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[2017] ZAECPEHC 24
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Pienaar and Another v Strauss and Another (3930/2016) [2017] ZAECPEHC 24 (28 March 2017)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN
CAPE LOCAL DIVISION, PORT ELIZABETH
CASE
NO:
3930/2016
Date
heard:
16 March 2017
Date
delivered:
28 March 2017
Not
reportable
In
the matter between:
THEUNIS
JOHANNES PIENAAR
First
Applicant
ANDRIES
DANIëL FABER PIENAAR
Second
Applicant
and
LAETITIA
STRAUSS
First
Respondent
THE
PROVINCIAL MANAGER OF THE
DEPARTMENT
OF HOME AFFAIRS,
PORT
ELIZABETH LOCAL OFFICE
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
PLASKET,
J:
[1]
The first applicant, Mr TJ Pienaar, and the second applicant, his son
Mr ADF Pienaar, apply for orders: (a) declaring that the
marriage
registered by the first applicant on 4 August 2005 in the records of
the second respondent, the Provincial Manager, Department
of Home
Affairs, Port Elizabeth Local Office, is null and void; (b)
declaring that the ‘purported marriage’ between
the
second applicant and the first respondent, cited as Ms Laetitia
Strauss, is void
ab
initio
and of no legal force or effect; (c) directing that the entry in the
second respondent’s records of the purported marriage
be
expunged; and (d) directing the respondent or respondents who oppose
the application to pay the applicants’ costs.
[2]
The second respondent abides the decision of the court but the first
respondent, who refers to herself as ‘Laetitia Pienaar
(born
Strauss)’, has brought a counter-application in which she seeks
orders: (a) staying the main application pending the
outcome of
proceedings in the Family Court of Southampton, England in which she
seeks a determination on whether that court has
jurisdiction to
consider the validity of a marriage ceremony between her and the
second applicant and, if so, whether they were
validly married; (b)
alternatively, in the event of this order not being granted,
postponing the matter to afford the first respondent
an opportunity
to file an answering affidavit in the main application; and (c)
directing the applicants in the main application
to pay her costs.
The
facts
[3]
The facts giving rise to the dispute between the parties are out of
the ordinary, to say the least.
[4]
The second applicant and the first respondent met at the University
of Port Elizabeth, now known as the Nelson Mandela Metropolitan
University, when they were both studying law. They met again in 1995
in England where the second applicant had gone to complete
a Masters
degree in Strategic Studies and the first respondent to work as an
au
pair
.
[5]
A romantic relationship developed and, in due course, they decided to
marry. Their plan was to return to South Africa
to marry. It
was decided that prior to returning to South Africa, they would
invite their English friends to a ‘religious
blessing service’.
It was agreed that the first applicant, who was a pastor in the Dutch
Reformed Church in South Africa,
would officiate at this service. The
ceremony was held on 8 June 1996 in Hampshire, England.
[6]
While the second applicant and the first respondent started living
together after the ceremony, the planned marriage in South
Africa
never took place. Although, according to the second applicant,
the relationship was a difficult one, they lived together
for some
time and have two children.
[7]
The first applicant stated in his affidavit that, on 4 August 2005 at
the request of the first respondent, ‘I prepared
a marriage
certificate to be issued which I signed as a marriage officer,
indicating that a marriage was solemnized at Port Elizabeth
on 8 June
1996’. He submitted the certificate to the office of the second
respondent and, as he said, ‘a “marriage”
was duly
registered in the records of the Second Respondent’. He
concluded that the certificate ‘does not reflect the
true
position as the parties never got married in South Africa nor did I
have the authority to marry the parties in England’.
[8]
By the time the first applicant completed the certificate at the
request of the first respondent, the relationship between her
and the
second applicant had broken down irretrievably.
[9]
The first respondent has instituted divorce proceedings against the
second applicant in the Southampton Family Court. In the
document
initiating the proceedings she claimed to have married the second
applicant on 8 June 1996 in Port Elizabeth. In her affidavit
attached
to her counter-application, however, she stated that ‘we were
married to each other in England on 8 June 1996 in
a formal wedding
ceremony conducted by my father-in-law’. In submitting that
only an English court has jurisdiction to determine
the validity of
the purported marriage, she stated that ‘[i]f a marriage is
good by the laws of the country where it was
effected, and it is
common cause that a ceremony took place in England, it is good all
over the world –
locus
legit actum
’.
Developments
in the litigation
[10]
Once it became clear from the counter-application that it was common
cause between the applicants and the first respondent
that no
marriage was alleged to have been solemnized in Port Elizabeth, the
applicants proposed an order to settle the matter.
[11]
The proposed order was to the effect that: (a) the entry in the
second respondent’s records of the marriage in Port Elizabeth
on 8 June 1996 would be expunged; (b) the second respondent would be
directed to expunge the record; (c) the relief claimed in
paragraphs
2 and 3 of the Notice of Motion – declarators as to the
validity of the purported marriage – would be stayed
pending
the outcome of the proceedings in England envisaged by paragraphs
(a)(i) and (ii) of the counter-application; and (d) the
first
respondent would pay the applicants’ costs.
[12]
This proposal was rejected by the first respondent. The applicants
now seek an order in the above terms.
The
issues to be decided
[13]
It is common cause that no marriage between the parties took place in
Port Elizabeth. It follows that the certificate that
purports to
record such a marriage is false. Despite this, the first respondent
sought a stay of the proceedings pending a determination
in England
of whether the English court has jurisdiction to determine the
validity of the ceremony conducted by the first applicant
on 8 June
1996 and, if it does, to decide whether the second applicant and the
first respondent are validly married. In the alternative,
she seeks a
postponement of this matter to enable her to file an answering
affidavit in the main application.
[14]
I shall deal briefly with the last issue. The first respondent, for
tactical reasons, it would appear, chose not to deal with
the merits
by answering the affidavits filed by the applicants. A party who
chooses not to plead over, as it we, does so at risk
of having the
matter decided on his or her opponents papers. Such a party has no
right to have the matter postponed to enable an
answering affidavit
to be filed.
[1]
Similarly, if a
party applies to strike out what is alleged to be inadmissible
evidence but does not deal with the merits, he or
she stands or falls
on the basis of this choice.
[2]
No acceptable reason has been given by the first respondent as to why
she did not answer to the merits of the main application.
I
accordingly find that there is no basis for the alternative, prayer
(b) of the counter-application, in the event of me deciding
not to
stay the proceedings.
[15]
I turn now to whether a case has been made out for the postponement
of the matter pending a decision of the English court concerning
whether the second applicant and the first respondent are validly
married.
[16]
This relief is predicated on both this court and the English court
being asked to determine whether the second applicant and
the first
respondent were legally married in England on 8 June 1996. While that
is what the English court will be required to decide,
it is not the
relief that was sought by the applicants at any stage. They sought,
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the notice of motion,
declarators that the
‘marriage registered by First Applicant on 4 August 2005’
is null and void, and that this ‘purported
marriage’
between the parties ‘is void
ab
initio
and
of no legal force or effect’. In other words, the relief sought
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the notice of motion refers to
a marriage
entered into in Port Elizabeth, and not the purported marriage that
the first respondent relies on.
[17]
In any event, the applicants no longer seek this declaratory relief
at this stage: in terms of paragraph 3 of the draft order
that they
have moved for, they propose the postponement of the relief claimed
in paragraphs 2 and 3 of the notice of motion pending
the
determination by the English court of its jurisdiction to consider
the validity of the second applicant’s and the first
respondent’s ‘marriage ceremony’ on 8 June 1996 in
England and, if it has jurisdiction, its decision whether
the parties
were validly married.
[18]
There is, consequently, no proper case made out by the first
respondent for the postponement of the application for the
expungement
of the record of the purported Port Elizabeth marriage.
That it never happened and that the record is false are two facts the
applicants
and the first respondent do agree on. Mr Rorke, who
appeared for the first respondent, was unable to point to any
concrete prejudice
that the first respondent would or even could
suffer if the false record of a non-existent marriage is expunged. It
most certainly
can have no effect one way or the other on the
proceedings in the English court and nothing I say about it can bind
in any way
an English judge deciding different issues on different
evidence.
[19]
The certificate evidencing a marriage between the second applicant
and the first respondent in Port Elizabeth on 8 June 1996
is false
and fraudulent. In
Road
Accident Fund v Mongalo; Nkabinde v Road Accident Fund
,
[3]
a case involving fraudulent certificates being tendered as
‘conclusive proof’ of the existence of customary unions,
Cameron JA held that ‘[d]eliberate deceit in the procurement of
a document must taint its entire subsequent existence, and
the law
cannot permit propagation of the fruits of dishonesty’. In
conformity with these sentiments, I can see no reason
for leaving a
false and fraudulent public record in existence, but only strong
grounds of public interest for having it expunged
forthwith.
[4]
[20]
In the result, the counter-application must fail and the application
must succeed on the basis of the amended relief sought
by the
applicants.
The
order
[21]
I make the following order.
(a)
It is ordered that the entry in the records of the second respondent
recording that a marriage
between the second applicant and the first
respondent took place in Port Elizabeth on 8 June 1996 be expunged.
(b)
The second respondent is directed to take all necessary steps to give
effect to paragraph
(a) of this order.
(c)
Subject to the first respondent filing, within 15 days of the date of
this order,
a claim for relief referred to in sub-paragraphs (i) and
(ii) below, the determination of the relief claimed in paragraphs 2
and
3 of the notice of motion in the main application is stayed and
postponed
sine die
, pending the outcome of the proceedings in
the English court under case number SO15D00914 in which the first
respondent seeks a
determination on:
(i)
whether or not that court has jurisdiction to determine the validity
or otherwise
of a marriage ceremony between the second applicant and
the first respondent in England on 8 June 1996; and
(ii)
if so, whether or not the second applicant and the first respondent
were validly
married, the marriage is a nullity or there is a
non-marriage.
(d)
The first respondent is directed to pay the costs of the applicants,
such costs to include
the costs of two counsel.
___________________________
C
PLASKET
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
APPEARANCES
For
the applicants: Ms TA Dicker SC and Mr G Gajjar,
instructed by Karel Brink Attorney, Cape Town and Le Roux Inc,
Port
Elizabeth
For
the first respondent: Mr S Rorke SC instructed by Lizelle Pretorious
Inc, Port Elizabeth
[1]
Jordaan &
another v Msweli
ELCLD
19 June 2007 (case no. EL 188/05; ECD 488/05) unreported, paras
25-28. This matter dealt with trial proceedings but the
basic idea
that the full defence of a party must be disclosed holds good for
applications too.
[2]
Gore v
Amalgamated Mining Holdings
1985
(1) SA 294
(C) AT 295h-I;
Helen
Suzman Foundation v President of the Republic of South Africa &
others
2015 (2) SA 1
(CC) para 136.
[3]
Road Accident
Fund v Mongalo; Nkabinde v Road Accident Fund
2003
(3) SA 119
(SCA) para 6.
[4]
As was ordered in
Snyman
v Snyman
1984 (4) SA 262
(W) at 263G-I;
S
v S
1975 (3) SA 440
(R) at 442A-B;
Morrison
v Morrison
1972 (3) SA 185
(C) at 185H-186A and 187A-B;
De
Bono v De Bono
1948 (2) SA 802
(C) at 807-808.