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[2016] ZAECPEHC 73
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Smit v Minister of Safety and Security for South Africa (51/2010) [2016] ZAECPEHC 73 (22 November 2016)
REPORTABLE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
(EASTERN
CAPE LOCAL DIVISION, PORT ELIZABETH)
Case no: 51/2010
D
ate
heard: 7 November 2016
Date
delivered: 22 November 2016
In
the matter between
ANDRE
PIETER
SMIT
Plaintiff
vs
THE
MINISTER OF SAFETY AND
SECURITY
FOR SOUTH
AFRICA
Defendant
JUDGMENT
PICKERING
J
:
[1]
On the night of 8
th
May 2008 plaintiff discovered for himself the truth of the adage that
brandy and depression make bad bedfellows. Late that
night
plaintiff was sitting disconsolately at the bar of the Bermuda Night
Club in Jeffreys Bay nursing the latest in a long succession
of
alcoholic drinks, as well as nursing an ego badly battered in the
aftermath of a bruising divorce, when a number of policemen
entered
the premises and ordered him to leave. In a less fraught
situation plaintiff would no doubt have informed them that
it was
actually his brother who they were looking for, it having been his
unruly conduct at the other end of the bar which had
caused the owner
of the club to call the police.
[2]
Things being as they were, however, he did not do so. Instead,
secure in the knowledge that he was innocent of any wrongdoing,
he
refused to leave and swore at the police, advising them impolitely to
leave him alone. Tensions escalated from there culminating
in
plaintiff, a white ex-police captain, swearing at the police, who
were all coloured persons, in what plaintiff himself conceded
were
unacceptable racial terms. The police then left the premises.
Plaintiff finished his drink and, after calling
his brother to
accompany him, left the club.
[3]
As appears from my judgment on the merits of this matter, the issues
of liability and quantum having been separated by agreement,
the
police, wounded by the racial epithets hurled at them by plaintiff,
had in the mean time called for reinforcements from the
Jeffreys Bay
police station. In an extraordinary step, the police station
was closed and locked and all the policemen on
duty there rushed to
support their colleagues who were waiting outside the club premises
for plaintiff to emerge. As plaintiff
made his somewhat
unsteady way down the stairs in the dark to the car park he was set
upon by the police and assaulted, in consequence
whereof he suffered
severe injuries including the loss of sight in one eye.
[4]
In my judgment I found that the police had deliberately ambushed the
plaintiff on the stairs, their motive being to exact revenge
for his
crude, racial slurs which had humiliated and angered them. I
rejected as false the evidence adduced by the relevant
police
officers to the effect that whatever injuries plaintiff had suffered
were sustained by him in the course of his resisting
arrest. I
also rejected the submission advanced on behalf of defendant that
because of plaintiff’s provocative conduct
which gave rise to
the assault he was not entitled to any damages and that his action
should be dismissed. In this regard
I stated as follows:
“
[94]
This submission cannot be upheld. A similar submission was
rejected 101 years ago in
Blou v
Rose Innes
1914 TPD 102
where,
at 104, de Villiers JP stated succinctly:
‘
But
none of the authorities, except one to which Mr. Tindall has
referred, in Cons. 183, vol.5, go so far as to say that a verbal
injury can be set off by an assault. All the authorities are
clear, I think, that it cannot be done. I think the reason
is
perfectly clear. We may differ upon the advisability of
extending the rule allowing a man to repel force by force.
But
we cannot doubt that it is entirely illegal ... although perhaps
under the circumstances perfectly natural ... for a man to
give
another a slap in the face because the other has called him a thief.
It is natural, but it is against the law.’
[95]
More recently in
Winterbach v Masters
1989 (1) SA 922
(ECD)
the same conclusion was reached by Zietsman JP, the headnote of which
reads as follows:
‘
In
a case where self-defence is not involved, to hold that provocation
which does not affect the defendant’s mental capacity
may
render lawful an otherwise unlawful assault is tantamount to
accepting the principle of an eye for an eye and a tooth for a
tooth,
and is contrary to our legal principles. Provocation on the
part of the plaintiff will, however, mitigate his damages,
and in a
proper case it may be held that his provocation was such as to reduce
to nothing the damages recoverable by him, or that
it was such as to
justify an award to him of nominal damages only coupled perhaps with
an order that he be deprived of his costs,
or even that he pay the
defendant’s costs.’”
[5]
I therefore found that the defendant was liable to pay to plaintiff
such damages as he might thereafter succeed in proving he
had
suffered in consequence of the assault upon him. I should
mention that defendant did not seek leave to appeal against
my
judgment and order.
[6]
The trial in respect of quantum was originally set down for hearing
on 20 June 2016 but was postponed with the issue of the
wasted costs
occasioned thereby being reserved. I will revert hereunder to
this issue.
[7]
The matter was again set down for hearing on 7 November 2016 on which
date I was informed by counsel that the quantum of damages
had been
settled in the sum of R600 000,00 made up as follows:
(a)
Past Medical expenses
R122 954,30
(b)
Future Medical expenses
R197 045,70
(c)
General Damages
R280 000,00
[8]
I was advised that in settling the quantum of plaintiff’s
general damages the parties had agreed upon a 20% reduction
thereof
in mitigation of plaintiff’s damages in order to take into
account plaintiff’s provocative behaviour which
had occasioned
the assault upon him. See in this regard:
Winterbach
v Masters
supra
.
[9]
The settlement was reached pursuant to the payment of R600 000,00
into Court in terms of Rule 34 on 28 October 2016, which
payment was
accepted by plaintiff on Thursday 3 November 2016. Although
costs were tendered up to and including 28 October
2016 there was,
however, no tender in respect of interest on the damages.
[10]
Accordingly two issues were argued before me on 7 November; namely,
the issue of the previously reserved costs and the issue
relating to
interest.
THE
RESERVED COSTS
[11]
It will be convenient to deal firstly with the issue of the reserved
costs.
[12]
In paragraph 8.6 of his original particulars of claim plaintiff
alleged that he had sustained a “
bleeding
perforation of the right eardrum
”.
On 10 June 2016, however, five court days before the trial was due to
commence on 20 June 2016, plaintiff filed a
notice of intention to
amend paragraph 8.6 by including after the word “
eardrum”
the words “
and a 2x2 painful
swelling behind the left ear
” and
by adding the following new sub-paragraphs as paragraph 9.1 and 16.10
namely:
“
9.6
Total deafness of the right ear and partial deafness of the left ear.
16.10
Plaintiff has a mild to moderate sensory hearing loss in the right
ear and a mild hearing loss in the low and middle
frequencies of the
left ear slopes into a steep moderate to severe high frequency
hearing loss which loss is permanent.
”
[13]
These proposed amendments were accompanied by a concomitant upwards
adjustment of the damages claimed by plaintiff.
[14]
The amendments were sought in order to give effect to a report by an
Ear, Nose and Throat Specialist, Dr. Nel, pursuant to
his examination
of plaintiff. Defendant did not object to the proposed
amendment but indicated that he required a postponement
of the trial
in order for plaintiff to be examined by his own expert. The
trial was then postponed by agreement with the
costs reserved.
[15]
In arguing that those costs should be paid by plaintiff Mr. Nepgen,
who appeared for defendant throughout the trial, submitted,
correctly, that despite plaintiff having testified in some detail
during the trial on the merits as to the nature and sequelae
of the
injury to his eye, there was no mention made in his evidence, nor
indeed in the evidence of Dr. Domingo who also testified
as to
plaintiff’s injuries, of plaintiff having suffered an
impairment of his hearing in consequence of the assault.
[16]
It is so, as was stressed by Mr. Frost, who appeared throughout for
plaintiff, that during October 2015 plaintiff had filed
a report
compiled by an Audiologist, Renee Verson, wherein she stated that she
had assessed plaintiff as having a “
mild
to moderate sensory hearing loss in the right ear
”
as well as the hearing loss detailed in paragraph 16.10 of the
proposed amendment, as set out above. Nowhere in her
report,
however, does Ms. Verson deal with the cause of such loss and whether
there was in fact any causal connection between that
loss and the
assault. It was only in the report of Dr. Nel, filed on 13 June
2016, that the opinion was expressed for the
first time that
plaintiff’s hearing loss was “
as
a direct result of the injuries
”
plaintiff had sustained.
[17]
Mr. Frost submitted, however, that it must have been obvious to
defendant prior to the filing of Dr. Nel’s report, that
plaintiff had suffered a serious injury to his eardrum and that the
loss of hearing alluded to in Ms. Verson’s report could
only
have been in consequence of the assault. In these
circumstances, so he submitted, it was incumbent on the defendant,
if
he disputed the causal nexus between the deafness and the assault to
have taken steps to investigate the matter.
[18]
I disagree. The onus was on plaintiff to prove his damages.
Until such time as Dr. Nel’s report was filed
and the amendment
of the particulars of claim was sought no causal nexus was pleaded
and there was no reason whatsoever for defendant
to have undertaken
any such investigation. The fact that according to Ms. Verson’s
report the plaintiff had a hearing
loss was, in the absence of any
evidence linking that loss to the assault, irrelevant to the issue of
plaintiff’s damages.
[19]
In those circumstances it was, in my view, entirely reasonable for
defendant, upon receipt of the report and the proposed amendment,
to
have required plaintiff to be examined by his own medical expert and
a postponement of the trial was accordingly inevitable.
[20]
The plaintiff must therefore bear the wasted costs occasioned by the
postponement of the trial on 20 June 2016.
INTEREST
[21]
As I have stated above the parties could not agree on the date from
which interest on plaintiff’s damages should run.
In this
regard Mr. Nepgen, with reference to
Solomon
N.O and Others v Spur Cool Corporation (Pty) Ltd and Others
2002 (5) SA 214
(C) at para 65 submitted that a distinction should be
drawn between the three different components of plaintiff’s
damages.
He submitted that no order of interest should be made
in respect of plaintiff’s past medical expenses inasmuch as
these had
been paid by plaintiff’s medical aid scheme; that
interest on future medical expenses should be ordered to run only
from
4 November 2016 when plaintiff accepted the offer; and that
there should be no order of interest on general damages. I
proceed
then to deal with each of these components in turn.
(a)
Past Medical Expenses
[22]
Mr. Nepgen correctly did not submit that such portion of plaintiff’s
claim for past medical expenses as was paid by plaintiff’s
medical aid scheme was deductible from plaintiff’s claim.
See
D’Ambrosi v Bane and Others
[2007] 1 All SA 570
(CC);
Hendricks v
Minister of Safety and Security and Another
,
unreported ECD case no 331/2005 dated 17 May 2010.
[23]
Whatever payments were made by plaintiff’s medical aid scheme
(apparently Discovery Health) were clearly
res
inter alios acta.
In paragraph 13
of
Hendricks
supra, Roberson J stated as follows:
“
In
D’Ambrosi v Bane and Others
[supra]
in which the plaintiff’s
claim was for damages arising from medical negligence, a medical aid
scheme was found to be a form
of indemnity insurance and payments in
terms of the scheme were found not to be deductible from the
plaintiff’s claim.
Van Zyl J referred to the following
passage in the judgment of Gautschi AJ in
Thomson
v Thomson
2002 (5) SA 541
(W) at
547 H – I (not a claim for damages):
‘
A
medical aid scheme is, if not in law then in substance a form of
insurance. One pays a premium against which there may be
no
claim, or claims less than the value of the premiums or claims which
far exceed the value of the premiums. Were this a
claim for
damages, whether in delict or in contract, there is little doubt that
the defendant would not have been entitled to rely
on the payments
received from the medical aid scheme.’
I
am in respectful agreement with this reasoning.”
[24]
In
D’Ambrosi
supra
van
Zyl J stressed that a medical aid scheme was “
no
different from any other form of indemnity insurance which offers
cover against injury or damage in return for premium payments.
”
It is clear therefore, that such benefits and obligations which may
arise from plaintiff’s membership of his
medical aid scheme are
matters between him and the scheme alone. In these
circumstances I can conceive of no reason in principle
why plaintiff
should not be entitled to interest on his past medical expenses.
(b)
Future Medical Expenses
[25]
I agree with the submission by Mr. Nepgen that inasmuch as this debt
consists of the present value of a future loss, plaintiff
is entitled
to interest only from 4 November 2016, the settlement date. See
s 2A(3) of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act
55 of 1975.
(c)
General Damages
[26]
Section 2A of the Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55 of 1975 (“
the
Act
”) is relevant. Section 2A, which is headed
“
Interest on unliquidated debts
” reads as
follows:
“
(1)
Subject to the provisions of this section the amount of every
unliquidated debt as determined
by a court of law. ... shall
bear interest as contemplated in s 1.
(2)(a) Subject to any
other agreement between the parties the interest contemplated in
ss(1) shall run from the date
on which payment of the debt is claimed
by the service on the debtor of a demand or summons, whichever date
is the earlier.
...
(5)
Notwithstanding the provisions of this Act but subject to any other
law or an agreement
between the parties, a court of law .. may make
such order as appears just in respect of the payment of interest on
an unliquidated
debt, the rate at which interest shall accrue and the
date from which interest shall run.
”
[27]
In this regard what was stated by EM Grosskopf JA in
SA
Eagle Insurance Co Ltd v Hartley
[1990] ZASCA 106
;
1990
(4) SA 833
(A) at 841 B – F is relevant:
“
Then
reference was made to awards of general damages. As stated by
Lord Diplock in
Wright v Railways
Board
[1983] 2 All ER 698
(HL)
at 699j, non-economic loss is not susceptible of measurement in
money. Any figure which is awarded cannot be other than
artificial and, if the aim is that justice meted out to all litigants
should be even-handed instead of depending on the idiosyncracies
of
the assessor, the figure must be ‘basically a conventional
figure derived from experience and from awards in comparable
cases’
(Ward v James
[1965] 1 All ER 563
(CA) at 576 E). The need for
even-handedness requires that, when comparing awards in comparable
cases, regard must be had
to the purchasing power of the currency at
the time when such cases were decided, otherwise one would not be
comparing comparables.
This does not offend against the
principle of currency nominalism. In assessing general damages
one is dealing, not with
a monetary debt, but with the valuation of a
non-monetary loss. Such a valuation must obviously be made in
terms of currency
values as they are at the time of valuation, and
not in terms of the values of an earlier time. In the same way,
as it was
put in argument, a valuer determining the present value of
a farm would not use the currency values of the past. A
monetary
debt is not, however, subject to a similar type of
valuation. It has to be paid according to its nominal value.
”
[28]
During 1997 the Act was duly amended to introduce section 2A.
With regard to this section Mpati J, as he then was, stated
as
follows in
Adel Builders (Pty) Ltd v
Thompson
1999 (1) SA 680
(SECLD) at 689
G – H:
“
This
section came into operation on 5 April 1997 and is clearly aimed at
alleviating the plight of a plaintiff as referred to by
EM Grosskopf
JA in
SA Eagle
supra that a plaintiff who has to wait a substantial period of time
to establish his claim through no fault of his own is paid
in
depreciated currency. The section confers a right on a party to
be paid
mora
interest,
to which he was not entitled before the amendment, on an unliquidated
debt.
”
[29]
See too:
Adel Builders (Pty) Ltd v
Hartley
2000 (4) SA 1027
(SCA);
Du
Plooy v Venter Joubert Inc and Another
2013 (2) SA 522
(NCK) where the following is stated at 528D, para 27:
“
The
purpose of s 2A is therefore, in my view, not to compensate a
creditor for his patrimonial loss, but to compensate the creditor’s
patrimonial loss in real monetary value and not in depreciated
currency.
”
[30]
As stated in
Adel Builders (Pty) Ltd v
Thompson
(SCA)
supra,
s 2A(2)(a) lays down what is the general position, namely that
interest runs from the date of demand or service of summons.
At
1032 G – I Howie JA stated that if a Court resolved to order
interest pursuant to ss(5) and not ss(2)(a) “
it
was open to the Court, in fixing the date from which interest was to
run, to give effect to its own view of what was just in
all the
circumstances
” and that no
question of any onus arose.
The
learned Judge stated further that:
“
The
discretion afforded by s 2A(5) was of the nature referred to in a
long line of cases in this Court from ex parte Neethling and
Others
1950 (4) SA 331
(A) onwards. Plainly, if parties wish certain
facts and circumstances to be weighed in the exercise of such a
discretion
they must establish them. But there are no facta
probanda. No enquiry arises as to whether a necessary fact has
been
successfully proved. Similarly, absence of proof does not
result in failure on any issue. Indeed, there are no evidential
issues to attract any onus.
”
[31]
In submitting that I should exercise my discretion in terms of ss(5)
to order the running of interest from a date other than
the
date of demand or service of summons Mr. Nepgen stressed the
rationale underlying the enactment of s 2A namely, to alleviate
the
hardship suffered by a plaintiff who had to wait a substantial period
of time to establish his claim and in the end had been
paid in
depreciated currency. See
Adel
Builders
case
supra
.
[32]
Mr. Nepgen submitted that such rationale was not present in a case
where a plaintiff was awarded general damages as there was
no
question of such plaintiff being paid in depreciated currency
inasmuch as such award was calculated in terms of present values.
There would accordingly be no loss of value which required to be
compensated for by an order that interest should run from a date
earlier than the date of judgment.
[33]
Mr. Frost submitted it would be grossly unjust to plaintiff not to
order interest to run at least from the date of service
of the
summons. He submitted that it had been obvious from that date
that defendant had never had any intention of paying
plaintiff’s
claimed damages but had instead hotly contested the merits in a trial
lasting a number of days in the course
of which it had become
apparent that the evidence adduced by defendant’s witnesses was
false and the defence entirely spurious.
Because of this
plaintiff was deprived of the use of the money owing to him for
nearly 7 years.
[34]
He relied in particular on two matters emanating from this Division.
[35]
In
Zealand v Minister of Justice and
Constitutional Development and Another
[2009] JOL 23423
(SE), dated 29 October 2008, the plaintiff was
awarded general damages of R2 million arising from his prolonged
unlawful detention.
Van der Byl AJ stated as follows at para
19:
“
This
brings me to the question of interest on any amount awarded. In
terms of
section 2A(2)(a)
of the
Prescribed Rate of Interest Act 55
of 1975
, interest runs from the date of demand or summons.
The
purpose of this section is obviously to alleviate the hardship
suffered by a plaintiff who had to wait a substantial period
of time
to establish his claim and in the end had been paid in depreciated
currency.
There
is, in my view, no reason why I should adhere to the submission on
behalf of the defendants that interest should run from
the date of
judgment on appeal. The court has a discretion in terms of
subsection (5) of that section to determine, notwithstanding
the
provisions of subsection (2), an order as appears just in respect of
the payment of interest on an unliquidated debt, another
date from
which interest shall run. The court must, however, be satisfied
that there are sufficient facts which justify deviation
from the
provisions of subsection (2). I am not so satisfied.
”
The
learned Judge accordingly granted an order that interest on the
damages run from the date of service of the summons. It
is
noteworthy that, despite the learned Judge having acknowledged the
purpose of the section and despite the plaintiff not being
paid in
depreciated currency, he proceeded to find without any further
reference to the section that there was no reason why interest
should
not run from date of service of summons.
[36]
In
Maart v The Minister of Police
, unreported case no
3049/2011, dated 9 April 2013, Goosen J stated as follows:
“
[34]
Two final aspects require consideration. Mr. Mouton, relying on
the provisions of section s 2A(2)(a)
of the
Prescribed Rate of
Interest Act, Act
55 of 1975 argued that interest payable on the
damages to be awarded should be ordered from the date of service of
the summons
upon the defendant.
[35]
In support of this it was argued that the defendant did not plead a
substantive defence to the
merits of the plaintiff’s claim yet
the merits of the claim were conceded only on the morning before the
trial date.
In the light of this, it was submitted that the
matter could have been resolved at a stage far earlier than when it
was and that
it would be appropriate to order interest on the damages
to run from the date of service of summons, being 29 September 2011.
[36]
Mr. Jooste argued that, notwithstanding that the merits were conceded
shortly before the commencement
of the trial, the determination of
the lion’s share of the plaintiff’s damages, namely loss
of earnings and general
damages, were matters that could not, given
the circumstances of the matter, be resolved without resort to
trial. Accordingly
interest should be ordered only from date of
judgment of the matter.
[37]
Section 2A(2)(a) of the Act lays down the general principle that
interest accrues from the date
of demand or date of service of
summons whichever is the earlier date. In this instance the
plaintiff does not seek an order
that interest runs from a date
earlier than that contemplated in section 2A(2)(a) and accordingly
that aspect need not be considered
in the context of sub-section
(5). Subsection (5) confers on the court a discretion to make
such order as to it appears just
in respect of payment of interest on
an un-liquidated claim for damages.
[38]
In the view I take of the matter, the plaintiff seeks no more than
the application of the general
principle in regard to the payment of
interest. It was not suggested that such an order would bring
about an injustice to
the defendant. In the light of the
circumstances giving rise to the plaintiff’s claim that cannot,
in any event, be
so.
”
[37]
It would appear from the
Maart
judgment that the submissions advanced in the present matter were not
advanced before Goosen J and were accordingly not considered
by him
in the exercise of his discretion.
[38]
Mr. Frost referred as well to a number of cases involving the award
of general damages, including
Woji v The
Minister of Police
[2014] ZASCA 108
, in
which interest was ordered to run from date of demand without,
however, any reference to s 2A(2)(a) of the Act and the rationale
for
its introduction into the Act. It does not appear from any of
the matters referred to by Mr. Frost that the issue of
the various
plaintiffs therein not being paid in depreciated currency was raised.
[39]
In
Du Plooy’s
case supra it would appear from paragraph 36 thereof that the damages
awarded to plaintiff were not calculated according to present
values,
hence the remark of Coetzee AJ that “
it
would not be just to pay her in depreciated currency and to deprive
her of being paid in real monetary value.
”
[40]
Each case must obviously be decided on its own facts and
circumstances. I have a broad discretion to make such order
as
to me appears to be just. In the determination of this issue I
am of the view that due regard must be given to the purpose
of the
legislation. In my view the concerns raised by Mr. Frost are
met by the fact that plaintiff’s general damages
have been
calculated according to present values and not in depreciated
currency. He has accordingly suffered no loss which
requires
that as a matter of justice he be compensated by an order that
interest should run from date of service of the summons.
In my
view therefore interest on such damages should be ordered to run from
the date of acceptance by plaintiff of defendant’s
offer of
settlement, namely 4 November 2016. I am satisfied having
regard to all the circumstances that it would be unjust
to defendant
to order him to pay interest from date of service of the summons.
COSTS
[42]
In defendant’s notice of payment into court in terms of Rule 34
the defendant tendered to pay plaintiff’s costs
to the date of
service of the notice, namely 28 October 2016. There was no
tender in respect of any of the qualifying expenses
of plaintiff’s
experts in respect of the trial on quantum. In this regard I
was informed by Mr. Nepgen that neither
he nor his instructing
attorney had instructions to concede either this issue or the
reasonable costs of certain photographs.
[43]
Plaintiff was accordingly obliged to proceed to court on 7 November
despite the quantum of the damages having been settled.
Plaintiff was further obliged to seek an order concerning the payment
of interest. Although plaintiff has been unsuccessful
in
respect of the interest payable on his general damages he has
succeeded in respect thereof on his past medical expenses.
[44]
In these circumstances I am satisfied that defendant should be
ordered to pay the costs occasioned by the hearing on 7 November
2016.
[45]
The following order will issue:
1.
Defendant is to pay to plaintiff the sum of
R600 000,00 in full and final settlement of plaintiff’s
claim for damages.
2. (a)
Defendant is to pay interest
at the legal rate on the sum of
R122 954,30 in respect of past medical expenses from date of
service of the summons on defendant
to date of payment.
(b)
Defendant is to pay interest at the legal rate on the sum of
R197 045,70 in respect
of future medical expenses from 4
November 2016 to date of payment.
(c)
Defendant is to pay interest at the legal rate on the sum of
R280 000,00 in respect
of general damages from 4 November 2016
to date of payment.
3.
Plaintiff is to pay the wasted costs occasioned by the postponement
of the trial
on 20 June 2016.
4.
Defendant is to pay plaintiff’s costs in respect of the trial
on quantum
including the costs of the proceedings on 7 November 2016
with interest thereon at the legal rate from a date fourteen (14)
days
after allocator to date of payment. Such costs are to
include:
4.1
The qualifying fees and expenses of:
4.1.1
Dr. R.W. Domingo in respect of the trial on merits.
4.2
The qualifying fees and expenses in respect of the trial on quantum,
if any, of:
4.2.1
Dr. R.W. Domingo;
4.2.2
Mr. J. Potgieter;
4.2.3
Dr. G. Nel;
4.2.4
Dr. V.B. Gardiner;
4.2.5
Ms. R. Verson
4.3
Costs of the photographs.
___________________
J.D.
PICKERING
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearing
on behalf of Plaintiff: Adv. Frost
Instructed
by: Friedman Scheckter Attorneys, Mr. Scheckter
Appearing
on behalf of Defendant: Adv. Nepgen
Instructed
by: State Attorney, Port Elizabeth