IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(WESTERN CAPE HIGH COURT, CAPE TOWN)
Case No: 768/2024
In the matter between:
PETRUS HERADIEN Applicant
versus
WERNER MESHOA First Respondent
JEFFREY DONSON Second Respondent
VALENCIO DONSON Third Respondent
BARBARA OWEN Fourth Respondent
INDEPENDENT CIVIC ORGANIZATION OF SOUTH
AFRICA
Fifth Respondent
INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION Sixth Respondent
THE CHIEF ELECTORAL OFFICER OF THE
INDEPENDENT ELECTORAL COMMISSION
Seventh Respondent
WITZENBERG MUNICIPALITY Eighth Respondent
MUNICIPAL MANAGER OF WITZENBERG
MUNICIPALITY
Ninth Respondent
2
JONATHAN NEL Tenth Respondent
Coram: Adhikari AJ
Heard: 26 January 2024
Delivered: 13 February 2024
JUDGMENT DELIVERED ELECTRONICALLY ON 13 FEBRUARY 2024
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to the
parties' legal representatives by email. The date for the hand- down is deemed
to be on 12 February 2024.
ADHIKARI, AJ
[1] This is an urgent application for an interdict, pending the outcome of judicial
review proceedings instituted under Part B of the Notice of Motion (‘Part B’).
[2] The applicant, Mr Heradien was a member of the fifth respondent (‘ICOSA’), a
political party that holds a seat on the Municipal Council (‘the Council’) of the eighth
respondent (‘the Witzenberg Municipality’) . D uring the tenure of his membership,
Mr Heradien was the proportional representation councillor (‘PR councillor’)
representing ICOSA on the Council. Following the termination of his membership he
was replaced as PR councillor by the tenth respondent (‘Mr Nel’).
[3] Mr Heradien sought an urgent interim interdict, pending a review of the
termination of his membership of ICOSA and his replacement as PR councillor by
Mr Nel:
3
[3.1] Suspending the purported decision taken on 4 December 2023, to expel
him as a member of ICOSA;
[3.2] Suspending the purported decision of the sixth respondent (‘the IEC’) to
replace him with Mr Nel as the ICOSA PR councillor on the Council;
[3.3] Restraining the respondents from interfering with or hindering him from
carrying out his duties as the ICOSA PR councillor; and
[3.4] Directing that he immediately be returned to his position as the ICOSA
PR councillor.
[4] The interdictory relief is opposed by Mr Nel and the first to fifth respondents
(‘the respondents’) .
1 The Witzenberg Municipality and the ninth respondent
(‘the Municipal Manager’) delivered an explanatory affidavit in which they state that
they abide by the decision of the court but oppose any costs being granted against
them. At the commencement of the hearing Mr Filand who appeared for Mr Heradien
confirmed that his client would not seek costs against Witzenberg Municipality or
the Municipal Manager. In the practice note filed by Mr Filand prior to the hearing, he
was indicated that t he IEC and the seventh respondent had advised his attorney
telephonically that they would not oppose the relief sought, and that his attorney had
given the IEC and the seventh respondent an undertaking that costs would not be
sought against them.
1 The first to fourth respondents are all office bearers of ICOSA. For ease of reference, I refer to
Mr Nel and the first to fifth respondents collectively as ‘the respondents’.
4
[5] The respondents oppose the relief sought in Part A on the basis that the relief
is incompetent; the requirements for an interim interdict have not been satisfied; and
the application constitutes an abuse of process.
RELEVANT FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[6] On 23 October 2023 Mr Heradien received a letter from the fourth respondent
in which she stated that she had been appointed as an investigator by an ad hoc
disciplinary committee of ICOSA to investigate two incidents of alleged misconduct
against Mr Heradien, in that he was alleged to have breached clauses 2.5.3.3, and/or
2.5.3.6 and 2.5.3.7 of the constitution of ICOSA (‘the constitution’). 2 It appears,
however, that no further steps were taken in respect of these allegations of misconduct
against Mr Heradien.
[7] On 17 November 2023 Mr Heradien received a letter from the first respondent
in which he was informed that he had not paid his monthly councillor contribution to
ICOSA which had been due on 7 November 2023, and affording him three days to
settle his outstanding dues.
[8] The respondents contend that correspondence was sent to ICOSA members ,
including Mr Heradien, advising them that they were required to urgently renew their
membership before 18h00 on 22 November 2023 in anticipation of the upcoming
national congress which was scheduled for 8 December 2023. Mr Heradien denies
having received this correspondence. It appears to be common cause that
2 The quoted provisions of the constitution provide that any member of ICOSA, including a public
representative, is guilty of misconduct i f he or she is disloyal to ICOSA; acts in a manner that is
unreasonable and detrimental to internal co-operation within ICOSA; unreasonably fails to comply
with or rejects decisions of the official structures of ICOSA or of the national executive committee
(‘the NEC’) or the provincial executive committee (‘the PEC’).
5
Mr Heradien did not attend a meeting held on 18 November 2023 at which ICOSA
members were reminded to renew their membership of the party before
22 November 2023.
[9] It is, however, not in dispute that Mr Heradien received the 17 November 2023
letter in which he was informed that he had not paid his monthly councillor contribution
to ICOSA and it is further not in dispute that he received a further letter dated
27 November 2023 in which he was again advised that he had not paid his monthly
councillor contribution to ICOSA ,and in which he was advised to pay his outstanding
dues by the close of business on that day (that is 27 November 2023).
[10] Mr Heradien does not deny that he failed to pay his membership dues to the
NEC. He contends in the replying affidavit that he had in fact paid his monthly
contributions to “the Western Cape Division of ICOSA which [he] recognized (sic) as
the only legitimate structure of ICOSA”. It appears from the papers that Mr Heradien
and certain other ICOSA members took issue with the legitimacy of the NEC , and as
a consequence, ceased paying their membership dues to the bank account controlled
by the NEC . The contention in the replying affidavit is that Mr Heradien and those
other ICOSA members instead took a decision to pay their membership dues into a
bank account controlled by what appears to be a breakaway provincial structure.
Mr Heradien in the replying affidavit contends that he paid his membership dues into
this alternative bank account on 7 October 2023.
[11] The respondents, on the other hand, contend that Mr Heradien’s membership
terminated automatically as provided for in clause 3.3.1.4 read with clause 3.3.2 of the
6
constitution as a consequence of his failure to pay his membership dues by
22 November 2023.
[12] Mr Heradien was advised on 4 December 2023 that his membership of ICOSA
had terminated. On 11 December 2023 the second respondent addressed
correspondence to the Municipal Manager advising him of the termination of
Mr Heradien’s membership of ICOSA. On 12 December 2023 the Municipal Manager
advised the IEC that Mr Heradien was no longer a member of ICOSA and that in terms
of s 27(c) of the Local Government Municipal Structures Act 117 of 1998
(‘the Structures Act’) Mr Heradien had ceased to be a member of the Council and to
hold office as a councillor.
[13] On 18 December 2023 the IEC advised the Municipal Manager that Mr Nel had
been declared elected to the Council, being the candidate at the top of the ICOSA
party list, and that Mr Nel had replaced Mr Heradien as the ICOSA PR councillor.
THE INTERIM RELIEF SOUGHT
[14] The well-established requisites for an interim interdict are 3 a prima facie right,
namely prima facie proof of facts that establish the existence of a right in terms of
substantive law;4 a well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm if the interim relief
is not granted, and the ultimate relief is eventually granted; that the balance of
3 Setlogelo v Setlogelo 1914 AD 221. See also Pilane v Pilane and Another (4) BCLR 431 (CC)
para [39].
4 National Council of Societies for the Prevention of Cruelty to Animals v Openshaw 2008 (5) SA 339
(SCA) para [20].
7
convenience favours the granting of an interim interdict; and that the applicant has no
other satisfactory remedy.
[15] These requirements must not be considered separately or in isolation, but in
conjunction with one another in order to determine whether the Court should exercise
its discretion in favour of granting interim relief. 5 Prospects of success in the main
application is a key factor in determining whether interim relief pendente lite should be
granted, in that the stronger the prospects of success, the less the need for the balance
of convenience to favour the applicant, and vice versa.
The prima facie right
[16] Prima facie proof of facts for purposes of interim relief has been formulated as
follows:
6 the right can be prima facie established, even if it is open to some doubt ,
mere acceptance of the applicant’s allegations is insufficient, but a weighing up of the
probabilities of conflicting versions is not required. The proper approach is (i) to
consider the facts as set out by the applicant together with any facts set out by the
respondents which the applicant cannot dispute; (ii) to decide whether, with regard to
the inherent probabilities and the ultimate onus, the applicant could
7 on those facts
obtain final relief in due course; and (iii) to then consider the facts set up in
contradiction by the respondents, and if they throw serious doubt on the applicant’s
case the latter cannot succeed.
5 Olympic Passenger Services (Pty) Ltd v Ramlaga 1957 (2) SA 382 (D) at 383E-F.
6 Webster v Mitchell 1948 (1) SA 1186 (W), as qualified by Gool v Minister of Justice 1955 (2) SA 682
(C); Spur Steak Ranches Ltd v Saddles Steak Ranch 1996 (3) SA 706 (C) at 714.
7 In Webster v Mitchell, the test was whether the applicant could obtain final relief on those facts. Gool
v Minister of Justice , qualified this, saying the test was “should” however, in cases of urgent
applications the lesser test formulated in Webster’s case may be applied: Singh & Co. (Pty) Ltd v
Pietermaritzburg Local Road Transportation Board 1959 (3) SA 822 (N).
8
[17] The prima facie right that Mr Heradien asserts in the founding affidavit is the
right to review the conduct of ICOSA in summarily expelling him as a member of the
party without due process and in breach of the provisions of the constitution relating
to expulsion of members. It would appear, at first blush, that Mr Heradien’s application
falters at the first hurdle given the principle articulated in OUTA,
8 that the prima facie
right that an applicant must establish is more than simply his right to approach the
court for a review, and that he must demonstrate a prima facie right threatened by an
impending or imminent irreparable harm.
[18] However, on a generous interpretation of the case made out in the founding
affidavit, it appears that Mr Heradien contends that he has a prima facie right to (a) the
suspension of the decisions to expel him and to replace him as a PR councillor, (b) be
returned to his position as ICOSA’s PR councillor, and (c) an order prohibiting the
respondents from interfering with his ability to carry out his duties as a councillor on
his return to the Council. Mr Heradien appears to contend that he has a right to the
aforesaid interim relief because the purported decision to terminate his membership is
unlawful and stands to be reviewed and set aside in that:
[18.1] His membership was terminated (a) in breach of the due process
provisions in the constitution, (b) in breach of the disciplinary
process prescribed by clause 8 of the constitution, and (c) without
regard to the rules of natural justice, in that ICOSA failed to consult
8 National Treasury and others vs Opposition to Urban Tolling Alliance and others
2012 (6) SA 223 (CC) at para [50].
9
with him prior to his expulsion, he did not receive a charge sheet
and he was not afforded an opportunity to make representations;
[18.2] He was not afforded a hearing before his membership was
terminated, in breach of the audi alteram partem principle; and
[18.3] His membership was terminated in order to settle a political score,
(that is with an ulterior purpose).
[19] In order to interrogate these submissions, I must consider the grounds of review
in the main review application and assess their strength, and I must be satisfied that
Mr Heradien has good prospects of success in the main review, based on strong
grounds which are likely to succeed before I may grant the interim interdict that he
seeks.
9
There was no decision taken
[20] The respondents contend that there was no decision taken to terminate
Mr Heradien’s membership and that his membership terminated automatically in
consequence of the provisions of clauses 3.2.2, 3.3.1.4, and 3.3.2 of the constitution,
when he failed to renew his membership by the date prescribed by the NEC (that is
by 22 November 2023).
[21] Clause 3.1.1.4 of the constitution provides that a member ceases to be a
member of ICOSA when he fails to renew his membership on or before the date
determined by the NEC in terms of clause 3.2.2 of the constitution which in turn
9 Economic Freedom Fighters v Gordhan and Others; Public Protector and Another v Gordhan and
2020 (6) SA 325 (CC) at para [42].
10
provides that the date of payment of annual membership subscriptions shall be
determined by the NEC. Clause 3.3.2 of the constitution provides that a member who
ceases to be a member of ICOSA, loses all privileges of party membership and if that
member is a public representative, he also loses the office which he occupies by virtue
of his membership, with immediate effect.
[22] Mr Heradien does not dispute that he failed to pay his membership dues to the
NEC. Instead, he contends that he paid his membership dues on 7 October 2023 to
the alternative bank account controlled by the breakaway provincial structure.
[23] The evidence on which Heradien relies in support of the contention that he
made payment of his outstanding membership dues are:
[23.1] A document styled as a “witness statement” from one Dawie Kampher
(‘Mr Kampher’)10 in which he identifies himself as the interim leader of
ICOSA, and in which he states that at a meeting held on 7 October 2023
membership fees, including the membership fees of Mr Heradien, were
paid and that “[t]he fees paid on this day was (sic) to be used for the
booking of the hall and refreshments, which was paid in advance by
Mr Benjamin Marsala and was (sic) compensated back unto (sic) him at
the conclusion of the meeting.”
[23.2] A letter dated 17 October 2023 addressed to the Municipal Manager by
Mr Benjamin Marsala (‘Mr Marsala’) who identified himself as the
Provincial Chairperson of ICOSA, requesting that “all future debit orders”
10 A confirmatory affidavit was filed by Mr Kampher in these proceedings.
11
be paid into a “Gold Business Account” at an unidentified bank with the
account name recorded as “ICOSA” and stating that “[a]ll party
contributions will use this account”.
[23.3] An ICOSA membership form completed by Mr Heradien and dated
7 October 2023.
[24] The difficulty for Mr Heradien is that none of these documents demonstrate that
the outstanding membership fees were in fact paid into the alternative bank account
referred to in the replying affidavit ,or that this alternative bank account is in fact a bank
account operated by “ the Western Cape Division of ICOSA” as alleged by
Mr Heradien.
[25] It bears emphasis that no bank statements or any other documents are
annexed to Mr Heradien’s affidavits substantiating the contention that this alternative
bank account exists and is a bank account operated by “the Western Cape Division of
ICOSA”. Further no proof of payment is annexed to Mr Heradien’s affidavits indicating
that he made payment of his outstanding membership dues into this alternative bank
account. If fact, the evidence put up by Mr Heradien demonstrates the opposite. It is
clear from Mr Kampher’s witness statement that the membership fees that were paid
on 7 October 2023 (which purportedly included the membership fees of Mr Heradien)
were paid over to Mr Marsala to reimburse him for monies that he had expended to
pay for the hall in which the meeting of 7 October 2023 was held, and the refreshments
provided at the meeting. There is no provision in the constitution that provides for
membership fees to be paid in this manner.
12
[26] It appears from the facts alleged by Mr Heradien that he did not pay his
membership fees to ICOSA by 22 November 2023. Consequently his membership of
ICOSA terminated.
[27] In Phenithi v Minister of Education and others , the Supreme Court of Appeal
held that a consequence that occurs by operation of law is not administrative action in
terms of PAJA (for an act to qualify as “ administrative action” under PAJA, it must
constitute a “decision”).11 In Phenithi a teacher was dismissed as a result of s 14(1)(a)
of the Employment of Educators Act 76 of 1998 because she had been absent from
work without leave for 14 days. The Supreme Court of Appeal concluded that the
teacher could not review her dismissal under PAJA because no decision had been
taken. Her employment terminated automatically.
[28] The Supreme Court of Appeal quoted with approval the following statement in
Minister van Onderwys en Kultuur en Andere v Louw:12
“There is then no question of a review of an administrative decision.
Indeed, the coming into operation of the deeming provision is not
dependent upon any decision. There is thus no room for reliance on the
audi rule which, in its classic formulation, is applicable when an
administrative - and discretionary - decision may detrimentally affect the
rights, privileges or liberty of a person.”
[29] While this does not preclude the possibility of reviewing the authority’s
determination that the factual basis for the operation of the provision exists , there is
11 Phenithi v Minister of Education and others 2008 (1) SA 420 (SCA) at paras [9]-[10].
12 Minister van Onderwys en Kultuur en Andere v Louw 1995 (4) SA 383 (A) at 388-389.
13
no scope to demand a hearing before a law applies. In this matter the objective
jurisdictional fact necessary for Mr Heradien’s expulsion as a member (that is his
failure to pay his membership fees to ICOSA ) has been established on the evidence
put up by Mr Heradien himself.
[30] This Court has consistently applied the principle established in Minister van
Onderwys en Kultuur and in Phenithi to matters involving the automatic termination of
membership of a political party.
[30.1] In Henderson v The Democratic Alliance 13 where the constitution
of the Democratic Alliance stated that a person’s membership ipso
facto ceased upon his or her conviction, it was held that upon
conviction there was no decision to end the applicant’s membership
of the Democratic Alliance.
[30.2] In Noland v Independent Democrats
14 this court per Louw and
Erasmus JJ considered the validity of a decision to summarily expel
the applicant from the Independent Democrats (‘ID’) before the
opening of the floor-crossing window-period; as well as the validity
of her subsequent attempt to cross the floor. In so doing, it became
clear that the applicant had signed a floor-crossing form before her
expulsion, thus indicating her desire to join another party. The court
noted that in terms of clause 15 of the ID’s constitution a member
automatically terminated their membership if they joined another
13 Henderson v The Democratic Alliance unreported case no. 2540/2007, 4 December 2007
at para [9].
14 Noland v Independent Democrats , unreported judgment case number 13275/07, 1 April 2008, per
Louw and Erasmus JJ at para [26].
14
party. The case was ultimately decided on other bases, but the
court noted that “[o]n the construction of the constitution, she had,
by joining another party, automatically terminated her membership,
the applicant ceased to be a member of the ID before the end of
Friday 31 August 2007.”
[30.3] Brummer v Democratic Alliance & Others ,
15 this court held that,
absent an attack on the validity of the relevant clause in the
constitution of the Democratic Alliance which provided for
automatic termination of membership on failure to pay candidate
fees for a period of two months, a member who f ell foul of the
provision in question after demand has no prima facie right to have
their membership re-instated.
[31] In Andrews v Democratic Alliance 16 this court, in dismissing a claim for
interdictory relief on substantially similar grounds those raised by Mr Heradien in these
proceedings, referred to the aforementioned judgments, and held that “ these cases
conclusively refute the applicant's suggestion that it is grossly unfair or unconscionable
for a political party to include in its constitution provisions which summarily terminate
membership of the party in defined circumstances. This court has repeated accepted
that these provisions require no decision”. In this matter too, there is no challenge to
the provisions of the constitution on which the respondents rely.
15 Brummer v Democratic Alliance & Others , unreported judgment case number 17305/2012
(12 September 2012).
16 Andrews v The Democratic Alliance, unreported case No. 17633/2012, 13 November 2012 at
para [33].
15
[32] Further, the constitution read as a whole, must be looked at to determine
whether according to its terms, construed in accordance with the ordinary principles
of construction17 there is any merit in Mr Heradien’s contention that the termination of
his membership was , in any event , subject to the disciplinary process prescribed in
clause 8 of the constitution.
[33] Clause 3.3.1 of the constitution provides that a member ceases to be a member
of ICOSA when the member in question engages in any of the conduct set out in
clauses 3.3.1.1 to 3.3.1.7. Clause 3.4.1 provides that “apart from clause 3.3.1 the
membership of any member including that of a public representative may only be
determined by a provincial executive and only after a proper process in terms of the
constitution”. Applying the ordinary principles of construction to the aforementioned
provisions,
18 it is clear that the disciplinary procedure in clause 8 of the constitution
does not apply to the cessation of membership as provided for in clause 3.3.1 of the
constitution. Put differently, the disciplinary procedure in clause 8 applies to cessation
of membership in terms of any provision of the constitution, other than cessation as
contemplated in clause 3.3.1.
[34] Having regard to the provisions of the constitution governing the termination of
Mr Heradien’s membership, in light of the decisions to which I have referred and by
which I am bound, I am unable to find that there was a decision taken by ICOSA to
terminate Mr Heradien’s membership, or that he was entitled to a hearing before his
17 Bothma-Batho Transport v S Bothma & Seun Transport 2014 (2) SA 494 SCA at para [12].
18 Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality 2012 (4) SA 593 (SCA) at para [18]
16
membership was terminated. His membership terminated automatically when he
failed to pay his membership fees.
[35] Further, s 27(c) of the Structures Act provides that a councillor vacates office
during a term of office if that councillor was elected from a party list referred to in
Schedule 1 or 2 and ceases to be a member of the relevant party . It follows that if a
member of a party who became a councillor by virtue of being elected from a party list,
ceases to be a member of the relevant party, that councillor vacates office.
[36] Item 18 (1) (b) of Schedule 1the Structures Act provides that “if a councillor
elected from a party list ceases to hold office, the chief electoral officer must, subject
to Item 20, declare in writing the person whose name is at the top of the applicable
party list to be elected in the vacancy”.
[37] The provisions of s 27(c) read Item 18 (1) (b) of Schedule 1 of the Structures
Act are peremptory. There is no decision involved in the replacement of a councillor
elected from a party list. Where a councillor elected from a party list ceases to be a
member of the party in question, he or she vacates their seat by operation of law and
is replaced by operation of law with the person whose name appears at the top of the
relevant party list. That is precisely what happened in this matter. No decision was
taken by the IEC to replace Mr Heradien with Mr Nel as the ICOSA PR councillor.
[38] Consequently, I am not satisfied that Mr Heradien has good prospects of
success in the main review, and Mr Heradien has thus failed to establish that he has
a prima facie right to the interim relief sought.
17
Reasonable apprehension of irreparable harm
[39] Mr Heradien’s failure to establish a prima facie right for the purposes of interim
interdictory relief ought to be the end of the matter, however, for the sake of
completeness, it bears emphasis that the conduct that Mr Heradien seeks to interdict
in prayers 2.1 and 2.2 of Part A of the notice motion, has already occurred. He has
been expelled as a member of ICOSA and he has been replaced as a councillor. A n
interdict is not a remedy for past invasion of rights but is concerned with present or
future infringements.19 It is appropriate where future injury is feared.20 An interdict is
meant to prevent future conduct and not conduct that has already occurred or
decisions already made.
21 Consequently, Mr Heradien has failed to demonstrate a
well-grounded apprehension of irreparable harm.
[40] Mr Heradien in addition seeks interim relief to, in effect, temporarily reinstate
his membership of ICOSA, in order to retain his seat on the Council until a court can
hear Part B and decide whether he is a member of ICOSA or not , in order to secure
his salary. A similar argument was rejected by this court in Harding v The Independent
Democrats.
22
[41] I agree with the submission of Ms Foster who appeared for the respondents,
that Mr Heradien’s financial position cannot justify the Court interfering with the proper
functioning of a political party or of the Council. This is particularly so where
Mr Heradien has made it clear that he does not recognise the NEC as the legitimate
leadership structure of ICOSA and where he has made it clear that he does not intend
19 NCSPCA v Openshaw para [20].
20 Phillip Morris Inc v Marlboro Trust Co SA 1991 (2) SA 720 (A) at 735B.
21 OUTA at para [50].
22 Harding v The Independent Democrats [2008] 2 All SA 199 (C) at 206.
18
to follow the NEC’s instructions. If Mr Heradien could occupy ICOSA’s seat on the
Council, to secure his personal financial interests and outside the party’s discipline,
while in open dispute with the party , ICOSA would effectively lose the seat which it
won in democratic elections. There is no basis in law to justify such far reaching relief.
[42] For these reasons, the application for interim interdictory relief must fail.
COSTS
[43] It is an established principle of law that costs are generally not awarded in
interlocutory proceedings, unless there are exceptional circumstances that warrant the
departure from this rule.23 This is so for good reason: a court finally hearing a matter
is better placed, having regard to all the evidence, to determine whether the application
was well-founded.
[44] The respondents contend that the application constitutes an abuse of process
and for that reason ask that costs be awarded against Mr Heradien. Although the
application for interim relief has not succeeded, there is no basis on which to find that
Mr Heradien lacked bona fides in bringing the application or that the application for
interim relief constitutes an abuse of process . I am not persuaded that there are
exceptional circumstances in this matter that warrant determining costs at the
interlocutory stage.
In the result I make the following order:
23 EMS Belting Co of SA (Pty) Ltd and Others v Lloyd and Another 1983 (1) SA 641 (E) at 644H
confirmed in Airodexpress (Pty) Ltd v Chairman, Local Road Transportation Board, Durban and
Others 1986 (2) SA 663 (A) at 683A and Maccsand CC v Macassar Land Claims Committee an
Others [2005] 2 All SA 469 (SCA) at para [13].
19
1. The application for interim relief in Part A of the notice of motion is dismissed.
2. The costs of this application shall stand over for determination by the court hearing
the relief sought in Part B of the notice of motion.
___________________________
M. ADHIKARI
Acting Judge of the High Court
20
APPEARANCES:
Applicant’s Counsel: Mr D Filand
Instructed by: Duncan Korabie Attorneys
First to Fifth and Tenth Respondents’ Counsel: Ms J Foster
Instructed by: Andrews & Co Attorneys