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[2016] ZAECPEHC 30
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Nedbank Limited v Antoniou (1150/00) [2016] ZAECPEHC 30 (1 July 2016)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN
CAPE LOCAL DIVISION – PORT ELIZABETH
Case
No: 1150/00
In
the matter between:
NEDBANK
LIMITED
Plaintiff
and
JULIANA
ANTONIOU
Defendant
JUDGMENT
REVELAS
J
Introduction
[1]
The plaintiff
(“the
bank”)
instituted
an action against the defendant claiming various amounts from her,
arising from the fact that she had on 21 July 1998,
signed a
suretyship agreement as co-principal debtor with her son Nicholas
Antoniou
(“Antoniou”)
,
for the payment of the latter’s unpaid debts to the bank.
The bank claims three amounts in respect of three
separate loan
accounts (or credit agreements) as set out below.
[2]
Antoniou had concluded a loan
agreement on 10 December 1996 with the bank for the payment of his
home loan, which was secured by
a mortgage bond registered over his
residential property in Jeffreys Bay
(“the
loan account”)
.
Antoniou further owed the bank money in respect of an overdraft
facility on his cheque account (on which the limit was R75,000.00
but
altered from time to time) and an amount owed on his credit card
account which was opened for him in October 1997
(“the
card account”).
[3]
The amount claimed in respect
of the loan account was the sum of R162,867.05 plus interest.
The amount claimed on the overdraft
cheque account was the sum of
R4,466,314.45 together with interest. The claim in respect of
the credit card account amounted
to R149,863.18 plus interest.
[4]
Mr Perie Kemp of the bank,
testified about the takeover by the bank of its predecessor’s
assets and the factual position of
Antoniou’s accounts which
fell under the bank’s collections. Kemp also handed in a
certificate in terms of the
provisions of
Section 15(4)
of the
Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 25 of 2002
, relating
to the details and extent of Antoniou’s indebtedness in respect
of his cheque, card and loan accounts. These
details were
contained in the annexures attached to the certificate.
Thus the bank relied on two certificates of balance.
The
defendant disputed the correctness of the amounts reflected on the
certificates and claimed by the bank in her pleadings.
However,
during cross-examination of the defendant, she conceded their
correctness on the basis that she had no knowledge of how
they were
computed.
[5]
Mr Frank Smith
(“Smith”)
,
the bank’s regional manager, also signed the certificates of
balance as contemplated in the suretyship agreement.
It was not
disputed that Smith was a competent official as foreseen in the deed
of surety.
[6]
Antoniou was finally
sequestrated on 20 January 1999. The bank allocated certain
dividends (R238,356.16) received from the
insolvent estate to certain
of the accounts. The bank pleaded that it was entitled to do so
in terms of the suretyship.
In the alternative, the bank
pleaded that if it ought not to have made the aforesaid allocations,
it was entitled to recalculate
the accounts by appropriating the
dividends in terms of the common law principles, i.e. firstly to the
interest and thereafter
to the most onerous debts. The
defendant did not challenge the allocations during the trial.
The aforesaid principles
are in any event applicable as between
creditor and debtor, and a surety may not rely on them. The
bank’s alternative
claims, premised on the eventuality of a
finding that the bank was not entitled to appropriate the dividends
aforementioned, are
therefore irrelevant. Accordingly only the
main claims are considered for purposes of determining this matter.
[7]
A further development had an
impact on the amounts claimed from the defendant. Smith handed in new
certificates in respect of the
defendant’s indebtedness, for
lesser amounts following the decision in
Paulsen
and Another v Slip Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd
[1]
.
In terms of this
decision, the prevailing legal position (as it then was) that
interest accruing after summons had been issued,
was not affected by
the
in duplum
rule,
is no longer applicable. Accordingly, the reduced amounts
claimed by the bank are at present: On the cheque account:
R308,624.67; on the loan account: R35,984.86; and on the card
account: R18,699.27 plus accrued interest on the aforesaid amounts
compounded until these interest amounts reached the amounts of the
capital.
[8]
At the time when the three
aforesaid credit agreements between the bank and Antoniou were
concluded, the bank was known as NBS Boland
Bank and thus the
original creditor. The latter became BOE Bank and in 2005, the
plaintiff bank eventually took over the
assets from BOE Bank. The
bank also changed its name a few times and at the relevant time the
bank was also known as Boland
PKS Bank. The present litigation
commenced in this court in June 2000. The bank successfully
applied to substitute
the aforementioned entities with the bank as
plaintiff. The defendant disputed that Antoniou’s debts
formed part of
the assets that were transferred by the original
creditor to its successors in title, in her pleadings.
[9]
Smith, who was concerned with
claims and collections in Port Elizabeth at the relevant time, gave
evidence about the history of
the business transfers of the bank.
These included Antoniou’s debt. Cross-examination did not
alter his testimony that
the bank, as part of the assets, took over
Boland Bank’s claim against Mr Antoniou. During the trial
the defendant
did not take issue with the aforesaid history of the
bank and the bank’s
locus
standi
to sue was
therefore not in issue.
The
Defences to the Bank’s Claims
[10]
Of the several defenes
pleaded, the defendant’s main defence was a challenge to the
validity of the suretyship agreement which
she contends she only
signed because of several misrepresentations were made to her by Mr
Neil Hull, the bank’s Jeffreys
Bay Branch Manager
(“Hull”)
.
According to the defendant, she signed a blank document which was
completed at a later stage by someone other than herself.
[11]
A further defence raised by
the defendant was that Antoniou and the bank had concluded an oral
agreement relating to an overdraft
account Antoniou had with First
National Bank
(“FNB”)
.
According to the defendant, Antoniou’s debt to the aforesaid
bank would first have had to be discharged with funds
advanced by the
bank in respect of Antoniou’s loan, before she would become
liable as a surety. The defendant pleaded
that in terms of the
agreement, certain credit preconditions were set, but had not been
fulfilled by the bank, and when she signed
the agreement she was
unaware that the surety agreement contained provisions contrary to
the alleged oral agreement. Accordingly,
she never intended to
be bound by it, and she was persuaded to sign the surety agreement by
misrepresentations made to her by the
bank (Hull).
[12]
The defendant also disputed
that the surety signed by her was for an unlimited amount. She
maintained that it was a limited
amount of R500,000.00.
[13]
In her plea, the defendant
contended that she ought to be discharged of her obligations in terms
of the suretyship, because the
prejudicial and onerous terms of her
surety agreement were against public policy.
Background
[14]
The undisputed evidence was
that Antoniou’s core business during 1996 was that of a fresh
produce merchant. At the time
he was a client of FNB in
Joubertina
.
Antoniou
wished to expand his business activities to Jeffreys Bay and open a
retail store. To this end he approached the original
creditor, Boland
PKS Bank in Jeffreys Bay to apply for the necessary credit. He
dealt with the bank’s collections manager,
Hull. Antoniou,
at that stage, owed a substantial amount of money to FNB in terms of
an overdraft facility as referred to
above. He told Hull that
he owed FNB R300,000.00. I must pause here to point out that
the defendant had also stood
surety for her son in respect of his
obligations to FNB and signed two sureties on 20 January 1995 and 5
July 1995 for the amounts
of R130,000.00 and R150,000.00
respectively. Antoniou had approached Hull with a view to close
his account with FNB and to
obtain credit facilities for his business
through the plaintiff bank. Hull testified that he found it
difficult to assess
Antoniou’s real financial status while he
was a client of both banks. It was decided to consolidate
Antoniou’s
debts at one bank.
The
Evidence
[15]
Detailed evidence was led by
the bank as to the amounts owed by Antoniou to the bank on various
dates. Since Antoniou
was not called to testify, the
evidence about the balance of the principal debtor’s three
accounts which formed the basis
of his indebtedness was not
successfully challenged and the figures reflected in the latest
certificates handed in by Smith ought
to be accepted. During
cross-examination of the defendant, it transpired that the extent of
her son’s indebtedness,
as alleged by the bank, was not in
dispute as far as she was concerned. As to what
transpired on 21 July 1998, the
day on which the defendant signed the
deed of surety and allegedly, the other ancillary documents, Hull and
the defendant gave
mutually destructive versions.
Hull’s
Testimony
[16]
Hull’s testimony about
his dealings with Antoniou could not be disputed as Antoniou did not
testify. Hull testified
that the first transaction between the
bank and Antoniou was the granting of the home loan. Thereafter
the business cheque
account and a credit card accounts were opened.
To consolidate Antoniou’s debts at one bank, he was to be
granted a credit
facility of R700,00.00: R600,000.00 (an overdraft
facility) plus R100,000.00 (an additional facility) to be
appropriated and utilized
firstly, to settle Antoniou’s debt to
FNB in the amount of R300,000.00. The balance of R400,000.00
was to be appropriated
as working capital. Antoniou’s
application for this credit facility was approved by the bank,
subject to certain conditions
relating to security for repayment.
It was recommended by the bank that security for Antoniou’s
indebtedness
was to be provided in the form of an unlimited surety
provided by the defendant, supported by the registration of a
covering mortgage
bond in the amount of R500,000.00 over three
properties in Joubertina, owned by the defendant.
Antoniou’s life
insurance policy with Commercial Union was to
be ceded to the bank.
[17]
Hull testified that to give
effect to the aforesaid, a formal appointment was made (through
Antoniou) to meet with the defendant
for purposes of her signing of
the relevant documentation on 21 July 1998. These documents
consisted of the deed of surety
(to be signed by the defendant) a
power of attorney to register the covering bond over her three
properties (also to be signed
by the defendant) and the documents
relating to the cession of insurance to be signed by both Antoniou
and the defendant.
[18]
When Antoniou and the
defendant arrived at the appointed time, all the documentation had
been prepared in advance by Hull’s
secretary (which she
confirmed when she gave evidence) and all the necessary details were
filled in on the deed of surety, such
as the defendant’s name
and identity number and the date and place of signature. The
bank had these details on record
since the time Antoniou had applied
for a credit facility before, but which he did not take up but
instead, took up the facility
with the R75,000.00 limit. The
defendant’s address was filled in later because it was not to
hand at the time.
[19]
Hull testified that he
explained to the defendant what the purpose of the surety was and
also, for what debts of Antoniou she stood
surety for, with reference
to Antoniou’s increased credit facilities. According to
Hull, the defendant was made aware
of the fact that the surety was
for an unlimited amount. She had also placed her initials below
the word “
onbeperk”
(unlimited) on the deed of surety in acknowledgment that this aspect
was explained to her. The defendant also signed the
cession
document and the power of attorney, and initialed each page of the
substantial draft bond document annexed thereto.
The defendant
further signed a document (drafted in
pro
forma
form by the bank),
acknowledging that she had signed a surety and what it was for.
On the same say, presumably on the
same occasion, Antoniou signed a
letter, also prepared by the bank, for transfer of his account with
FNB, and the balance thereon,
to Boland PKS.
[20]
On the strength of the
anticipated securities provided by the defendant, Antoniou was
advanced the facilities in question.
However, when the covering
bond was to be registered over the defendant’s properties, the
attorneys for the bank received
a letter dated 23 July 1998 from Mr
Mattheus, the attorney tasked with cancellation of Antoniou’s
bond in favour of FNB.
It transpired that Antoniou did not owe
FNB the amount of R300,000.00 as he had represented to Hull, but in
fact owed FNB a much
more substantial amount, namely R534,171.88.
[21]
The facilities approved on
the strength of the anticipated security provided by his mother, the
defendant, were clearly insufficient
to pay FNB the aforesaid
amount. In addition, Antoniou made no payments in respect of
his debts. On 20 August 1998
the bank requested him to return
his cheque book and credit cards. By September 1998, Antoniou’s
account was overdrawn
by R229,256.23 and he was placed on terms to
repay this amount by 25 September 1998, failing which he would be
held liable for
his entire debt which would then become due and
owing. Antoniou did not respond. His account was then closed
and four months
later he was sequestrated and the defendant found
herself in the unenviable position of being a surety for her son’s
substantial
debts at two different banks.
The
Defendant’s Testimony
[22]
The defendant testified that
on 21 July 1998 she visited her son at Mondplaas and he asked her to
accompany him to Jeffreys Bay
where he wished to introduce her to
Hull. She was apparently not told why this introduction
was necessary.
On arrival at the bank she was introduced
to Hull who thereafter spoke to her son alone, while she sat in a
chair waiting for them
to finish their discussion. She
said that thereafter, when they left, as they were walking out, Hull
called her back
and asked her to quickly sign a document. She
stated that she was in a hurry to get home before it was dark and she
did not
read what she was signing, but believed it was a written
consent form to enable her son’s account and debts at FNB, to
be
transferred to the Boland PKS. She was adamant that she
would never have agreed to stand surety for her son in favour of the
bank, unless his debt to FNB had been extinguished with the funds
advanced by the bank. During cross-examination she stated
that
she only signed one document, and that was the “
consent”.
According to her, the
signatures on the cession documentation, power of attorney, draft
bond and letter of acknowledgement were
all falsified.
[23]
Mr Theron, an attorney from
Stellenbosch (formerly from Joubertina) represented the defendant
throughout these proceedings.
The main thrust of Mr Theron’s
cross-examination of Hull was that he (Hull) was neglectful of his
duties as a bank manager
by allowing Antoniou to make withdrawals
from his business account far in excess of the R75,000.00 limit on
his overdraft being
well over R200,000.00. As a result,
Hull needed to rescue his own position
,
vis-à-vis
the
bank, and he decided to reel the defendant in as a surety, so that
the bank could lay claim to all her properties to compensate
for
Hull’s negligence and keep himself out of trouble with his
superiors
(“om sy
eie bas te red”)
.
[24]
The aforesaid proposition was
not pleaded. Since Antoniou did not testify, the bank’s
position (as pleaded), namely
that the overdraft limit on that
account was R75,000.00, but was altered from time to time, stands
undisputed.
[25]
Hull should perhaps have been
more meticulous in establishing Antoniou’s creditworthiness and
the extent of Antoniou’s
debt with FNB much sooner. As I
understood his evidence, Hull conceded as much under
cross-examination. The aforesaid
does, however, not
amount to a
bona fide
defence and does not assist the defendant, particularly if one has
regard to the defences pleaded and the defendant’s own
testimony in court. It must also be borne in mind, in this
regard, that Antoniou was a businessman and had misled Hull as
to the
extent of his debts with FNB.
Analysis
[26]
The defendant’s
evidence in chief, that she believed that she was signing a consent
form that her son’s account may
be transferred from FNB to the
Boland PKS is simply disingenuous. The defendant was, on
her own version, an astute
businesswoman who could hardly have been
so naïve as to believe that her adult son, himself a
businessman, required her consent
to transfer bank accounts.
Moreover, during cross-examination she testified that she did in fact
see the word “
Borgakte”
(deed of surety) at the
top of the one page document she had in fact signed, according to
her.
[27]
Her testimony that she signed
a blank document does not bear close scrutiny. Firstly, she
said she did not read the document
except for its heading.
It is therefore difficult to apprehend how she could have noticed all
the alleged blank spaces
she referred to. Secondly,
her initials below the part of the document dealing with the
unlimited surety, tends
to exclude that version. It was also
common cause during the trial, that she had signed at least two deeds
of surety prior
to 21 July 1998. She therefore must have known what
the import of signing a deed of surety was. She was no strnger to
this type
of transaction.
[28]
Her testimony that she
accompanied her son to the bank, merely so that he could introduce
her to Hull, is farfetched. According
to the defendant, she
knew absolutely nothing about her son’s debts, he had
never asked her to stand surety for him,
and they had no formal
appointment with Hull to sign documents. In this scenario
(where she went to the bank only for a short
introduction and knew
nothing of any other purpose for the visit) it is hardly likely that
Hull would have called her back (after
her departure) to quickly sign
a blank surety deed which he pretended, was a consent form.
That suggests fraud on a most
serious scale on the part of Hull.
This proposition is so preposterous that it ought to be rejected out
of hand. There
is no basis to rely on this evidence,
particularly in the absence of any testimony by Antoniou regarding
the visit to the bank.
It also seems rather curious that
a person would take his mother to a bank to whom he owed large sums
of money, simply
to introduce his mother to his bank manager.
Even more curious is that when she leaves the bank, having been
introduced,
the mother has become the surety for his debts. If
the defendant was misled by anyone, it was by her son.
[29]
The defendant accused the
bank of fraud with regard to her signature on the cession document,
the power of attorney and other documents.
Such a case was
never pleaded, as one would have expected if this indeed was the
case. This version never formed part of
the defendant’s
case and was never put to Hull. This version only illustrates
the lengths to which the defendant would
go to avoid liability under
the surety. Her version is simply false and ought to be
rejected.
[30]
As to the alleged
misrepresentations made by Hull, the defendant’s version must
also be rejected. It directly conflicts
with her own version
that she had no discussion with Hull about her son’s debts and
who, on her way out of the bank, asked
her simply to sign a blank
document.
[31]
As illustrated above, the
defendant gave self-contradictory evidence. On numerous
occasions during her evidence when counsel
for the plaintiff pointed
out flaws in her testimony, and on other occasions, she would refer
to God as being her witness in very
emotional tones. She was
also prone to bursting into tears and to shouting, to the point that
I eventually had occasion to
call her to order.
[32]
The defence of an oral
agreement to the effect that the surety was conditional on FNB being
paid by the bank first, also does not
bear close scrutiny either.
Antoniou was the only witness who could testify about such an
agreement and he did not.
Apart from the fact that this version
flies in the face of her version about events of the bank on
21
July 1998, it is also highly unlikely. Few banks would risk
extinguishing a client’s debt with a different entity,
without
any security being in place. It would surely be a most unwise
business practice for any bank to follow.
[33]
Broadly speaking, the
defendant’s defences collectively amount to a mistake on her
part in signing the deed of surety in question.
In order to
succeed in the defence of
iustus
error,
the defendant is
obliged to show that she was misled as to the nature of the deed, or
as to the terms it contained, or by some act
or omission on the part
of the bank (or Hull) if there was a duty on him to inform her of the
consequences of signing the surety,
such a duty would only arise
where the document departed from prior representations as to the
nature of contents thereof
[2]
.
[34]
In
Slip
Knot Investments 777 (Pty) Ltd v Du Toit
[3]
the Supreme Court of
Appeal recognized the principle that a party is permitted to rely on
his or her own mistake in certain circumstances,
except where the
other party has not made misrepresentations.
[35]
In
Langeveld
v Union Finance Holdings (Pty) Ltd
[4]
the court applied the
‘
praesumptio
hominis’
(popular
presumption) in holding that there was a strong presumption that
anyone who has signed a document had the intention to
enter into the
transaction contained in it, and the surety is burdened with the onus
of convincing the court that he or she had
not intended to enter into
the contract, and if the defendant fails to do so, the maxim ‘
caveat
supscriptor’
then
trumps the defence of ‘
iustus
error’
[5]
.
[36]
FirstRand Bank also
(successfully) instituted an action against the defendant as
surety
[6]
.
In that matter she also raised the defence that she did not
appreciate the nature of the document she had signed and signed
only
as a result of misrepresentations made to her. In his judgment in
favour of FirstRand Bank, Erasmus J stated
[7]
that a person who voluntarily places her signature on a deed of
suretyship is generally hard pressed to avoid liability under the
document.
[37]
Since the defendant’s
version of events is to be rejected as false, I accept that the
defendant, as a literate astute businesswoman
knew exactly what kind
of document she was signing, and that she indeed intended to stand
surety, as co-principal debtor for her
son’s obligations to the
bank. She just did not want to be liable if he defaulted, a common
regret felt by those who stand
surety for defaulting debtors.
[38]
In the circumstances, the
defendant is liable as co-principal debtor for payment of the three
capital amounts as claimed, plus interest
thereon at the legal rate,
and the plaintiff’s cost of suit on a scale as between attorney
and client.
Costs
[39]
There are several examples of
how Mr Theron delayed the outcome of this matter: The first time this
matter came before me was on
4 February 2013 (thirteen years after
summons was issued), it stood down for four days. On 8 February
2013 it was postponed
sine
die
and on 18 November
2013 it was postponed to 4 May 2015, when the trial finally
commenced. It was during this period that
Mr Theron asked for
days off during the allocated trial period, to consult with his
client and to prepare for trial. Several
court hours were lost
thereby. This was a relatively simple matter, which Mr Theron
attempted to complicate and prolong at every
opportunity. For
example, there where many documents in this matter which became
evidence by consent. When Mr Theron lead the evidence
of the
defendant, he insisted, despite my rulings to the contrary, that the
defendant read the contents of the document into the
record, an
exercise which was bound to take up more time.
[40]
Another example of this type
of conduct became evident when the evidence in this matter was
completed more than a year ago.
Counsel for the plaintiff bank
and Mr Theron both presented their arguments on that same day.
Before I could reserve judgment,
Mr Theron requested an opportunity
to obtain the record of the proceedings and file written heads of
argument (as counsel for the
plaintiff had done). He gave an
undertaking that he would file his heads of argument within thirty
days of receipt of the
record. No heads were forthcoming.
Further extensions were sought based on Mr. Theron’s health,
supported by
medical certificates. I was advised of that Mr Theron
was suffering from severe stress. Most unfortunately, Mr Theron
was
also injured during an assault. Further extensions were
sought and granted on the basis of his slow recovery. Mr Theron
is elderly and appeared to be frail. Therefore I had sympathy
for him. However, I ran out of sympathy during the previous
term because it appeared to me after a while, that the extensions
were sought for opportunistic considerations and I then in February
2016, wrote a sternly worded letter to Mr Furstenberg, who, on Mr
Theron’s behalf, had requested all the extensions. In the
letter I made it clear that Mr Theron had one last opportunity to
file heads. The response thereto, which arrived in March this
year,
was that no heads of argument would be filed by Mr Theron, after
all. Thereafter there were telephonic
pleas by Mr
Theron, asking for a yet further postponement. On 29 June 2016,
the day before judgment was to be delivered,
a written request by Mr
Furstenberg for a postponement until the end of July was received and
refused on 30 June 2016 in writing.
[41]
The plaintiff argued that Mr
Theron should be ordered pay 15% of the costs of this trial
de
bonis propriis
by virtue
of the fact that Mr Theron wasted court time on preparation and
consultations with his client, matters that he ought to
have seen to
before the trial commenced, and over weekends. It is correct
that Mr Theron wasted time and that was in keeping
with the general
manner in which he conducted himself throughout these proceedings.
The record abounds with examples thereof.
I formed a strong
view, during the trial, that Mr Theron had no desire to finalize this
case by attempting to string matters out
for as long as possible and
to obfuscate issues for purposes of delaying the outcome. These
observations were fortified by his
conduct before, during and after
the trial.
[42]
The figure of 15% proposed by
counsel for the bank strikes me as arbitrary, and even within the
discretion I have with regards to
costs, it would be difficult to
justify such a costs order. In any event, Mr Theron’s
client associated herself
with his conduct and she is therefore
liable for the plaintiff’s costs of suit on a scale as between
attorney and client.
[43]
In the circumstances, I find
for the plaintiff and the following orders are made with regards to
the defendant’s liability
as surety:
1.
Cheque Account
The
defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of R308,624.67
plus interest on the aforesaid amount as from 20 May 1999
at the rate
of 22% per annum, calculated daily and compounded, monthly in arrears
until 1 July 2002 when it equaled the capital
amount.
2.
Loan Account
The
defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of R35,984.86
plus interest on the aforesaid amount at the rate of
14,50% per
annum, calculated daily and compounded, monthly in arrears until 3
September 2005 when it equaled the capital amount.
3.
Card Account
The
defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of R18,699.27
plus interest on the aforesaid amount at the rate of 17%
per annum,
calculated daily and compounded, monthly until 3 November 2004 when
it equaled the capital amount.
4.
Costs
The
defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiff’s costs of suit, on a
scale as between attorney and client.
____________________
E
REVELAS
Judge
of the High Court
Appearances
:
For
the plaintiff, Adv A B Beyleveld SC instructed by BLC Attorneys, Port
Elizabeth
For
the defendant, Mr P J Theron (Snr) of Theron & Partners,
Stellenbosch
Date
heard:
05 May 2015
(Evidence completed)
01 March 2016 (Judgment
Reserved)
Date
delivered: 01 July
2016
[1]
2015 (3) SA 479 (CC).
[2]
Tesoriero v Bhyjo Investments
Share Block (Pty) Ltd
2000
(1) SA 167
(W) at 175F-H.
[3]
2011 (4) SA 72
(SCA) at 76D-F.
[4]
2007 (4) SA 572
(W), see also
Roomer v Wedge Steel
(Pty) Ltd
1998 (1) SA
538 (N).
[5]
See also
ABSA
Bank Ltd v Trzebiatowsky and Others
2012
(5) SA 134
(ECP) at paragraph [25].
[6]
Under case number 2498/02
[7]
At page 8