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[2013] ZAECPEHC 62
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Gentech Engineering Plastics CC v Zimmer and Others; In Re: Gentech Engineering Plastics CC v Reddy and Others (2462/2008, 1422/2009) [2013] ZAECPEHC 62 (11 April 2013)
NOT
REPORTABLE
IN THE EASTERN CAPE
HIGH COURT
(SOUTH EASTERN CAPE
LOCAL DIVISION)
CASE
NO: 2462/2008
In the matter between
GENTECH ENGINEERING
PLASTICS CC Applicant
and
SHELDON MAURICE
ZIMMER First
Respondent
KEITH BLAKE
BELLING Second
Respondent
SIVALINGUM KEVIN
REDDY Third
Respondent
UREFLEX
CC Fourth
Respondent
CASE
NO: 1422/2009
In the matter between
GENTECH ENGINEERING
PLASTICS CC
Applicant
and
SIVALINGUM KEVIN
REDDY First
Respondent
KEITH BLAKE
BELLING Second
Respondent
SHELDON MAURICE
ZIMMER Third
Respondent
UREFLEX
CC Fourth
Respondent
GRAYMAUR CC
Fifth
Respondent
VOLKSWAGEN OF SOUTH
AFRICA (PTY)
LTD Sixth
Respondent
REVIEW
OF TAXATION JUDGMENT
HARTLE
J
1. The
applicant seeks a review, in terms of rule 48(1) of the Uniform Rules
of Court, of the
taxing master’s decision to reduce the hourly
rate of counsel retained by it in two separate applications in
circumstances
where the order of court envisaged the recovery of
costs on the scale as between attorney and client, including the
costs of two
counsel.
2. The
respondents successfully objected upon taxation that the hourly rate
charged by senior
and junior counsel retained by the applicant was
not reasonable having regard to the Eastern Cape Bar Council’s
guidelines
for counsel’s fees for their years of experience.
3. The
contentious items are the disbursements at items 59, 137, 158, 165,
216, 366, 397, 421
and 439 of the applicant’s bill of costs,
being the accounts of Advocates
A P Joubert
and
G D
Wickens
, the fees of whom the taxing master reduced from R3
000.00 to R2 000.00 and from R1 800.00 to R1 000.00 per hour
respectively.
(Their day fees were also ostensibly reduced from
R30 000.00 to R20 000.00 and from R18 000.00 to R10 000.00
respectively.)
4. The
applications in respect of which the costs order was granted related
to contempt of court
proceedings (in two separate applications)
subsequent to the breach by the first to fourth respondents of an
interdict order granted
against them in favour of the applicant.
5. The
trial court held that the first to fourth respondents acted willfully
and
mala fide
in breaching the interdict order and were guilty
of “
a serious case
” of contempt of court. In
his judgment,
Kroon
J noted and agreed with the submissions by
the applicant’s counsel that a punitive costs order was
justified due regard being
had to, firstly, the nature of the
proceedings which sought to uphold the dignity of the court and,
secondly, the first to fourth
respondents’ reprehensible
conduct which was described in the judgment as “
calculated,
devious and
(a)
persistent”
flouting of the
authority of the court.
Kroon
J further agreed with
counsels’ submission at the hearing that the manner in which
the first to fourth respondents had conducted
the various proceedings
was unacceptable.
6.
The
applicant contends (as it did at the taxation)
[1]
that since attorney and client costs were allowed, it was entitled
“
to
recover more than it would be entitled to recover on a party and
party basis to ensure that it was not out of pocket; an attorney
and
client costs order being punitive in nature
”.
7.
Additionally
it argued upon taxation that, having regard to the nature of the
application and its complexity, the matter not only
warranted the
costs of two counsel but especially counsel with Advocates
Joubert
and
Wickens’
experience and years of practice; and that the hourly rates charged
by them were commensurate with such experience and years of
practice.
[2]
8. The
taxing master – somewhat incompletely, duly stated a case in
terms of the provisions
of rule 48(3) as follows:
“
Has
the Taxing Master erred in reducing the Senior Counsel’s
rate?”
[3]
9.
His reasons for disallowing portions of counsels’ fees
was justified thus:
“
In the matter of
Nel v Waterberg Lanbouers Ko-operatiewe Vereeniging
1946 AD
597
(sic) it was stated that where the attorney and clients costs are
to be paid by the opposite party the taxation should be stricter
than
in a taxation as between attorney and client where costs are to be
paid by the client to his attorney. Based on this
authority the
Taxing Master rejected the Applicant’s submissions and reduced
the Senior Counsel’s account to R2 000.00,
which is a fee
generally allowed in this division for matters of this magnitude.”
10.
It
is abundantly plain that the applicant’s concerns in respect of
the affected items in the bill relate to the fees of both
counsel.
[4]
Although the taxing master’s stated case is framed as if
the dispute is limited to the complaint against the reduction
of
senior counsel’s fee only (and seemingly without reference to
the applicable scale and basis for the taxation), I expect
that the
justification above relates to the reduction of Advocate
Wicken’s
fee as well, and I will regard it as such. To re-submit the
matter to the taxing master to correct this shortcoming
will
only result in a further delay
[5]
and prejudice to the parties who are
ad
idem
regarding the items of dispute. Notwithstanding later
clarification that the affected items indeed concern the fees of
both
counsel,
[6]
the taxing master
has consciously chosen not to add anything to the stated case,
[7]
an unfortunate abdication of his responsibility to clearly define the
issues between the parties and to set out the relevant facts
to
assist the court.
[8]
11. The
taxing master has a discretion to allow, reduce or reject items in a
bill of costs. This discretion
must be exercised judicially in
the sense that he must act reasonably, justly and on the basis of
sound principles with due regard
to all the circumstances of the
case. A court is reluctant to interfere with his decisions upon
matters in respect of which
he is required to exercise a discretion
entrusted to him. The general principles governing interference
with the exercise
of a taxing master’s discretion have been
stated as follows:
“
The Court will not
interfere with the exercise of such discretion unless it appears that
the Taxing Master has not exercised his
discretion judicially and has
exercised it improperly, for example, by disregarding factors which
he should properly have considered,
or considering matters which it
was improper for him to have considered; or he has failed to bring
his mind to bear on the question
in issue; or he has acted on a wrong
principle. The Court will also interfere where it is of the
opinion that the Taxing
Master was clearly wrong but will only do so
if it is in the same position as, or a better position than, the
Taxing Master to
determine the point in issue… The Court
must be of the view that the Taxing Master was clearly wrong, ie its
conviction
on review that he was wrong must be considerably more
pronounced than would have sufficed had there been an ordinary right
to appeal.”
[9]
12.
A
review of taxation is, therefore, not strictly a “
review
”
in the sense of the court interfering only with the exercise of an
improper discretion; the powers of the court are wider
than the known
and recognized grounds to which a power of review is limited at
common law.
[10]
13.
The
Appellate Division judgment of
Nel
v Waterberg Landbouers Ko-operatiewe Vereeniging
[11]
is authority for the proposition relied on by the taxing master that
when a court has ordered a litigant to pay the other’s
costs as
between attorney and client and the bill is taxed against the losing
party, the taxing master should apply a “
stricter
taxation
”
than he would when taxing a bill as between an attorney and his
client, referred to in the judgment as an “
intermediate
basis of taxation
”.
[12]
The intermediate scale refers to costs somewhere between the party
and party scale, and that of (pure) attorney and own client
costs.
[13]
14.
Ostensibly
what was envisaged by this “
stricter
”
oversight is to rule out costs which a winning party has suffered in
prosecuting his case which are (
inter
alia
)
“
extraordinary
”,
or incurred “
unnecessarily
”
or “
superfluously
”
(and which cannot justly, and therefore lawfully, be recovered from
the losing party in any circumstances).
[14]
Included in those charges to be disallowed on taxation against the
losing party are “
charges
in the nature of luxuries incurred with the approval of the client,
who may happen to be a rich man”
and “
exceptionally
high fees to counsel
”
[15]
15. The
reason for the differentiation between the party and party scale and
that applicable when a taxing
master is required to tax a bill of
costs for payment to an attorney by his own client is essential “
to
prevent injustice
” to the losing party as a result of the
costs award against him, particularly since he was not a party to the
costs agreement
and to avoid a situation where he is fleeced by an
exorbitant assessment.
16. But
by the same token, the need to ensure the effectiveness of an order
for costs taxed as between attorney
and client cannot be overlooked.
Tindall
JA explains the rationale for a special costs order in
Nel (supra)
as follows:
“
The true
explanation of awards of attorney and client costs … seems to
be that,
by
reason of special considerations arising from the circumstances which
give rise to the action or from the conduct of the losing
party, the
court in a particular case considers it just, by means of such an
order, to ensure more effectually than it can do by
means of a
judgment for party and party costs that the successful party will not
be out of pocket in respect of the expense caused
to him by the
litigation.
Theoretically, a party and party bill taxed in accordance with the
tariff will be reasonably sufficient for that purpose.
But in
fact a party may have incurred expense which is reasonably necessary
but is not chargeable in the party and party bill.
See
Hearle
& McEwan v. Mitchell’s Executor
(1922, T.P.D. 192).
Therefore in a particular case the court
will try to ensure, as far as it can, that the successful party is
recouped.
I say “as far as it can” because there
may be a considerable difference between the amount of the attorney
and client
bill which a successful party is bound to pay to his own
attorney and the amount of an attorney and client bill which has been
taxed against the losing party. For instance, in the taxation
of the attorney’s bill against his client, the latter
could not
object to a special fee, however high, to counsel which he had
specially authorized. See
Hearle
& McEwan v. Mitchell’s Executor supra.”
[16]
(Emphasis added)
17.
In
Aircraft
Completions Centre (Pty) Ltd v Rossouw and Others (supra)
the
court noted that - whether in respect of either party and party or
attorney and client costs, the taxing master (when taxing
against the
losing party) is always required to adhere to the tariff. The
fact that a bill of costs is between attorney and
client does not
mean that the fees allowed should be more liberal or that they should
be on a higher scale. Departure from the
tariff may well be warranted
however where the taxing master in the exercise of his discretion
concludes that the case is “
extraordinary
or exceptional
”
within the meaning of Rule 70 (5) (a) of the Uniform Rules of
Court
[17]
and that it would,
for that reason, be inequitable to adhere strictly to the tariff.
This approach accords with that in
Nel
(supra)
vis-à-vis
identifying
the presence of “
special
considerations
”
arising from the particular circumstances calling for a fuller
indemnity.
[18]
18. In
this regard the court in
Aircraft Completions Centre
(
supra
)
emphasized the need for the taxing master to look to the objective of
an inter-party attorney and client costs order in order
to give it
practical realization: When the court makes a “
special
”
costs order that one party should pay the costs of another taxed as
between attorney and client, it does so for one of two
reasons.
The first (but not the main reason for such a special order) is
punitive. It is an expression of the court’s
censure of
reprehensible conduct on the part of the costs order that caused the
litigation or that made the proceedings unduly
burdensome. Such
censure is in itself punitive. It brings with it the punitive
consequences that the costs debtor’s
liability for costs will
be increased by the amount the taxing master finds to be justified in
the light of the second and main
reason for the special order.
19. The
latter, the second and main reason (the “
true explanation
”
referred to in
Nel
), is that the court making the order
considers it likely that, when the costs order comes to be taxed, it
will be found by the
taxing master that the reprehensible conduct of
the costs debtor that was censured by the court, was conduct that
caused the costs
creditor reasonably to incur extra costs that would
not be recoverable on a strict party and party taxation; and that
court considers
it just in the circumstances of the case to ensure
more effectually than it can do by means of a party and party costs
award that
the successful party will not be out of pocket in respect
of the expenses caused to him by the litigation.
20. For
this reason:
“
The
taxing master is … required to look to the circumstances in
which the court came to order one party to pay the costs
of another
taxed as between attorney and client. He must do so in order to
be able to consider whether, and to what extent,
the conduct of the
costs debtor that resulted in the special costs order also resulted
in the costs creditor’s having in
fact incurred additional
expenses that would not have been incurred but for the misconduct of
the costs debtor.”
[19]
21. Thus
where the attorney and client order follows not by agreement, but by
conduct giving rise to
the litigation, or conduct itself in relation
to the litigation which is reprehensible and deserving of the censure
of the court,
the order is not merely punitive but:
“
(i)t
implies that, to the extent that the inappropriate conduct of one of
the parties may, on taxation of costs, be found by the
taxing master
to have resulted in the other party’s having reasonably
incurred extra costs that would not be recoverable
on a taxation as
between party and party, such other party (the “
innocent
”
party, or “
victim
”
of the inappropriate conduct of the other party) should be afforded a
fuller indemnity for the costs that he has reasonably
incurred than
he would receive on a party and party taxation.”
[20]
22. The
latter approach is no different from that adopted by this court in
Loots v Loots (supra)
. It is suggested however that it
is self evident that, whether a taxation on an attorney and client
basis arises by agreement
between the parties or is ordered by the
court, the taxing master may when considering the particular
circumstances of the case
find them to be “
extraordinary or
exceptional
” within the meaning of Rule 70(5)(a). In the
exercise of his discretion, therefore, the taxing master may be
released, by
the provisions of that sub-rule from strict adherence to
the tariff in either case.
23. In
determining what circumstances ought to be singled out as warranting
a departure from a strict tariff,
the court noted that:
“
it
is generally a strong indicator to the Taxing Master that in the
Judge’s view the costs debtor has conducted his case in
such a
way as to be likely to have caused the costs creditor to incur costs
that ought to have been unnecessary and that may not
be recoverable
on a taxation as between party and party. Such a finding by the
Judge would therefore often lead the Taxing
Master to conclude that
the case is indeed an extraordinary or exceptional one for the
purposes of Rule 70(5)(a), and that a consideration
of the bill of
costs will show that strict adherence to the tariff would be
inequitable”.
[21]
24.
The
taxing master in this instance evidently did not even consider that
anything other than a strict basis was to be applied on
taxation
leading him to conclude (without any further question and seemingly
without even having regard to the usual factors in
determining what
is a reasonable fee for an advocate in respect of each attendance)
that common generally allowed rates (well at
least for senior
counsel) were applicable across the board for him, and exactly one
half of that for the junior advocate retained
by the applicant.
[22]
25.
The
impression gained from such approach is that he had no option other
than to stick to a fee which is generally allowable “
in
this division for matters of this magnitude
”
(what this standard is was nowhere explained), I assume leaning
conservatively toward what is recognized on a party and
party basis
(by whom and with reference to what it is not entirely clearly clear)
as being the accepted hourly (and daily) rate
for local counsel.
[23]
If this is what the taxing master understood by a “
stricter
taxation
”,
he clearly erred. Evidently the special costs award and the
stern comments of the trial judge warranted a taxation
on the
intermediate basis which, whilst it does indeed call for a stricter
taxation
vis-à-vis
the non client at the receiving end of an attorney and client award,
yet sanctions a departure from the tariff where applicable
amounting
to a more generous hand on taxation than would be permissible in
respect of the assessment of a standard party and party
bill of
costs.
Stegmann
J eloquently explains this difference in approach in
Aircraft
Completions Centre (supra)
:
“
…
the
‘intermediate’ basis of taxation established by
Nel
…was
not
the
same as the unduly restrictive basis that the English rule of court
had established within the jurisdiction of the English courts,
and
which had been criticised both by the English Court of Appeal in
Giles Randall,
above,
and by the
Appellate
Division in
Nel.
The
intermediate basis of taxation identified in
Nel
does
not have its origin in English law. It is a feature of South African
law and practice confirmed by the decision in
Nel.
It
allows the costs creditor who has an order for payment by his
opponent of costs taxed as between attorney and client, to recover
from the costs debtor what may, depending upon the circumstances of
the particular case, amount to a substantially fuller indemnity
than
he could recover on a party and party taxation. Within the bounds of
reasonableness in the circumstances of the case, the
taxing master is
expected to tax such a bill generously. He should allow rates that
may reasonably exceed the tariff if the work
was of some complexity
and was made unduly burdensome by whatever conduct on the part of the
costs debtor caused the court to make
an order for attorney and
client costs
.
On the same basis, the taxing master should allow periods of time for
consultations, and for other work ordinarily charged on
a time basis,
that may reasonably exceed the time that he would allow if taxing
strictly as between party and party.”
[24]
(Emphasis added)
26. Seemingly
in casu
the taxing master erroneously reflected that a
stricter taxation demanded a conservative assessment without regard
to the special
considerations applicable which the trial court had in
mind when imposing the costs award, the clear objective of which, to
my
mind, was to ensure that the applicant was indemnified more
completely than could be achieved by an order for party and party
costs,
in respect of the costs to which the litigation had put it.
27.
The
limitation or safeguard to be applied on taxation then is not the
application of a rote restrictive tariff (which seemingly
in the
perception of the taxing master limits the recovery to nothing more
than a strict party and party permissible fee for counsel),
[25]
but the considerably less stringent criterion that costs of the kind
for which the costs creditor has incurred liability
reasonably
should be allowed as against the costs debtor to prevent injustice to
him, while at the same time allowing the applicant to receive
a
fuller indemnity than a party and party taxation would provide for
all reasonable additional costs to which the respondents’
conduct that received the trial court’s reproach may have put
it. In this regard the taxing master considered the aspect
of
the reasonableness of counsels’ fees from an entirely wrong
premise, if he considered that they were reasonable at all
except for
the generalized manner in which he appears to have decided the issue.
28. The
taxing master is obliged to remain aware:
“
that
it is the intention of the court that has ordered a taxation as
between attorney and client that the costs creditor should
have a
full indemnity for the costs to which the litigation has put him,
except for luxurious, extravagant, unnecessary and other
types of
unreasonable expense that it would be an injustice to impose upon the
costs debtor.”
[26]
29. Beyond
the basic assumption that a stricter rate for senior counsel’s
fee was warranted, the taxing
master did not suggest that such
charges were incurred unnecessarily or that his attendances were
superfluous or beyond what was
reasonable to advance the prosecution
of the applications. The respondents’ submissions too, in
respect of the rates adhered
to by counsel, were that they were not
reasonable, but only in relation to the guidelines proposed by the
Eastern Cape Bar Council
pertaining to their hourly (and daily)
rates. Evidently no thought was given by the taxing
master (or the respondents
for that matter) to the question whether
the applicant - by virtue of the special costs award, was not
entitled rather to as full
an indemnity as possible in the peculiar
circumstances of the matter and in relation to the specific invoices
in contention.
Against that yardstick reasonableness was not
assessed. The taxing master ought to have addressed his mind to the
question of the
extent to which the extraordinary or exceptional
nature of the case (undoubtedly evidenced by the trial judge’s
stern remarks
and rounded criticism of the respondents in their
attitude towards the matter, the dignity of the court and the
reprehensible manner
in which they had conducted themselves in the
conduct of the proceedings) caused the applicant reasonably to incur
costs of counsel
in excess of the run-of-the-mill generally
allowed fee per hour (and day) permitted in party and party
taxations.
He ought to allow such fees charged by counsel or to
tax them off only to the extent that they inflict injustice upon the
respondents.
30. I
have already expressed the observation above that the presence of the
special considerations arising
in this matter, with particular
reference to the trial judge’s comments and the nature of the
special costs award, ought
to have operated in my view in favour of
the applicant in the sense that the intermediate basis as required by
Nel
should have been generous to the extent required by it so
as to give the applicant the fullest indemnity envisaged, which
to the extent that it is justified by the circumstances of the case
may exceed the ordinary and generally allowable party and party
sanctioned rates for counsel, an indemnity which the taxing master
appears to have thought was rendered inappropriate following
his
narrow interpretation of the manner in which he was required to tax
the bill of costs.
31. The
taxing master ought to have examined each affected invoice in the
bill to determine whether equity
requires that the fees charged
therein should have been allowed on a basis more generous to the
applicant than that of the tariff
or generally accepted basal rate
for senior or junior counsel as the case may be. By the
reduction of counsel’s fees
on a general basis, the applicant
was in my judgment placed in an inequitable position which was not
intended by the trial court
in awarding the special costs order
32. In
the result it follows in my view that the taxing master has failed to
exercise his discretion in a
proper manner, justifying an order that
his reduction of both senior and junior counsels’ fees in the
circumstances be set
aside and the bill of costs remitted to him to
consider the applicant’s entitlement afresh.
33. The
review accordingly succeeds with costs, which I fix in the sum of R1
500.00, plus vat.
34. I
issue the following order:
1.
the taxing master’s rulings in respect of items 59, 137,
158, 165, 216, 366, 397, 421 and
439 referred to in the applicant’s
bill of costs are each set aside;
2.
the bill is remitted to the taxing master to reconsider the
affected items afresh with due regard
to the provisions of Rule
70(5)(a) in the light of,
inter alia,
the nature of the
special costs award; the special considerations arising from the
circumstances which gave rise to the applications
or from the conduct
of the respondents; the sentiments expressed by the trial judge in
his judgment; this judgment and such information
and arguments as the
parties may wish to present on that occasion; and
3.
the respondents are to pay the applicant’s costs of the review,
fixed in the sum of R1 500.00,
plus vat.
_________________
B
C HARTLE
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
Date
of Judgment: 11
April 2013
For
the applicant: Rushmere Noach Incorporated, 5 Ascot Office
Park, Conyngham Road, Greenacres, Port Elizabeth (ref. Ms L
Koorsse/mt/MAT17890).
For
the respondents: Friedman Scheckter Attorneys, 75 Second Avenue,
Newton Park, Port Elizabeth (ref. Mr G Friedman/ps/L06259).
[1]
It appears from the taxing master’s stated case that the
applicant argued in reply that the costs payable by the respondents
were ordered on an attorney and client basis, hence did not fall to
be reduced as being excessive as contended for by the respondents.
This is confirmed by its Notice in terms of rule 48(1) and (2) in
which it went further contending that, by the reduction, it
had been
placed in an inequitable position which was not intended by the
trial court in awarding the special costs order.
[2]
This is to be gleaned from the applicant’s notice in terms of
rule 48(1) and (2). The taxing master does not
deal with
this aspect in the stated case at all.
[3]
A more comprehensive description of what is in issue is whether, in
the light of the special costs order, the taxing master correctly
reduced the rate of both senior and junior counsel to bring it in
line with generally allowable fees charged by counsel on a
party and
party basis.
[4]
The disputed items are referenced by number in the applicant’s
rule 48(1) and (2) notice and the taxing master could not
have been
under any misapprehension as to the fact that the complaint related
to the reduction of both counsels’ fees.
[5]
There appears to have been a considerable delay in the allocation of
the review to a judge.
[6]
The respondents’ attorneys noted especially in their notice in
terms of rue 48(5)(c) that the taxing master’s submissions
had
not dealt with the allowable fees with regard to junior counsel, yet
aligned themselves with his “
decision
and reasoning
”.
[7]
I refer in this regard to the taxing master’s report
contemplated by the provisions of section 48(5)(b).
[8]
Rule 48(1) behoves the taxing master in clear and explicit terms to
state a case for the decision of a Judge, which case shall
set out
each item or part of an item with the grounds of the objection
advanced at the taxation and shall embody any relevant
finding of
facts by the taxing master. See
Fourie
v The Taxing Master
1983 (4) SA 210
(O) at 211G - H in which the purpose and necessity
for this function is expounded upon.
[9]
Visser
v Gubb
1981 (3) SA 753
(C) at 745H - 755C.
[10]
Legal
and General Assurance Society Ltd v Lieberum NO
1968 (1) SA 473
(A) at 478G.
[11]
1946 AD 597.
[12]
Nel
(supra)
at 608.
[13]
Aircraft
Completions Centre (Pty) Ltd v Rossouw & Others
2004
(1) SA 123
(W) at par [54].
[14]
Nel
supra
at
606.
[15]
Nel
supra
at 608.
[16]
At 607 – 608.
[17]
Rule 70(5)(a) provides that the taxing master shall be entitled, in
his discretion, at any time to depart from any of the provisions
in
the High Court tariff “
in
extraordinary or exceptional cases, where strict adherence to such
provisions would be inequitable
.”
[18]
See
in this regard
Loots
v Loots
1974 (1) SA 431
(E) where in a matter where the plaintiff in a
divorce action agreed in a consent paper to pay the defendant’s
taxed party
and party costs, the court held that, in taxing the bill
the taxing master is bound to apply, or at least to be fairly guided
by, the scale of fees provided in the tariff in Rule 70, and only to
depart from it when in his discretion, extraordinary or exceptional
cases present themselves where strict adherence would be
inequitable.
[19]
At
par [80].
[20]
At pages 157 – 158, par [80] & [81].
[21]
At page 16, par [92].
[22]
Ostensibly
the taxing master’s treatment of the affected items flowing
from a taxation on a strict party and party basis
led him to deal
with the quantum of the junior advocate’s fee on the basis
provided for in Rule 69 (2), this notwithstanding
that not every
attendance of the junior advocate was a tandem attendance with the
senior advocate.
[23]
It
bears mentioning that both senior and junior counsel retained by the
applicant were from Johannesburg.
[24]
At par [62]
[25]
Stegmann
J
criticises the notion that this conservative assessment applies
where taxation on an intermediate basis is indicated.
[26]
At
the end of par [62].