Michael Jantjies v S (532/2022) [2024] ZASCA 3 (15 January 2024)

55 Reportability
Criminal Law

Brief Summary

Criminal Law — Appeal against conviction — Evaluation of evidence — The appellant, Michael Jantjies, was convicted of three counts of rape and sentenced to 16 years imprisonment. The trial court relied heavily on the complainant's testimony, which was inconsistent and lacked corroborative evidence. The high court dismissed the appellant's appeal, failing to properly assess the totality of the evidence and the reasonable possibility of the appellant's version being true. The Supreme Court of Appeal found that the State did not prove the appellant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, leading to the conclusion that the convictions and sentences were set aside.

THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEAL OF SOUTH AFRICA
JUDGMENT

Not Reportable

Case no: 532/2022

In the matter between:

MICHAEL JANTJIES APPELLANT

and

THE STATE RESPONDENT

Neutral citation: Michael Jantjies v The State (Case no 532/2022) [2023]
ZASCA 3 (15 January 2024)
Coram: NICHOLLS, CARELSE and MATOJANE JJA and MUSI and
TOKOTA AJJA
Heard: Matter disposed of without oral hearing in terms of s 19(a) of the
Superior Courts Act 10 of 2013
Delivered: This judgment was handed down electronically by circulation to
the parties’ representatives by email, publication on the Supreme Court of
Appeal website, and release to SAFLII. The date for hand down is deemed to be
15 January 2024 at 11h00.

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Summary: Criminal appeal – courts must take all the evidence into account – a
court cannot convict the accused unless it finds that the accused’s version is so
improbable that it cannot be reasonably possibly true.

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ORDER


On appeal from: Western Cape Division of the High Court , Cape Town
(Boqwana J and Mayosi AJ sitting as court of appeal):
1 The appeal is upheld.
2 The order of the court below is set aside and replaced with the following
order:
‘The appeal is upheld, and the convictions and the resultant sentences are set
aside.’

JUDGMENT
__ ___
Matojane JA ( Nicholls, Carelse JJA and Musi and Tokota AJJA
concurring):

[1] This is an appeal against the judgment of the Western Cape Division of the
High Court, Cape Town , per Mayosi AJ with Boq wana J concurring (the high
court), in respect of which they dismissed an appeal by Mr Michael Jantjies (the
appellant) against his conviction on three counts of rape by the regional
magistrate in the Regional Division of Western Cape (the trial court).

[2] On 5 June 2019, the trial court convicted the appellant on three counts of
rape and sentenced him to an effective term of 16 years imprisonment. On 17 July
2019, the trial court granted the appellant leave to appeal against his conviction
only in terms of s 309C of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 (the CPA). The

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high court dismissed the appeal on the rape convictions. This is a further appeal
against conviction, with the special leave of this Court.

[3] In the trial court, the State led the evidence of the complainant and a retired
police officer, Warrant Officer Johan Tobias Grobbelaar (Grobbelaar), to whom
the complainant reported the incident . The appellant testified in his defence
without calling any further witnesses. In summary, the evidence can be broadly
set out as follows.

[4] The complainant, a 48-year-old schoolteacher, met the appellant on a social
media dating site in August 2014 . The appellant held himself out as a private
investigator and police officer. They communicated daily with each other through
Facebook and WhatsApp. They met in person on 24 December 2014 and started
seeing each other almost daily, including weekends and after school. They went
away most weekends and would stay in one room together. The complainant
testified that they went on weekend trips to Vredenburg on three occasions ,
always staying at St Helena Bay Hotel (the hotel) in St Helena Bay. She stated
that, despite sharing a room and being alone with the appellant, he never made
any sexual advances towards her.

[5] Regarding the actual incident, the complainant testified that o n 6 March
2015, she and the appellant booked themselves a room at the hotel. They shared
a room but slept in separate beds. On 7 March 2015, she was awakened by the
appellant climbing onto her bed. According to her, the appellant placed his arm
under her neck, held her wrist, and prevented her from getting up. Despite her
attempts, he pinned her down, turned her on her stomach, and proceeded to
penetrate her anus with his penis, she testified that she experienced excruciating
pain. After that, the appellant went to the bathroom, took a shower, returned to
the bedroom, turned her on her back and inserted his penis into her vagina , and,

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after that, placed his penis into her mouth . None of these acts by the appellant
were with the complainant’s consent.

[6] The following Monday, the appellant went to the complainant’s house to
inform her of a housing opportunity available for her children following an
alleged cancellation on the council’s waiting list. The appellant asked for R50
000 to cover the deposit and transfer costs by Thursday. In response, the
complainant and her children secured loans and provided the funds to the
appellant. On Friday, as per the appellant’s request, the complainant drove him
to town to facilitate the payment. However, upon exiting t he car with the cash,
the appellant disappeared and never returned.

[7] During cross-examination, the complainant stated that she did not resist the
alleged assault because the appellant had positioned a firearm between their beds.
Significantly, in her evidence-in-chief and her statement to the police, there was
no mention of a firearm or her efforts to engage in a conversation with the
appellant before the alleged incident.

[8] Grobbelaar was called to demonstrate the consistency of the complainant's
account of being raped by the appellant. Grobbelaar met the complainant at
Kenilworth Clinic during psychiatric treatment in April 2015, where she told him
that she had been raped by her ex -boyfriend (the appellant) at a hotel in March
2015. Despite Grobbelaar advising her to file a rape case, the complainant
delayed doing so until 19 September 2015. This delay coincided with the
appellant's release on bail for a theft case previously filed by the complainant.
Grobbelaar's testimony, therefore, not only contradicted the complainant's
description of her relationship with the appellant but also raised questions about
the timing of her decision to report the rape.

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[9] The complainant testified that she was advised by the South African Police
Directorate for Priority Crime Investigation (the Hawks) to maintain contact with
the appellant after the incident to facilitate his arrest and get her money back. This
was her explanation for her continued expressions of love in t ext messages and
emails she sent to the appellant after the alleged incident. Despite describing the
appellant as merely a friend, the complainant was unable to explain under cross-
examination why she allowed the appellant to engage in physical intimacy if their
relationship was purely platonic.

[10] The appellant vehemently denied all allegations against him, particularly
that he was with the complainant at the hotel in March 2015. He insisted that all
intimate encounters he had with the complainant were consensual. According to
the appellant, their love relationship began in December 2014 and ended in March
2015. He stated that the sole purpose of his pursuing an affair with the
complainant was in order to obtain money from her. He contended that the rape
accusation was fabricated, attributing it to the complainant’s sense of betrayal
after he stole R50 000 from her and terminated their relationship. The appellant
portrayed the complainant as vengeful, asserting that she opened numerous police
dockets against him and orchestrated media accusations of rape. He stated that
their last weekend together was on 18 January 2015, during which he booked a
bungalow in Lanesville to celebrate his birthday.

[11] The trial court adopted an incorrect judicial approach to the evaluation of
evidence and failed to exercise caution when it evaluated the evidence of a single
witness. The trial court expressed itself as follows:

‘If indeed sexual intercourse was a regular occurrence between the two parties as a lleged by
the accused, the question would be, why would the complainant choose a particular venue and
particular date to the exclusion of other dates.’

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[12] The high court was satisfied with the findings of the trial court and, in
paragraph 39 of its judgment, reasoned that:

‘The complainant’s account of the events of 7 March 2015 was consistent through out and she
did not veer from this account even under thorough cross examination by two different
representatives of the Appellant. The events she described are reflected in the statement of Ms
Coetzee to whom she reported the rape, nine days after it occurred. The complainant's account
of what occurred is further consistent when viewed against the manner she described it to Mr
Grobbelaar in April 2015. The only discrepancy between the complainant and Mr Grobbelaar
is his reference to an 'ex-boy-friend' having committed the rape, in circumstances where the
complainant was adamant that the Appellant was never her boyfriend. This discrepancy is not
material. Mr Grobbelaar attributes his use of the term ‘boyfriend’ as opposed to ‘man’ to a
difference of understanding of the terms or their interpretation depending on whether one
speaks Afrikaans (his mother tongue) or English. His use of t he term was not based on the
complainant having told him that she had been in a relationship with the Appellant.’

[13] The high court materially misdirected itself by not taking into account the
entirety of the evidence 1 and neglecting the fundamental principle in criminal
proceedings that the State must prove its case beyond a reasonable doubt. The
high court failed to recognise that the accused is not obligated to prove the truth
of any explanation he provides; rather, the burden lies with the State. If there is a
reasonable possibility that the accused’s evidence might be true, the accused
should be acquitted.2

[14] The high court also neglected to evaluate the appellant’s countervailing
evidence that the complainant had a motive to falsely accuse him of the alleged
rapes. The appellant highlighted the social media campaign initiated by the

1 In S v Shilakwe [2011] ZASCA 104; 2012 (1) SACR 16 (SCA) para 11, this Court underscored the importance
of a detailed and critical examination of each component of the evidence and stressed the necessity of stepping
back to consider the evidence as a cohesive whole to avoid missing the broader perspective ; see also S v Hadebe
& Others 1998 (1) SACR 422 (SCA) at 426F-H and S v Mbuli 2003 (1) SACR 97 (SCA) at 110C-E.
2 See R v Difford 1937 AD 370 at 373; and S v Kubeka 1982 (1) SA 534 WLD at 537 F-G.

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complainant following his refusal to return her stolen money. Importantly, the
high court misdirected itself in overlooking significant email correspondence,
text messages and newspaper articles that portrayed the complainant’s
unwavering love for the appellant and her sense of betrayal after the appellant
defrauded her and absconded with her money. This evidence could redound to
the appellant’s favour. Furthermore, the court failed to address the inconsistencies
in the complainant’s testimony and did not provide reasons for giving preference
to her evidence over that of the appellant. The court is enjoined to consider the
evidence in its totality.3

[15] At issue in the appeal before us is whether the State has proved the
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt on the evidence presented before the
trial court. There is conflicting evidence as to whether the appellant was with the
complainant at the hotel when the incident occurred . The State’s case is wholly
dependent upon the testimony of the complainant. Section 208 of the CPA
provides that an accused may be convicted of any offence on the evidence of a
single competent witness.4 When assessing the credibility of a single witness, it
is crucial to understand that there is no one -size-fits-all approach. The evidence
presented by such a witness must undergo the same rigorous scrutiny as any other
evidence. The trial court is tasked with meticulously evaluating the evidence,
taking into account both its strong points and shortcomings. After this thorough
examination, the court must then determine whether, despite potential flaws or
inconsistencies in the testimony, it is convinced of the truthfulness of the witness's
account 5. This careful and balanced evaluation is fundamental to ensuring a fair
and just legal process.

3 S v Van der Meyden 1999 (1) SACR 447 (W) at 450A-B.

3 S v Van der Meyden 1999 (1) SACR 447 (W) at 450A-B.
4 See R v Mokoena 1956 (3) SA 81 (A); S v Webber 1971 (3) SA 754 (A) at 758G; S v Sauls and Others 1981 (3)
SA 172 (A) at 179G-180G; S v Stevens [2004] ZASCA 70; [2005] 1 All SA 1 (SCA) para 17 and S v Gentle [2005]
ZASCA 26; 2005 (1) SACR 420 (SCA) para 17.
5 S v Sauls and Others 1981 (3) SA 172 (A) 180E-G.

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[16] The court must assess the credibility and reliability of the complainant’s
evidence in light of all other evidence presented. It must weigh the potential risks
associated with relying exclusively on the complainant’s account as a single
witness and seek corroborative evidence from other sources when available. In
this instance, no supporting evidence from other sources was available to validate
any aspect of the complainant’s evidence.

[17] First, the State could but did not provide evidence to support the claim that
the appellant was at the hotel when the incident happened. When the complainant
was shown a hotel register for bookings on March 6, 7 and 8 March 2015 on
which their names did not appear, she alleged that their names were “tippexed
off” by an employee who took their bookings and kept the money for herself.
Additionally, the complainant claimed that Sergeant Vosloo was there when other
workers confirmed that the employee had taken the money. No explanation was
proffered for the State’s failure to call the necessary witnesses.

[18] Second, the complainant testified that she saw a doctor two days after the
incident due to abdominal pains and anal bleeding. However, the doctor was not
called to testify . This prevented the court from hearing about the doctor's
observations and conclusions, which could have provided corroboration for the
complainant’s version.6

[19] The timing of the initial report of rape is just one aspect to consider. There
is no strict guideline governing the behaviour of sexual assault victims, and a
court may not dra w inference only from the length of any delay between the
alleged commission of such offence and the reporting thereof 7. In this instance,
the complainant’s explanation for not immediately disclosing the incident to the

6 MM v S [2012] ZASCA 5; 2012 (2) SACR 18 (SCA); [2012] 2 All SA 401 (SCA) para 24.

6 MM v S [2012] ZASCA 5; 2012 (2) SACR 18 (SCA); [2012] 2 All SA 401 (SCA) para 24.
7 Section 59 of The Criminal Law (Sexual offences and related matters) Amendment Act 32 of 2007

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doctor who treated her is that she underwent a complete mental shutdown, which,
according to her, was later diagnosed by her psychiatrist as a dissociative disorder
where the brain shuts off to protect the body. Again, the State failed to summon
the said psychiatrist to offer substantiating evidence for the complainant's alleged
mental health challenges.

[20] Sister Ntwana, the medical professional who examined the complainant
and completed the J88 medical form six months after the incident, was not called
as a witness to discuss her findin gs or the information provided to her by the
complainant. The form only noted a two-centimetre scratch mark on the
complainant's left wrist area. Without Sister Ntwana's testimony, it is not possible
to conclusively link the scratch mark to the complainant 's allegation that the
appellant cut her wrist during their separation after the incident. This gap in
evidence and testimony presents a significant oversight in the case, impacting the
interpretation of the medical evidence and its relevance to the compla inant's
claims.

[21] The complainant made her first report of the alleged incident to her friend,
Chantal Coetzee, only after the appellant had repeatedly reneged on his promise
to refund her money. This is apparent from an email of 21 March 2015, about 13
days after the alleged incident , that the complainant wrote to the appellant
showing her intense emotional distress at being defrauded and abandoned. There
is no suggestion of the alleged rape. The email reads:

‘I have been isolating the past week…at work and at home. I even changed my email address
and cell no so no one can contact me.
I have been crying non stop the past week… at work and at home. I have been crying because
I was disappointed, felt betrayed, used, confused abandoned, discarded.
Then you made contact with me , and my heart hurt so much. I appreciated hearing from you
but long to hear your voice, to see you.’

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[22] I am unable to find anything in the evidence presented in this case that
could be viewed as independent support for the complainant’s allegations. There
is only the complainant’s word against that of the appellant that the appellant was
at the hotel on 8 March 2015 , where the incident allegedly occurred. When the
evidence is weighed in its totality, it supports the conclusion that the appellant’s
version of events could reasonably possibly be true and that the evidence of the
complainant, when viewed with the appropriate caution called for, raises doubt
about the appellant’s guilt. Accordingly, the State has failed to prove the
appellant’s guilt beyond reasonable.

[23] The court must express its concern about the poor quality of the
investigation and evidence presented. This impacts the administration of justice
and the public confidence in the legal system. Crucial steps, such as interviewing
potential witnesses at the crime scene and scrutinising the appellant's alibi, were
apparently neglected. Material witnesses were not called to testify with no
explanation advanced for their absence. The absence of evidence from the
investigating officer further suggests that a comprehensive investigation may not
have been conducted at all. Not only is the legal process jeopardised, but the
broader societal understanding and response to sexual assault cases is impacted8.









8 See S v Sebofi 2015 (2) SACR 179 (GJ) at [65] – [67]

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[24] In the premises, the following order issues:

1 The appeal is upheld.
2 The order of the court below is set aside and replaced with the following:
‘The appeal is upheld and the convictions and the resultant sentences are
set aside.’


____________________
K E MATOJANE
JUDGE OF APPEAL

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Appearances

For the Appellant: Instructed by S Kruger
Instructed by: Legal Aid South Africa, Cape Town
Legal Aid South Africa, Bloemfontein

For the respondent: Instructed by P Thaiteng
Instructed by: The Director of Public Prosecutions, Cape Town
The Director of Public Prosecutions, Bloemfontein.