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[2016] ZAECPEHC 72
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Nieuwenhuis v Registrar Health Professions Council of South Africa and Others (3540/2015) [2016] ZAECPEHC 72 (1 November 2016)
REPORTABLE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN
CAPE LOCAL DIVISION, PORT ELIZABETH
CASE NUMBER:
3540/2015
DATE HEARD:
27/10/2016
DATE DELIVERED:
01/11/2016
In
the matter between:
MARINDA
NIEUWENHUIS
APPLICANT
and
REGISTRAR
HEALTH PROFESSIONS COUNCIL
1
st
RESPONDENT
OF
SOUTH AFRICA
THE
HEALTH PROFESSIONS
COUNCIL
2
nd
RESPONDENT
OF
SOUTH AFRICA
THE
ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
3
rd
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
NAIDU
AJ:-
INTRODUCTION:
[1]
The Applicant has approached the Court for the following relief:
‘’
Please
take notice that the Applicant will apply to court to have the
failure on the part of the First Respondent to comply with
the duties
imposed upon him/her in terms of Regulation 3 of the Road Accident
Fund Regulations of 2008 (the regulation) (published
under GNR.770 of
July 2008 in Government Gazette No 31249 as amended by GNR.347 of 15
May 2013, which in turn was published in
Government Gazette 36452) to
be reviewed, being inter alia
a)
The
duty to refer the dispute to an appeal tribunal (as required in terms
of sub-regulation 5(d) and 8(a) of the regulation); and
b)
The
duty to inform the applicant and the third respondent of who the
persons are that were appointed as the appeal tribunal (as
required
in terms of sub-regulation 9(a) of the regulation.)
Take
further notice that the Applicant will seek a cost order against the
Third Respondent, as is contemplated in terms of sub-regulation
14 of
the regulation; alternatively the Applicant will seek an order that
the Second Respondent shall pay the costs of the application;
and
further alternatively the Applicant will seek an order that the
Second Respondent shall pay the costs of all other parties
to these
proceedings.
Take
further notice the Respondents are hereby called upon to show cause
why such review and cost order should not be granted.
NOTICE
IN TERMS OF RULE 53(1) (b)
The
First Respondent is hereby called upon, to dispatch, within 15 days
after receipt of this notice of motion, to the registrar
of this
Honourable Court the record of the proceedings, which is sought to be
corrected, together with such reasons as he/she is
by law required or
desires to give or make, and to notify the applicant that he/she has
done so.’’
[2]
It is common cause that the Applicant only persists with the prayer
for costs as set out above.
BACKGROUND
[3]
The Applicant a 51 year old women, was injured in a motor vehicle
collision that occurred on the 1
st
August 2011. She approached her current legal representatives for
assistance in lodging a claim against the Third Respondent.
[4]
It is trite that a claim for compensation for injuries she sustained
in the motor vehicle collision was lodged with the Third
Respondent
under reference number 72/1963184/030/0.
[1]
[5]
A medico-legal report was drafted on her behalf by Doctor L.A
Oelofse, who saw the Applicant some two years after the accident.
[6]
The following facts are common cause:
[6.1]
On the 06
th
June 2014, the Applicant’s Attorneys of record received an
email from an employee of the Third Respondent, one Thamsanqa
Mafanya, that the Third Respondent had rejected the Applicant’s
claim in essence on the basis that her whiplash type injury
did not
qualify as a serious injury.
[2]
The Applicant’s attorneys were also advised that an appeal
could be lodged with the Second Respondent.
[6.2]
On the 28
th
August 2014, the Applicant’s attorneys
formally declared a dispute and dispatched a letter to the First
Respondent herein
advising of the disputed assessment and attaching
various documentation, including the duly signed RAF form 5.
[6.3]
On the 29
th
October 2014, the Applicant’s attorneys drafted a letter to the
Second Respondent requesting a response to the letter of
the 28
th
August 2014. The Second Respondent only responded to such
correspondence on the 23
rd
January 2015, some 102 days after the referral of such dispute.
[3]
[6.4]
In its reply to the Applicant’s attorneys, the Second
Respondent advises
inter alia
that the Third Respondent and/or
its attorneys would be advised of the dispute and that they (the
Fund) would be granted 60 days
to respond to the Applicant’s
dispute. The Applicant is further advised that the First Respondent
herein would advise her
of the names of the medical practitioners
that would be appointed to determine her dispute.
The
Applicant is further advised that the Appeal Tribunal would determine
her dispute and that the First Respondent herein would
advise her as
to the outcome.
[6.5]
On the 22
nd
April 2015 the Applicant having received no further feedback from
either the First or Second Respondent’s herein, drafted
further
correspondence to the Second Respondent requesting a status report.
No response was forthcoming from the Second Respondent
in this
regard.
[6.6]
As a result of receiving no reply from the First or Second
Respondent’s herein, the Applicant instituted the present
application against the Respondents on the 14
th
September 2015. Copies of the application were duly served on the
First and Second Respondents on the 06
th
October 2015, and on the Third Respondent on the 13
th
November 2015.
[6.7]
On the 25
th
January 2016, after various correspondence by the attorneys for the
Third Respondent to the Second Respondent requesting a decision
as to
the Applicant’s appeal, the Second Respondent finally advised
the attorneys for the Third Respondent per email, that
the Appeal
Tribunal had indeed sat on the 20
th
January 2016 to consider the Applicant’s appeal, and had
decided that the Applicant’s injuries did not qualify for
general damages.
[4]
[6.8]
the attorneys for the Third Respondent were further advised that a
formal letter confirming the refusal would be furnished
to them once
the chairperson had authorized that such minutes could be
communicated.
[5]
[6.9]
It is trite that the Second Respondent had made such decision some
508 days after the Applicant had filed her dispute with
them.
[6.10]
On the 15
th
March 2016 the Applicant’s attorneys of record conveyed a
letter to the First and Second Respondents, drawing their attention
to the present application and the potential cost implications
against them. To date there has been no reply from neither the First
nor the Second Respondent.
APPLICABLE
LEGISLATION
[7]
Section 17 (1A) of the Road Accident Fund Act 56 of 1996 (‘’The
Act’’), read with regulation 3 of the
Road Accident Fund
Regulation 2008 (Government Gazette No.331249) sets out the basis of
upon which a claimant may claim damages
sustained as a result of a
motor vehicle collision against the Road Accident Fund (‘’The
Fund’’). It is
common cause that compensation will only
be made in the event of a serious injury.
[8]
In terms of regulation 3 (1) (b) (ii), an injury will only be
considered serious if there is a 30 percent impairment or more
of the
whole person as provided in the AMA Guides, which is defined in
regulation 1 as the ‘’American Medical Association’s
Guides to the Evaluation of Permanent Impairment, Sixth Edition.’’
[6]
[9]
Regulation 3(4) sets out the procedure to be followed should a third
party or claimant dispute the serious assessment injury
form. Such
dispute must be lodged with the Registrar of the Health Professionals
Council, within 90 days of being advised of the
rejection.
[7]
This was complied with by the applicant who lodged such dispute on
the 28
th
August 2014. Regulation 3(4) and to 3(13) sets out the procedure by
which the appeal tribunal enquires into the dispute.
[10]
Regulation 3(6) then sets out the procedure to be followed once the
Registrar has indeed received the notification as set out
above. The
Registrar must within 15 days of having been notified of such
dispute, advise other parties to the dispute, in writing
and provide
copies of such dispute application with the necessary documentation.
The First Respondent herein acknowledged the Applicant’s
dispute only some 150 days later.
[11]
In terms of Regulation 3(7), the so-called ‘’other
party’’ then has 60 days to refute the submissions
made
by the claimant. This procedure was evidently not followed by the
First Respondent herein.
[12]
In terms of Regulation 3(8) (a), after receiving notification by the
other party or after the expiry of the 60 day period,
the Registrar
must refer the dispute for consideration by an appeal tribunal paid
for by the Fund ( Third Respondent herein);
[13]
Regulation 3(9) provides in essence that the Registrar must in
writing inform that parties whom the persons are that constitute
the
appeal tribunal. The sub-regulation also provided procedures to be
followed in the event that a party is aggrieved by the appointment
of
any person/s on the appeal tribunal.
[14]
Regulation 3(10) (a)-(h) sets out the machinations of the appeal
tribunal in assessing the dispute and Regulation 3(11) (a)-(i)
sets
out the powers of the tribunal in assessing such dispute.
[15]
In the event of the tribunal being satisfied in the assessment of the
dispute, Regulation 3(12) confirms that the appeal tribunal
shall
notify the Registrar of its findings within 90 days after the
referral of the dispute. In this instance the appeal tribunal
only
made a decision in upholding the Third Respondent’s decision in
dismissing the applicant’s claim, on the 20
th
January 2016, some approximately 508 days after the applicant lodged
a formal dispute on the 28
th
August 2014.
[16]
Regulation 3(13) then confirms that the Registrar shall then inform
the parties of the findings of the appeal tribunal, which
are
considered to be final and binding on the parties. The Second
Respondent via one Busisiwe Ngobeni, advised the attorneys of
the
Third Respondent of the appeal tribunals decision on the 25
th
January 2016.
[17]
It must be noted that once a dispute has been lodged with the First
Respondent, there rests no further obligations upon the
Third
Respondent in the further conduct of the matter other than those set
out in regulation 3(6) and 3(7).
APPLICANT’S
CASE
[18]
The Applicant’s initial application was for the review of the
First Respondent’s failure to comply with regulations
3(5) (d),
8(a) and 9(a) of the Act. This application was served on the First
and Second Respondent’s on the 05
th
October 2015 and upon the Third Respondent on the 13
th
November 2015.
[8]
[19]
The initial application only sought costs against the Third
Respondent herein. The Third Respondent filed a Notice of Acting
on
the 04
th
January 2016, and then filed a formal Notice of Opposition on the
26
th
January 2016, on the day when the application was set down for
hearing on the unopposed motion court roll.
[20]
The matter was postponed on the 26
th
January 2016, to allow the Third Respondent an opportunity to file
its opposing papers, the costs of such postponement being reserved.
The Third Respondent then then filed its opposing papers on the 10
th
March 2016.
[9]
[21]
Having regard to the Third Respondent’s opposing papers, it
appears that the Applicant and Third Respondent are
ad idem
as
to the culpability of the First and Second Respondents in their
non-compliance with the regulations.
[22]
It is argued by counsel for the Applicant that as a result of the
submissions proffered in the Third Respondent’s pleadings
regarding the
culpa
of the First and Second Respondents, the Applicant then amended her
Notice of Motion to submit a prayer in the alternate, that
the Second
Respondent be held liable for the costs of the application and
further that the Second Respondent would also be held
liable for the
costs of all other parties to the proceedings.
[10]
[23]
In support of the submission that the Third Respondent must be held
responsible for the costs of the application, the Applicant
relies on
the interpretation of Regulation 3(14), which reads as follows:
‘’
3(14)
(a) The Fund shall bear the reasonable costs of the Health
Professions Council of South Africa arising from sub-regulations
(4)
to (13), as agreed between the Fund and the said Council, or, failing
such agreement, as determined by the Minister after consultation
with
the Minister of Health.
(b)
The Fund shall bear the reasonable fees and expenses, as determined
or approved by the Fund, of the persons appointed in terms
of
sub-regulation (8) and (10) (b).’’
[24]
Mr
Marais
for the Applicant relies on the unreported matter of
Buthelezi
and others v HSPCA and Others.
[11]
Mr
Marais
submits that in terms of such judgment the Fund was held liable for
the payment of costs in applications where the applicant succeeded
to
review certain actions of the Second Respondent and members of
various appeal tribunals which were constituted in terms of the
regulation.
THE
THIRD RESPONDENT’S CASE
[25]
The Third Respondent being the Road Accident Fund has opposed the
present application.
Mr
Nyameko
for the Third Respondent submitted that the Fund cannot be held
liable for the cost of the application, and that the rationale
upon
which the Applicant claims against the Third Respondent is flawed.
[26]
In respect of holding the Fund liable in terms of the provisions of
Regulation 3(14) (a),
Mr
Nyameko
submitted that the Third Respondent disputed that the interpretation
of the applicable regulation, as proffered by Counsel for
the
Applicant, could be read to be interpreted that the Third Respondent
is liable for the Applicant’s costs of the Application.
[27]
Mr Nyameko further submitted that regulation 3(14) (a) reflects an
internal agreement between the Fund and the Second Respondent,
and
their respective heads, being the Minister of Transport and the
Minister of Health. He submits that on a clear reading of the
regulation, no mention is made of legal costs incurred by a third
party, nor is there any reference to the Fund being liable for
the
legal costs of a third party in the present context.
[28]
Having regard to the second leg of the Applicant’s argument,
being a reliance on the
Buthelezi
Judgment,
Mr Nyameko submits that the decision the court made in Buthelezi, was
not based on an interpretation of regulation 3(14)
(a), but on the
discretion of the Court, in such instance.
[29]
The Third Respondent then prayed that the present application for
costs be dismissed with costs.
DISCUSSION
[30]
It is common cause that both the Applicant and Third Respondent are
ad idem
as to the culpability of the Second Respondent in these proceedings.
In this regard the Applicant has amended her Notice of Motion
to
include a prayer in the alternative to include that the Second be
held liable for the costs of the application.
[31]
It is also not in dispute that the Applicant was entitled to bring
the present application having regard to the obvious dilatory
actions
of the Second Respondent.
[32]
The only issue that falls to be determined is the issue of whether
the Third Respondent should be held liable for the costs
of the
present application. A proper determination of this issue would then
necessitate an analytical discussion of the two grounds
on which the
Applicant submits that the Third Respondent should be held liable for
the costs of the application.
AD
REGULATION 3(14) (a)
[33]
The question to be determined in terms of the argument proffered by
the Applicant is whether a reading of the regulation lends
itself to
the drawing of a conclusion that the Third Respondent should be held
liable for the Applicants costs of the Application.
[34]
Our Courts have held that the primary rule of interpretation is that
if the meaning of the words are clear, it should be put
into effect
and must be equated with the Legislature’s intention. There are
various theories of interpretation that have
been postulated by our
courts. In
Bastian
Financial Services (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman Primary
School
2008 (5) SA 1
(SCA)
at paras 16-19, the relevant authorities regarding the issue of
interpretation were collected and summarized.
[12]
[35]
In
Natal Joint Municipal Pension Fund v Endumeni Municipality
2012(4) SA 593 (SCA),
the Court per Wallis AJ held as follows at
page 603-602:
‘’
The
present state of the law can be expressed as follows: Interpretation
is the process of attributing meaning to the words used
in the
document, be it legislation, some other statutory instrument, or
contract, having regard to the context provided by reading
the
particular provision or provisions in the light of the document as a
whole and the circumstances attendant upon its coming
into existence.
Whatever
the nature of the document, consideration must be given to the
language used in the light of the ordinary rules of grammar
and
syntax; the context in which the provisions appears; the apparent
purpose to which it is directed and the material known to
those
responsible for its production. Where more than one meaning is
possible each possibility must be weighed in light of all
these
factors. The process is objective not subjective.’’
[36]
In my opinion the dictum in the above matter should be regarded as
the
locus
classicus
for issues pertaining to interpretation.
[37]
The question then to be decided is having regard to Regulation 3(14)
(a), and utilizing the guideline in
Natal
Joint Municipal Pension Funds
case above, could it possibly be construed that the Third Respondent
can be held liable for the Applicant’s costs herein.
[38]
The words and grammar used in the relevant regulation are to me, on
an objective reading of the regulation are clear and unambiguous.
It
leaves no room for vagueness or an alternate interpretation.
[39]
On the reading of the Act and the regulations as a whole, it clear
that the Legislature clearly distinguishes between the various
parties to which the Act and the regulations would be applicable to.
When the Act or the regulations makes reference to the ‘’Third
Party’’, it is clear to me that such reference is made to
a claimant. Regulation 3(4) in this regard clearly states
that ‘’
If
a Third Party wishes to dispute the rejection of the serious in jury
assessment report, or in the event of either the third party
or the
Fund or the agent disputing the assessment performed by a medical
practitioner in terms of these Regulations, the disputant
shall:….’’
The reference to this point has a direct bearing on the
interpretation of regulation 3(14) (a).
[40]
Regulation 3(14) (a) makes no reference whatsoever to a ‘’Third
Party’’. There can also be no insinuation
of any other
interpretation. It is clear to me that had the Legislature intended
to allow a claimant like the applicant to claim
legal costs against
the Third Respondent in terms of the regulation, it would have
clearly provided for same by at the very least
making reference to a
‘’Third Party’’. Having regard to the context
of the Act and the regulations as a
whole I can find no reason as to
why the Legislature would make reference to ‘’Third
Parties’’, yet fail
to make such reference in regulation
3(14) itself.
[41]
It is quite apparent to me that regulation 3(14) was designed
specifically to determine the issue of costs between the Third
Respondent and the Second Respondent only. The Second Respondent is
entitled to recover costs for services rendered and which costs
the
Third Respondent would be held liable for irrespective of the outcome
on a claimant.
[42]
The intention of the Legislature in my view was clearly to provide a
dispute resolution mechanism to resolve disputes between
claimants
and the Third Respondent where the Third Respondent has rejected
claims that fail the standard of a ‘’serious
injury’’
as described. Regulation 3(14) elucidates the pecuniary relationship
between the Second Respondent and the
Third Respondent and the
concomitant obligations between the parties relating in particular to
the assessment of disputed claims
and the Second Respondent’s
compensation attendant upon deliberating upon such claims. There can
be in my view, no other
interpretation.
[43]
Consequently I find the Applicant’s submissions regarding the
Third Respondent’s liability for her costs in this
regard to be
without merit.
AD
BUTHELEZI JUDGMENT
[44]
The
Buthelezi
matter
[13]
concerned nine separate review applications that related to the
Appeal Tribunal dismissing the applicants’ claims for damages.
The Appeal Tribunal had upheld the Fund’s view that the
injuries sustained by the claimants were not serious injuries either
under the ‘’AMA Guides’’ or the Narrative
Test.
[45]
The Applicants’ had approached the Court in terms of Section 8
(1) (c) (ii) (aa) of the Promotion of Administration of
Justice Act 3
of 2000 (‘’PAJA’’). The Applicants’ all
challenged the conclusions reached by the tribunal
in dismissing
their dispute.
[14]
[46]
At the conclusion of the matter, the Court as per Molefe J, made
certain findings regarding each of the applicants’ cases.
In
the cases where the court felt that a proper case for review of an
applicant’s case had been made out, the Appeal Tribunal’s
decision was set aside and was sent back to the Tribunal for
reconsideration. The Fund was ordered to pay the costs of the
application
in such instant. In instances where a proper case for
review had not been made out, the application was dismissed and it
was ordered
that each party would pay its own costs.
[15]
[47]
The Applicant’s reliance on
Buthelezi
in the
present case, is based purely on
Molefe
J
finding
the Fund liable for costs of the successful litigants in the review
application.
[48]
The reliance purely on this finding is myopic in my view, as the
Buthelezi’s
case
must be distinguished from the present matter. In the
Buthelezi
matter,
the applicants therein had clearly prosecuted their application for
review of the Tribunals Decision to the end. In the
present case it
is trite that the Applicant has chosen not to proceed in reviewing
the Tribunals decision in dismissing her dispute.
The Applicant in
the present circumstance has chosen to proceed to argue the present
matter only on the aspect of costs.
[49]
Had the Applicant chosen to prosecute a review application against
the Second and Third Respondents herein against the decision
to
declare her injuries as non-serious, and had she been so successful a
costs order in her favour in all likelihood would have
been granted.
Conversely, had the Applicant not been successful there also would
have been a great likelihood that she would not
have been mulct with
costs associated thereto.
[50]
Having regard to the above, I find no grounds to hold the Third
Respondent liable for the costs of the present application.
Having
regard to the initial application seeking costs solely against the
Third Respondent, the Third Respondent was entitled to
oppose the
application on the premise that the applicant incorrectly sought a
cost order against it.
[51]
It is clear to me that the Third Respondent plays no role in the
final determination of a dispute before the appeal tribunal.
The time
limits regarding the institution and finalization of a claimants’
dispute has been clearly set out in the Act and
the Regulations
thereto. The Third Respondent has no authority to expedite the
process other than to make enquiries from the Second
Respondent as to
the status of the matter, which it did in the present case.
[16]
[52]
The applicant’s insistence that the Third Respondent be held
liable for costs in the present application is ill founded
in my
view. It should have been quite apparent that it was the Second
Respondent that was dilatory in its action, and accordingly
that the
Second Respondent should be held solely liable for the costs.
[53]
Mr
Marias
for the Applicant submitted that in the event that I am not swayed by
the argument proffered regarding the culpability of the Third
Respondent for the costs of the application, his argument as I
correctly understand it, is that at the time of launching the
application
due regard was had to the
Buthelezi
judgment which related to review proceedings, and the orders relating
to costs made therein. The present application is also a
review
application of sorts and accordingly although unsuccessful as per the
Buthelezi decision, I should not hold the Applicant
liable for costs.
[54]
Mr
Marais
further argued that in the alternative the Second Respondent should
bear the cost of the application or further
alternatively
that the Second Respondent be liable for costs of all the parties in
the application.
Mr
Nyameko
for the Third Respondent submitted that he had no submissions to make
regarding the Applicant’s alternate prayers.
[55]
Mr
Marias
also referred me to the matter of
Road
Accident Fund v Duma and three related cases (Health Professions
Council of South Africa as amicus curiae)
[2013] 1 ALL SA 543
(SCA),
where
the court held that due to the uncertainty regarding the
interpretation of regulation 3 it was equitable not to grant a cost
order against the unsuccessful Plaintiff’s in the matter.
[17]
Mr
Marais
consequently entreated me to follow the ratio in this judgment
pertaining to the issue of costs and the judicial discretion
exercised
therein in not granting a cost order against the applicant
herein.
[56]
In attempting to reach a sagacious decision in the matter, regard
must be had to the fact that the applicant has acted
bona
fide
in
attempting to resolve her dispute with the Fund. The Applicant had
every right to have her dispute adjudicated upon in terms
of the
provisions of the Act and the regulations thereto.
[57]
The Applicant’s argument in trying to convince the Court of the
Third Respondent’s liability for costs of the application
based
on the interpretation of regulation 3(14) (a) whilst ill-founded, was
also
bona
fide
in
my view and so was the reliance on the
Buthelezi
judgment.
In the circumstances I do not deem it equitable to mulct the
Applicant with the costs of the application.
[58]
Notwithstanding that the present application was served timeously on
the First and Second Respondents, and further notwithstanding
correspondence being addressed by the attorney for the Applicant to
the First and Second Respondents on the 15
th
March 2016, which was served by the Sheriff of this Court, reminding
the First and Second Respondents of the pending application
and the
potential cost implications for the First and Second Respondents,
these Respondents remained stoic in their silence. It
is common cause
that the Second Respondent to date has yet to provide the applicant
with a formal response to the outcome of the
Applicant’s appeal
to the tribunal. The conduct of the Second Respondent must be frowned
upon.
[59]
It is a well-established principle in our law that the award of costs
is a matter wholly within the discretion of the Court.
[18]
Such
discretion however must be exercised on grounds that a reasonable
person could have come to the conclusion arrived at.
[19]
The trier of facts must have regard to the circumstances of each
case, carefully weighing up the conduct of each party and other
factors which may have a bearing upon the question of costs and to
then make a such order as to costs as would be fair and just
between
the parties.
[20]
[60]
The apathetic conduct of the Second Respondent cannot be condoned. To
not effectively sanction the Second Respondent for its
conduct in
these proceedings would in my view be to effectively condone such
conduct which would have a direct impact on claimants
raising
disputes with the Appeal Tribunal. A proper assessment needs to be
conducted as to the reasons for the Second Respondent’s
dilatory action and as such I do not present to make an order
in
vacuo
in this regard. The Court’s displeasure must be conveyed to the
relevant authority.
[61]
Having regard to the above principles, and the particular
circumstances of this case and the conduct of the parties in the
matter, I make the following Order:
(1)
The Second
Respondent is ordered to pay the costs of the application;
(2)
The
Registrar of the Court is hereby directed to serve a copy of this
Order on the Minister of Health.
__________________________
V
NAIDU
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Counsel
for the Applicant:
Adv P Marais
Oasim Chambers
Port Elizabeth
Instructed
by:
Jaco Hattingh Attorneys
Port Elizabeth
Counsel
for the Third Respondents:
Adv NW Gqamana (SC)
Oasim Chambers
Port Elizabeth
Adv MW Nobatana
Oasim Chambers
Port Elizabeth
Instructed
by:
Smith Tabata Attorneys
Port Elizabeth
Date
Heard:
27 October 2016
Date
Delivered:
01 November 2016
[1]
Indexed Bundle page 9
[2]
Page 17 of the Indexed Bundle.
[3]
Page 54 of the Indexed Bundle.
[4]
Page 105 of the Indexed Bundle
[5]
Page 105 of the Indexed Bundle
[6]
Regulation
3 of the Road Accident Fund Regulation 2008 (Government Gazette
No.331249)
[7]
Regulation 3(4)(a) Road Accident Fund Regulations 2008 (Government
Gazette No.331249)
[8]
Pages 64-66 of the Indexed Bundle
[9]
Page 83 of the Indexed Bundle.
[10]
Pages 1and 2 of the Indexed Bundle.
[11]
[2014] ZAGPPHC 675 (29 August 2014)
[12]
Bastian Financial Service (Pty) Ltd v General Hendrik Schoeman
Primary School 2008 (5) SA 1 (SCA).
[13]
[2014] ZAGPPHC 675 (29 August 2014)
[14]
Page 2 and 3 of the Judgment
[15]
Pages 43 to 47 of the Judgment
[16]
Annexures TM1-TM9 of the Indexed Bundle
[17]
Page
559 paragraph 41 of the Judgment.
[18]
Graham v Odendaal 1972(2) SA 611 (A) at 616
[19]
Herbstein and Van Winsen,’’The Civil Practice of the
High Courts of South Africa, 5
th
Edition, at page 955.
[20]
Erasmus v Grunow 1980(2) SA 793 (O) at 797B-D