clearly written over by
someone. That overwriting casts some doubt as
to whether that document was in fact initialled and signed by Mr
Sibuyi. Whilst I
am not in a position to make any conclusion one way
or the other, I do think that it would be remiss of me not to express
some
unease about a document supposedly signed under oath and
supposedly by the person who takes the oath being tempered with
presumably
before the document is served and filed. The integrity of
affidavits in the functioning of the courts should never be
compromised
which is what seems to have happened in that affidavit,
assuming that nothing worse than overwriting an authentic signature
happened.
[43] As regards Apex, the
irrefutable evidence is that it was its franchisee that made the
approach in Limpopo, an independent entity,
through an erstwhile
employee of the first respondent. No case was sought to be made
that Apex used its franchisees to assist
the respondents in breaching
their restraint agreements. That entity was not cited and there
is no evidence at all about
the alleged contact, at the very least, a
confirmatory affidavit by the person to whom contact was made,
assuming it was a matter
that needed consideration and determination
of this Court. In all these circumstances it becomes difficult to
resist the conclusion
that the Landbank incident seems to have been
used as a springboard for launching these proceedings on an urgent
basis in this
Court, an issue I turn to now.
The urgency.
[44] On urgency the
applicant deals with the letter it wrote on 5 April 2023 confronting
the respondents regarding what it calls
the attempted solicitation
and/or enticement of its customer, Ericsson to which Mr Du Toit
responded in writing on 7 April 2023.
In his response he denied
it but undertook to make sure that the respondents complied with
their obligations about the restraint
provisions. Thereafter,
nothing seems to have happened. The applicant goes on to talk about
negotiations between May and
August 2023 regarding the conclusion of
an exit agreement consequent upon the termination of the sublicence
and agency agreements.
Then the applicant talks about an
attempt at soliciting Landbank which is its client by Apex “
in
breach of the Polokwane and Mpumalanga restraints provisions
.”
In this regard, Apex is alleged to have done the approach to
Landbank “
through the applicant’s Polokwane and
Mpumalanga agents
”. As I understand this allegation,
Apex used applicant’s own agents to approach Landbank.
Therefore, it
did not use the respondents but applicant’s
unnamed agents. This is also not explained and is therefore
difficult to
understand the case sought to me made on these facts.
[45] Over and above all
of this, there is no allegation that the applicant had entered into a
restraint of trade agreement with
Apex relating to the areas of
Polokwane and Mpumalanga or the basis on which Apex was in any event
not entitled to approach the
applicant’s customers in that
area. There are further no allegations that the respondents did
in fact enter into such
an agreement which is in any event not
referred to or annexed concerning that area. The basis on which
any of the respondents
would have acted in breach of their restraint
provisions in Polokwane and Mpumalanga is conspicuous by its
absence. It is
unclear why this Court should in any event have
jurisdiction to deal with a matter or issue or breach that was
committed, allegedly,
in an area outside its jurisdiction.
[46] Averments are then
made about the applicant not launching this application earlier
believing that the respondents would comply
with their respective
restraint provisions presumably based on Mr Du Toit’s
undertaking in his letter dated 7 April 2023.
Again, it is
unclear what these restraint provisions are as they relate to that
area. As I said before, the applicant appears to
have accepted Mr Du
Toit’s undertaking after the Ericsson incident as a result of
which it did not take any further action
since April 2023 until the
issue of Landbank arose outside the territory as defined.
[47] There was a long
period of inaction of more than four months on the Ericsson
incident. Thereafter, the Landbank incident
in another
jurisdiction happened. It appears to have been used to create a
veneer of urgency to launch these proceedings
in this Court seeking
to rely on urgency rules with no justification or appropriate factual
basis. Even worse, this urgent
application was launched with no
certificate of urgency being filed at all. When it was subsequently
filed it was in the form of
an affidavit, not a certificate as we
have come to understand it. In that affidavit a specific allegation
is made that the solicitation
of Landbank was “
in breach of
the Polokwane and Mpumalanga agency restraint provisions
’’.
This is patently incorrect as such agency agreement with Apex simply
does not exist. The non-filling
of a certificate of
urgency was a shocking flagrant violation of this Court’s rules
and practice directives. Those
involved in the drawing of the
applicant’s papers seem to have done very little to acquaint
themselves with this Court’s
procedural rules, practices, and
directives.
[48]
In the circumstances I consider it necessary to deal with the urgency
procedures in this Court. In doing so, I can do
no better than
refer copiously to the judgment of Mbenenge JP in
Bobotyana
[4]
:
I consider the following paragraphs instructive.
“
[8]
Ms Stretch submitted that a directive by a Judge permitting a
litigant to set down an urgent application on a Thursday was,
upon a
proper interpretation of rule 12(d) of the Eastern Cape Practice
Directions, not a requirement. The relevant portion
of the rule
reads:
‘
(d)
In all urgent applications in which it is sought to enrol the matter
other than on a day normally reserved for the hearing of
motion court
matters:
(i)The practitioner who
appears for the applicant must sign the certificate of urgency which
is to be filed of record before the
application papers are placed
before the judge and in which the reasons for urgency are fully set
out. In this regard, sufficient
particularity is to be set out
in the certificate for the question of urgency to be determined
solely therefrom and without perusing
the application papers.
(ii) The certificate of
urgency will be placed before the judge who will make a determination
solely from that certificate as to
whether or not the matter is
sufficiently urgent to be heard at any time other than the normal
motion court hours.’
[9] Reliance for the
submission was further placed on
Madlongolwana v Walter Sisulu
University
, where it was stated:
“
[3]
The applicants approached the duty judge in chambers on 12 February
2016, presenting a certificate of urgency in which were
set out
reasons why the matter should be permitted to proceed as an urgent
application and seeking a directive in terms of rule
12 of the Joint
Rules of Practice for the High Courts of the Eastern Cape Province
regarding the hearing and further conduct of
the matter. A
directive was issued to the fact that the matter may be set down for
hearing on 18 February 2016 at 09h30 and
requiring service of the
application papers on or before 15 February 2016.
[4] The first observation
which must be made is that it was not necessary for the applicant to
approach the duty judge for a directive
regarding the hearing and
further conduct of the matter. Th reason is that the targeted
date, 18 February 2016 [a Thursday],
was a motion court date. A
careful reading of rule 12(d) of the Joint Rules of Practice …
reveals that the purpose
of that rule is to provide a mechanism
whereby an applicant can approach a judge in chambers for a directive
in circumstances in
which the applicant wishes to move the court for
relief on a day which is not ordinarily a day on which a motion court
sits.
Given that the applicants wished to move for relief on a
motion court day, they were at liberty to do so by an issue of a
notice
of motion accompanied by a certificate of urgency and
supported by a founding affidavit in accordance with the provisions
of rule
6 (12) of the Uniform Rules of Court. It was not
necessary for the applicants obtain a directive before issuing and
serving
their application.”
[49] With no certificate
of urgency, the applicant issued its papers on 08 September 2023
indicating that the matter was to be heard
on 3 October 2023.
Inexplicably, it indicated in the notice of motion that the
respondents should file their notice to oppose
by 17h00 on 8
September 2023, the same day papers were issued. It then
proceeded to give the respondents three days from
Monday the 11
September 2023 unless they were expected to attend to this matter
even over the weekend in which case it gave them
five days to file
their answering affidavit by 17h00 on 13 September 2023. This,
in circumstances in which the matter was
only going to be heard on 3
October 2023. The applicant gave itself, generously I must say,
more than enough time to file
a replying affidavit on any day after
the 13 September 2023, that is, if it determined that it needed to
file one. I can
only surmise that the issues I raise above as
they relate to urgency and even the manner in which the evidence in
general is presented
have as their root causes, the failure to
diligently examine the facts to ensure that the case sought to be
made is correctly grounded
on the alleged particular factual matrix.
[50]
In this regard and especially relating to urgency, our
locus
classicus
is
Luna
Meubel
[5]
.
In that case Kroon J had this to say:
“
Practitioners
should carefully analyse the facts of each case to determine, for the
purpose of setting the case down for hearing,
whether a greater or
lesser degree of relaxation of the rules and the ordinarily practice
of the court is required. The degree
of the relaxation should
not be greater than the exigency of the case demands. It must
be commensurate therewith.
[A]n
applicant must make out a case in the founding affidavit to justify
the particular extent of the departure from the norm, which
is
involved in the time and day for which the matter be set down.”
[51] The failure to
appreciate and apply the urgency rules and practice directions and in
the process, unnecessarily give the respondents
insufficient time for
them to instruct their legal representatives and consult for purposes
of filing opposing papers is, in my
view, an abuse of court process.
The assertion that in the end they were afforded more time as they
were granted an extension
as the applicant suggested is cold solace
and it certainly is not how the urgency rules were intended to be
used. The issue
of a possible relaxation of the timetable has
no role to play in setting out the required timetable depending on
the exigencies
of the matter.
[52] While the fact that
the applicant’s legal representatives were from a different
jurisdiction and therefore were clearly
not adept about this Court’s
practice directions played a role, there is no excuse for not
familiarizing themselves sufficiently
with this Court’s rules
and practice directions. The applicant’s attorneys had a
responsibility to ensure that
they were in possession of the practice
directions and the Joint Rules of this Division which are to be read
in conjunction with
Rule 6(12) of the Uniform Rules of Court. They
cannot and could not have safely relied on correspondent attorneys
when in fact
the rules and practice directions of this Court are
published and easily accessible.
[53] In all the
circumstances, the applicants have failed to make out a case for the
relief sought as earlier indicated. It follows
therefore that this
application must fail.
[54] In the result the
following order shall issue:
1. The application is
dismissed.
2. The applicant shall
pay costs of this application including costs occasioned by the
employment of two counsel.
M.S.
JOLWANA
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Counsel
for the applicant
H.J.
Fischer
Instructed
by
DMS
Attorneys
Sandton
Counsel
for the1st, 2
nd
, 3
rd
A.
Beyleveld SC with K. Morris
and
4
th
respondent
Instructed
by
Greyvensteins
and Joubert Galpin Searle respectively.
Gqeberha
Date
heard
26
October 2023
Date
delivered
20
December 2023
[1]
Reddy
v Siemens Telecommunications
2007 (2) SA 486
(SCA) at 497 c-f in
which Malan AJA stated the legal principles as follows. A
restraint would be unenforceable if it prevents
a party after
termination of his or her employment from partaking in trade or
commerce without a corresponding interest of the
other party
deserving of protection. Such a restraint is not in the public
interest. Moreover, a restraint which
is reasonable as between
the parties may for some other reason be contrary to the public
interest. In Basson v Chilwan
and Others, Nienaber JA
identified four questions that should be asked when considering the
reasonableness of a restraint: (a)
Does the one party have an
interest that deserves protection after termination of the
agreement? (b) If so, is that interest
threatened by the other
party? (c) In that case, does such interest weigh qualitatively ad
quantitatively against the interest
of the other party not to be
economically inactive and unproductive? (d) Is there an aspect
of public policy having nothing
to do with the relationship between
the parties that requires that the restraint be mentioned or
rejected? Where the interest
of the party sought to be
restrained weighs more than the interest to be protected, the
restraint is unreasonable and consequently
unenforceable. The
enquiry which is undertaken at the time of enforcement covers a wide
field and includes the nature,
extent and duration of the restraint
and factors peculiar to the parties and their respective bargaining
powers and interests.
[2]
New
Justfun Group (Pty) Ltd v Turner and Other (2018) 39 ILJ 2721 (LC)
para 20
[3]
Rawlins
and Another v Caravantruck (Pty) Ltd
[1992] ZASCA 204
;
1993 (1) SA 537
at 541 D-H.
[4]
Bobotyana
and Others v Dyantyi and Others 2021 (1) SA 386 (ECG)
[5]
Luna
Meubelvervaardigers (Edms) vs Makin and Another t/a Makin’s
Furniture Manufactures
1977 (4) SA 135(W)
at pg. 137 E-G.