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[2023] ZAECQBHC 59
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Van Heerden and Another v Master of the Eastern Cape High Court, Port Elizabeth and Others (1358/2022) [2023] ZAECQBHC 59; [2023] 4 All SA 875 (ECP) (3 October 2023)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN
DIVISION, GQEBERHA)
CASE
NO: 1358/2022
In
the matter between:-
ANDRE
CHARL VAN HEERDEN
First
Applicant
ANDRE
CHARL VAN HEERDEN N.O.
[In
his capacity as joint liquidator of Retro Reflective
(Pty)
Ltd (in liquidation)]
Second
Applicant
and
THE
MASTER OF THE EASTERN CAPE HIGH
COURT,
PORT ELIZABETH
First
respondent
BRIAN
VAN ZYL
Second
respondent
HANTLE
INFRA PLANNING (PTY) LTD
Third
respondent
SUNE
SMIT N.O.
[in
her capacity as joint liquidator of Retro Reflective
(Pty)
Ltd (in liquidation)]
Fourth
respondent
JUDGMENT
MATEBESE
AJ
[1]
On 18 December 2018 Retro Reflective (Pty) Ltd, hereinafter referred
to as Retro, was placed under
voluntary winding up in the hands
of the first respondent. The first applicant and the fourth
respondent were appointed as
provisional liquidators on 14 January
2019 and as final liquidators on 6 February 2019. Their appointments
were made by the first
respondent under reference S1/2019.
[2]
On 18 August 2020 the first respondent, pursuant to complaints and an
application by the third
respondent, approved an enquiry in terms of
section 381 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 (“the Companies
Act”) to investigate
the conduct of the liquidators of Retro in
the performance of their duties (“the decision”). The
third respondent is
a proven creditor of Retro.
[3]
In his letter dated 18 August 2020 containing the decision the first
respondent identified six
(6) issues to be investigated by the
enquiry. He also indicated his intention to “
utilise the
services of an evidence leader (counsel) to cross examine the
evidence placed before the enquiry by the liquidators
and others
witness (sic)”
.
[4]
In the letter the first respondent further stated that “
the
evidence leader will only question the liquidators and other witness
and the Master will make final findings with regard to
whether the
case of Infra is substantiated or not”
.
[5]
In a letter dated 18 August 2020 addressed to Honey Attorneys and
Bedford Trust, on behalf of
the fourth respondents and applicants,
respectively, the first respondent informed the applicants and the
fourth respondent of
his decision aforesaid. He also advised that he
“
will in due course issue notices to liquidators and other
witnesses to attend the enquiry”.
[6]
On 12 October 2020 the first respondent issued the applicants with
the notice referred to in the
letter dated 18 August 2020. In the
notice the first respondent stated, inter alia, the following:
1.
“
You are informed that:
1.1
The
Master of the High Court will conduct an enquiry in terms of section
381 of the Companies Act. The purpose of the enquiry is
to
investigate the complaints made against Andre Charl Van Heerden by
Hantle Infra Planning (Pty) Ltd (creditor) with regard to
execution
of his fiduciary duties.
1.2
The
enquiry will be convened on the 17 November 2020 at….
1.3
You
are requested to appear in person at the enquiry on the 17 November
2020 at 9h00 a.m. and to remain in attendance until excused
by the
Master.
2.
Take notice further that
2.1 You have a right
to legal representation at the enquiry….”
[7]
The enquiry was postponed on 17 November 2020 to 29 April 2021. On 29
April 2021 the enquiry was
postponed to 6 September 2021 so as to
allow the section 417/418 enquiry to be finalised since according to
the first respondent
“
the section 417/418 enquiry evidence
has a directing (sic) bearing in the outcome of the section 381
enquiry”
. It was again postponed on 6 September 2021
to 13 December 2021.
[8]
I pause to mention that on 31 March 2021 the third respondent’s
attorneys addressed an email
to the office of the first respondent.
The email reads:
“
Dear Mr Komle
Further to your below
email, we have been instructed to request that you enquire from the
office of the chief master if adv Brian
van Zyl can be appointed as
the evidence leader for the section 381 enquiry in this insolvency to
commence on 1 June 2021 for reasons
set out in our below email of 6
March 2021. Our instructions are further that our client, the proven
creditor, Hantle Infra Planning
(Pty) Ltd tenders to pay the costs to
be incurred for appointment of ad van Zyl.”
[9]
It appears that the first respondent had, by letter dated 5 February
2021 addressed to the Bedford
Trust, through which the applicants
communicated with first respondent, agreed to postpone the enquiry
which was scheduled to sit
on 1 March 2021 to 1 June 2021. It is
apparently for this reason that reference is made to 1 June 2021 in
the above email.
[10]
The email of 6 March 2021 referred to in the above quoted email is
not included in the papers. The reasons
set out therein are also not
disclosed in any of the affidavits. To make matters worse the first
respondent has not filed any affidavit
explaining whether he acted on
the said reasons or not and what those reasons were. I say more on
this later in this judgement.
[11]
On 8 November 2021 the first respondent approved the appointment of
advocate Brian van Zyl, the second respondent
herein. In his letter,
addressed to the third respondent’s attorneys, the first
respondent stated:
“…
Your letter dated 19
October 2021 refers.
I approve that
appointment of advocate Brian van Zyl as evidence leader in the
section 381 enquiry approved by the Master in the
abovenamed estate.
I further consent to the costs of the evidence being paid by the
creditor (Hantle Infra Planning (Pty) Ltd).
Hantle Infra Planning
(Pty) Ltd is the creditor who approached the Master to hold the
section 381 enquiry to investigate the conduct
of the liquidator in
the administration of the above estate….”
[12]
On 17 May 2022 the applicants instituted proceedings seeking an order
in the following terms:
1.
“
That the decision of the First Respondent to allow the
enquiry in terms of section 381 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 to be
conducted
by anyone else than the Master, the matter of retro
Reflective (Pty) Ltd, be reviewed and set aside;
2.
In the alternative, that the decision of the First respondent
to appoint the Second Respondent as “evidence leader” to
conduct the Section 381 enquiry in the matter of Retro Reflective
(Pty) Ltd (in liquidation), be reviewed and set aside;
3.
That the proceedings and record of such enquiry to date be
declared null and void;
4.
That the First Respondent pay the costs of this application
together with any party who chooses to oppose this application
jointly
and severally the one paying the others to be absolved.”
[13]
On 1 June 2022 the first respondent filed a Notice to Oppose the
application. The opposition was later withdrawn
and a Notice to abide
was filed on 23 August 2022. The reason for the withdrawal of
opposition appears to be that the applicant
agreed to abandon the
prayer for costs against the first respondent. This means the first
respondent had no intention of opposing
the application on its merits
but only filed opposition to the prayer for costs. As stated above,
nothing has been filed by the
first respondent, not even reasons for
his decisions.
[14]
The second and third respondents (“the respondents”) are
opposing the application. They have
raised the following points:
1.
That the applicants lack the
locus standi
to bring this
application;
2.
That the applicants failed to bring the application within reasonable
time;
3.
That the decisions under attack do not amount to administrative
action as envisaged in the
Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3
of 2000 (“PAJA”).
4.
That the application is without merit.
[15]
In response to the unreasonable delay point raised by the respondents
the applicants filed an application
for condonation. I deal with this
application hereunder. But, first I must dispose of the
locus
standi
point in limine. This is so because if I find against the
applicants on this point, that will be the end of the matter.
Locus
standi
[16]
I must mention that this point was not pursued during argument.
Neither was it abandoned. Accordingly, it
is for this reason that I
have decided to deal with it for completeness.
[17]
The second respondent contends that the first applicant lacks the
locus standi to bring these proceedings
principally because he is an
appointee of the first respondent and acts, in his capacity as
liquidator, as the latter’s representative.
He, accordingly, so
the argument goes, in his personal capacity, does not have the
requisite
locus standi
in terms of section 151 of the
Insolvency Act and section 6(1) of PAJA.
[18]
As regards the second applicant the second respondent contends that
the decision to appoint the evidence
leader is done for the benefit
of the first respondent and it cannot affect the rights of any person
participating in the section
381 enquiry; that the decision does not
amount to administrative action as it is not a decision taken in the
exercise of a power
in terms of the constitution, provincial
constitution or exercise of a public power in terms of legislation
and that there are
no rights of the second applicant that are
affected by the decision.
[19]
The third respondent contends that the applicants do not have
locus
standi
on the facts of the case to approach court because they
are not persons aggrieved by the decisions/actions-they, so the
argument
proceeds, have not suffered a legal grievance wrongfully
depriving them of anything or wrongfully refusing them anything. It
is
argued, by the third respondent, that the applicants’ rights
have not been infringed.
[20]
Locus
standi
in the legal sense has two connotations. In one sense it connotes a
person’s right to bring legal proceedings to court. In
the
second sense it means a party bringing proceedings must have a
direct and substantial interest in the matter.
[1]
[21]
It is not contended by the respondents that the Mr van Heerden, both
in his personal and representative capacity
as liquidator, lacks the
right to bring legal proceedings to court. Properly understood their
contention is simply that they do
not have a direct and substantial
interest in the decision that is the subject of review, because the
decisions do not affect any
of their rights and the decisions do not
constitute administrative action reviewable at their instance.
[22]
I disagree. The decisions of the first respondent are purportedly
taken in terms of section 381 of the Companies
Act. Therefore, the
first respondent was exercising a public power when taking the
decisions. The enquiry that is authorised by
the decision of 18
August 2020 is directed at investigating the conduct of,
inter
alia
, the first applicant in his capacity as the liquidator. If
findings are made against him as such, such findings are likely to
affect
him as a person and as liquidator.
[23]
In my view the applicants have a right to challenge these decisions
and have a direct and substantial interest
in these proceedings which
are mainly to challenge decisions that have a potential to adversely
affect them.
[23]
The question whether the decision constitutes administrative action
as defined in the PAJA is, in my view,
irrelevant, to whether a party
has
locus standi
or not. It is only relevant if a court must
decide whether a decision is reviewable under the PAJA or not, which
is not the challenge
at this stage.
[24]
For the above reasons I find no merit to the respondents’
locus
standi
point.
Decisions not
amounting to administrative action under PAJA
[25]
The third respondent contends that the decisions under attack do not
amount to administrative action as envisaged
in PAJA in that they do
not adversely affect the rights of the applicants and also do not
have external legal effect.
[26]
PAJA defines administrative action to mean “
any decision of
an administrative nature made… under an empowering provision
and taken by an organ of State, when exercising
a power in terms of
the…, or exercising a public power or performing a public
function in terms of any legislation, or taken
by a natural person,
other than an organ of state when exercising a public power or
performing a public function in terms of an
empowering provision,
which adversely affects the rights of any person and which has a
direct, external legal effect….”
[27]
The first respondent is an organ of state. He was exercising a public
function in terms of the Companies
Act, a legislation, when he took
the decision to initiate an enquiry and to appoint the evidence
leader. Whether he acted
ultra vires
in doing so is irrelevant
for purposes of determining whether his decision amounts to
administrative action or not.
[28]
In
Grey’s Marine Hout Bay (Pty) Ltd and Others v Minister of
Public Works and Others
[2005] ZASCA 43
;
2005 (6) SA 313
the SCA per
Nugent JA, as he then was, stated:
“
[23]
While PAJA's definition purports to restrict administrative
action to decisions that, as a fact, 'adversely affect the
rights of
any person', I do not think that literal meaning could have been
intended. For administrative action to be characterised
by its effect
in particular cases (either beneficial or adverse) seems to me to be
paradoxical and also finds no support from the
construction that has
until now been placed on s 33 of the Constitution. Moreover, that
literal construction would be inconsonant
with s 3(1),
which envisages that administrative action might or might not
affect rights adversely. The qualification, particularly
when seen in
conjunction with the requirement that it must have a 'direct and
external legal effect', was probably intended rather
to convey that
administrative action is action that has the capacity to
affect legal rights, the two qualifications
in tandem serving to
emphasise that administrative action impacts directly and immediately
on individuals.
[24]
Whether particular conduct constitutes administrative action depends
primarily on the nature of the power
that is being exercised rather
than upon the identity of the person who does so. Features of
administrative action (conduct of
'an administrative nature') that
have emerged from the construction that has been placed on s 33
of the Constitution are that
it does not extend to the exercise of
legislative powers by deliberative elected legislative bodies, nor to
the ordinary exercise
of judicial powers, nor to the formulation of
policy or the initiation of legislation by the executive, nor to the
exercise of
original powers conferred upon the President as head
of State.
Administrative action
is rather, in general terms, the conduct of the bureaucracy
(whoever the bureaucratic functionary might
be) in carrying out the
daily functions of the State, which necessarily involves the
application of policy, usually after its translation
into law, with
direct and immediate consequences for individuals or groups of
individuals.”
[29]
The decision by the first respondent is a decision taken by a
bureaucratic functionary, carrying out the
functions of a State, and
exercising a power in terms of legislation. Accordingly, I find no
merit to the first respondent’s
contention. The first
respondent’s decision has all the attributes of administrative
action as envisaged in section 1 of
PAJA.
[2]
Unreasonable delay
[30]
The respondents contend that the applicants have unreasonably delayed
in bringing this application and therefore
stand to be non-suited.
They argue that the applicants became aware of the decisions that are
the subject of review on 18 August
2020 and on 8 November 2021.
[31]
It is their argument that in so far as the decision of 18 August 2020
is concerned, the application was brought
18 months after the
applicants became aware thereof and in respect of the decision
appointing the second respondent (the decision
of 8 November 2021)
the application was brought six months from the date of the decision.
[32]
The respondents contend that, irrespective of whether the application
is brought in terms of section 151
of the Insolvency Act 24 of 1936
(“the
Insolvency Act&rdquo
;) or in terms of the PAJA, the
applicants have unduly delayed in bringing the application.
[33]
Faced with this point
in limine
, the applicants brought an
application for condonation or for the extension of time in terms of
section 9
of the PAJA. The application is opposed by the respondents.
It is to the merits of this application that I turn hereunder.
[34]
The applicants first contend that the main application is brought in
terms of
section 151
of the
Insolvency Act and
is a common law
review. They argue that this court has an inherent power to condone
the late filing of such review. They also argue
that no substantive
application for condonation is required.
[35]
Whilst I agree with the applicants on the inherent power of the court
to condone the late filing of the review
and that under legality or
common law reviews no formal application for condonation is required,
I dare say that the legal position
remains that the applicants have a
duty to explain the delay.
[36]
It is trite that condonation is not granted for the mere asking. A
party seeking condonation must furnish
an explanation which accounts
for the entire period of the delay and that above all the explanation
must be reasonable.
[37]
It is also trite that a court granting condonation, or overlooking a
delay, exercises a discretion and the
discretion must be execised
judiciously in the interests of justice.
[38]
The applicants do not dispute that they became aware of the first
respondent’s decision to initiate
an enquiry on 18 August 2020.
They however, state that in the letter containing the decision the
first respondent simply stated
that he is in the process of acquiring
the services of counsel to lead evidence in the enquiry. They also
admit becoming aware
of the decision to appoint the second
respondent, at the latest on 13 December 2021.
[39]
The first applicant states that, since he was not legally represented
he was not aware that the Master’s
decision was unlawful and
also states that his understanding was always that he must raise the
issue of his dissatisfaction with
the Master’s decision on the
first date of the enquiry, which he did on 1 March 2022.
[40]
The applicants accordingly argue that there was no delay in bringing
the review application and that, if
there was any, the delay is not
unreasonable.
[41]
The respondents contend that the applicants became aware of the
decisions on 18 August 2020 and 8 November
2021 respectively, and
therefore they ought to have brought their review application within
180 days of the decisions respectively.
They argue that in respect of
the first decision the applicants are woefully out of time and they
have not furnished any explanation,
let alone a reasonable one. In
respect of the second decision they argue that the application ought
to have been brought, at the
latest, on 5 May 2022 but was only
brought on 17 May 2022.
[42]
What the respondents do not dispute, though, is that at the
commencement of the hearing on 1 March 2022,
the first applicant
advised the Master that he was advised that the appointment of the
second respondent was unlawful and that
he stated that “
I am
going to delve into it further into it further (sic) and if I believe
it is a valid point, then I am going to address you before
the
proceedings begin.”
[43]
What the above suggests is that at the time the first applicant
raised the issue of the appointment of the
second respondent with the
Master on 1 March 2022 he had just been advised of the alleged
unlawfulness thereof. He needed to be
certain of same before making
it an issue for consideration by the Master. But his intention was to
raise it before the proceedings
begin.
[44]
It is also not in dispute that the Master in response stated that “
if
anyone is unhappy with his appointment must instruct an attorney and
institute legal proceedings to set that aside.”
[45]
From the above it is clear that the applicants sought to resolve the
matter, once they became aware of any
possible illegality in the
appointment of the second respondent, by way of engagement with the
Master. It is this engagement that
the Master dismissed outrightly on
1 March 2022.
[46]
The question is whether the applicants must be faulted for having
sought to resolve the matter amicably with
the Master before they
approached the court.
[47]
I believe not. Parties should be encouraged to resolve their disputes
before resorting to litigation.
[48]
Accordingly, I am of the view that there was no delay in the bringing
of this application. Even if I am wrong
in this regard and there was
a delay, such delay was in my view not unreasonable and is hereby
condoned.
The merits
[49]
As already stated above the applicants seek an order that the
decision of the first respondent to allow the
enquiry in terms of
section 381 of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 to be conducted by anyone
else than the Master, in the matter of
Retro Reflective (Pty) Ltd, be
reviewed and set aside; alternatively that the decision of the first
respondent to appoint the Second
Respondent as “
evidence
leader
” to conduct the Section 381 enquiry in the matter of
Retro Reflective (Pty) Ltd (in liquidation), be reviewed and set
aside
and that the proceedings and record of such enquiry to date be
declared null and void;
[50]
The questions raised in these proceedings, therefore, are:
(a) Whether section
381(1) of the Companies Act permits the appointment of any person
other than the Master to conduct an
enquiry into the liquidator’s
conduct; and
(b) Whether the
appointment of second respondent by the first respondent is
susceptible to review on the grounds relied upon
by the applicants
Does
section 381 permit the appointment of any person other than the
Master?
[51]
This question is a
vires
(power) question. Put differently,
the question is whether, on a proper interpretation of the section,
the Master has the power
to appoint someone else to conduct an
enquiry regarding or relating to the conduct of a liquidator.
[52]
I must indicate from the onset that if regard is had to the letter of
the first respondent dated 18 August
2020 it is clear that the first
respondent appointed the second respondent as “
evidence
leader”
in an enquiry to be presided over by the first
respondent (“the Master”). It follows therefore that on
the facts of
this case the question whether any person other than the
Master can conduct an enquiry in terms of section 381 of the
Companies
Act does not even arise.
[53]
However, to the extent that the question to be answered is whether
the Master, in appointing an evidence
leader and a person who is an
outsider from the Master’s office, to assist him in conducting
the enquiry acted
ultra vires
the provisions of the
legislation, I deal with the question hereunder. I do so because it
seemed to be the question to which the
argument of the applicants was
directed.
[54]
The answer to this question lies in the proper interpretation of
section 381(1) of the Companies Act.
[55]
In interpreting statutory provisions, recourse is first had to the
plain, ordinary, grammatical meaning of
the words in question. In
addition, principles of interpretation also require that the
statutory provisions should always be interpreted
purposively; the
relevant statutory provision must be properly contextualised; and the
statutory provision must be construed consistently
with the
Constitution.
[3]
The exercise is
an objective one and the subjective views of the parties, their state
of mind, or the facts of the case have no
bearing on this
analysis.
[4]
[56]
Section 381 of the Companies Act provides:
381
“
Control of Master over liquidators
(1)
The Master shall take cognizance of the conduct of liquidators
and shall, if he has reason to believe that a liquidator is not
faithfully
performing his duties and duly observing all the
requirements imposed on him by any law or otherwise with respect to
the performance
of his duties, or if any complaint is made to him by
any creditor, member or contributory in regard thereto, enquire into
the matter
and take such action thereanent as he may think expedient.
(2)
The Master may at any time require any liquidator to answer
any enquiry in relation to any winding-up in which such liquidator is
engaged, and may, if he thinks fit, examine such liquidator or any
other person on oath concerning such winding-up.
(3)
The Master may at any time appoint a person to investigate the
books and vouchers of a liquidator;
(4)
The Court may, upon the application of the Master, order that
any costs reasonably incurred by him in performing his duties under
the section be paid out of the assets of the company or by the
liquidator de bonis propriis.
(5)
Any expenses incurred by the Master in carrying out any
provision of this section shall, unless the Court otherwise orders,
be regarded
as part of the costs of the winding-up of the company.”
[57]
The purpose of the section is for the Master to exercise control over
liquidators, to deal with the conduct
of liquidators and with
complaints regarding the conduct of liquidators. It empowers the
Master, where he has reason to believe
that a liquidator has acted,
or failed to act, in the manner evisaged in the section, to open an
enquiry into such liquidators
conduct and act thereon.
[58]
It does not prescribe how the Master must enquire into the conduct of
the liquidator. Neither does it preclude
the Master from utilising
the services of an evidence leader in the enquiry, where such is
necessary. In my view, to interprete
the section to preclude the
Master from appointing an evidence leader in an enquiry under section
381 of the Companies Act would
frustrate the objects and purpose of
the section and may lead to an absurdity.
[59]
There are varied enquiries that may be conducted by the Master under
section 381 of the Companies Act. Each
depending on the nature of the
conduct enquired upon or the nature of the complaint or complaints
levelled against the liquidator
or liquidators and the complexity of
the issues involved. Some may require the appointment of evidence
leaders and some may not.
In my view, it is unnecessary to
restrictively interprete the powers of the Master in this regard.
[60]
Accordingly, I find that the Master may appoint an evidence leader to
assist him in the enquiry.
[61]
In any event, I am of the view that the power to appoint an evidence
leader in an enquiry under section 381
of the Companies Act is
logically necessary for the exercise of the Master’s powers in
terms of the section, it does not
extend beyond the powers conferred
upon the Master and does not interfere with the rights of third
parties more than section 381
of the Companies Act allows.
[61]
The applicants argued in the alternative that, in the event I find
that the Master is empowered to appoint
an evidence leader, such
appointment is limited to officials within the various Master’s
offices and exclude any other person.
I disagree with the applicants
in this regard. The exigencies of the enquiry may sometimes demand
that the Master look outside
the Master’s offices for the
evidence leader. There is no logic to prefer such a restrictive
interpretation to the appointment
of a person to assist the Master.
It may be sound when it comes to the person to preside over the
enquiry and take decisions but
not for the evidence leader who takes
no decisions.
[62]
Accordingly, I find that the decision of the first respondent to
appoint an evidence leader to assist him
in the enquiry in terms of
section 381, contained, in the letter dated 18 August 2020, is not
ultra vires the provisions of section
381 of the Companies Act. The
applicant’s case in the regard must fail.
The
challenge on the appointment of Adv van Zyl, the second respondent
[63]
It is not disputed that the second respondent was appointed as the
evidence leader by the first respondent
at the instance of the third
respondent. It is also not in dispute that the second respondent has
represented and still represents
the third respondent in the section
417 or 418 enquiry involving the affairs of Retro and that he has
represented the third respondent
in legal proceedings before this
court against Retro and its liquidators, including the applicants.
[64]
The applicants argue that the second respondent should not have been
appointed by the first respondent because
the applicants have a
reasonable apprehension that he is biased against them. They argue
that he has not denied this in his papers.
His conduct also, so the
argument goes, confirms the extent of his bias. The applicants cite
in this regard,
inter alia
, the fact that he has opposed this
application, his opposition of postponement of the enquiry when the
Master excused Smit, his
relationship with one Mr Erasmus who is a
deponent to the third respondent’s answering affidavit.
[65]
The respondents argue that the evidence leader, just like a
prosecutor in an adversarial system is inevitably
partisan and he
would, so the argument goes, be only disqualified where his bias
affected the applicant’s right to a fair
hearing. They argue
that the applicant has failed to establish, by way of evidence, that
their right to a fair hearing will be
affected in any way should the
respondent proceed as evidence leader. They base their case on
S v
Zuma and Another
2022 (1) SACR 575
(KZP)
.
[66]
Whilst I agree with the standard laid down in the Zuma case, above, I
am, however, not sure if it finds application
in enquiries conducted
by the Master, which, in my view, are not supposed to be adversarial
in nature.
[67]
For the reasons that appear below I need not decide this issue. I
also do not find it necessary to decide
whether the applicants have
made out any case for a reasonable apprehension of bias as a ground
for the review and setting aside
of the Master’s appointment of
the second respondent.
[68]
I have stated herein above that it is the third respondent that
requested the appointment of the second respondent.
The request was
made on 31 March 2021 and was directed to the first respondent. It
was, according to the email dated 31 March 2021,
based on the reasons
contained in the email of 6 March 2021.
[69]
I have also stated herein above that the first respondent has not
filed any reasons for his decision to appoint
the second respondent.
He has also not filed any affidavit explaining his decision to
appoint the second respondent. I am left
in the dark as to what are
the first respondent’s reasons for the appointment and whether
they are the same reasons contained
in the letter dated 6 March 2021,
which I also do not have. I must therefore assume that such decision
was taken without good reasons
[5]
or that it was influenced by the unwarranted dictates of the third
respondent.
[70]
In
Kalil
NO and Others v Mangaung Metropolitan Municipality and Others
[6]
the SCA stated:
“
The function of
public servants and government officials at national, provincial and
municipal levels is to serve the public, and
the community at large
has the right to insist upon them acting lawfully and within the
bounds of their authority. Thus where,
as here, the legality of their
actions is at stake, it is crucial for public servants to neither be
coy nor to play fast and loose
with the truth. On the contrary, it is
their duty to take the court into their confidence and fully explain
the facts so that an
informed decision can be taken in the interest
of the public and good governance.”
[71]
The first respondent has failed in this duty. No reasons are advanced
for the decision to appoint the second
respondent. No facts have been
furnished to explain how he arrived at the decision to appoint the
second respondent. His decision
is, in my view, irrational, on this
basis and deserves to be reviewed and set aside.
[72]
Accordingly, the first respondent’s decision to appoint the
second respondent as evidence leader in
the section 381 enquiry is
reviewed and is set aside.
Costs
[73]
The general principle on costs is that costs follow the result. Both
the applicants and the respondents have
obtained substantial success
in these proceedings.
[74]
I was also advised during argument that the applicants are not
insisting on costs against the first respondent.
In fact, it was
indicated that this was the reason the first respondent withdrew his
opposition of the application.
[75]
In the circumstances it appears just that each party should pay its
own costs.
[76]
In the result the following order is made.
1.
The applicants’ application to review and set aside the
decision of the first respondent dated 18 August 2020 to appoint an
evidence leader in the enquiry in terms of section 381 of the
Companies Act is dismissed.
2.
The first respondent’s decision to appoint the second
respondent (Adv van Zyl) as the evidence leader in the section 381
enquiry
is reviewed and set aside.
3.
Each party shall pay his or its own costs.
Z.Z.
Matebese
Acting
Judge of the High Court
Appearances:
For
the applicant:
Adv
MM van Staden
Instructed
by:
Smith
Tabata Buchanan Boyes Attorneys
For
the respondents:
Adv
P. Du Toit
Instructed
by:
Van
Zyl Rudd Incorporated
Date
Heard:
24
August 2023
Date
delivered:
03
October 2023
[1]
Desai-Chilwan
NO v Ross and Another
2003 (2) SA 644
(C) para. 30
[2]
See
Trustees for the Time Being of the Legacy Body Corporate v BAE
Estates
2022 (1) SA 424
para. 16 - 19
[3]
South
African Reserve Bank and Another v Maddock NO and Another
2023 (4)
SA 85
(SCA) para.27
[4]
CA
Focus CC v Village Freezer t/a Ashmel Spar
2013 (6) SA 549
(SCA)
para.18
[5]
Section
5(3) of the PAJA, Zweni v Road Accident Fund 2022 (6) SA 639 (WCC)
[6]
2014
(5) SA 123
(SCA) para.30