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[2010] ZAECPEHC 61
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Swartz v Road Accident Fund (3653/05) [2010] ZAECPEHC 61 (23 September 2010)
IN THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA NOT
REPORTABLE
EASTERN CAPE, PORT ELIZABETH
Case No: 3653/05
Date Heard: 16 September 2010
Date delivered: 23 September 2010
In the matter between:
FELICIA SWARTZ
….....................................................................
Plaintiff
and
THE ROAD ACCIDENT FUND
….................................................
Defendant
JUDGMENT
EKSTEEN J:
[1] This matter concerns only the
quantum of the damages which the plaintiff has suffered as a result
of the injuries which she
sustained in a motor vehicle collision
which occurred on 11 June 2002.
[2] The plaintiff, a teacher by
profession, was travelling home from the school where she taught at
lunchtime on 11 June 2002. She
was driving a Toyota Corolla motor
vehicle along the N2 National Road, a dual carriage freeway passing
through Port Elizabeth,
in a westerly direction when the accident
occurred. A motor vehicle (“the insured vehicle”)
travelling in an easterly
direction had allegedly come into collision
with an oil tanker, driven in the same direction, which caused it to
leave the eastbound
roadway and to cross over onto the westbound
roadway upon which the plaintiff was travelling. It came into
collision, head-on,
with the vehicle driven by the plaintiff. The
defendant immediately conceded, in its plea, that the collision
occurred due solely
to the negligence of the driver of the insured
vehicle.
[3] The plaintiff claims damages in
the amount of R3 569 601,64, which amount is made up as follows:
“
1. Past
hospital and medical expenses R 55 699,14
2. Future medical expenses R 188
000,00
3. Past and future loss of earning
capacity R 3 125 902,50 and
4. General damages for shock, pain and
suffering, discomfort, disability,
disfigurement and loss of the
enjoyment
of the amenities of life R 200 000,00”
[4] I was advised at the commencement
of the trial that the parties have reached agreement in respect of
the quantum of the plaintiff’s
damages in respect of past
hospital and medical expenses in the amount of R49 581,29. I was
accordingly requested to include such
an amount in the order which I
make herein. In addition the defendant has tendered to provide to the
plaintiff an undertaking as
envisaged in
section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road
Accident Fund Act, No. 56 of 1996
. This undertaking would provide for
all the plaintiff’s future medical expenses and Mr
Niekerk
,
who appears on behalf of the plaintiff, has accordingly requested,
with the agreement of Mr
Jooste
, who appears on behalf
of the defendant, that I order the defendant to provide such an
undertaking.
[5] What remains for decision is
accordingly the plaintiff’s loss of earning capacity and
general damages.
[6] There is no dispute as to the
injuries which the plaintiff sustained in and as a result of the
collision. A number of medico
legal reports have been provided and I
was advised at the commencement of the trial that the parties are
agreed that the medico
legal reports of Dr RJ Keeley, a neuro
surgeon, Dr Basil Mackenzie, an orthopaedic surgeon, Dr Ian Taylor, a
psychiatrist and Mr
Mark Eaton, a clinical psychologist may be
admitted into evidence without the necessity of calling these
witnesses. The parties
are in agreement as to the correctness of both
the facts recorded therein and the opinions set out therein.
[7] These reports reveal that the
plaintiff suffered the following physical injuries in the collision:
1. A laceration to the area above her
right eye;
2. A moderate whiplash injury to the
neck with paracervical neck spasm and pain;
3. Soft tissue pain and tenderness to
the right elbow;
4. A head injury with mild concussion;
and
5. A soft tissue injury to her right
shoulder.
[8] As a result of these injuries the
plaintiff continues to suffer from the following
sequelae
:
1. A chronic, severe post traumatic
stress disorder;
2. A moderate major depressive
disorder, without psychotic features;
3. A mild neurocognitive disorder;
4. A chronic pain disorder, due to
both psychological factors and a general medical condition;
5. Acquired dependent personality
traits;
6. Cognitive fallouts in attention,
concentration, memory and executive ability; and
7. A mild traumatic brain injury.
[9] Immediately after the accident the
plaintiff was transported from the scene of the accident by ambulance
to the St Georges Hospital.
She complained of pain to her neck and
her right elbow and she was fully conscious with a Glascow Coma Scale
reading of 15/15.
On examination no significant neurological findings
were made save for a possible reduction in sensation in the right
arm. She
was given analgesics and a soft cervical collar to wear and
advised to see a general practitioner in a week. With this she was
dispatched home.
[10] The plaintiff attended upon her
general practitioner, Dr Tobias, the following morning. He advised
bed rest, suggesting that
she would need follow up consultations and
X-rays as indicated. Dr Tobias saw the plaintiff again on 24 June
2002, approximately
two weeks later, and noted that there was
essentially no change in her condition. On 15 July 2002, she again
approached Dr Tobias.
She still complained of pain at the back of her
neck, particularly at night and in the early morning. There was a
paraesthesia
in her right hand and on the back of her right wrist.
She experienced pain in the right axilla and limited movement about
the right
shoulder joint.
[11] On 23 July 2002 the plaintiff saw
one Ren Harrington, a physio therapist. She complained of severe neck
pain radiating to the
right shoulder and down the medial aspect of
the right arm. The pain, she said, was aggravated when she moved her
head and particularly
when putting on clothes. Harrington found that
all her neck movements were stiff and painful as were the movements
about the right
shoulder joint. On 30 October 2002 she went to see Mr
Dugmore, a chiropractor still complaining of pain in her neck,
shoulder and
lower back and now also of headaches.
[12] She returned to her teaching
post, however, she experienced increasing difficulty with the
discharge of her functions. She
was diagnosed with a post traumatic
stress disorder. She has been on constant treatment for post
traumatic stress disorder since
28 March 2003 which has consisted of
psycho therapy and psychiatric medication. In January 2004 Dr Ian
Taylor confirmed the diagnosis
of post traumatic stress disorder and
described her symptoms as follows:
“
Pain in back
and shoulders
Loss of independence
Flashbacks to accident
Does not drive at night
Insomnia, with both initial and middle
insomnia
Nightmares
She has pain attacks
Emotional libility
Irritable and angry
Exaggerated startle reflect
Hyper vigilant”
[13] Dr Taylor recorded the origin of
the problem as being the motor accident. She was finally boarded from
the Department of Education
in consequence of her post traumatic
stress disorder at the end of 2004 and has not returned to any form
of remunerative employment
since then. On these considerations I am
asked to assess her loss of earning capacity and general damages.
[14]
Loss of earning capacity
At the trial the parties were agreed
that the plaintiff is permanently unemployable in consequence of the
sequelae
of the injuries which she sustained in the collision
and, save for the pension which she continues to receive from the
Department
of Education, will not be capable of any form of
remunerative activity in future.
[15] In respect of the past loss of
earning capacity the plaintiff makes no claim for any loss of
earnings from the date of the
accident to the date of her being
boarded from the Department of Education at the end of 2004. The
pension benefits which she has
received since her being boarded are
not in dispute.
[16] I was referred to an actuarial
report prepared by Dr Alex Munro, an actuary in which Mr Munro has
calculated the plaintiff’s
past and future loss of earning
capacity on the basis of certain assumptions. The calculations of the
plaintiff’s earnings,
having regard to accident, the same being
her pension benefits to which I have referred, is not in dispute.
Before me the parties
were in agreement as to the actuarial accuracy
of all the calculations and Mr
Jooste
, on behalf of the
defendant accepts the assumptions made by Mr Munro, save for the
earnings which the plaintiff would have earned,
but for the
collision, in the period January 2005 to the date of trial.
[17] In the circumstances, all that
remained in dispute relating to the claim for loss of earning
capacity was the calculation of
the plaintiff’s past earnings,
but for the accident (and hence the base salary for the calculation
of future loss of earning
capacity), and the contingencies which fall
to be applied both in respect of past loss of earning capacity and
future loss of earning
capacity.
[18] The plaintiff testified that she
initially obtained a three year teaching diploma from Dower College
and thereafter, in 1983,
commenced a career as a teacher in the
Department of Education. She was employed as a teacher in the
Department, without interruption,
from 1983 to the end of 2004, when
she was boarded. Whilst teaching she undertook part time studies and
obtained a BA Degree in
1998. She says that after acquiring her BA
Degree the Department of Education regarded her as a matriculant with
four years post
matric qualifications for purposes of salary
calculation.
[19] It is common cause between the
parties that in terms of the current dispensation in the Department
of Education the plaintiff
would, but for the collision, have had the
choice to retire at the age of 60 with full pension benefits, if she
so wished. She
would, however, have been entitled to continue in her
profession to the age of 65, that being the mandatory retirement age.
The
plaintiff testified that she has always enjoyed her profession
and derived great satisfaction from it. She says, unequivocally,
that
she would have continued in her profession to the age 65.
[20] Under cross-examination she
conceded, fairly in my view, that the final decision would only have
been taken when she gets to
the age of 60 and that she is not able to
say with certainty what considerations may have come into play when
ultimately she reaches
that age. On current information, however, she
remains adamant that she would in all probability have continued
teaching to the
age of 65, primarily because she loves teaching. She
says that the financial consideration of having a salary for a
further five
years would probably also have been a factor in her
decision to continue teaching. In addition, her husband is also
employed by
the Department of Education and he is four years her
junior.
[21] All these factors appear to me to
be supportive of the probability that she would, as she had intended,
have continued in her
teaching career to the age of 65. I accept, as
a matter of probability that she would have.
[22] Mr Peter Whitehead, an industrial
psychologist testified in support of the plaintiff’s claim. His
evidence is not seriously
in dispute. Mr Whitehead testifies that he
has researched the developments in the Department of Education in
recent years and has
perused the plaintiff’s personnel file
with the Department. He testifies that the plaintiff was earning R121
542,00 per annum
at the time when she was boarded in December 2004.
This represented her basic salary. In addition thereto she received
an annual
13
th
cheque based upon basic salary (value of
one month’s salary); and a pension fund contribution of 7,5% of
her monthly salary.
She would have qualified too for a medical aid
contribution (depending on the number of dependants and medical
option) and a housing
subsidy. The plaintiff, however, has never
received medical aid and housing benefits because her husband is also
employed in the
Department of Education and he enjoys these benefits
in respect of the family. Should the plaintiff have been divorced in
future,
however, she would have qualified for such additional
payments too.
[23] Mr Whitehead testified that
salary scales in the Department of Education are adjusted annually
for inflation based on annual
wage negotiations between the
respective unions and the Department of Education. There are
currently 206 different salary notches
applicable to the different
levels of educators and management employees. The increase based upon
the annual wage negotiations
impacts also upon the salary notches.
[24] Since 2008, however, remuneration
structures for teachers have changed resulting in additional
adjustments over and above the
aforesaid for the occupation specific
dispensation which was introduced by the Department. This implies
that the plaintiff would
have received an additional adjustment
effective from 1 June 2008. The salary adjustments which the
plaintiff would have qualified
for having regard to all these
dispensations and the actual wage negotiations which did occur were
as follows:
“
1 July 2005:
R127 134,00 per annum
1 July 2006: R133 872,00 per annum
1 July 2007: R143 913,00 per annum
1 January 2008 (after OSD): R150 816,
per annum
1 July 2008: R166 656,00 per annum
1 July 2009: R184 989,00 per annum
1 July 2009 (after OSD): R205 452,00”
[25] Mr Whitehead testifies further
that, although it has not been officially finalised, the wage
negotiations for 2010 appear to
have been settled on an increase of
7,5% and a variation in the housing subsidy.
[26] I pause to mention that the
evidence of Mr Whitehead in this regard was not challenged and in
argument at the conclusion of
the trial Mr
Jooste
, on
behalf of the defendant, accepted the correctness of these historical
figures. There was therefore now no dispute relating
to the past of
loss of earnings.
[27] In respect of the future, Mr
Whitehead testifies that the occupation specific dispensation which
has been introduced by the
Department of Education will continue to
provide into the future for the annual wage increases resulting from
wage negotiations,
plus an additional 1% pay progression each year.
This additional 1% over and above the negotiated annual increase,
would apply
to all educators. Certain educators may, however, qualify
for a further 3% or 6% increase over and above the ordinary pay
progression,
which would occur every second year, on the strength of
a performance assessment, depending on the performance of the
educator.
Mr Whitehead accordingly proposed a calculation based upon
an additional 4,5% increase based on merit, every second year, to the
anticipated date of retirement. This was indeed the basis used by Mr
Munro in his actuarial calculations.
[28] Under cross-examination Mr
Whitehead was constrained to concede that as this dispensation has
not been introduced yet he was
unable to cast any light at all on the
criteria which might be applied in the performance assessment. He was
unable to provide
any guidance as to what percentage of teachers
would be afforded such additional salary increases or what the
plaintiff’s
prospects would have been to obtain these. No
evidence was adduced by any representative of the department to
assist in this regard.
[29] As indicated above, by the
conclusion of the trial there was no dispute in respect of the
calculation of the plaintiff’s
past loss of earnings. The
parties were agreed that the plaintiff’s past loss of earnings
amounted to R294 300,00 and they
were further agreed that a
contingency deduction of 5% should be applied in respect of such
figure.
[30] The parties were similarly agreed
in respect of the manner of calculation of the future loss of
earnings and argument before
me centred only on the contingency
deductions which should be made from the calculation of Mr Alex
Munro. Mr Munro calculated the
plaintiff’s future earning
capacity, but for the collision, in the amount of R4 099 500,00. The
plaintiff’s future
earnings, having regard to the collision,
being her pension benefits, amount to R1 022 400,00. The plaintiff’s
future loss
of earning capacity was accordingly calculated to be R3
077 100,00. The only issue which falls to be decided in this regard
is
the contingency adjustment which should be made to such
calculation.
[31] Mr
Niekerk
, on
behalf of the plaintiff, has urged me to adjust the figure set out in
the actuarial calculation by the deduction of 7,5%. He
has referred
me to the decision of
Goodall v President Insurance Company
1978 (1) SA 389
(W).
Goodall
was a male buyer in a
commercial buying section of a company, who was already 46 years of
age at the time of the trial, so that
the period for which the
contingencies had to be taken into account was much shorter than in
the case of younger plaintiffs. Margo
J held, in those circumstances,
that a contingency deduction of 10% from the assessed damages was
fair. No special contingencies
fell to be considered in that matter
and the debate related solely to the ordinary contingencies of life.
[32] Mr
Niekerk
argued
that in the present case the plaintiff was 51 years of age and
accordingly that the period over which the calculation is
made is
even shorter. On this basis he submits that a deduction of 7,5% would
be reasonable. He referred me also to the matter
of
Currie v
Road Accident Fund
, a judgment of this Court, where Jansen J
applied a 5% adjustment for contingencies similar to those in
Goodall
’
s
case, but in respect of a
58 year old plaintiff.
[33] Mr
Jooste
, on
behalf of the defendant, on the other hand, submits that I should
adopt a 15% deduction to allow for the usual vicissitudes
of life,
which he described as a benchmark for this type of case, as a
starting point and thereafter to increase the percentage
deduction
having regard to specific contingencies. On this line of reasoning he
submits that a 20% adjustment to the assessed figure
would represent
fair and reasonable compensation.
[34] The obvious difficulty with the
approach which Mr
Niekerk
urges me to adopt is that it
has no regard to the facts of the matter before me. It does not take
cognisance of the uncertainties
which exists in respect of the
assumptions which underlie the actuarial calculations.
[35] Nicholas JA, in
Southern
Insurance Association Limited v Bailey NO
1984 (1) SA 98
(A)
at 113 noted that an enquiry into damages for future loss of earning
capacity is “of its nature speculative, because
it involves a
prediction as to the future, without the benefit of crystal balls,
soothsayers, augers or oracles. All that the court
can do is to make
an estimate, which is very often a rough estimate, of the present
value of the loss.”
[36] He went on to note that two
approaches to this enquiry were open to the court. The first is to
make a rounded estimate, an
approach which he described as “entirely
a matter of guess work, a blind plunge into the unknown.”
[37] The second approach is to try to
make a calculated estimate by way of actuarial evidence as to the
probable value of the loss.
In this matter the parties are agreed
that the actuarial calculation of Mr Munro should serve as such a
calculation. Such a calculation
proceeds, however, on the basis of
assumptions resting on evidence. The validity of this approach
depends of course upon the soundness
of the assumptions, and these
may vary from the strongly probable to the speculative. Compare
Southern Insurance Association v Bailey NO
supra
at 113H.
[38] The stronger the evidential basis
for the assumption the greater the validity of the calculation would
be. The weaker the evidential
basis for these assumptions become the
greater the doubt becomes as to the authority of the calculation.
This, it seems to me,
is a factor which would have a considerable
bearing on the adjustment which needs to be made to such a
calculation to allow for
the possibility of error in the assumptions
made. This may sometimes be difficult, however, as Margo J remarked
in
Goodall v President Insurance Company
supra
at 392H-393A:
“
In the
assessment of a proper allowance for contingencies, arbitrary
considerations must inevitably play a part, for the art or
science of
foretelling the future, so confidently practised by ancient prophets
and soothsayers, and by modern authors of a certain
type of almanack,
is not numbered among the qualifications for judicial office. “
[39] I have accepted that the brief
period over which the calculation is to be made, having regard to the
current age of the plaintiff,
is a factor which militates in favour
of a lesser contingency. There are however two specific
considerations which Mr
Jooste
has urged upon me. The
first relates to the pay progression utilised in the calculation of
Mr Munro. I have referred above to the
evidence of Mr Whitehead to
the effect that the occupation specific dispensation introduced by
the Department of Education provides
for all educators to receive an
annual negotiated inflation related increase plus 1%. Over and above
this increase provision is
made for certain educators to receive an
additional 3 or 6% every second year, based upon a performance
assessment. I have alluded
above to the somewhat speculative features
of Mr Whitehead’s evidence in regard to the latter. He is
unable to cast any light
on the criteria which would be used in such
assessment and accordingly the probability of the plaintiff falling
within one of those
categories qualifying for an additional pay
progression cannot be gauged. These criteria, clearly, are matters
which ought to have
been clarified in evidence and which one would
assume that an official of the Department of Education could readily
have explained.
Similarly the plaintiff’s ability and
competence relative to other educators in the system are matters
which could and should
have been addressed in evidence.
[40] Mr Munro, in performing the
actuarial calculation has assumed an addition 4,5% increase every
second year for the remainder
of the plaintiff’s working life,
but for the accident. This, it seems to me, assumes that in every
second cycle the plaintiff
would have been awarded an additional 3%
salary progression and in every alternate cycle, 6%. As set out above
the reliability
of the actuarial calculation depends on the soundness
of the evidential basis for the assumption.
[41] Mr
Jooste
urged
upon me that there is no evidential basis whatsoever for this
assumption and that I should accordingly ignore those increases
in
their entirety. I do not consider this approach to be correct. The
plaintiff would, but for the accident, presently have had
nearly 30
years of service as an educator. She would rank amongst the more
experienced educators in the system. She has shown herself
to be
dedicated and to endeavour to improve her position within the
Department, thus, she embarked upon part time study of her
own
initiative to obtain a degree whilst working, so to improve her
qualifications. She has testified that she derives great satisfaction
from her functions and accordingly that she would have chosen to
continue in the profession to the age of 65. It may accordingly
safely be assumed that she was an enthusiastic educator.
[42] In my view these are all
indicators that the plaintiff may well have qualified sometimes,
perhaps even regularly, for such
additional pay increases. This is a
real possibility which may be included in the calculation, provided a
realistic adjustment
is made to the figure arrived at so as to
reflect the possibility of an error in calculation. Given the paucity
of evidence underpinning
the assumption made in the calculation I am
of the view that considerable recognition should be given to this
real possibility
that the calculation may be over-optimistic. It is
not, however, so lacking, in my view, as to vitiate the entire
calculation.
[43] The second specific contingency
which Mr
Jooste
urges upon me is the option which the
plaintiff has to retire at the age of 60. The calculation of the
plaintiff’s future
loss of earning capacity proceeds, of
course, on a retirement age of 65. The plaintiff’s evidence in
this regard is that
she intended to remain in her profession to the
age of 65. This is uncontested. It is true that unforeseen
circumstances may have
arisen closer to the retirement age which may
have led to her earlier retirement. Some allowance must accordingly
be made in the
contingency deduction for this possibility. It appears
to me, however, on the evidential material before me, to be a remote
possibility.
[44] On the weighing of all these
considerations I am of the view that the figure calculated in respect
of future loss of earning
capacity in the actuarial calculation of Mr
Munro should be adjusted by a 15% reduction so as to reflect a fair
and reasonable
compensation. In the circumstances I consider that it
would be fair to award the plaintiff the amount of R279 585,00 in
respect
of past loss of income and an amount of R2 615 535,00 in
respect of future loss of earning capacity.
[45]
General damages
The Courts have never laid down rules
as to the manner in which to approach the problem of an award for
general damages, neither
is it desirable to do so. Watermeyer JA, in
Sandler v Wholesale Coal Supplies Limited
1941 AD 194
at 199 stated as follows:
“
The amount
to be awarded as compensation can only be determined by the broadest
general considerations and the figure arrived at
must necessarily be
uncertain, depending upon the Judges view of what is fair in all the
circumstances of the case.”
That remains the position.
[46] There is no hard and fast rule of
general application requiring a trial court or a court of appeal to
consider past awards.
Such awards are seldom on all fours with the
facts of the case under consideration. Compare
Road Accident
Fund v Marunga
2003 (5) SA 165
(SCA) 169G-H. Such previous
awards may serve merely as guidelines. In considering such previous
awards it would be incorrect to
fix upon a previous award as being
comparable and thereafter to slavishly apply the consumer price index
in order to arrive at
the present day value of such an award.
Inflation rates, no matter how reliable, are like previous awards,
merely guidelines to
what is an appropriate award in the particular
case. Compare
AA Onderlinge Assuransie Assosiasie Beperk v
Sodoms
1980 (3) SA 134
(A) at 141G-H; and
Malonie v AA
Mutual Insurance Association Limited
1984 (3E2) QOD 480 (E).
On a consideration of these principles I have endeavoured to assess
what I consider to be fair compensation.
[47] The injuries which the plaintiff
sustained and the sequelae which she has endured are set out and
discussed above. I have given
careful consideration thereto in
endeavouring to assess a reasonable compensation for general damages.
[48] I have been referred to by Mr
Niekerk
, on behalf of the plaintiff, to a number of
previous decisions which Mr
Niekerk
argued are of
assistance in indicating a general trend of the value of awards in
matters comparable to the present. I have given
careful consideration
to each of these decisions, and regrettably, each of these differs on
the facts and considerations raised
therein from the present. To the
extent that some guidance may be derived from these matters I have
given careful consideration
to them. A number of the matters to which
reference has been made date back some years. Mr
Niekerk
,
on behalf of the plaintiff, has referred me to what he has termed the
present day value of such awards. These are derived, I am
advised
from
Koch: Quantum Yearbook 2010
in which Mr Koch, an actuary,
has adjusted the awards made by applying the consumer price index so
as to arrive at a present day
value. I recognise the effect which the
ravages of inflation has had upon the value of money, however, I have
been alive to the
warnings sounded in
AA Onderlinge Assuransie
Assosiasie Beperk
,
supra
and
Malonie v AA Mutual
Insurance Association
Limited
v Sodoms
,
supra
in the consideration of these awards.
[49] I have had regard to the recent
tendency to grant higher awards in current times than has been the
trend in the past. (Compare
Wright v Multilateral Vehicle
Accident Fund
reported in
Corbett and Honey: The Quantum
of Damages in Bodily and Fatal Injury cases
, Vol 4 at E3-31; and
Road Accident Fund v Marunga
supra
at 170F.) I
have considered too the well-established principle that I should take
care to see that the award which I make is fair
to both sides so as
to give just compensation to the plaintiff, but not “to pour
out largesse from the horn of plenty at
the defendant’s
expense”. (Compare
Pitt v Economic Insurance Company
Limited
1957 (3) SA 284
(N) at 287.)
[50] On a consideration of all these
factors and in particular the injuries and sequelae sustained by the
plaintiff as fully set
out above I consider that an award of R160
000,00 would represent a fair compensation as general damages for
shock, pain and suffering,
discomfort, disability, disfigurement and
loss of the enjoyment of the amenities of life which the plaintiff
has suffered.
[51] In the result, the following
order is made:
1. The defendant is ordered to pay to
the plaintiff R3 104 701,29 as and for damages.
2. The defendant is ordered to provide
to the plaintiff an undertaking in terms of
section 17(4)(a)
of the
Road Accident Fund Act. No. 56 of 1996
within fourteen (14) of the
date hereof.
3. The defendant is ordered to pay to
the plaintiff interest on the aforestated damages calculated at the
legal rate from a date
fourteen (14) days after the date hereof to
the date of payment.
4. The defendant is ordered to pay the
plaintiff’s costs of the suit, such costs to include the
qualifying expenses, if any,
of
Dr R J Keeley,
Dr B L Mackenzie,
Dr I Taylor,
Mr M Eaton,
Dr P Whitehead, and
Mr A J Munro.
5. The defendant is ordered to pay to
the plaintiff interest on the plaintiff’s taxed costs
calculated at the legal rate from
a date fourteen (14) days after
taxation to the date of payment.
___________________________
J W EKSTEEN
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
For Plaintiff:
Adv D Niekerk,
instructed by Jock Walter Inc, Port Elizabeth
For Defendant:
Adv P Jooste,
instructed by Joubert Galpin Searle, Port Elizabeth