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[2019] ZAECPEHC 53
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Abdol v Prinsloo and Another (2809/17) [2019] ZAECPEHC 53 (13 August 2019)
IN THE
HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN
CAPE LOCAL DIVISION, PORT ELIZABETH
CASE
NO: 2809/17
REPORTABLE
In the
matter between:
MOGAMAT
TARIQUE
ABDOL Applicant
AND
NOLENE
PRINSLOO First
Respondent
AND
ALL THOSE OCCUPYING THE PREMISES
UNDER
THE FIRST RESPONDENTS CONTROL
NELSON
MANDELA BAY METROPOLITAN Second
Respondent
MUNICIPALITY
JUDGMENT
VAN
ZYL DJP:
[1]
The applicant is the registered owner of a residential property
situated at no 6 Hercules
Street, Springdale, Gelvandale, Port
Elizabeth (Erf no 1867, Gelvandale Township, Port Elizabeth).
The first respondent and
her family members are the occupants of the
property. The applicant seeks their eviction from the property
on the basis that
they are “
unlawful
occupiers”
as contemplated by the
Prevention of Illegal Eviction From and Unlawful Occupation of Land
Act 19 of 1998 (the Act).
[2]
The applicant purchased the property from a Mr Malgas, who in turn
had acquired the
property from the Estate of the late Henry Charles
Malgas. (the deceased). The first respondent is one of
seven children
of the deceased who were the intestate heirs in the
deceased estate. (the Estate). The first respondent
resided
on the property at the time of her father’s death and
continued to do so thereafter. The applicant’s case is
that the first respondent’s continued occupation and her
refusal to vacate the property is unlawful.
[3]
The first respondent does not claim to have obtained any right to
occupy the property
from the applicant. Instead, she contends
that the sale of the property by the executors of the estate was
irregular in that
she did not consent to the initial sale of the
property by the executor to Mr Malgas, and that the subsequent sale
to the applicant
was fraudulent. To this extent, the first
respondent contends that while she continues to reside in the
property, she is
liaising with her attorneys, the matter is still
being investigated, and she remains uniformed about what happened to
the Estate.
[4]
Before dealing with the issues raised by the first respondent, there
are two preliminary
issues that must be dealt with. The first
is the applicant’s application for condonation for the late
filing of his
replying affidavit. The test for determining
whether condonation should be granted or refused is the interests of
justice.
It is dependant upon the facts and circumstances of
each case, and factors that are relevant to the enquiry includes, but
are not
limited to, the length of the delay; the explanation
for the delay; the prejudice to the other party; the
effect
of the delay on the administration of justice; the
importance of the issues raised; and the prospects of success
for
the party seeking condonation. (
Smith
NO v Brummer NO and
Another
1954 (3) SA 352
(O) at 358 H;
Van Wyk v
Unitas Hospital
[2007] ZACC 24
;
2008 (2) SA 472
(CC) at para
[20]
, and
Turnbull-Jackson v Hibiscus Coast
Municipality and Others
2014 (6) SA 592
(CC)
at para [23].)
[5]
The applicant has given a satisfactory explanation for the delay.
He lives and
works abroad. He was consequently not able to
consult with his attorneys in person, and everything had to be done
by way
of electronic mail. He further did not have personal
knowledge of what the first respondent contends transpired with
regard
to the winding up of the Estate and the sale of the property
to Mr Malgas. He was advised that in the absence of particulars
having been given with regard thereto by the first respondent and of
alleged fraud and the improper conduct attributed to the Executor,
further investigations were required to deal with what was raised by
the first respondent in her answering affidavit. The
Executor
initially refused to release to the applicant’s attorneys the
relevant documentation from the Estate file.
When it was
eventually released, its volume required time for its analysis and
distillation into evidence.
[6]
The documentation in question is relevant and necessary to place the
applicant in
a position to properly deal with the merits of the
serious allegations of malfeasance made by the first respondent, and
her denial
of the alleged unlawfulness of her occupation of the
property. I am satisfied that the delay does not constitute a
reckless
or wilful neglect to comply with the Court Rules, or that
the first respondent has been prejudiced thereby. Upon a
consideration
of the applicant’s prospects of success and of
the other relevant factors, condonation of the late filing of the
replying
affidavit must be granted.
[7]
The second preliminary issue is the following: In her answering
affidavit the
first respondent
in limine
raised the point that the applicant has failed to comply with the
peremptory provisions of the Act. The objection is premised
on
the fact that the applicant’s section 4(2) notice and the
notice contemplated in section 4(3) of the Act were served on
the
first respondent at the same time. This objection is based on
the decision in
Cape Killarney Property
Investments (Pty) Ltd v Mahamba and Others
2001 (4) SA 1222
SCA where the Court expressed the view that the
section 4(2) notice can only be directed and authorised by the Court
after all
the papers on both sides have been served (at 1228 B-D of
the judgment.).
[8]
Although the requirements of section 4 are peremptory, a deviation
therefrom will
not necessarily be fatal. The material question
remains whether despite the defect, the objective of the statutory
provision
has in all the circumstances been achieved. The
object of the notices is to ensure that the unlawful occupiers and
the relevant
municipality are aware of the proceedings, that the
unlawful occupier is aware of his rights, and the basis upon which
the eviction
order is sought so to enable him to meet the case.
In
Unlawful Occupiers of the School Site v
City of Johannesburg
2005 (4) SA 1999
(SCA)
at para [22] Brand JA, with reference to the peremptory nature of the
provisions of section 4, said the following:
“
Nevertheless,
it is clear from the authorities that even where the formalities
required by statute are peremptory it is not every
deviation from the
literal prescription that is fatal. Even in that event, the
question remains whether, in spite of the
defects, the object of the
statutory provision had been achieved (see eg
Nkisimane
and Others v Santam Insurance Co Ltd
1978 (2) SA 430
(A) at 433H-434B;
Weenen
Transitional Local Council v Van Dyk
2002 (4) SA 653
(SCA) in para [13]).
And
at para [24]:
“
The
question whether in a particular case a deficient s 4(2) notice
achieved its purpose, cannot be considered in the abstract.
The
answer must depend on what the respondents already knew. The
appellant's contention to the contrary cannot be sustained. It
would
lead to results which are untenable. Take the example of a s 4(2)
notice which failed to comply with s 4(5)(d) in that it
did not
inform the respondents that they were entitled to defend a case or of
their right to legal aid. What would be the position
if all this were
clearly spelt out in the application papers? Or if on the day of the
hearing the respondents appeared with their
legal aid attorney? Could
it be suggested that in these circumstances the s 4(2) should still
be regarded as fatally defective?
I think not. In this case, both the
municipality's cause of action and the facts upon which it relied
appeared from the founding
papers. The appellants accepted that this
is so. If not, it would constitute a separate defence. When the
respondents received
the s 4(2) notice they therefore already knew
what case they had to meet. In these circumstances it must, in my
view, be held that,
despite its stated defects, the s 4(2) notice
served upon the respondents had substantially complied with the
requirements of s
4(5).”
[9]
In
Moela v Shoniwe
2005
(4) SA 357
(SCA) at para [9] the Court dealt with the situation where
the contents and the manner of service of a section 4(2) notice was
not authorised and directed by an order of court. Streicher JA
said the following:
“
However,
the object of s 4(2) is clearly to ensure that the unlawful
occupier and municipality are fully aware of the proceedings
and that
the unlawful occupier is aware of his rights referred to in
s 4(5)(d). It may well be that that object, in appropriate
circumstances, may be achieved notwithstanding the fact that service
of the notice required by s 4(2) had not been authorized
by the
court. That may for example be the case if at the hearing it is clear
that written and effective notice of the proceedings
containing the
information required in terms of s 4(5) had in fact been served
on the unlawful occupier and municipality,
14 days before the
hearing.”
[10]
In the present matter the contents and the manner of service of the
section 4(2) notice was authorised
and directed by an order of
court. The only issue is that the notices in terms of sections
4(2) and 4(3) were served simultaneously.
It is not contended
that the respondents were prejudice thereby, or that the objective of
the legislature has not been achieved
as a result.
[11]
I am accordingly satisfied that the respondents were given effective
notice of the proceedings,
and the case they were required to meet,
and that they were not prejudiced in any way by the simultaneous
service of the relevant
notices in terms of section 4 of the Act.
[12]
The next question is whether or not the first respondent and the
other respondents are unlawful
occupiers for purposes of the Act.
An “
unlawful occupier”
is in section 1(ix) of the Act defined as, “
a
person who occupy land without the express or tacit consent of the
owner or person in charge, or without any right in law to occupy
such
land.”
A right to occupation
cannot arise from the first respondent’s status as an heir in
the intestate estate of her late
father. Like any of the other
heirs, her right was limited to an equal share in the proceeds of the
Estate. As stated
earlier, the first respondent also does not
profess to have the consent of the applicant as the registered owner
of the property
to be in occupation thereof. Instead, she
questions the lawfulness of the applicant’s title to the
property by contending
that the sale of the property by the Executor
to Mr Malgas and later to the applicant was executed fraudulent, and
without the
consent of the heirs.
[13]
The sale of the property in a deceased estate is regulated by
section
47
of the
Administration of Estates Act 66 of 1965
. It reads as
follows:
“
Unless it is
contrary to the will of the deceased, an executor shall sell property
(other than property of a class ordinarily sold
through a
stock-broker or a bill of exchange or property sold in the ordinary
course of any business or undertaking carried on
by the executor) in
the manner and subject to the conditions which the heirs who have an
interest therein approve in writing:
Provided that –
(a)
in the case where an absentee, a minor or a person under curatorship
is heir to the property;
or
(b)
if the said heirs are unable to agree on the manner and conditions of
the sale,
the executor shall
sell the property in such manner and subject to such conditions as
the Master may approve”
[14]
The documentation in the Estate file shows the factual position to be
the following: The
deceased passed away on 17 April 2002.
The first respondent submitted an inventory for the Estate in terms
of
section 9
of the
Administration of Estates Act. The
first
respondent recorded herself and her brother, Deon Meyer, as being the
only children of the deceased. Om 21 May 2002
the Master of the
High Court issued a letter of authority to a Mr Harrington to take
control of the assets of the deceased estate
as the representative of
the Master. From correspondence between Harrington and a firm
of attorneys representing a Lorna
Accum, who later passed away before
the finalisation of the Estate, it is evident that Ms Accum claimed
to be a daughter of the
deceased born out of wedlock, an consequently
an heir in the intestate estate.
[15]
Harrington later, in 2009 renounced his position as representative of
the Estate. In his
letter informing the first respondent of
this, Harrington stated that he accepted the appointment to act as
the Master’s
representative on the basis of the first
respondent’s declaration that the deceased only had two adult
children.
That declaration was however in conflict with
what the first respondent telephonically told Harrington, namely that
the deceased
in fact had seven children, and not only two as she had
declared earlier. Harrington, clearly conflicted by this turn
of
events, renounced his position as representative of the Estate.
[16]
In June 2010, and again in July 2010, a meeting of the heirs was held
with the Master of the
High Court. The only heir that was not
present at the two meetings was Ms Accum who had by then already
passed away.
Four of the heirs were recorded as being in favour
of the sale of the property and three voted against the sale.
It was also
recorded that an executor was to be appointed to the
Estate, but that the appointed person must not be a family member.
On
27 July 2010 a Mr van Niekerk was appointed as the executor.
On 2 December 2010 he wrote to the first respondent to confirm
that
her brother, Deon Meyer, had made an offer to purchase the property
and that he was given until 30 January 2011 to obtain
the necessary
finance, failing which the property will be sold.
[17]
This is consistent with what the first respondent says in her
answering affidavit, namely that
at a meeting it was pointed out to
them that Ms Accum was entitled to a share in the Estate, and that as
result it was decided
by the remaining heirs that the property must
be purchased by their brother Deon Meyer in order for the first
respondent and her
children to continue to reside on the property.
[18]
On 17 February 2011 the Executor in writing informed the first
respondent that the deadline for
Deon Meyer to come up with the money
for the purchase of the property was extended to 30 March 2011.
Thereafter, more than
a year later, the Executor once again wrote to
the heirs advising them that they were given an opportunity to
purchase the property,
and that if they did not contact the Executor
before the 14 June 22012, the property would be sold.
[19]
On 9 October 2012 the Executor informed the heirs in writing that an
offer to purchase the property
had been received, but that the heirs
will have first preference to purchase the property, and should they
be interested, they
must inform the executor before 26 October 2012.
It is further recorded in the letter that a consent to the sale of
the property
was attached and must be signed and returned. That
explains the existence of the consent forms signed by some of the
heirs
in respect of which the first respondent raised the suspicion
of forgery. On 12 December 2012 the Master forwarded a letter
to the Executor. The letter was from the first respondent
wherein she expressed her unhappiness with the fact that the property
was to be sold. What followed thereafter is correspondence
between the first respondent’s attorneys and those representing
the executor concerning payment to the first respondent of her share
of the proceeds of the sale of the property.
[20]
What is evident from the aforementioned documentation is that the
first respondent has been anything
but frank in her responses to the
applicant’s claims in these proceedings and very selective in
what she disclosed with regard
to the events which preceded the sale
of the property. She for example failed to disclose the fact
that she made a declaration,
under threat of criminal penalty, that
the deceased only had two adult children. That was a blatant
untruth. In these
proceedings the first respondent acknowledged
that the deceased was survived by six legitimate children and one
child born out
of wedlock.
[21]
Further, the first respondent’s statement in her answering
affidavit that she is unsure
as to how it happened that the property
was sold, or what happened to the proceeds of the sale, is not
supported by the relevant
correspondence. The correspondence
shows that the executor kept the heirs, including the first
respondent, informed of the
steps taken by him to sell the property.
That included the fact that the first respondent’s brother, Mr
Deon Meyer,
was given an opportunity to buy the property. When
he was quite clearly unable to raise the necessary finance, the
property
was sold, but not before the intestate heirs were given a
first preference to purchase the property. The correspondence
further
reveals that the executor wrote to the first respondent’s
attorneys asking for her banking details so that payment can be
made
to her of her share of the proceeds of the sale. It is recorded
in the said letter that the first respondent’s
banking details
were also requested some time earlier.
[22]
The first respondent’s allegations that the sale was fraudulent
is without any factual
basis. She points to the signing of
consent forms by the remaining heirs on certain dates, and signatures
“
that appear seem (sic) to be different
to those that the siblings previously used.”
What
the significance of the dates are is not stated. Similarly, in
what way the signatures are different is not stated.
It is
telling that none of the first respondent’s siblings have come
forward to claim that their signatures have been forged,
which is a
very serious and damaging allegation to lay at the door of the
attorney appointed to act as the executor of a deceased
estate.
[23]
The first respondent further suggests that it is illogical that the
heirs would give their consent
to the sale of the property after they
had said a year earlier that they do not want to sell the property.
As counsel for
the applicant correctly submitted, their change of
heart is not illogical in that some of them have agreed at an earlier
meeting
with the Master that the property be sold, and that save for
the first respondent who is staying rent free in the property, none
of them were deriving any financial benefit therefrom.
[24]
In terms of
section 47
of the
Administration of Estates Act the
executor may sell the property forming part of a deceased estate in
such manner and subject to such conditions as the Master may
approve
if the heirs are unable to agree on the manner and conditions of the
sale. It is evident that the heirs were not
in agreement with
regard to the sale of the property and that the nominated sibling was
unable to raise the purchase price despite
having been given adequate
opportunity to do so.
[25]
The liquidation and distribution account was lodged by the executor
on 29 August 2013.
On the first’s respondent’s own
version, she was informed by Mr Malgas who purchased the property
from the estate,
that she must vacate the property. The first
respondent further admits that the applicant visited her thereafter
and informed
her that the property was sold to him, and that she must
vacate the property. The first respondent’s attorneys in
a
subsequent letter to the executor similarly acknowledged the sale
of the property.
[26]
Despite such knowledge, the first respondent has to date not taken
any steps to seek the setting
aside of the sale of the property.
The suggestion that it is not known how the property was sold, and
that there is no further
information regarding the Estate, is not
supported by the documentary evidence. The vague and
unsubstantiated statement that
she continued to liaise with her
attorney, and that the matter was still investigated, is supportive
of a conclusion that no steps
of any nature have been undertaken by
the applicant to set the sale of the property aside if any basis
therefore exists.
[27]
Counsel for the applicant submitted that there in any event exists no
legal basis for seeking
such an order in any proceedings in that any
claim to contest the Estate or the sale of the property, has become
prescribed.
On the first respondent’s version she was
informed in 2013 that the applicant purchased the property and that
she must vacate
it. A letter was written to her attorney in
October 2013 informing them that the property was sold and that
despite transfer
of ownership, the first respondent refused to vacate
the property. As stated, the first respondent’s attorneys
in subsequent
correspondence acknowledged the sale of the property.
[28]
The first respondent accordingly had knowledge by the end of 2013 of
the facts relevant to her
claim to have the property, that she
contends was fraudently sold by the Executor, restored to the
Estate. Counsel for the
applicant is correct that the first
respondent’s failure to act would adversely affect the
enforceability of any claim that
she may have against the Executor of
the Estate, whether on the basis of an unreasonable delay in bringing
review proceedings,
or a failure to bring an action with the three
year time period prescribed by the
Prescription Act 68 of 1969
.
[29]
I am accordingly satisfied that the first respondent is an unlawful
occupier of the property.
What
remains to be considered is whether it would be just and equitable to
grant an eviction order. Sachs J, dealing with the
concept
‘
just
and equitable’
in the context of the Act in
Port
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers
[2004] ZACC 7
;
2005
(1) SA 217
(CC), referred with approval to the comments of Horn AJ in
Port
Elizabeth Municipality v Peoples Dialogue on Land and Shelter and
Others
2000
(2) SA 1074
(SE) stating in para [33]:
“
In
matters brought under PIE, one is dealing with two diametrically
opposed fundamental interests. On the one hand, there is the
traditional real right inherent in ownership, reserving exclusive use
and protection of property by the landowner. On the other
hand, there
is the genuine despair of people in dire need of adequate
accommodation...It is the duty of the court, in applying
the
requirements of the Act, to balance these opposing interests and
bring out a decision that is just and equitable...The use
of the term
‘just and equitable’ relates to both interests, that is,
what is just and equitable not only to persons
who occupied the land
illegally but to the landowner as well.”
The
learned judge continued at paras [36] and [37]:
“
[36]
The court is thus called upon to go beyond its normal functions and
to engage in active judicial management according to equitable
principles of an ongoing, stressful and law-governed social process.
This has major implications for the manner in which it must
deal with
the issues before it, how it should approach questions of evidence,
the procedures it may adopt, the way in which it
exercises its powers
and the orders it might make. The Constitution and PIE require that,
in addition to considering the lawfulness
of the occupation, the
court must have regard to the interests and circumstances of the
occupier and pay due regard to broader
considerations of fairness and
other constitutional values, so as to produce a just and equitable
result.
[37]
Thus, PIE expressly requires the court to infuse elements of grace
and compassion into the formal structures of the law. It
is called
upon to balance competing interests in a principled way and to
promote the constitutional vision of a caring society
based on good
neighbourliness and shared concern. The Constitution and PIE confirm
that we are not islands unto ourselves. The
spirit of
ubuntu,
part
of a deep cultural heritage of the majority of the population,
suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual
rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the
Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a structured,
institutionalised
and operational declaration in our evolving new
society of the need for human interdependence, respect and concern.
[30]
The nature of the discretion which a court employs in this exercise
is described
Ndlovu v Ngcobo; Bekker and Another v Jika
2003 (1) SA 113
(SCA) where Harms JA held at para [18]:
“
The
court, in determining whether or not to grant an order or in
determining the date on which the property has to be vacated (s
4(8)), has to exercise a discretion based upon what is just and
equitable. The discretion is one in the wide and not narrow sense.”
[31]
I am satisfied that it will be just and equitable to order the
eviction of the first respondent.
Despite the first
respondent’s misgivings, there is no evidence that Mr Malgas or
the applicant did not
bona fide
acquire the property in 2013 from the Estate. The applicant has been
unable to enjoy any benefit arising from his right of ownership
of
the property by reason of the first respondent’s unlawful
occupation thereof. The first respondent on the other
hand has
been in occupation of the property since the death of the deceased,
and continues her occupation, without any right thereto
following the
sale of the property. She has not been
bona
fide
in the manner in which she dealt with
the property and its occupation. In 2002 she misrepresented to
the Master the number
of children of the deceased, clearly in an
attempt to limit the number of persons who may be entitled to benefit
from the estate
property which included the residential property.
She failed to correct this until 2009 when she admitted to the
representative
of the Estate that there were in fact more than two
children. As a result of this misrepresentation, the said
representative
refused to accept a claim lodged in the Estate by the
daughter of the deceased who was born out of wedlock. As a
consequence
the said child, Ms Accum, was forced and placed in a
position where she had to prove her relationship with the deceased.
According to the affidavit submitted to the representative by Ms
Accum, she lived with the deceased from the age of fourteen;
she in fact shared a bedroom with the first respondent; her
wedding reception was held at the property, and her husband and
daughter lived on the property after her marriage.
[32]
As a direct consequence of the aforementioned misrepresentation, the
representative of the Estate
was unable to proceed with the
administration of the Estate and informed the first respondent
thereof in writing. In these
proceedings the first respondent
acknowledged the fact that the deceased had seven children without
disclosing to this Court that
she had previously made a
misrepresentation in this regard, or that the representative of the
Estate felt obliged to terminate
his mandate as a result.
[33]
The first respondent’s lack of candour and
bona
fides
is further displayed by her assertion
that she does not know how the property came to be sold to the
applicant. The contents
of the Estate file however shows that
the appointed Executor kept her informed of the steps taken to
realise the property, and
importantly, that he afforded the heirs the
opportunity to purchase the property. The first respondent
clearly had access
to documents relevant to the Estate when she filed
her answering affidavit in the present proceedings. She annexed
to her
affidavit copies of several documents bearing the stamp of the
Master. It is evident that she has been very selective in her
disclosure in these proceedings of the facts relevant to the
administration of the Estate.
[34]
The first respondent further sought to attack the lawfulness of the
sale of the property by the
Executor by relying on what is nothing
more than conjecture based on vague and unsubstantiated allegations
of fraud. She
is but one of several heirs, none of whom have
obviously found any reason to raise, or harbour any concern about the
sale of the
property and the distribution of the proceeds amongst
them by the Executor. These are all aspects that raises
questions about
the truthfulness and the bona fides of the first
respondent, and the lengths to which she is prepared to go to ensure
that she
continue her occupation of the property.
[35]
With regard to her personal circumstances and the impact her eviction
from the property may have
on her and her family, the first
respondent has similarly not provided this Court with much
information. What she did say
amounts to nothing more than the
unsupported statement that she and her children, “
including
those that are currently studying in schools and those that are
majors,”
will be prejudiced, and
further that, while she is employed, she has financial constraints
and cannot afford to rent a house.
In argument, the first
respondent, who appeared in person following the withdrawal of her
attorneys of record, informed the Court
in response to enquiries made
that she has four children. Three of her children are majors
and only one child is of school
going age. Her daughter lives
with her fiancé. The first respondent further informed
this Court that she is
employed by the Nelson Mandela Bay
Municipality and that she earns eight thousand rand per month.
What the financial position
of her major children are is not stated.
Similarly, no information has been given with regard to what she
contends in her
affidavit her financial constraints are.
[36]
The first respondent chose not to pertinently deal with the
applicant’s contention in his
founding affidavit that the child
that stays on the property is that of the first respondent’s
daughter, and that the daughter
is employed and financially supports
both her child and the first respondent. The first respondent
prima facie
is not
indigent, and her failure to fully disclose to this Court
information, which falls within her personal knowledge, regarding
her
financial and domestic position, strengthens that conclusion.
She is employed and is earning a salary, and “
does
not belong to the poor and vulnerable class of persons whose
protection was obviously foremost in the Legislature’s mind”
when it enacted the Act. (Wormald NO and Others v Kambule
2006
(3) SA 562
SCA at para [20].)
[37]
In all the circumstances, and on a consideration of the relevant
factors set out in section 4(7)
of the Act, I am satisfied that the
applicant is entitled to relief claimed. With regard to the costs of
this application, the
conduct of the first respondent does not
justify an order other than the usual order. In the result it
is ordered that:
(a)
The first respondent and all other occupants of the residential
property, being Erf no 1867,
Gelvandale Township, Port Elizabeth, and
situated at no 6 Hercules Street, Springdale, Gelvandale, Port
Elizabeth, be and are hereby
evicted from the said property;
(b)
The first respondent and all other occupants must vacate the
aforesaid property on or before
31 October 2019; and
(c)
The first respondent pays the costs of the application.
__________________
D
VAN ZYL
DEPUTY
JUDGE PRESIDENT
Counsel
for the Applicants:
Adv Crompton
Counsel
for the Respondents: In person
Date
Heard:
30 May 2019
Judgment
Delivered:
13 August 2019