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[2012] ZAECPEHC 5
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Musket Ltd v Roux and Another (3687/11) [2012] ZAECPEHC 5 (31 January 2012)
IN THE HIGH COURT
OF SOUTH AFRICA
EASTERN CAPE
DIVISION – PORT ELIZABETH
CASE NO: 3687/11
Heard: 15 December
2011`
Delivered: 31 January
2012
In the matter
between
:
MUSTEK LIMITED
…...................................................................................
APPLICANT
and
MATILDA MARIE ROUX
…..............................................................
1
ST
RESPONDENT
BENEFIT IT SERVICES
(PTY) LTD
t/a METRO COMPUTER
SERVICES
…...........................................
2
ND
RESPONDENT
___________________________________________________________________
JUDGMENT
___________________________________________________________________
MAGEZA AJ
[1] Applicant approached
this Court by way of urgency seeking the following relief:
“
1…
2. That the First
Respondent be and is hereby declared to be in contempt of the order
issued by this Court in Mustek Limited v Matilda
Marie Roux and
Others (Unreported) under case No. 345/11 delivered on 1 April 2011
(“the order”);
3. That the First
Respondent is directed to pay a fine of R10 000,00 by no later
than 15h00 on 14 December 2011, such fine
being payable at the office
of the Registrar of this Court;
4. That the First
Respondent is sentenced to three months imprisonment in the event of
the fine mentioned above not being paid timeously,
fully or at all;
5. That the First
Respondent is sentenced to three months imprisonment, wholly
suspended until 12 February 2012, on condition that
she not again be
committed for contempt of the order during the period of suspension;
6. In the alternative to
paragraphs 3 to 5,that this Honourable Court impose such fine and/or
imprisonment on the First Respondent
as it may deem fit;
7. To the extent only
that it may be deemed necessary, that it be declared that the 12
month period referred to in paragraph 6 of
the order terminates on 12
February 2012;
8. That the First
Respondent pay the costs of this application on an attorney and
client scale;
9. That in the event of
the Second Respondent opposing this application, it be ordered to pay
the costs of the application on a
party and party scale jointly and
severally with the First Respondent, the one paying the other to be
absolved.”
The relief sought is not
opposed by the Second Respondent.
[2] The salient
background covers by way of detail that First Respondent was
previously employed by the Applicant, an Information
Technology
company whose main business entails the assembly, marketing, sale,
distribution and support of computer hardware. First
Respondent was
employed as a Regional Sales Manager and later promoted to Divisional
Director exclusively managing Applicant’s
sales relationships
with its customers within the Eastern Cape Province for a period of
about 10 years. In sum, she had been in
the employ of the Applicant
for a total of some 17 years. In this last senior position, she
became the face of the Applicant’s
business. Her employment
with Applicant came to an end when she submitted a letter of
resignation dated 11 November 2010, which
resignation was contingent
on her serving a three month notice period ending February 2011. As
part and parcel of the First Respondent’s
employment agreement,
a restraint of trade clause in favour of Applicant bound her not to
accept employment for 12 months with
any of the Applicant’s
competitors in the event of the termination of her employment with
Applicant. It is common cause that
the agreed restraint period is a
12 month period from date of termination of the employees’
services with the employer. One
of the principal differences of
opinion in this dispute is the date on which such termination took
effect.
[3] Following what the
Applicant refers to as a previous breach of this restraint provision,
Applicant sought and successfully obtained
an interdict against the
First Respondent under Case No 345/11 before Alkema J on 1
April
2011. Save to say First Respondent had in the aforesaid matter, been
found by Alkema J to have taken up an employment opportunity
with a
competitor in contravention of the restraint alluded to above, and
the Court having made the Order on which the present
relief is
premised, the balance of the facts therein are not particularly
material for my findings herein.
[4] The Contempt of Court
alleged and on which the Applicant proceeds, is founded on
Applicant’s view that the only reasonable
construction or
interpretation of that Court’s Order is that despite the
resignation (subject to the 3 month notice period)
having been
tendered on 11 November 2010, the resignation was effective only from
12 February 2011 and the restraint consequently
expires on 12
February 2012. The reasoning, in Applicant’s view, underlying
this proposition is set out in its founding and
replying papers as
will be evident herein.
[5] Paragraph 6 of the
Order of Alkema J confirming the Interdictory relief is worded as
follows:
“…
The
order set out in paragraphs 1.1 to 1.5 of the
Rule
Nisi
,
as amended above, shall operate against first respondent for a period
of 12 months calculated
from
the date of her resignation from her employment with applicant
.”
(my underlining).
Applicant contends that
in flagrant disregard of the Order of Alkema J, the First Respondent
on 14 November 2011, yet again took
up employment with a competitor
of the Applicant, the Second Respondent, in breach of the restraint
and in contempt of the Order.
That despite this transgression being
brought to her attention by way of a letter dated 16 November 2011,
First Respondent refused
to desist from her unlawful conduct. Second
Respondent is, as the name suggests, an Information Technology entity
based in Port
Elizabeth. Applicant describes the Second Respondent as
a competitor in the fields of the sale, marketing, distribution and
support
of computer products and services in the Eastern Cape within
the Municipal and Government markets as well as in the corporate
field.
[6] The First
Respondent’s challenge to the relief sought, ably argued on her
behalf by Mr Moorhouse, is based on the following
propositions, that;
6.1 First Respondent
disputes that the restraint commenced 12 February 2011 and contends
that the same took effect on the date of
the submission of the notice
to resign dated 11 November 2010;
6.2 The Second Respondent
does not carry on business in competition with the Applicant;
6.3 The First Respondent
furthermore contends that she commenced her employment with the
Second Respondent in the
bona fide
belief that the Order had
ceased to be of effect on 11 November 2011, a belief said by First
Respondent to have been strengthened
by legal advice received by her
from her legal advisors. This being the position it is argued,
nothing suggests that First Respondent
acted wilfully and
mala
fide
in the alleged disobedience of the Order.
[7] Applicant in reply
emphasises that First Respondent was at all material times aware of
the provisions of her employment agreement
inclusive of the
requirement of serving a 3 month notice period prior to the formal
effective termination of her employment. Applicant
contends that
despite the Applicant opting to accelerate the payment of her salary
for the agreed 3 month notice period, she remained
employed for the
period paid for and could therefore not claim such period as part of
the agreed restraint period. Applicant contends
that the practice of
relieving a senior employee in a sensitive position such as that
occupied by the First Respondent immediately
upon resigning is a
standard practice to prevent what is feared as potential prejudice
that could be caused to the employer by
an incumbent with possibly
conflicting interests.
[8] Applicant repeats the
assertion that Second Respondent is a competitor and provides as an
example instances of communications
previously exchanged between
itself and Second Respondent relating to price comparisons in respect
of the supply of equipment tendered
for from an educational facility
in the Western Cape. Relevant emails are annexed to Applicant’s
papers. Quite curiously,
some of these emails requesting comparative
quotes and prices from Applicant were penned by the First Respondent
in the days immediately
after she left the Applicant to take up the
position in the Second Respondent’s business.
[9] In considering the
first contention pertaining to when exactly the resignation took
effect, it is important to refer to the
reasons alluded to by Alkema
J in coming to his finding where, in particular at paragraph 9 of his
judgment, he commented:
“
The
outcome of the hearing was that the first respondent was relieved of
her duties as Divisional Director, and she was offered
the position
as Sales Executive. Her response was to resign from the employment of
applicant.
Her
letter of resignation became effective on 12 February 2011
.
She intended to commence employment with Fourth Respondent from 1
March 2011.
All
of the aforesaid is common cause between the parties
.”
(my underlining).
Moreover, at paragraph
78, the learned Judge had this to say;
“
The
effect of the aforesaid is that the first respondent will be
restricted in her freedom to trade for 12 months calculated from
her
date of resignation in the geographical area of the Eastern Cape
Province only…”
[10] Clause 9.2 of the
employment agreement provided that;
“
Subject
to compliance with provisions of the Act the parties shall during the
currency of this agreement have the right to terminate
the employment
relationship:
9.2.1. …
9.2.2. On 3 (three)
months written notice to the other party where the reason for the
termination is based on a no fault termination.”
[11] First Respondent
addressed a letter on 11 November 2010 to Applicant tendering her
resignation worded in the following terms:
“
Clearly
our relationship no longer has the element of trust. In light thereof
I hereby tender my resignation effective 11 November
2010.
My three month notice
period shall start on 12 November 2010. Please indicate as to whether
you require me to work my notice period
or to be paid in lieu
thereof.”
Applicant elected to pay
the First Respondent all her salary and emoluments for the said 3
month notice period on the condition
that she vacates its premises
that same day. As is evident from the judgment of Alkema J, despite
the Applicant’s decision
to financially settle the three month
salary without requiring the First Respondent to provide it with the
services contracted
for in its employment agreement, the effective
date of resignation still remained 12 February 2011. The reference by
Alkema J at
paragraph 9 of his reasons could not be clearer and all
ambiguity is removed by his reference therein that this effective
date
was at the time, common cause between the parties. It is also
clear from the Court’s comments that the First Respondent had
at the time abided the 3 month notice period well aware of her
responsibilities towards the Applicant for the accelerated salary
payment made to her encompassing the notice period. She was aware
that she was still bound to the Applicant and could not take
up
employment in the paid-for period until, in her view, 1 March 2011.
This view turned out to be correct save to add that this
meant the
restraint provisions in her employment contract did not allow her to
take up employment with competitors for another
12 months from the
effective date of termination, 12 February 2011. The restraint
provisions were found to be valid by Alkema J,
who in the process
stated that Applicant’s interests in the sanctity of the
contract weighed quantitatively and qualitatively
against the First
Respondent’s interests not to be restricted in her economic
activity and productivity thus upholding the
principle of
pacta
servanda sunt
.
[12] Taking into account
not only that a simple reading of the judgment contains this
reference to the effective date of resignation
as 12 February 2011,
but also the fact that this had been an issue that had been common
cause between the First Respondent and
the parties involved in the
said matter, it eludes me as to how the First Respondent would now
assert the contrary in her papers
before me in this sequel. I am also
at a loss as to how First Respondent can confidently state that her
legal advisors had gainsaid
the explicit finding by the said Court
that the effective date had in those proceedings been collectively
acknowledged and agreed
as 12 February 2011 and advised her
otherwise.
[13] Mr Moorhouse argued
that the act of resignation is a unilateral act by an employee and is
an act which validly terminates the
employment contract and
relationship between the employer and employee from the moment that
the employer becomes aware of the said
resignation. On this basis he
argued therefore that the First Respondent’s employment with
the Applicant was terminated on
11 November 2010, that is, on the
date of her resignation. Mr Moorhouse referred me to,
inter alia,
the decision in
Mafika v South African Broadcasting
Corporation Ltd
[2010] 5 BLLR 542
(LC).
For a start, this
decision is distinguishable as the contract involved therein was a 36
month fixed term contract as opposed to
that pertinent herein, that
is, a long term contract making provision for a 3 month notice
period. All that was at issue in the
said decision was whether the
Applicant therein, having sent an SMS (short message service)
communicating through a mobile phone
with his employer that he ”quit
with immediate effect”, then changing his mind 6 weeks later,
was a lawful and binding
notice of resignation from the moment it
came to the employer’s attention and became irrevocable without
requiring acceptance
by the employer.
On the contrary, I am
persuaded by the decision of Cheadle AJ in
Lottering v
Stellenbosch Municipality
[2010] 12 BLLR 1306
(LC)
, where he had
this to say at para 14 and 15:
“
14.
In an indefinite contract, either party may terminate the contract on
notice. A resignation in this context is simply the termination
by
the employer on notice. There does not have to be a specific
provision to that effect, it is an inherent feature of an indefinite
contract and if there is no agreed notice, the notice must be
reasonable (provided that it is not less than the minimum notice
prescribed in section 37 of the BCEA). If the contract is for a fixed
term, the contract may only be terminated on notice if there
is a
specific provision permitting termination on notice during the
contractual period – it is not a feature of this kind
of
contract and accordingly requires specific stipulation.
15. The common law rules
relating to termination on notice by an employee can be summarised as
follows:
15.1 Notice of
termination must be unequivocal (
Putco Ltd v TV & Radio
Guarantee Co (Pty) Ltd
1985 (4) SA 809
(SCA) at 830E).
15.2 Once communicated, a
notice of termination cannot be withdrawn unless agreed (
Rustenburg
Town Council v Minister of Labour
1942 TPD 220
and
Du Toit v
Sasko (Pty) Ltd
(1999) 20 ILJ 1253 (LC)).
15.3 …
15.4
Subject to the
waiver of the notice period and the possible summary termination of
the contract by the employer during the period
of notice, the
contract does not terminate on the date the notice is given but when
the notice period expires (
SALSTAFF obo Bezuidenhout v
Metrorail
[2001] 9 BALR 926 (AMSSA) at paragraph [6]).”
(my underlining).
This in my view disposes
of the contention that the resignation took effect on 11 November
2010 prior to the notice period being
served. First Respondent does
not propose that the Applicant waived the notice period provided for
in the agreement. The Applicant
has performed its obligations in
accordance with the agreement by in fact settling her emoluments for
the full 3 month period and
First Respondent happily accepted this
accelerated payment. All that First Respondent was reciprocally
expected to do in turn was
to honour the notice period without the
need for her to present herself to Applicant’s offices on a
daily basis due to what
Applicant says it feared and as a
precautionary measure.
[15] I have already
pointed out that despite Second Respondent being joined in these
proceedings, it did not oppose the relief sought
by Applicant. It
thus fell on First Respondent to raise issue with whether the Second
Respondent is a competitor of Applicant operating
within the sphere
of product sales and supply as well as client base. First Respondent
offers a simple denial that the Second Respondent
is such a
competitor but does not offer any assistance by way of explaining
what her intended future employer precisely does. Her
own expertise
is in Information Technology and indeed she has been hailed as having
had a stellar and impressive history in that
field whilst with
Applicant. There is no suggestion that she is looking to engage in
any vocation other than what she is best qualified
to do, that is,
continued sales and marketing within the sector.
[16] When considering the
meaning of a provision contained in an Order of Court,
“
The
basic principles applicable to construing documents also apply to the
construction of a court’s judgment or order: the
court’s
intention is to be ascertained primarily from the language of the
judgment or order as construed according to the
usual, well known
rules. See
Garlicke
v Smartt and Another
,
1928 A.D. 82
at 87;
West
Rand Estates Ltd, v New Zealand Insurance Co. Ltd
1926 A.D. 173
at p.188. Thus, as in the case of a document, the
judgment or order and the court’s reasons for giving it must be
read as
a whole in order to ascertain its intention.” –
per Trollip J.A.,
Firestone
South Africa (Pty) Ltd v Genticuro A.G.
1977 (4) SA 298
(A) at 304
D-F
.
[17] Contempt of court as
an offence is fundamental to the administration of justice and the
rule of law. It:
“
requires
that the dignity and authority of the courts, as well as their
capacity to carry out their functions, should always be
maintained”
Per Sachs J in,
Coetzee
v Government of the Republic of South Africa; Matiso v Commanding
Officer, Port Elizabeth Prison
[1995] ZACC 7
;
1995 (4) SA 631
(CC).
Furthermore:
“
It
permits a private litigant who has obtained a court order requiring
an opponent to do or not do something
(ad
factum praestandum)
,
to approach the court again, in the event of non compliance, for
a further order declaring the non compliant party in
contempt of
court, and imposing a sanction.”
See:
Fakie NO v CCII
Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA 326
(SCA) at page 332 para C-D per
Cameron JA (as he then was).
[18] The test for when
disobedience of a civil order constitutes Contempt has come to be
stated as whether the breach was committed
‘deliberately and
mala fide
’. See:
Frankel Max Pollak Vinderine Inc v
Menell Jack Hyman Rosenberg Co Inc
[1996] ZASCA 21
;
1996
(3) SA 355.
[19] In
Fakie NO
(above) the court at p 333 para C-E, went on to state:
“
A
deliberate disregard is not enough, since the non complier may
genuinely, albeit mistakenly, believe him or herself entitled
to act
in the way claimed to constitute the contempt. In such a case, good
faith avoids the infraction. Even a refusal to comply
that is
objectively unreasonable may be
bona
fide
(though
unreasonableness could evidence lack of good faith).
These requirements –
that the refusal to obey should be both wilful and
mala fide
,
and that unreasonable non compliance, provided it is
bona
fide
, does not constitute contempt – accord with the
broader definition of the crime, of which non compliance with
civil
orders is a manifestation. They show that the offence is
committed not by mere disregard of a court order, but by the
deliberate
and intentional violation of the court’s dignity,
repute or authority that this evinces. Honest belief that
non compliance
is justified or proper is incompatible with that
intent.”
[20] As regards the
standard of proof required, the decision of Pickering J in
Uncedo
Taxi Service Association v Maninjwa & Others
1998 (3) SA 417
(ECD) at page 428 para A to the effect:
“
In
my view, therefore, insofar as the summary procedure by way of notice
of motion places an
onus
upon
the offender and requires proof of guilt only upon a balance of
probabilities, it is in conflict with the Constitution and
such
conflict is neither reasonable nor justifiable in terms of s 36. I am
in the circumstances satisfied that in motion proceedings
the guilt
of the offender must be proved beyond reasonable doubt…”
[21] This position has
since been confirmed by the full bench of this court in
Burchell v
Burchell
[2006] JOL 16722
(E). There the court found (a) that
‘civil contempt’ remains a criminal offence and that a
Respondent is an accused
person; (b) that whilst the Applicant has to
prove the elements of civil contempt beyond reasonable doubt, the
application procedure
is constitutionally competent to accommodate
the altered onus.
[22] I am not persuaded
that Applicant and her legal representatives could misinterpret the
Order of Alkema J preceded in his reasoning
by the reference to the
effective date of resignation as being 12 February 2011. The
authorities clearly require that the Order
be read in context and
within the ambit of the judgment as a whole without isolating the
Order. This position was on a plain reading
of the judgment one which
was commonly understood to be so by the parties at the time and
accepted by the Court on that basis.
I can come to no conclusion
other than that First Respondent was and remains well aware that this
is the position. This being the
case, Applicant and her legal
advisors could not have entertained a
bona fide
belief that it
could commence employment prior to the lapse of the restraint period
dating the 12 months from 12 February 2011.
Furthermore, I am also
unable to find any support for the First Respondent’s denial
that the Second Respondent is a competitor
in the terms and manner
alluded to by Applicant. Indeed, once she took up employment with the
Second Respondent, First Respondent
brazenly communicated by email
sourcing product from Applicant for onward supply. There was a
product supply agreement between
Second Respondent and Applicant,
which supply agreement was understandably cancelled by Applicant on
First Respondent taking up
employment with Second Respondent. She had
joined them well aware of the nature of this business model and in
contravention of
the restraint.
I say this mindful of the
unfortunate consequences that flow from this type of infraction. The
bar to reach in order to come to
the conclusion that a Respondent
acted wilfully and
mala fide
is not light and proof beyond
reasonable doubt is the imperative standard. I have no doubt in the
present matter that on the facts,
this obligatory requirement has
been met. Not only does the Order of Alkema J (read in the context of
the reasons and judgment
as a whole) not present doubt or ambiguity,
it alludes to the effective date of her resignation as one commonly
understood to be
the case at the time that that matter was heard.
Moreover, the plain language of the judgment and Order avoids any
obscurity or
double meaning. First Respondent’s allegation that
she was wrongly advised provides little detail and is unsupported by
any
evidence of, for example, communications exchanged with legal
advisors, something which is normally the case in matters of such
importance. She knew with complete precision and particularity that
Second Respondent’s business interests were of the same
nature
as that of the Applicant. She herself was involved in requesting
comparative pricing from Applicant. I can do no more than
refer to
the decision of Alkema J in the previous matter where he stated that
this restraint of trade agreement is in place to
prevent the
salesperson from damaging the business of the employer, which damage
may be considerable or even fatal, and the employer
has a right to
expect the Courts to enforce the terms of such agreement.
[23] I am also
sufficiently satisfied that this matter is urgent. First Respondent
took up employment on 14 November 2011 and a
demand for her to desist
was addressed to her 2 days later on 16 November 2011. She refused to
abide by the demand and failed to
assuage the Applicant’s
distress by providing it with the undertaking required of her by 17
November 2011. This conduct being
in the correct view of Applicant
evidently in breach of the restraint Order, necessitated an immediate
response.
In
Protea Holdings Ltd
v Wriwt and Another
1978 (3) SA 865
(W)
at 868H, Nestadt J held
that as:
“
One
of the objects of contempt proceedings is by punishing the guilty
party to compel performance of the order, it seems to me that
the
element or urgency would be satisfied if in fact it was shown that
the respondents were continuing to disregard the order of
3 August
1977. If this be so, the applicant is entitled, as a matter of
urgency, to attempt to get the respondents to desist by
the penalty
referred to being imposed.”
In addition, it is
certainly in the public interest that in the administration of
justice and the vindication of the Constitution
that an ongoing
failure or refusal to obey an Order of Court is a matter attended by
urgency and must be dealt with as expeditiously
as circumstances and
the dictates of fairness allow. – See in this regard the
observations of Plasket AJ in
Victoria Park Ratepayers Association
v Greyvenouw CC and Others
[2004] 3 All SA 623
(SE)
at paras [26]
and [27].
[24] In the view I take
of the matter and there being no evidence to establish a reasonable
doubt both in so far as the effective
date of the resignation and
date of lapse of the restraint being 12 February 2012, as well as the
fact that Second Respondent is
a competitor, I am left with little
else but to find that the principles governing Contempt of Court have
been established beyond
reasonable doubt.
[25] In arriving at a
proper sentence a Court must have regard to the triad of factors,
that is, the crime, offender and interests
of society. -
S v Zinn
1969 (2) SA 537
(A).
Furthermore punishment must be reasonable,
taking into account the individual’s moral blameworthiness. All
factors in mitigation
and aggravation must be similarly considered.
One of the difficulties of sanctioning an errant respondent in these
sort of proceedings
is the dearth of suitable precedent, taking into
account the specific facts of the case at hand. The facts herein are
based on
a restraint of trade as a tool for the protection of private
commercial and business interests. The infraction arises simply by
reason of the breach of the Order in the sense of taking up
employment with another and not so much by causing the harm the
restraint
seeks to protect, for example, by inveigling the customers
of the erstwhile employer. In other words, unlike in theft cases
where
some object or item is in fact appropriated or an attempt is
made to unlawfully appropriate with an intention to deprive its
owner,
no such act is required to commit the offence. There is
consequently no discernible loss to the employer. The offence has
been
authoritatively described in the following terms:
“
In
the hands of a private party, the application for committal for
contempt is a peculiar amalgam, for it is a civil proceeding
that
invokes a criminal sanction or its threat. And while the litigant
seeking enforcement has a manifest private interest in securing
compliance, the court grants enforcement also because of the broader
public interest in obedience of its orders, since disregard
sullies
the authority of the courts and detracts from the rule of law.”
See Fakie N.O. v CCII
Systems (Pty) Ltd
[2006] ZASCA 52
;
2006 (4) SA 326
(SCA) at 334 F-G.
I do not imagine that
this exposition of the law intends to convey that the underlying
premise for the infraction, in this case
the breached restraint
clause, should not guide the Court in assessing and weighing the
various factors in an attempt to arrive
at a suitable penalty. Indeed
I imagine that would constitute weighty misdirection. In the matter
before me for example the most
part of the restraint was indeed
observed and served. This is a factor that I must consider. First
Respondent took up employment
less than 3 months before the expiry of
the restraint. This restraint lapses on 12 February 2012 from which
date First Respondent
can lawfully pursue her career and make a
living. There is, to all intents and purposes, no more than a
moderate number of weeks
left of this restraint and she did dutifully
observe the overwhelmingly substantial part thereof. There is also no
real or actual
loss occasioned the Applicant.
[26] The next factor to
take into cognisance is that this being a civil matter, costs
ordinarily follow the result and if, as I
intend to order, the
Respondent is to pay the Costs herein, she will needless to say be
more disadvantaged than an offender appearing
in connection with an
ordinary criminal matter. This is another peculiarity of civil
Contempt. Clearly she has been unemployed
for a considerable duration
whilst lawfully abiding the restraint. In this period she was clearly
without income and a substantial
fine in itself may well be imposing
an unaffordable obligation. Direct imprisonment without the option of
a fine is certainly out
of the question.
[27] I am of the view
that in all the circumstances, the following Order must ensue;
The Application
succeeds.
First Respondent is
found guilty of Contempt of Court.
In the result First
Respondent is directed to pay a fine of R1 000.00 by no later
than 15 February 2012.
In the event of the fine
mentioned above not being paid timeously fully or at all, First
Respondent is to undergo ten days imprisonment.
First Respondent is to
pay the costs herein. .
______________________
MAGEZA AJ
FOR APPLICANT: ADV
S.C.
RORKE SC
INSTRUCTED BY: SWEIDAN
ATTORNEYS C/O
NELSON ATTORNEYS
60A WORRAKER STREET
NEWTON PARK
PORT ELIZABETH
TEL- 041 365 6463
FOR FIRST RESPONDENT:
MR A.C. MOORHOUSE
INSTRUCTED BY: BUKKY
OLOWOOKORUN ATTORNEYS
70 SECOND AVENUE
NEWTON PARK
PORT ELIZABETH
TEL
– 072 497 0745
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