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[2020] ZAECPEHC 6
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Kulati v Minister of Police (2459/2017) [2020] ZAECPEHC 6 (18 February 2020)
REPUBLIC
OF SOUTH AFRICA
THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN
CAPE LOCAL DIVISION, PORT ELIZABETH
Not
reportable
Case
No:2459/2017
OLWETHU
KULATI
Plaintiff
and
MINISTER
OF POLICE
Defendant
JUDGMENT
MFENYANA
AJ
Introduction
[1]
The plaintiff is an eighteen-year old man. He instituted proceedings
against the defendant
for damages emanating from his arrest by
employees of the defendant, without a warrant. He alleges that on 14
April 2017 he was
arrested by members of the South African Police
Services (SAPS) near Soga Street in Kwa-Nobuhle, Uitenhage who
accused him of being
in possession of mandrax.
[2]
It is common cause that the plaintiff was transported in the back of
a police van
to the KwaNobuhle Community Service Centre (KwaNobuhle)
and thereafter to the Church Street Community Service Centre (Church
Street)
where he was detained until his release on 18 April 2017. He
did not appear in court. It is further common cause that at the time
of his arrest, the police officers were acting within the course and
scope of their employment with the defendant which and that
this
renders the defendant vicariously liable for their actions.
[3]
It is the plaintiff’s contention that his arrest and detention
was unlawful
on the basis that his arrest was for a purpose other
than that intended by the legislature, the police did not entertain a
reasonable
suspicion that he had committed an offence and they failed
to exercise their discretion if at all, in a manner that is fair, and
rational by using less invasive methods of securing his attendance at
court. He further alleges that the police failed to bring
him before
a standby prosecutor forthwith, in order to secure his release on
bail. The plaintiff claims an amount of R500 000.00
for his
arrest and detention.
[4]
The defendant denies that the plaintiff’s arrest and detention
was unlawful.
In denying liability the defendant relies on sections
40(1)(a) and 40(1)(h) of the
Criminal
Procedure Act
[1]
(the Act) which authorise the police to arrest any person who commits
an offence in the presence of the police, and who is reasonably
suspected of committing or having committed an offence under a law
governing the supply and possession of drugs, respectively.
The
defendant contends that the plaintiff was arrested for the purpose of
bringing him to justice.
[5]
It was agreed between the parties that the duty to begin rests with
the defendant
who bears the onus to prove that the plaintiff’s
arrest and detention was lawful.
Issues
to be determined
[6]
This court has to decide whether the plaintiffs’ arrest and
detention was justified
in terms of sections 40(1) (a) and (h) and if
so, determine the appropriate amount to be awarded to the plaintiff
for damages.
The
evidence
[7]
The defendant called two witnesses; the arresting officer, Warrant
Officer Kobus Allers
(Allers) and Captain Monwabisi Kwitshi
(Kwitshi). Allers testified that he has been a warrant officer with
the SAPS for nineteen
years. On the day in question he and his
colleague, Sergeant Ova were on duty, patrolling on Soga Street when
the plaintiff emerged
out of a house which they know to be selling
drugs. At that point he had a ‘reasonable’ suspicion that
the plaintiff
was in possession of drugs. When the plaintiff saw him
and his colleague, he started running. They chased after him and once
they
caught up with him he threw away a matchbox he had in his hand.
Allers picked up the matchbox and inside he found half a mandrax
tablet. He asked to search the plaintiff and once he did he found
nothing on him. After reading him his rights he arrested him
for
possession of drugs. He testified that the plaintiff did not ask to
enforce any of his rights after being advised of them.
He further
testified that that he arrested the plaintiff because he was in
possession of mandrax and KwaNobuhle has a big drug
problem with
children stealing from their own families so they can buy drugs and
he wanted to bring the plaintiff before court.
He took him to
the police station at KwaNobuhle where he was processed, a statement
and fingerprints taken, and all the necessary
police requirements
met. He further testified that the plaintiff read the warning
statement before signing it. He testified that
throughout the
engagement he spoke to the plaintiff in English. He thereafter took
the plaintiff to the charge office where he
filled in the cell
register (SAP 14) and handed the plaintiff over to his colleagues at
the cells. His role ended there.
[8]
During cross examination, Mr Le Roux, appearing on behalf of the
plaintiff put to
Allers that the plaintiff’s level of education
is up to standard 4, he does not understand English let alone the
details
of prosecutorial bail which Allers himself stumbled to
explain in court. He however maintained that he informed the
plaintiff of
all his rights but the plaintiff did not respond or ask
any questions and did not tell him that he did not understand
anything
that was said to him. It was further put to him that
the plaintiff never fled from the police and nothing was found in his
possession. This is despite the fact that Mr Le Roux had put to
Allers that the plaintiff had gone to buy
vetkoeks
. It is
rather surprising that he did not have anything in his possession,
not even the
vetkoeks
he went to buy. In relation to the
item found inside the matchbox, Allers maintained that the plaintiff
threw the matchbox
on the ground, which he (Allers) then opened in
the presence of the plaintiff and found half a mandrax tablet inside.
[9]
When it was put to Allers that he never asked the plaintiff if he
wanted to be released
on bail, he stated that the plaintiff did not
say anything when his rights were read to him, including the right to
be released
on bail. He conceded that he did not ask the plaintiff
for his address after he arrested him, and deferred this to the
investigating
officer. He added that it was also the duty of the
investigating officer to determine whether a suspect is fit to be
granted bail.
[10]
Kwitshi testified that as a captain, he has the overall
responsibility of supervising case dockets
and preparing them for
court. In relation to the present matter, he was the officer on
standby and it was his duty to inspect the
docket, attend to bail
applications and ensure that everything that needed to be done was
done. He saw the docket in respect of
the plaintiff on the morning of
15 April 2017 when he went to the station. He testified that he is
required to inspect a docket
within 24 hours if it is not urgent. He
played a dual role of investigating officer and standby officer as he
needed to know everything.
He further testified that he did not
request the prosecutor to grant bail in this case because the
plaintiff did not apply for
bail and had he applied for it, he would
have called the prosecutor. He testified further that the plaintiff
had said that he wanted
to speak in court. Under cross examination he
maintained that his duty to request the prosecutor for bail only
arises if the accused
person informs him that he requires bail. He
testified that when he received the docket on the morning of 15 April
2017, the docket
was ready for court and it was sent to court on the
next court day which was Tuesday,18 April 2017 as it was the Easter
long weekend.
He testified further that he did not complete the bail
information sheet as it is the responsibility of the investigating
officer
or the arresting officer to do so. He handed the docket over
to Warrant Officer Groenewald (Groenewald) who was the investigating
officer to whom the matter was ultimately allocated. Kwitshi
testified however that there was no bail information sheet when he
received the docket and agrees that at least one of the three people
who handled the docket including himself, should have noticed
that it
was not there, but they did not. This meant that bail was not
considered. He further testified that he suspected that the
case
against the plaintiff would be withdrawn as it is usually the case
with cases involving possession of drugs, as they have
to wait for
results to come back from the laboratory. He conceded that if the
results come back indicating that the substance is
not a drug, that
would be the end of the matter. Kwitshi further conceded that the
charges against the plaintiff could have been
withdrawn on 15 April
2017 if it was a court day because the police had already completed
their work. He testified that he did
not think of presenting the
docket to the prosecutor on 15 April and did not see the need to tell
the plaintiff that he could be
released on bail even if he qualified
for it, as he said he would speak in court. He testified that if the
plaintiff did not understand
anything, he could have just asked. He
further testified that he did not interview the plaintiff at any
stage and largely relied
on what was on the docket regarding what the
plaintiff had been apprised of. When asked why he saw it necessary to
detain an 18
-year old, his response was that he is an adult and was
caught in possession of an illegal substance. For that reason, he
testified
that he would not have recommended bail, but would not have
opposed it either. It was put to Kwitshi that the plaintiff’s
mother attended at the police station at approximately 19h00 on 14
April 2017 to pay his bail but did not get any assistance as
she was
told that the plaintiff had been transferred to Church Street, and
told to wait at home. His response was that if the police
officers,
including the investigating officer or any detective had such
information, they would have contacted him as they work
as a team. He
reiterated that he did not see the need to prioritise the plaintiff’s
matter as it was not urgent, and attended
to it within the required
24-hour period. He conceded that nothing was done on the docket
between 15 and 18 April, but added that
this was because everything
that needed to be done was already completed. He ultimately stated
that if he had to give an amount for bail, he would have recommended
R600.00 but added that it was not his duty to recommend bail if the
plaintiff did not ask for it.
[11]
On behalf of the plaintiff, only one witness testified, the
plaintiff’s mother, Ms Ntwazana
Pieta (Ms Pieta). She testified
that on 14 April 2017 she was informed by a passer-by that her son
had been arrested. Her neighbours
lent he R500.00 as she assumed that
she would have to pay for her son's release on bail. She thereafter
attended at the police
station at KwaNobuhle and arrived there at
approximately 19h00. After telling the police officer who attended to
her the purpose
of her visit, she was told to wait, whereafter she
was told that the plaintiff had been transferred to Church Street.
The same
police officer told her to go home and wait for the police
to come to her house. The police did not arrive. On Tuesday, 18 April
2017, she went to the KwaNobuhle court and waited until she realised
that her son was not there. She eventually gave up. As
she was
leaving, she met a police officer and asked him where her son could
be. The police officer told her that he may have been
released “from
downstairs”, referring to matters that were not enrolled. This
later turned out to be the case as it
later transpired that the
plaintiff had been released without appearing in court.
Applicable
legal provisions
[12]
Section 40(1)(a) of the Act authorises a peace officer to arrest a
person without warrant if
that person commits or attempts to commit
an offence in his presence.
[13]
Section 40 (1)(h) on the other hand authorises a peace officer to
arrest without a warrant, any
person,
"who is reasonably
suspected of committing or of having committed an offence under any
law governing the making, supply, possession
or conveyance of
intoxicating liquor or of dependence-producing drugs or the
possession or disposal of arms or ammunition…"
[14]
For a defence in terms of section 40 (1) (a) to succeed, certain
jurisdictional facts must be
present. First, the arrestor must be a
peace officer. Second, the arrestee must have committed or attempted
to commit an offence
in the presence of the arrestor. For a defence
under section 40(1)(h), the arrestor must entertain a reasonable
suspicion that
the arrestee has committed an offence under the liquor
legislation or the drug and drug trafficking and/or the firearms
control
legislation. The broad purpose of this subsection as
Du
Toit
[2]
states, is to make it possible for peace officers to enforce the
provisions of these laws. Similarly, to a defence under section
40(1)(b), the suspicion must rest on reasonable grounds.
[15]
The issue then turns on whether Allers entertained a reasonable
suspicion as required in section
40(1)(h). In my view he did. He
found a mandrax tablet or what appeared to be mandrax in the
plaintiff's possession after seeing
the plaintiff coming out of a
drug den. I do not make light of the fact that the substance was not
confirmed to be mandrax. It
was in any event, not required of Allers
to have any certainty that the substance was in fact mandrax. He was
not at that stage
seeking a conviction, only an arrest. In
Mabona
& Another v Minister of Law and Order
[3]
the court stated the
following:
"Would
a reasonable of man in the second defendant's position and possessed
of the same information have considered that there
were good and
sufficient grounds for suspecting that the plaintiffs were guilty of
conspiracy to commit robbery or possession of
stolen property knowing
it to have been stolen? It seems to me that in evaluating his
information a reasonable man would bear in
mind that the section
authorises drastic police action. It authorises an arrest on the
strength of a suspicion and without the
need to swear out a warrant,
ie something which otherwise would be an invasion of private rights
and personal liberty. The reasonable
man will therefore analyse and
assess the quality of the information at his disposal critically, and
he will not accept it lightly
or without checking it where it can be
checked. It is only after an examination of this kind that he will
allow himself to entertain
a suspicion which will justify an arrest.
This is not to say that the information at his disposal must be of
sufficient
ly
high quality and cogency to engender in him a conviction that the
suspect is in fact guilty. The section requires suspicion but
not
certainty. However, the suspicion must be based upon solid grounds.
Otherwise, it will be flighty or arbitrary, and not a reasonable
suspicion."
[4]
[16]
Admittedly, when Allers saw the plaintiff coming out of a 'known drug
house', he formed a suspicion,
reasonable in his view, that the
plaintiff was in possession of drugs. The only basis for his
suspicion was that the place the
plaintiff was coming from was known
to be selling drugs. When the plaintiff started running as he saw
Allers and his colleague,
Allers became even more suspicious. When
the plaintiff threw the matchbox on the ground, this fuelled the
suspicion even further,
and when he found half a mandrax tablet
inside the matchbox, his suspicion was confirmed. Only at this stage
was an offence committed,
which set in motion the application of
section 40(1)(h). On the basis of these events he arrested the
plaintiff. The turn of events
at the time of arrest, taken together,
pointed to a suspicion, reasonable as I have found, that the
plaintiff was in possession
of a prohibited substance or drugs. This
in my view satisfies the requirements of section 40(1)(h). I have
difficulty in accepting
the same to be the case in respect of section
40(1)(a). The authority of the police to arrest under section
40(1)(a) is limited
to crimes which are already completed and
attempts to commit crimes. The section does not require the peace
officer to entertain
any suspicion. The offence must be committed in
their presence. Thus, an arrest following an honest and reasonable
belief that
a crime has been committed will not trigger the
application of this section. Allers's suspicion when the plaintiff
came out of
the drug house is of no significance in the absence of
any facts which point to the commission of a crime at that time. The
facts
observed by him did not "as a matter of law
prima
facie
establish the commission of the offence in question."
[5]
On this aspect, the defence in respect of section 40(1)(a) must fail.
[17]
It does not follow that because the arrest was lawful, the detention
must also be. It was contented
on behalf of the plaintiff that the
plaintiff's detention from approximately 16h00 on 14 April to 13h00
on 18 April 2017 was unlawful
as it followed an unlawful arrest. As I
have already found that the plaintiff's arrest was lawful his ensuing
detention must equally
be. It was further contended on behalf of the
plaintiff that his further detention was unlawful on account of the
failure by the
police officers to facilitate his release on
'prosecutorial' bail in terms of section 59A. I agree. Kwitshi
testified that
the investigation in respect of plaintiff was
completed on 15 April 2017. By his own admission, the standard
practice in relation
to the offence allegedly committed by the
plaintiff was to release the accused person pending the testing of
the substance found
in their possession. This, he testified, would be
done after the accused's circumstances have been established, his
address confirmed,
previous convictions ascertained and the police
satisfied that he/she is not a flight risk. He confirmed that all
these had been
established in relation to the plaintiff.
Notwithstanding, his release on bail was not considered as he
contended that it was the
plaintiff's responsibility to inform the
police that he wanted to be released on bail and that the police do
not have a responsibility
to gratuitously grant him bail. It appeared
that the overriding factor for his decision to not consider granting
the plaintiff
bail, was that the plaintiff said he would speak in
court. There is no merit to this contention. The general provisions
in relation
to bail impose a duty on the police to release an accused
person on bail, where circumstances allow it. In this regard it is
important
to briefly consider the provisions of the Act which deal
with bail. He also stated that the plaintiff had been arrested for a
serious
offence.
[18]
Section 59 provides:
Bail before first
appearance of accused in lower court
(1) (a) An accused who is
in custody in respect of any offence, other than an offence referred
to in Part II or Part III of Schedule
2 may, before his or her first
appearance in a lower court, be released on bail in respect of such
offence by any police official
of or above the rank of
non-commissioned officer, in consultation with the police official
charged with the investigation, if the
accused deposits at the police
station the sum of money determined by such police official.
[19]
Nothing need be said about the nature of offence for which the
plaintiff was arrested, it being
common cause that it falls within
Par II of Schedule 2 to the Act. Its relevance to the present
matter is that it sets out
the duties of the police in relation to
bail, and make it the responsibility of the police to consult with
each other and determine
the amount of bail to be paid by the
accused. From the literal reading of the provision it is clear that
the accused person is
not in a position to pay any amount until the
police have consulted with each other and determined the amount of
bail. This is
hardly surprising as the police are vested with the
necessary information to inform the accused person whether or not
bail is competent
in each circumstance. In respect of offences not
covered by section 59 and for which the attorney- general or a
prosecutor is authorised
to grant bail section 59A finds application.
It provides:
59A Attorney-general
may authorise release on bail
(1) An attorney-general,
or a prosecutor authorised thereto in writing by the attorney-general
concerned, may, in respect of the
offences referred to in Schedule 7
and in consultation with the police official charged with the
investigation, authorise the release
of an accused on bail.
(2) For the purposes of
exercising the functions contemplated in subsections (1) and (3) an
attorney-general may, after consultation
with the Minister, issue
directives.
(3) The effect of bail
granted in terms of this section is that the person who is in custody
shall be released from custody- (a)
upon payment of, or the
furnishing of a guarantee to pay, the sum of money determined for his
or her bail at his or her place of
detention contemplated in section
50 (1) (a); (b) subject to reasonable conditions imposed by the
attorney-general or prosecutor
concerned; or (c) the payment of such
sum of money or the furnishing of such guarantee to pay and the
imposition of such conditions.
(4) An accused released
in terms of subsection (3) shall appear on the first court day at the
court and at the time determined by
the attorney-general or
prosecutor concerned and the release shall endure until he or she so
appears before the court on the first
court day.
[21]
It is clear from this section as well that the provision does not
envisage a request by the accused
person, but a determination by the
prosecutor armed with such information as may be relevant for them to
arrive at a decision,
in consultation with the investigating officer.
It involves the exercise of a discretion by the prosecutor in
consultation with
the police officer. Were this not the case,
it would be reasonable for the prosecutor to simply wait for the
accused person
and only then, make such a determination. This is not
what is contemplated by Section 59A. That discretion was not
exercised, ostensibly
in the belief that the accused person had to
make a request and in the absence thereof, the discretion did not
arise. This cannot
be.
Du Toit
affirms that the exercise
of this discretion follows the same considerations as in respect of
the discretion to arrest, and in
appropriate circumstances the
accused person may bring an application for release on bail in terms
of section 59A. It was incumbent
on Kwatsha in consultation with
Groenewald, to assess the circumstances of each case, and make a
determination whether the matter
qualifies to be brought before the
prosecutor for bail. With due diligence, the police could have
ensured that the plaintiff was
released upon finalisation of the
investigation and prevent a further infringement of his right to
liberty. As Kwitshi stated,
nothing further was done on the
plaintiff's docket until it was taken to court where the charge was
withdrawn and the plaintiff
released without appearing in court.
There was no reason to detain the plaintiff beyond 08h00 on 15 April
2017.
[23]
I was referred to a judgment of this division in
Malisha
v Minister of Police
[6]
where the court found that there was no legal duty on the police to
contact a prosecutor and to secure bail for the plaintiff where
there
was no request from the plaintiff. I respectfully disagree with the
reasoning of the learned judge for the following reasons:
(a)
Section 59A does not require the accused person to make application
or representations to
be released on bail.
(b)
It remains a constitutional imperative for an accused person whose
liberty has been limited,
whether justifiably or not, to be informed
of all his rights including the right to be released on bail.
(c)
Section 59A places a duty on the prosecutor upon receiving the
relevant information
from the investigating officer, to make a
determination whether or not to release the accused. By their
own admission, the
police did not place this information before the
prosecutor.
[24]
The evidence before the court is that the bail information was not
completed and no attempt was
made to establish from the plaintiff
whether he wanted to apply for bail. This dispels any suggestion that
the police may have
entertained an intention to release the plaintiff
on bail. Consequently, the plaintiff's detention from 08h00 on 15
April to 13h00
on 18 April 2017 was unlawful.
[25]
I do not consider it necessary to deal with the evidence tendered on
behalf of the plaintiff,
that of Ms Pieta, in any elaborate detail.
The less said about it, the better. As a witness, she was
unreliable and unhelpful
to the court. Her evidence was incoherent
and improbable. It did not take the plaintiff's case any further. In
that regard, and
given the unreliability of her evidence, it remains
unclear whether she in fact went to the police station to post bail
for her
son as she testified. The court finds it improbable that any
reasonable person would simply go home and wait for the police to
come as Ms Pieta testified. It is also improbable that she, of her
own volition, simply knew when her son would appear in court.
Overall, her testimony appears to have been tailored to suit the
circumstances as she may have assumed necessary. However
in
view of my finding that it was the responsibility of the police to
determine the plaintiff's eligibility for bail and bring
his matter
to the attention of the prosecutor, her evidence would not have
changed the outcome of the matter, that the police had
an obligation
to inform the plaintiff of his right to be released on bail,
including prosecutorial bail, and bring his matter to
the attention
of the prosecutor within a reasonable time.
Quantum
[26]
In considering what would be an appropriate award for damages, it is
necessary to set out at
the outset that the purpose of an award is
not to enrich the plaintiff, but to provide the necessary
solatium
for the infraction on his rights. Guidance to whatever extent
possible can be sourced from various awards made in this division
and
other divisions. Of particular importance is that it must be noted
that an arrest is an infringement of a constitutionally
entrenched
right to freedom of movement and dignity. The Supreme Court of Appeal
in
Minister
of Safety and Security v
Tyulu
[7]
stated:
"…
our courts should be astute to ensure that the awards they make for
such infractions reflect the importance of the
right to personal
liberty and the seriousness with which any arbitrary deprivation of
personal liberty is viewed in our law."
[8]
[27]
The facts of a particular case need to be looked at as a whole in
order to arrive at what could
be considered a fair amount of damages.
In this matter the plaintiff was detained from 14 April 2017. On the
evidence before the
court it appears that his detention from 15 April
to 18 April 2017 was without justification. The SAP10 reflects
that he
was arrested at 16h00 on 14 April 2017 and taken to court at
08h10 on 18 April 2017.
[28]
No evidence was led with regard to the conditions under which the
plaintiff was detained. However
in
Madze
v Minister of Police
[9]
the court held that conditions in police cells anywhere in the
Eastern Cape are generally unsavoury and far from comfortable.
[29]
I have been referred to various decisions of this and other divisions
by both counsel and have
considered them to the extent relevant. I
confine myself to mention those that warrant commentary from this
court. I do not find
De Klerk applicable in this matter, it being
concerned with detention post-court appearance. That is not the issue
in this matter.
It is trite that comparative awards serve as a useful
guide to what other courts have considered appropriate. As Nugent JA
(as
he then was) in
Minister
of Safety and Security v Seymour
[10]
stated, "they have no higher value than that".
[30]
I have given due consideration to comparative awards made by this
division in relatively comparative
circumstances, none of which fit
squarely within the circumstances of this case. I have also
considered the personal circumstances
of the plaintiff and the
duration of the detention as well as the peculiar circumstances of
his detention. I am guided in my endeavour
by the words of Innes CJ
in
Pitt
v Economic Insurance Co. Ltd
[11]
where the learned judge stated:
"I have only to add
that the court must take care to see that its award is fair to both
sides- it must give just compensation
to the plaintiff, but must not
pour out largesse from the horn of plenty at the defendant's
expense."
[12]
I
find an amount of R128 000.00 appropriate in the circumstances.
Costs
[31]
It was submitted on behalf of the plaintiffs that costs should be
allowed on the High Court scale
of costs. Mr Le Roux however
submitted that the plaintiff should be awarded an amount of R150 000
for damages. On the other hand,
the defendant argued that in view of
the
quantum
involved, costs should be granted at the
Magistrate's Court scale. It is trite that the award of costs is a
matter within the discretion
of the court, which discretion should be
exercised judicially. There has been a general acknowledgement by the
courts that the
right to liberty is one of the most important rights
afforded to a person. The infringement of such right is a matter of
public
interest. While the
quantum
of damages is a
consideration, it is not the deciding factor in determining the scale
of damages. There is no doubt that this matter
is of significant
importance to both parties that an award of costs on the High Court
scale is justified.
In
the result I make the following order:
(a) The arrest of
the plaintiff and his subsequent detention from 14 April to 08h00 on
15 April 2017 was lawful.
(b) The continued
detention of the plaintiff from 08h00 on 15 April to 13h00 on 18
April 2017 was unlawful.
(c) The defendant
is liable to compensate the plaintiff for damages arising from the
plaintiff's unlawful detention in the
amount of R128 000.
(d) The defendant
shall pay interest on the above amount at the prescribed rate of
10.25 % calculated from date of judgment
to date of payment.
(e) The Defendant
is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit.
__________________________________________
S.
M. MFENYANA
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances
Counsel
for the Plaintiff: Mr JD le Roux
Instructed
by: Lessing, Heyns, Keyter and van der Bank Inc.
Counsel
for the Defendant: Ms A Rawjee
Assisted
by: Mr N O'Brien
Instructed
by: The State Attorney, Port Elizabeth
Date
Heard: 1- 15 November 2019
Date
Delivered 18 February 2020
[1]
Act
51 of 1977
[2]
Du Toit
et al Commentary of the Criminal Procedure Act, [Service 62, 2019]
[3]
1988(2)
SA 654 (SE)
[4]
At 658
E-H
[5]
Scheepers
v Minister of Safety and Security
(2015) (1) SACR 284
(ECG) at 20.
[6]
(2006/2016)[2019]
ZAECPEHC
[7]
2009
(5) SA 85(SCA)
[8]
At 93D
[9]
(48/2014)[2015]ZAECGHC
[10]
[2007]
1 All SA 558
(SCA
)
[11]
1957
(3) SA 284 (D)
[12]
At
287E- F