About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, Port Elizabeth
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: Eastern Cape High Court, Port Elizabeth
>>
2019
>>
[2019] ZAECPEHC 70
|
|
VE v VE (1339/2016) [2019] ZAECPEHC 70 (18 October 2019)
SAFLII Note:
Certain
personal/private details of parties or witnesses have been
redacted from this document in compliance with the law
and
SAFLII
Policy
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE LOCAL DIVISION, PORT
ELIZABETH)
Case
No: 1339/2016
In
the matter
between:
L[…]
A[…] V[…]
E[…]
Applicant
And
G[…]
L[…] V[…] E[…]
Respondent
JUDGMENT
BESHE
J:
[1]
This matter was on the roll of
civil trials to be heard on the 14 October 2019. It is a
divorce
action. Ahead of it on the roll were two matters which were set to
proceed, a trial and an opposed application for postponement.
In
respect of this matter as well, it was intimated to me that defendant
will seek a postponement, and that plaintiff is opposing
the
application for a postponement. I was engaged with the trial and
could not accommodate the two opposed applications for postponement.
On the following day, the 15 October 2019, I was advised in court
that the parties had subsequently agreed that the matter should
be
postponed. There was however no agreement as regards which of the
parties should be responsible for the costs of the application,
as
well as whether the matter should be postponed
sine die
(applicant’s / defendant’s stance) or according to the
respondent / plaintiff it should be postponed to a preferential
date
in March next year, being 2020. As far as the costs are concerned,
Ms
Crouse
for the applicant contended for an order directing that
respondent should bear the costs of application because, in her
submission
the opposition was unwarranted. She submitted that the
applicant has maintained during at least three Case Flow Management
meetings
that she was not ready to proceed on the 14 October 2019.
[2]
Ms Veldsman
for the
respondent on the other hand contended for the reservation of costs.
Support for this contention was that applicant’s
founding
affidavit in respect of the postponement application is fraught with
inaccuracies. And that those can be dealt with by
way of
cross-examination of the applicant during the trial. And that
therefore the trial court will be best placed to determine
which
party should bear the costs of the postponement.
[3]
The reason adduced on behalf of
the applicant as to why it will not be appropriate to postpone
the
matter to a preferential date in March next year, is that it has not
been possible to establish whether applicant’s counsel
who is
currently out of the country with be available on the proposed date.
Incidentally, it transpired that respondent’s
counsel will not
be available on an earlier date that was suggested for allocation as
a preferential date also in March next year.
[4]
I am not called upon to
determine whether the application for a postponement has merit
or
whether the opposition was justified because the parties have since
agreed that the matter should be postponed. I have already
stated in
which aspects the parties diverge as regards the apparently
inevitable need for the postponement of the matter.
[5]
It appears to me that it will be
foolhardy to postpone the matter to a date on which it
has not been
possible to establish whether applicant’s counsel will be
available. Lest the parties find themselves in a similar
situation as
happened this time around. In my view, it will be appropriate to
order that the matter be postponed
sine die
.
[6]
Further, in order to ensure that
none of the parties sit on their laurels, the matter should
once
again be subjected to case flow management in order to monitor
inter
alia
:
arrangements
for legal representation in respect of the applicant;
proposed
joinder of the trust/s concerned;
finalisation
of applicant's experts’ reports.
[7]
It will also be appropriate in
my view to reserve the issue of costs for determination
by the trial
court or in the event of a settlement by agreement between the
parties.
[8]
I was placed in possession of
what is entitled “The Addendum report of the Family
Advocate”.
The addendum relates to the Family Advocate report in respect of the
parties’ minor child dated 14 November
2018. The purpose of the
addendum is to seek the replacement of the minor child’s
therapy with the child’s current
therapist Ms Jackie McKowen
who has apparently been appointed by the parties.
[9]
The addendum was drawn to my attention by
Ms Veldsman
.
Ms
Crouse
was not in a position to make any submissions in this
regard in view of the fact that she was only briefed to move the
application
for a postponement only.
[10]
In the interest of the minor child, I did not deem it necessary to
insist on a formal / substantive
application in this regard.
Especially in view of the fact that Ms McKowen is the child’s
current therapist who I understand
was appointed by the parties.
[11]
Accordingly, the following order is issued:
(i) The matter is postponed
sine
die
.
(ii) The Registrar is to reenrol the
matter for case flow management to monitor
inter alia
:
Arrangements for the legal
representation of the defendant; the proposed joinder of the
concerned trust/s;
finalisation of defendant’s
expert report/s.
(iii) The minor child’s
therapist is hereby replaced with the current child’s therapist
Ms Jackie McKowen.
(iv) Costs of the application are
reserved.
_______________
NG BESHE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES
For
the Applicant :
Adv: E Crouse
Instructed
by
:
HOWARD
COLLEN INC
11A Shirley Street
Newton Park
PORT ELIZABETH
Ref: H Collen/Lucille
Tel.: 041 – 365 3700
For
the Respondent : Adv:
Ellis
Instructed
by
: GREYVENSTEIN
ATTORNEYS
104 Park Avenue
Central
PORT
ELIZABETH
Ref:
M Rossouw
Tel.:
041 – 585 5539
Date
Heard
:
15
October 2019
Date
Reserved :
15 October
2019
Date
Delivered :
18
October 2019