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[2013] ZAECPEHC 58
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Absa Bank Ltd and Another v Jooste NO and Others (3521/2012) [2013] ZAECPEHC 58 (19 November 2013)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH
AFRICA
(EASTERN CAPE HIGH COURT –
PORT ELIZABETH)
CASE NO. : 3521/2012
Heard on : 06 June 2013
Date delivered: 19 November 2013
In the matter between:
ABSA BANK LIMITED
......................................................................
First
Applicant
MARIA RAMOS
..............................................................................
Second
Applicant
And
PAUL ERASMUS JOOSTE N.O.
....................................................
First
Respondent
JACOBUS HENDRIKUS JANSE
VAN RENSBURG N.O.
................................................................
Second
Respondent
THE MASTER OF THE EASTERN
CAPE
HIGH COURT
.................................................................................
Third
Respondent
JUDGMENT
______________
MAJIKI J:
[1] This is an application
launched by the applicants to set aside the summons authorised by the
first respondent, in his capacity
as the commissioner in the enquiry
of Milkwood Construction Limited (in liquidation) (“Milkwood”),
issued against the
second applicant. The enquiry was ordered (“the
order”) by this court on 7 February 2012 on application by NJO
Du Plessis
Building Contractors CC (under supervision) (“NJO”)
in terms of the provisions of sections 417 and 418 of the Companies
Act 61 of 1973, as amended (“the Act”).
[2] The applicants further
sought an order interdicting and restraining first respondent from
authorising summons against any employee
of the first applicant in
the enquiry into the affairs of Milkwood, without the prior leave of
this court.
[3] The relevant terms of the
said order were :-
3.1. that leave was granted to
the applicant, [NJO], to conduct a commission of enquiry into the
affairs of Milkwood in terms of
the provisions of section 417 and 418
of the Act;
3.2. that leave was granted to
NJO to appoint attorneys, counsel and forensic auditors to assist and
advise the applicant in the
execution of the enquiry;
3.3. that advocate Paul Erasmus
Jooste be appointed as commissioner in terms of the provisions of
Section 418, to report to the
Master of the High Court, in respect of
the following;
3.3.1. the identity of witnesses
who gave evidence before him, the nature, contents and necessity of
the evidence of each such witness,
the relevancy thereof and to what
extent the evidence contributed to the investigatory process into the
affairs of the liquidated
company;
3.3.2. the particulars of assets
and monies that were discovered through the investigatory process,
and to what extent the enquiry
procedure disclosed assets and monies
for the advantage of the creditors of the liquidated company and the
reasons therefore;
3.3.3. the particulars of
transgressions and irregularities, if any, disclosed through the
evidence and whether such should be referred
to the National
Prosecuting Authority;
3.4. that the commissioner is
authorised to issue summons in respect of any person or entity
referred to in the application or during
the enquiry, to appear at
the enquiry to be interrogated by the liquidator, the legal
representative and/or the creditors of the
liquidated company;
3.5. that the individuals
identified in the application or during the enquiry, be interrogated
before the commissioner at a time
and date and venue fixed by the
commissioner and that such individuals and/or entities be called upon
to give evidence in respect
of their appointment or association with
the business, the operation of the scheme and/or the assets or
liabilities of the liquidated
company;
3.6. that each of the persons so
identified and who are interrogated at the enquiry, be instructed to
present all books and documentary
proof which are in their possession
and under their control and which may disclose assets or monies of
the liquidated company;
3.7. that the commissioner is
authorised to issue summons against any person or entity to appear at
the enquiry and to give evidence
in respect of any issue that might
have arisen during the enquiry or thereafter in order to effect due
compliance with this order;
3.8. that the commissioner is
authorised to issue summons against any person or entity not being
referred to specifically in the
application or during the enquiry, to
appear at the enquiry and present books and documents or proof which
may be necessary to
facilitate the enquiry and with the intention to
effect due compliance with this order;
3.9. that the signature of the
commissioner,
alternatively
the Master be regarded as
sufficient for official authorisation of any summons issued before or
during the enquiry;
3.10. that the evidence
presented in this application and the evidence presented at the
enquiry be regarded as confidential and
which may not be disclosed
without the prior written authorisation by the Master, except that
the applicant is granted leave to
use any transcript of the enquiry
for the purposes of further steps, including litigation, that may
flow from the enquiry;
[4] In terms of the first
respondent’s summons, the second applicant or her duly
authorised agent was called to appear before
the first respondent, in
order to testify to matters within her knowledge. Alternatively, to
provide material or relevant information,
in respect of her
association with the affairs and property of Milkwood and in
particular matters within her knowledge concerning
the dealings and
association of Milkwood with NJO, Milkwood and erf 1109 Marina
Martinique CC (in liquidation) (“erf 1109”).
[5] The second applicant or her
duly authorised agent were required to produce all documents, records
and papers in her possession,
custody or within her power or under
her control relating to the affairs and dealings of Milkwood. She or
her duly authorised agent
were specifically required to bring with
them and produce to first respondent the documents set out in
annexure “A”
to the summons.
[6] Annexure “A”
listed the following:
“
1. All
documents relating to Development Bonds and/or Loans made to, or on
behalf of, or between the Company Milkwood (Pty) Ltd
(in liquidation)
and Erf 1109 including :
(a) All loan
agreements in respect of the development on Erf 1109, Marina
Martinique CC from Absa Bank;
(b) Proof of
all progress payments made in respect of the development of Erf 1109
including the dates of such payments, the underlying
cause of such
payments, the amounts, the instructions to pay and the payees;
(c) The
details of both bond accounts, including the statements on both bond
accounts;
(d) Copies of
the sale agreements pertaining to three stands sold to NJO du Plessis
Building Contractors CC
(e) The bank
statements in respect of account numbers 7010032238 and 7010032288
for the period of the development;
(f) Copies of
the Absa bank bond settlement account number 299098117;
(g) The bank
statements of Milkwood Construction (Pty) Limited for the entire
period of the development on Erf 1109;
(h) All
certificates for progress payments in respect of the development on
the property of Erf 1109;
(i)
Copies of all correspondence, whether electronically or otherwise, in
respect of development on Erf 1109.
Background information
leading to the present application
[7] Erf 1109 is the owner of the
property known as Erf 1109, Dolphin Drive, Aston Bay, which was to be
developed. Milkwood was a
management company formed and managed by
five people. Milkwood was responsible for, and entitled to drive the
development on the
property, it was more of a facilitator for the
development on the property of Erf 1109. NJO was contracted as a
builder on the
property of Erf 1109 upon facilitation by Milkwood. At
the time of the institution of these proceedings NJO was under the
supervision
of the business rescue practitioner.
[8] A loan agreement was entered
into between the first applicant and Erf 1109. Subsequently a
development bond of 76 million rand
in favour of the first applicant
was registered over Erf 1109. Erf 1109 authorised drawdowns of funds
to various third parties
and first applicant would effect the
payments upon Erf 1109’s written instructions. Milkwood, as
facilitator entered into
a written agreement with NJO to erect 32
apartments on the property owned by Erf 1109.
[9] Erf 1109 defaulted on the
loan agreement and was liquidated at the instance of first applicant.
The enquiry into the affairs
of Milkwood was prompted by the fact
that according to the second respondent, (Jacobus Van Rensburg,
business rescue practitioner
in NJO) 5 million rand was paid to
members of Milkwood, even though it was supposed to have been paid to
NJO as the sole recipient
of progress payments on the development
bond. The payments made to the members of Milkwood could not be
accounted for and Milkwood
refused to pay NJO.
[10] The applicants in their
main supportive affidavit attacked the summons on the basis that the
first respondent sought documents
relating to the affairs of Erf
1109; that the second applicant was summoned in her personal capacity
and not as chief executive
officer or chairperson of Absa; that Van
Rensburg referred to the issuing of subpoena of Ms Ramos, whereas
s.417 of the Act refers
to issuing of summons; that the summons
exceeded boundaries of paragraph 11 of the order in that the second
applicant was advised
that she would be required to testify and
disclose everything she knew relating in any way to the affairs of
Milkwood. Milkwood
was not owed any monies by Erf 1109, according to
the second respondent it was NJO which was owed by Milkwood.
[11] Further, that the loan
agreement indicated that the loan account would be held from where
Absa administered the loan after
the final drawdown, being
Greenacres, Port Elizabeth. The second applicant is in Johannesburg
therefore is not the relevant person
to be summoned; that first
applicant did not have any documents, records or papers relating to
the affairs of Milkwood as paragraph
3 of the summons required the
production of; that documents in paragraphs (a)-(c) (e) and (f) of
annexure “A” had already
been furnished to the
commission; that paragraph (i) of annexure “A” did not
specify or sufficiently describe what
was required; documents
referred to in paragraph (d) could not be provided they were not
identified as relating to Milkwood or
Erf 1109; that documents
requested in paragraph (f) were said to be bulky and that documents
requested in paragraph (g) did not
exist.
[12] Furthermore, that the
summons is self contradictory, it summoned the second applicant to
appear in person or provide material
or relevant information in
respect of her association with the affairs and property of Milkwood,
and in particular matters within
her knowledge concerning the
dealings and association with Milkwood and NJO, Milkwood and Erf
1109. The clear indication of this
is that the second applicant on
the one hand was summoned to attend the enquiry and remain in
attendance until excused, whilst
also informed that she need not
attend should the requested documents be produced prior to her date
of appearance.
[13] Furthermore, the summons
was attacked on the basis that it was issued to secure a benefit for
NJO in its litigation against
directors of Milkwood. No employee of
first applicant would know of dealings between Milkwood, NJO and Erf
1109. Absa employees
answered truthfully, to the extent that the
transmission account and statements were made available to the
commission showing a
record of payments made. The first respondent
did not produce the transcript relating to or disclose the evidence
on which he based
his ruling that Erf 1109, Milkwood and NJO were
interrelated. He also did not make attempts to seek permission of the
Master to
do so.
[14] The applicants advanced
their reason in approaching the court directly by way of this
application as being that the first respondent,
who ordinarily would
rule on their objections raised at the enquiry, had already found
that the enquiry was and would be hampered
by first applicant’s
refusal to partake in the enquiry. The first respondent failed to
take into account that the undertaking
sought by the first
respondent, to the effect that the first applicant’s employees
would not be subjected to questioning
beyond the terms of the court
order, was not given, and that the first respondent’s enquiry
as to who would pay for the search
of the documents was not answered.
The threat to subpoena was made to terrorise the applicants.
[15] In his answering affidavit
the second respondent stated that he, as the business rescue
practitioner of NJO, could not obtain
information or a clear
explanation regarding the millions that flowed to Milkwood, in
addition there was no accounting for the
said monies but it was clear
that they disappeared. He then obtained a court order for a
commission of enquiry into the affairs
of Milkwood.
[16] The first applicant’s
officials were subpoenaed so that the second respondent, NJO and Erf
1109 could get clarity on
the monies paid to Milkwood from the
development bond. The first applicant withdrew from the commission,
each witness that was
called from first applicant could not provide
information about the file of the development bond, its whereabouts
and under whose
control it was.
[17] When an attempt to summon
the chairman of first applicant failed, the first respondent summoned
the second applicant because
she could not say the file was not under
her control, wherever it was in South Africa. Various witnesses who
testified stated that
it was in George, Cape Town, Johannesburg, even
when reference was made to Port Elizabeth, there was evidence that an
official
who was involved in the handling of the file was dismissed
for suspected irregularities. The applicants cannot hide behind the
fact that they have complex administrative systems. They must have
accessed the file when they applied for liquidation of Erf 1109.
[18] According to first
respondent, after he heard evidence of two (2) witnesses, i.e.
employees of first applicant, he concluded
that the three entities
were so interrelated that one could not get to the bottom of the
affairs of Milkwood without reference
to Erf 1109 and NJO.
Furthermore, the said witnesses were ducking and diving from giving
the commissioner information pertaining
to payments made from the
development bond. It then became necessary for him to enquire as to
why monies were paid to Milkwood.
However, he could not successfully
summon the chairperson of the first applicant as it turned out that
he was a non-executive director
and had left the employ of the first
applicant.
[19] It is common cause that the
order authorised an enquiry into the affairs of Milkwood and that
Milkwood never had an account
with the first respondent or conducted
business with first respondent. Therefore, any payments made to any
director of Milkwood
concerned Erf 1109. It is also common cause that
NJO was a creditor of Milkwood.
Issue
[20] The following issues were
raised whether the summons issued fell within the ambit of the court
order authorising an enquiry
into the affairs of Milkwood; whether
the first respondent could enquire into matters relating to the
development bond of Erf 1109;
and whether the first respondent could
call for witnesses to testify about the affairs of Erf 1109 and
payments made from the development
bond of Erf 1109, in particular
those made to Milkwood.
[21] Furthermore, whether the
first respondent gave due and proper consideration to the matter and
the contents of the summons before
he exercised his power to
authorise the summons; whether the summons substantially and
technically complied with what the first
respondent stated it was
required to convey in order to facilitate the objectives of the
commission of enquiry and whether the
applicants have made out a case
for the granting of the final interdict sought in favour of its
employees.
[22] The respondents argued, and
correctly in my view, that the fundamental question that requires to
be answered is whether the
summons called for relevant information
and whether the commissioner had reasonable grounds for believing
that the second applicant
might be able to give material information
concerning the affairs of Milkwood.
[23] Section 417 of the Act
provides:
“
Summoning
and examination of persons as to affairs of company. –
(1) In any winding-up of a
company unable to pay its debts, the
Master or the Court may, at any
time after a winding-up order has been made, summon before him or it
any director or officer of
the company or person known or suspected
to have in his possession any property of the company or believed to
be indebted to the
company, or any person whom the Master or the
Court deems capable of giving information concerning the trade,
dealings, affairs
or property of the company.
(2) (a) The Master or the Court
may examine any person
summoned under subsection (1) on
oath or affirmation concerning any matter referred to in that
subsection, either orally or on written
interrogatories, and may
reduce his answers to writing and require him to sign them.
Any such person may be
required to answer any question put to him or her at the
examination, notwithstanding that the answer
might tend to
incriminate him or her and shall, if he or she does so refuse on
that ground, be obliged to so answer at the
instance of the Master
or the Court: Provided that the Master or the Court may only oblige
the person in question to so answer
after the Master or the Court
has consulted with the Director of Public Prosecutions who has
jurisdiction.
The Master of the Court may
require any such person to produce any books or papers in his
custody or under his control relating
to the company but without
prejudice to any lien claimed with regard to any such books or
papers, and the Court shall have power
to determine all questions
relating to any such lien
…
(7) Any examination or enquiry
under this section or section 418 and any application therefor shall
be private and confidential,
unless the Master or the Court, either
generally or in respect of any particular person, directs otherwise.”
Section 418 of the Act provides:
1.
Examination by
commissioners –
Every magistrate and every
other person appointed for the purpose by the Master or the Court
shall be a Commissioner for the purpose
of taking evidence or
holding any enquiry under this Act in connection with the winding-up
of any company.
The Master or the Court may
refer the whole or any part of the examination of any witness or of
any enquiry under this Act to
any such Commissioner, whether or not
he is within the jurisdiction of the Court which issued the
winding-up order.
2. A commissioner shall in any
matter referred to him have the same powers of summoning and
examining witnesses and of requiring
the production of documents, as
the Master who or the Court which appointed him, and, if the
Commissioner is a magistrate, of punishing
defaulting or recalcitrant
witnesses, or causing defaulting witnesses to be apprehended, and of
determining questions relating
to any lien with regard to documents,
as the Court referred to in section 417.
[24] According to
Henochsberg
on the Companies Act, Volume 1, at page 889
there is no
limitation upon the matters about which there can be interrogation
provided, of course, in each case that, or those,
contemplated
concerns, or concern, the trade, dealings, affairs or property of the
company. The scope of the investigation is no
less extensive than
that of one under s.415. The judicial dicta regarding s.415 apply
mutatis
mutandis
in relation to s.417.
[25] Examination under s.417, or
an enquiry under the same provisions read together with s.418, are
automatically private and confidential
unless the court or master as
the case may be, were to direct otherwise. A person who seeks
examination under s. 417 or an enquiry
under s. 417 read with s. 418,
while carrying no onus of proof as such, must satisfy the court, or
the master that in the circumstances
such an examination or enquiry
is to be preferred and that there is a fair ground for suspicion that
the person sought to be examined
can probably give information about
what is suspected.
[26] Section 415 (1) of the Act
provides that :
“
Examination
of directors and others at meetings
.-
(1) The Master or officer
presiding at any meeting of creditors of a
company which is being wound up
and is unable to pay its debts, may call and administer an oath to or
accept an affirmation from
any director of the company or any other
person present at the meeting who was or might have been subpoenaed
in terms of section
414(2)(a), and the Master or such officer and any
liquidator of the company and any creditor thereof who has proved a
claim against
the company, or the agent of such liquidator or
creditor, may interrogate the director or person so called and sworn
concerning
all matters relating to the company or its business or
affairs in respect of any time, either before or after the
commencement
of the winding-up, and concerning any property belonging
to the company: Provided that the Master or such officer shall
disallow
any question which is irrelevant or would in his opinion
prolong the interrogation unnecessarily.
[27] Section 415(2) of the Act
provides that :
“
In
connection with the production of any book or document in compliance
with a subpoena issued under section 414(2)(b) or the interrogation
of a person under subsection (1) of this section, the law relating to
privilege as applicable to a witness subpoenaed to produce
a book or
document or give evidence in a magistrate’s court shall apply:
Provided that a banker at whose bank the company
concerned keeps or
at any time kept an account, shall be obliged, if subpoenaed to do so
under section 414(2)(b), to produce-
any cheque in his possession
which was drawn by the company within one year before the
commencement of the winding-up; or
if any cheque so drawn is not
available, any record of the payment, the date of payment and the
amount of the cheque which may
be available to him, or a copy of
such record, and shall, if called upon to do so, give any other
information available to him
in connection with any such cheque or
the account of the company.
[28] According to
Henochsberg
supra, at page 880
-
881
the scope of the interrogation
for which s.415 provides is defined in the widest terms and no matter
affecting the company’s
affairs is outside its ambit. In this
regard the author refers to
Moolman v Builder’s &
Developers (Pty) Ltd
:
Jooste Intervening
1990 (1) SA 954
(A)
at
960.
The object of the legislature is, the facilitation
of the gathering of information necessary to enable the winding up to
be properly
and effectively administered and the greatest financial
benefit to the creditors be obtained. In approving the views of De
Vos
J in
Simon v The Assistant Master
1964 (3) SA 715
(T)
Horn
AJ in
Lordan v Dusky Dawn Investments (in liquidation)1998 (4) SA
519 (SE)
at
525
held that an interrogation, the purpose of
which is to expose misdemeanours or liability of directors for
mismanagement with no
actual or potential effect upon the financial
interests of the company or its creditors, should not be permitted by
utilization
of s.s 415 or 417. The purpose of the interrogation which
would not relate to the affairs of the company, and which cannot at
all
affect the administration of the winding up is an abuse of the
provisions of s.415, for example, the use of the section to get facts
about alleged claim which a proved creditor proposes to enforce
against someone other than the company.
[29] The applicants argue that
they furnished to the commission all the required information through
their employees who testified
and also submitted the statements
reflecting payments they made. Furthermore, that the actual file in
respect of the development
bond was not sought by the respondents in
the summons. However, even if the respondents had done so, they would
not be able to
furnish it because it was subject to client
confidentiality.
[30] The first applicant argued
that it was denied of copies of the exhibits with which they were
confronted; that the undertakings
it sought were not given by the
commissioner, with regard to payment of costs of launching extensive
investigations and making
of copies of documents and that it was not
given the clarity it sought as to who was allegedly in control of the
required documents
and where they were allegedly to be found.
[31] The first applicant argued
further that the summons was defective in form and substance and was
an abuse of process. Furthermore,
there was no legal basis for
authorisation of subpoenas against first respondent and its employees
without authorisation of the
court and further that the summons is
self contradictory.
[32] In my view the applicants
have not substantiated their assertion that the summons is defective
in form and substance. The information
sought in the summons is in
respect of the applicants’ association with the affairs of
Milkwood, in particular about the
payments made to the directors of
Milkwood from the development bond. Evidence suggesting that
irregular payments were made to
Milkwood or its directors from the
development bond of Erf 1109 was led by the employees of the first
applicant at the enquiry.
When they were asked about the development
bond file they could not give a definite answer about its
whereabouts. I also find no
basis for the assertion that it is
contradictory to ask second applicant to come or furnish the required
information, the key issue
would be the supply of the required
information.
[33] Erf 1109 was liquidated at
the instance of the first applicant. The correspondence requested
under (d) and (i) of annexure
“A” would be part of the
information contained in the development file. I find merit in the
respondents’ argument
that the first applicant used the
information contained in the file in its application for the
liquidation of Erf 1109. In my view,
the applicant ought to make an
effort to furnish the information so required.
[34] NJO was a creditor of
Milkwood. In my view, in the absence of a finding that the
interrogation was of no actual or potential
effect upon the financial
interests of the company or its creditors, there should be no basis
for finding that the actions of the
second respondent were an abuse
of the provisions of s.417.
[35] As regards confidentiality
in
Gumede and Others v
Subel NO and Others;
2006 (3) SA 498
(SCA)
at
505-506 [para 19],
held that a bare assertion
that documents are confidential does not entitle the person to be
interrogated to withhold them. The
proper approach to determine
whether there is a reason to believe that the documents requested
will throw light on the affairs
of the company before the winding up.
Relevance will outweigh privacy. Moreover, the first applicant on its
own version had already
availed the transmission account and
statements to the commission.
[36] Section 417(5) provides
that any person summoned under s.417(1) shall be entitled to witness
fees. It therefore would have
been open to the applicants to claim
any fees for the costs they would have incurred in searching and
copying of the required documents,
in line with this section. The
reliefs the applicants are seeking are not aimed at securing the
furnishing of such undertakings.
In my view, the respondents could
record at the commission the difficulties they had with complying in
full with the summons.
[37] With regard to whether the
summons is a subpoena
ad testificandum
and
duces tecum
,
the second applicant was summoned to an enquiry held in terms of
s.417. The intended examination of the second applicant therefore
was
in terms of ss. 417 and 418. The summons was framed as such in line
with the court order. It is in the answering affidavit
that the
document is interchangeably referred to as a subpoena and or summons.
Its content and purpose are indicative that it was
issued as a
summons.
[38] Section 414(2) provides for
the issuing of subpoena of persons to the meeting of creditors of a
company being wound up. S.417
provides for summoning and examination
of persons by the Master or Courts.
Section 418 provides that every
magistrate and every other person appointed for the purpose by the
Master or Court, shall be a commissioner
for the purpose of taking
evidence or holding any enquiry under this Act in connection with the
winding up of any company. Section
418 (2) confers to the
commissioner the same powers of summoning and examination of
witnesses and of requiring the production of
documents as the Master
who or Court which appointed him or her. The first respondent was
appointed by Court, the first respondent
therefore could and did
validly issue the summons of the second applicant.
In Lategan
and Others v Lategan and Others
2003 (6) SA 611
(D)
at
618
Magid J referred to
Jessel MR
in Re
Gold Co (1879) 12
ch D77
at
82
, in connection with rights of somebody
summoned in terms of s.115 of English Companies Act, which has a
large measure of similarity
with our s. 417 and quoted:
“
He is not more nor less than a mere
witness, like a witness in any other case; but he has this
protection, that in an ordinary action
the subpoena issues as a
matter of right at the option of the litigant, whereas in this case
it cannot be issued without the opinion
of the Judge of a Superior
Court being that it is a proper case in which to issue a summons,
which comes in lieu of the subpoena”
Magid J found that the authority
issuing summons is required to apply its mind to the question whether
it is a proper case to issue
summons whereas the authority issuing
the subpoena does not have that duty. In summing up the issues that
should be born in mind
by the Court in authorising an examination in
terms of s.417, he further referred at page 618 to authority in
Bernstein and Others v Bester and Others NO
[1996] ZACC 2
;
1996 (2) SA 751
(CC)
at
770 D-E
and quoted Ackermann J as follows :
“
Moreover, judicial control over the manner
in which the examination is conducted complements the control which
the Court exercises
over whether the examination should take place in
the first place. Courts have long recognised that the examination is
open to
abuse and that the proceedings ought to be watched carefully.
[39] An enquiry into the affairs
of Milkwood cannot be limited to investigation of monies owed to
Milkwood. The applicants suggest
that, the enquiry was sought in
order to benefit NJO; Milkwood had no claim against Erf 1109,
according to them there was no need
to enquire into the payments made
by or on behalf of Erf 1109 to Milkwood. In
Lordan’s
case
supra
, the Court’s view with regard to an
interrogation by a creditor, was that the matters investigated and
dealt with at the
meeting of creditors must have some immediate or
mediate bearing, actual or potential on the financial interests of at
least the
interrogating creditor. The scope of the s.417
investigation is no less extensive than that under s.415 and the
judicial dicta
regarding s.415 is equally applicable in relation to
s.417. An investigation into the affairs of Milkwood, above
interrogating
the payments received by Milkwood, would also include
those that have a bearing on the financial interest of the
interrogating
creditor, NJO in this instance.
[40] The first respondent had
ruled that Milkwood, Erf 1109 and NJO are interrelated. The
applicants have not sought a review of
the said decision . In my view
the summons called relevant information. The commissioner applied his
mind in this regard.
[41] I am not persuaded that any
of the applicants’ objections could not validly be raised at
the commission. They do not
justify the granting of an order setting
aside the summons.
[42] Similarly, I am not
persuaded that the applicants have made out a case for the granting
of the final interdict against the
first respondent from authorising
a summons to any of the first applicant’s employee in the
enquiry into the affairs of Milkwood.
Consequently, the application
is dismissed with costs.
_________________________
B MAJIKI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Counsel for the Applicant :
Advocate Olivier SC
Instructed by : Messrs
Sandenbergh Nel Haggard
c/o McWilliams & Elliot
Incorporated
83 Parliament Street
Central
PORT ELIZABETH
Counsel for the Respondent:
Advocate Coller
Instructed by : Messrs Rob
McWilliams Attorneys
11 Lenox Street
Glendinningvale
PORT ELIZABETH