Peterson NO and Another v ABSA Bank Limited (2011 (5) SA 484 (GNP)) [2011] ZAGPPHC 127; 24067/2010 (27 July 2011)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Delict — Pure economic loss — Liability for omission — Plaintiffs, as curators of two companies, sought to amend particulars of claim against ABSA Bank for alleged negligence in failing to verify authority of a third party who misappropriated funds — Defendant excepted to the particulars of claim, arguing they were excipiable — Court held that the claim for pure economic loss based on an omission is recognized in South African law, and the existence of a legal duty is essential for establishing wrongfulness — Application for amendment dismissed as it did not cure the excipiability of the original particulars of claim.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


Introduction


The proceedings were an application for leave to amend particulars of claim, brought in the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria. Although framed as an amendment application, the parties were agreed that it should effectively be treated as an exception, because the defendant’s objection to the proposed amendment was that the amended pleading would remain excipiable.


The applicants were Barend Peterson N.O. and John Andrian Levin N.O., suing in their capacities as curators of Ovation Global Investment Services (Pty) Ltd and Ovation Global Investment Nominees (Pty) Ltd. The respondent was ABSA Bank Limited, cited as defendant in the underlying action.


Procedurally, the plaintiffs had delivered original particulars of claim (dated 29 April 2010). ABSA responded with a notice to remove cause of complaint, contending the pleading was excipiable. The plaintiffs then delivered a notice of intention to amend, to which ABSA delivered a notice of objection. The present application sought to have the amendment allowed, with ABSA contending that the amended particulars would still be excipiable for (i) lacking averments necessary to sustain a cause of action and (ii) being vague and embarrassing.


The dispute concerned an alleged delictual claim for pure economic loss said to have resulted from ABSA’s negligent opening, maintenance, management, and monitoring of certain bank accounts, and its alleged failure to detect and warn about the misappropriation of funds by a third party. The core question was whether the plaintiffs had pleaded sufficient facts to establish wrongfulness (in the form of a breached legal duty) in a claim for pure economic loss based on omissions.


Material Facts


Ovation Global Investment Services (Pty) Ltd administered investor funds entrusted to it by or on behalf of investors (referred to as “the principals”). Those funds were paid to and were required to be held by Ovation Global Investment Nominees (Pty) Ltd as trust property for the benefit of investors under section 4 of the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001, with ownership remaining with the principals in terms of section 4(5).


By agreement between Ovation Nominees and Common Cents Portfolio Strategists (Pty) Ltd (“Common Cents”), Ovation Nominees would transfer cash into a banking account designated by Common Cents and/or Angus Cruickshank for investment in cash portfolios. Cruickshank was alleged to have acted fraudulently and without authority. He was the sole shareholder of Cornerstone Transaction Financing (Pty) Ltd, which held all issued shares in Ovation Services and Common Cents, but he was not employed by Ovation Services, Ovation Nominees, or Common Cents.


Between February 2005 and January 2006, Cruickshank caused Ovation Nominees to make available R209 529 336,00 to Common Cents Portfolio for investment on behalf of the principals. Between April 2005 and January 2006, from Ovation Nominees’ account at First National Bank, Cruickshank caused large sums to be transferred to ABSA accounts, including an account opened in the name of Ovation Global Investment Holdings and another in the name of Common Cents. Additional ABSA accounts were opened in the name of Ovation Global Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd, and funds were transferred among these accounts. The pleaded case was that Cruickshank misappropriated substantial sums from these ABSA accounts.


The plaintiffs pleaded that all the ABSA accounts in question were opened and processed by an ABSA employee, Mr Leon Dawie Prinsloo, who was responsible for overseeing the accounts and who acted within the course and scope of his employment. The plaintiffs further alleged that Prinsloo was aware that amounts dealt with constituted trust property, and that ABSA had duties (by reference to internal rules, procedures, and protocols, and by reference to a common-law duty of care) to verify identities, verify authority, ensure proper completion and support for account-opening documentation, and to manage and monitor the accounts thereafter.


The alleged omission central to the pleaded case was that ABSA, through Prinsloo or otherwise, failed to manage and monitor the accounts in a manner that would have detected suspicious activity and, once suspicious activity was detected or should reasonably have been detected, failed to notify Ovation Services and/or Ovation Nominees (and also, on the pleadings, the principals). The plaintiffs pleaded that appropriate monitoring would have flagged high-value and high-volume activity, and that the pattern of transfers required reporting under the Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001 (“FICA”) and enquiry directed to Ovation Services.


It was pleaded that some money was repaid to Ovation Nominees’ First National Bank account from certain ABSA accounts, but that a very substantial balance remained unrecovered. The plaintiffs claimed damages on behalf of the principals in the amount of R129 469 648,71, alleged to constitute pure economic loss caused by ABSA’s negligent breaches of duty.


For purposes of the exception-like enquiry, the material “facts” were those pleaded in the particulars of claim; the court’s decision did not turn on the resolution of factual disputes by evidence, but on whether the pleaded facts were sufficient in law to sustain the pleaded cause of action and whether the pleading was impermissibly vague and embarrassing.


Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the plaintiffs’ amended particulars of claim pleaded facts sufficient to establish wrongfulness for a delictual claim based on pure economic loss caused by omissions, specifically whether ABSA owed a legal duty (duty of care in the delictual sense) in relation to the opening of accounts and the monitoring/management of those accounts, and whether ABSA’s failure to act (including a failure to warn the relevant parties) could be regarded as wrongful.


A related question was procedural and pleading-based: whether the proposed amended particulars would be excipiable for lacking essential averments necessary to sustain a cause of action (with wrongfulness identified as the missing element according to the objection). This required the court to determine whether wrongfulness was sufficiently pleaded and supported by pleaded facts, bearing in mind the approach to exception in claims of this kind.


A further issue was whether the particulars of claim were vague and embarrassing, primarily because ABSA contended that the pleading was confusing or contradictory about to whom the alleged duty was owed (Ovation Services, Ovation Nominees, and/or the principals), potentially prejudicing ABSA’s ability to plead.


The dispute therefore concerned a combination of legal sufficiency of pleading and the application of delictual principles to the pleaded facts, including an acknowledged evaluative component: the determination of wrongfulness in pure economic loss cases depends on a value judgment informed by policy considerations.


Court’s Reasoning


The court located the dispute within the established South African jurisprudence on pure economic loss, emphasising that negligent causation of pure economic loss is not prima facie wrongful. Wrongfulness depends on the existence of a legal duty, the recognition and content of which are determined judicially by reference to public and legal policy consistent with constitutional norms. In this connection, the court referred to the approach articulated in Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v South African National Road Agency Ltd [2008] ZASCA 134; 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA) and related authorities.


The court also accepted that it can be appropriate to decide pure economic loss issues on exception in suitable cases, noting that the Supreme Court of Appeal in Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA) found no fault in such an approach, and that other well-known matters had been disposed of on exception. However, the court stressed that the decisive question in this case was whether, on the pleaded facts, wrongfulness had been sufficiently alleged and supported, particularly given that the duty contended for extended beyond settled cheque-collection scenarios and entered an area requiring assessment of policy and practical considerations in the banking context.


In analysing wrongfulness, the court drew on Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A) for the proposition that determining the existence of a legal duty entails a value judgment embracing relevant facts and policy. The court noted that, in Indac, the Appellate Division recognised that at exception stage it is not appropriate to undertake a final balancing of policy considerations; it may be sufficient that policy and convenience considerations prima facie indicate the existence of a legal duty, leaving room for evidence at trial to rebut or qualify that indication.


The court observed that South African case law recognising a banker’s duty of care had commonly arisen in the context of cheques and duties owed to true owners of stolen or lost cheques. Those cases were not treated as dispositive precedent for the present claim, which related instead to the opening of bank accounts and the subsequent alleged failure to monitor and act upon suspicious activity. The court nevertheless treated the absence of direct precedent as not barring development, and considered it necessary to engage in the evaluative enquiry required for novel duty situations.


In that evaluative enquiry, the court identified several considerations, based on what was pleaded, as supporting at least a prima facie recognition of wrongfulness. These included the pleaded existence of statutory duties under FICA to report suspicions, the pleaded fact-pattern of large sums being transferred between accounts and withdrawn in ways alleged to be out of the ordinary, and the pleaded allegation that the account-opening documentation (annexed to the particulars) was not properly completed or supported as required by ABSA’s own protocols, which was said to have been a basis for suspicion and further enquiry. The court also referred to the broader societal context of prevalent crime, including money laundering, as a policy consideration informing the expectation that banks should not ignore indications that accounts may be used for criminal purposes.


At the same time, the court emphasised limitations inherent in deciding such matters purely on exception. It reasoned that questions about the existence and scope of a bank’s monitoring procedures, what a prudent bank does in practice, and what burden recognition of the pleaded duties would impose upon banks, are matters on which evidence, including expert evidence on banking practice, would ordinarily be helpful. Relying on the approach in Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another 2003 2 SA 98 (W) and the principle that some wrongfulness enquiries are fact-bound, the court held that it could not, at exception stage, finally determine the burden and implications for banks without evidential material. The court regarded it as inappropriate to seek to decide wrongfulness conclusively on the exception, given its fact-sensitive character, referring in this regard to Axiam Holdings Ltd v Deloitte & Touche 2006 1 SA 237 (SCA).


On that basis, the court concluded that, as the particulars stood, they disclosed a cause of action: the element of wrongfulness was prima facie established on the pleaded facts, and the defendant’s objection that the pleading lacked necessary averments to sustain a cause of action could not succeed at this stage.


Turning to the objection that the pleading was vague and embarrassing, the court restated the general principle that a pleading may be vague and embarrassing even if it discloses a cause of action, but that such an exception is not usually upheld unless the excipient will be prejudiced in pleading. Reading the particulars “by a mind willing to understand”, the court found the pleading sufficiently clear in alleging that ABSA owed a duty of care to Ovation Services and Ovation Nominees. The additional allegation that a duty was also owed to the principals did not, in the court’s view, create a fatal contradiction or confusion, because there was no legal or logical reason why a duty could not be owed to more than one party. The court therefore rejected the vague and embarrassing objection.


Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed ABSA’s objection to the proposed amendment and allowed the amendment to the particulars of claim.


Costs were awarded against ABSA, including the costs of two counsel.


Cases Cited


Administrateur, Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk 1979 3 SA 824 (AD)


Fourway Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v South African National Road Agency Ltd [2008] ZASCA 134; 2009 2 SA 150 (SCA)


Minister of Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden 2002 6 SA 431 (SCA)


Telematrix (Pty) Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA 2006 1 SA 461 (SCA)


Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd 2006 3 SA 138 (SCA)


Lillicrap, Wassenaar and Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd 1985 1 SA 475 (AD)


Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd 1992 1 SA 783 (A)


Minister of Law and Order v Kadir 1995 1 SA 303 (A)


Cross v Ferreira 1950 3 SA 443 (C)


Columbus Joint Venture v ABSA Bank Ltd 2002 2 SA 1049 (SCA)


Powell and Another v ABSA Bank t/a Volkskas Bank 1998 3 SA 807 (SEC)


KwaMashu Bakery Ltd v Standard Bank of South Africa Ltd 1995 1 SA 377 (D)


Commissioner, South African Revenue Service and Another v ABSA Bank Ltd and Another 2003 2 SA 98 (W)


Axiam Holdings Ltd v Deloitte & Touche 2006 1 SA 237 (SCA)


Legislation Cited


Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act 28 of 2001


Financial Intelligence Centre Act 38 of 2001


Rules of Court Cited


No specific rule of court was expressly cited in the judgment.


Held


The court held that, treating the amendment application as an exception, the proposed amended particulars of claim were not excipiable for want of a cause of action. On the pleaded facts, the element of wrongfulness in a delictual claim for pure economic loss based on alleged omissions by a bank was prima facie established, and it was not appropriate at exception stage to attempt a final balancing of the relevant policy considerations given the fact-bound nature of the enquiry and the likely need for evidence about banking practice and monitoring burdens.


The court further held that the particulars of claim were not vague and embarrassing in a manner that would prejudice the defendant. The pleading sufficiently conveyed that ABSA was alleged to owe duties of care to Ovation Services and Ovation Nominees, and the fact that duties were also alleged toward the principals did not render the pleading unintelligible or contradictory.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A claim for pure economic loss caused by negligence is not prima facie wrongful. Wrongfulness depends on whether the defendant owed a legal duty to prevent the loss, and the recognition of such a duty is a matter of judicial determination grounded in considerations of public and legal policy consistent with constitutional norms.


In claims for pure economic loss based on omissions, the plaintiff must allege wrongfulness and plead facts supporting that element. The absence of such allegations may render particulars of claim excipiable for failing to disclose a cause of action.


The determination of a legal duty involves a value judgment that embraces the relevant facts and policy considerations. At the exception stage, it is generally inappropriate to undertake a final balancing of policy factors where the enquiry is fact-bound and would likely benefit from factual and/or expert evidence, including evidence about industry practice and the practical burden that recognising the duty would impose.


An amendment should not be allowed if it would render the pleading excipiable.


An exception on the ground that a pleading is vague and embarrassing will not ordinarily succeed unless the vagueness causes prejudice by preventing the excipient from understanding the case it must meet. A pleading that discloses a duty alleged to be owed to multiple parties is not necessarily vague or contradictory merely because duties are alleged toward more than one potential claimant.

About SAFLII
Databases
Search
Terms of Use
RSS Feeds
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
SAFLII
>>
Databases
>>
South Africa: North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria
>>
2011
>>
[2011] ZAGPPHC 127
|

|

Peterson NO and Another v ABSA Bank Limited (2011 (5) SA 484 (GNP)) [2011] ZAGPPHC 127; 24067/2010 (27 July 2011)

REPORTABLE
IN
THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT,
PRETORIA
/ES (REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA)
CASE
NO: 24067/2010
DATE:27/07/2011
IN
THE MATTER BETWEEN
BAREND
PETERSON
N.O.
...........................................................................
Ist
APPLICANT
(in
his capacity as Curator of Ovation
Global
Investment Services (Pty) Ltd
and
of Ovation Global Investment Nominees (Pty) Ltd)
JOHN
ANDRIAN LEVIN
N.O.
.....................................................................
2ND
APPLICANT
(in
his capacity as Curator of Ovation
Global
Investment Services (Pty) Ltd
and
of Ovation Global Investment Nominees (Pty) Ltd)
AND
ABSA
BANK
LIMITED
....................................................................................
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MAKGOBA,
J
[1]
This case brings to mind what was foretold by RUMPFF, CJ some thirty
two years ago in the well-known case of
Administrateur,
Natal v Trust Bank van Afrika Bpk
1979 3 SA 824
(AD)
when
he said:
"The
birth-pangs of such a right of action have endured so long that the
time has arrived, perhaps even with a Caesarean section,
that the
child should be brought into the world. It should immediately be
added that it can be foretold that this child will be
a problem
child. With the necessary love, and especially discipline, it can
however play a useful role in legal life."
[2]
The problem child referred to by the learned Chief Justice is none
other than the legal principle,
"an
action for a claim for pure economic loss based on an omission"
or
"liability
for an act of omission, causing pure economic loss".
[3]
"Pure economic loss"
connotes
loss that does not arise directly from damage to the plaintiffs
person or property, but rather in consequence of the negligent
act
itself, such as a loss of profit, being put to extra expenses, or the
diminution of the value of property - see:
Fourway
Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Road Agency Ltd
[2008] ZASCA 134
;
2009 2 SA 150
(SCA) at para 10,
and the authorities cited
therein.
[4]
Our problem child has grown up and advanced to a stage where an
action for a claim for pure economic loss based on an omission
is
recognised in our law. The Supreme Court of Appeal in
Fourway
Haulage,
supra,
at
para 12, per BRAND, JA stated that in dealing with the claim for pure
economic loss, one had to remember that negligent causation
of such
loss was not regarded as
prima facie
wrongful. Its wrongfulness depended on the
existence of a legal duty. The imposition of this legal duty was a
matter of judicial
determination involving criteria of public or
legal policy consistent with constitutional norms. Conduct causing
pure economic
loss would only be regarded as wrongful, and therefore
actionable, if public or legal policy considerations require that
such conduct,
if negligent, should attract legal liability for the
resulting damages. See also:
Minister of
Safety and Security v Van Duivenboden
2002 6
SA
431
(SCA) paras 12 and 22; Telematrix (Pty)
Ltd t/a Matrix Vehicle Tracking v Advertising Standards Authority SA
2006 1 SA 461
(SCA) in paras 13-14;
and
Trustees, Two Oceans Aquarium Trust v
Kantey & Templer (Pty) Ltd
2006 3 SA 138
(SCA) at paras 10-12.
[5]
In these proceedings I have to decide whether the plaintiffs'
application for amendment of their particulars of claim should
be
allowed and/or whether the defendant's exception to plaintiffs'
particulars of claim, on the basis that it lacks averments which
are
necessary to sustain an action, are well founded or not. In
Telematrix (Pty) Ltd,
supra,
the Supreme Court of Appeal found no fault
in deciding a case such as the present on exception. Three more
important judgments that
spring to mind where this issue was decided
on exception are:
Lillicrap, Wassernaar and
Partners v Pilkington Brothers (SA) (Pty) Ltd
1985 1 SA 475
(AD);
Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank Ltd
1992 1 SA 783
(A);
and
Minister of
Law and Order v Kadir
1995 1 SA 303
(A).
[6]
The applicants are the plaintiffs in an action instituted by them
against the respondent as defendant. For ease of reference,
the
applicants will henceforth be referred to as "the plaintiffs"
and the respondent as "the defendant".
[7]
The plaintiffs sue in their capacities as curators, both, of two
companies, namely Ovation Global Investment Services (Pty)
Ltd
("Ovation Services") and Ovation Global Investment Nominees
(Pty) Ltd ("Ovation Nominees"). The first and
second
plaintiffs are authorised to institute these proceedings in terms of
the Order of Court granted by the Western Cape High
Court, pursuant
to the two companies having placed under curatorship.
[8]
The plaintiffs delivered particulars of claim dated 29 April 2010
("the original particulars of claim") to which the

defendant delivered a Notice to Remove Cause of Complaint, contending
that the original particulars of claim were excipiable. The
Notice to
Remove Cause of Complaint led to the delivery of a Notice of
Intention to Amend by the plaintiffs. The defendant delivered
a
Notice of Objection to the intended amendment. It is as a result of
this objection that the plaintiffs launched the present
application
to amend. The objection is to the effect that the particulars of
claim as sought to be amended would still be excipiable,
that is,
that the amendment sought to be introduced do not cure the
excipiability of the original particulars of claim.
[9]
In this judgment, reference to "the particulars of claim"
will be to the particulars as sought to be amended, and
not the
original particulars of claim.
[10]
The parties herein are agreed that the present application for
amendment should be regarded as in essence being an exception
and
should be treated as such. Accordingly, if the particulars of claim
are excipiable, then the application for leave to amend
ought to be
dismissed. It is trite that an amendment ought not to be allowed
where its introduction into the pleading would render
such pleading
excipiable. See
Cross v Ferreira
1950 3
SA
443
(C) at 450E-F.
[11]
The nature of the exception and the resulting issues in this matter
can best be understood against the background of the
facts pleaded in
the plaintiffs' particulars of claim. I accordingly proceed to set
out in detail the factual matrix of this case
hereunder.
[12]
Ovation Services administered funds entrusted to it by or on behalf
of investors ("the principals") which funds were
paid to
and were obliged to be held by Ovation Nominees as trust property on
behalf of and for the benefit of investors in terms
of section 4 of
the Financial Institutions (Protection of Funds) Act, 28 of 2001
("the Protection of Funds Act"). Such
property remained the
property of the principals in terms of the provisions of section 4(5)
of the Protection of Funds Act.
[13]
By agreement between Ovation Nominees and a financial service
provider named Common Cents Portfolio Strategists (Pty) Ltd ("Common

Cents") Ovation Nominees would transfer cash amounts into a
banking account designated by Common Cents and/or one Angus
Cruickshank
for investment of such funds in cash portfolios.
[14]
Angus Cruickshank is a sole shareholder of Cornerstone Transaction
Financing (Pty) Ltd which in turn held all issued shares
in Ovation
Services and Common Cents. Cruickshank is not employed by either
Ovation
Services, Ovation Nominees or Common Cents but purported to act on
their behalf in the fraudulent manner relevant to this
case.
[15]
During February 2005 to January 2006 Cruickshank caused Ovation
Nominees to make available an amount of R209 529 336,00 into
Common
Cents Portfolio to be invested on behalf of principals. During April
2005 to January 2006 from the abovementioned amount
Cruickshank
caused the following amounts to be paid into the following ABSA bank
accounts from the account in the name of Ovation
Nominees at First
National Bank:
Account
665
: in the sum of R47 708 657,18 opened in
the name of Ovation Global Investment Holdings and transferred this
amount into the account
during the period 21 April 2005 to 5 July
2005.
Account 459
:
in the sum of R121 490 460,63 opened in the name of Common Cents and
transferred this amount into this account during the period
July 2005
to 5 January 2006.
[16]
Furthermore Cruickshank caused further ABSA bank accounts to be
opened in the name of Ovation Global Investment Holdings (Pty)
Ltd.
These were accounts 707 and 933 to which funds from account 665 were
transferred. Cruickshank misappropriated the sum of R34
844 988,14
from accounts 665, 707 and 933. During July 2005 to January 2006 he
misappropriated the sum of R103 382 402,74 from
account 459.
[17]
At all material times and when the bank accounts 459, 665, 707 and
933 were opened same were processed by one Mr Leon Dawie
Prinsloo,
the employee of ABSA, who was responsible for overseeing the said
accounts. The plaintiffs allege that the defendant
was represented by
the said Prinsloo who was employed by the defendant as business
banker at the Booysens branch of the defendant
and who acted in the
cause and scope of his employment as such with the defendant.
[18]
The plaintiffs allege that both Ovation Services and Ovation Nominees
had existing accounts with the defendant in various names
belonging
to various principals of Ovation Services and that Prinsloo was aware
of the fact that the amounts dealt with by Cruickshank
as pleaded
herein constituted "trust property".
[19]
In alleging unlawfulness on the part of the defendant the plaintiffs
state that in respect of the opening of account 665 the
defendant was
required to comply with and adhere to its own internal rules,
procedures and protocols and owed Ovation Services
and Ovation
Nominees a duty of care in the following respects:
19.1
it was obliged to establish and verify the identity of Ovation
Services and of Ovation Nominees as well as their respective
head
offices or principal places of business;
19.2
it was obliged to establish that Ovation Nominees had entered into an
irrevocable agreement with Ovation Services in accordance
with
subsection (d) of the definition of "nominee" in section 1
of the Protection of Funds Act;
19.3
it was obliged to establish and verify whether Cruickshank had the
necessary authority to establish the intended business relationship

between the defendant, Ovation Services and Ovation Nominees;
19.4
it was obliged to ensure that the application forms for the required
accounts were properly filled in and accompanied by the
necessary
supporting documentation;
19.5
it was obliged to peruse the aforesaid application forms and
supporting documents and compare them to the information contained
in
the application documentation relating to the accounts.
[20]
The plaintiffs aver that had the defendant complied with its
obligations it would have established that Cruickshank was not

authorised to open an account in the name of Ovation Global
Investment Holdings. Furthermore that the defendant would have
established
that Cruickshank was not authorised to act on behalf of
Ovation Nominees.
[21]
In respect of the opening of account number 459 the plaintiffs aver
that the defendant owed a duty of care to the plaintiffs
in that
21.1
it was obliged to establish and verify the identity of Common Cents
as well as its head office or principal place of business;
21.2
it was obliged to establish that Ovation Nominees had entered into an
asset management agreement with Common Cents;
21.3
it was obliged to establish and verify whether Cruickshank had the
necessary authority to establish the intended business relationship

between the defendant and Common Cents;
21.4
it was obliged to ensure that the application forms for the required
account were properly filled in and accompanied by the
necessary
supporting documentation and was obliged to peruse the aforesaid
application forms and supporting documents.
[22]
The plaintiffs further allege that subsequent to opening accounts
459, 665, 707 and 933 the defendant had a duty of care under
the
common law to manage and monitor the accounts. That the defendant
negligently, wrongfully and unlawfully breached its obligations
by
failing to manage and monitor the above accounts, alternatively, by
failing to properly manage and monitor the accounts.
[23]
The plaintiffs aver in their particulars of claim that in the event
that the defendant had complied with the obligations in
respect of
the proper management and monitoring of all of the above accounts, it
would have established that:
23.1 the
activity on account numbers 665 and 459 should have
flagged
internal risk procedures in respect of:
(a)
the high value and volume of the transactions;
(b)
that the accounts should have been handled by ABSA Corporate instead
of a private/business account at local branch level;
23.2 the
transfer of funds into and out of accounts 665, 459, 707 and 933 in
the high volumes aforesaid, amounted to improper activity
on the
accounts which necessitated reporting in terms of FICA and an enquiry
to Ovation Services.
[24]
In the circumstances, the plaintiffs aver that the defendant:
24.1
should reasonably have known that trust property was being
misappropriated by Cruickshank;
24.2
had a duty to the principals as owners of such property to act on
such knowledge by notifying Ovation Services, Common Cents
or Ovation
Nominees in respect of the transactions to and from the accounts,
which duty defendant wrongfully and unlawfully breached.
[25]
In further breach of its duty of care, neither Prinsloo nor any other
representative of the defendant notified Ovation Services
nor Ovation
Nominees of the above misappropriation of funds which notification
the defendant ought reasonably to have given to
Ovation Services and
Nominees.
[26]
But for the defendant's aforesaid unlawful omission, Ovation Services
and/or Ovation Nominees would have:
26.1
been alerted to and investigated the activities on the accounts;
26.2
taken steps to prevent any unauthorised employment of the funds;
26.3
recovered or attempted to recover any funds that had already been
misappropriated.
[27]
An amount of R18 108 057,89 was repaid from account 459 to Ovation
Nominees' FNB account. Furthermore an amount of R12 863
669,04 was
repaid to Ovation Nominees' FNB account from account 665.
Consequently and as a result of defendant's alleged negligent

breaches of its duty of care as pleaded by the plaintiffs,
Cruickshank was able to misappropriate a total sum of

R169 199 117,81 of which the plaintiffs have recovered the sum of R8
757 742,17 to date. The plaintiffs have been and remain unable
to
recover the remaining balance of R129 469 648,71.
[28]
In concluding the particulars of claim the plaintiffs allege that as
a result of the defendant's negligent breach of its duties
as
aforesaid, the principals suffered damages in the sum of R129 469
648,71. This is the amount claimed against the defendant.
[29]
The plaintiffs' case is founded on the facts that the defendant
negligently opened and maintained banking accounts which caused
pure
economic loss to them and/or the principals.
[30]
The defendant objects to the amendment of plaintiffs' particulars of
claim in that if allowed, same would be excipiable on
the following
grounds:
30.
1 that the particulars of claim lack allegations necessary to sustain
a cause of action; and
30.2
that the particulars of claim are vague and embarrassing.
The
theme in the defendant's objection, directed at the absence of a
cause of action, is directed at the absence from the particulars
of
claim of one of the essential elements of such a claim, namely
wrongfulness or "the breach of a legal duty". The theme
in
the defendant's objection directed at the vague and embarrassing
character of the particulars of claim is aimed in the main
at
confusion and contradiction surrounding the identity of the party to
whom the alleged legal duty is owed.
[31]
In synoptic form, the defendant alleges that the factual allegations
in the particulars of claim do not found or support the
legal
conclusions or averments that the defendant owed a legal duty to
Ovation Services or to Ovation Nominees or to the principals
and that
the omissions of the defendant were wrongful or unlawful.
[32]
It is appropriate to revisit the particulars of claim as set out
above in order to crystallise the role of the defendant in
this
action. It was the defendant (ABSA Bank) which opened account 665 (in
the name of Ovation Global Investment Holdings) and
account 459 (in
the name of Common Cents) and accounts 707 and 933 [in the name of
Ovation
Global
Investment Holdings (Pty) Ltd] all on the instructions of
Cruickshank.
[33]
The role attributed to the defendant (apart from the mere opening of
the accounts) is that of an omission in the following
context. It is
alleged that all the aforesaid accounts were processed by the
defendant's servant, Mr Prinsloo, (acting in the course
and scope of
his employment) who was also responsible for overseeing the accounts
and that the defendant has certain duties in
the opening of the
accounts and that the defendant had a duty to manage and monitor the
accounts. It is further alleged that the
defendant's wrong was its
omission to carry out these duties and thereby detect Cruickshank's
misappropriation and warn Ovation
Services or Ovation Nominees
thereof. In essence the plaintiffs' claim is based on the defendant's
alleged omission to warn Ovation
Services or Ovation Nominees of
Cruickshank's misconduct, and thereby enable one of them to prevent
the misappropriation of monies
by Cruickshank.
[34]
The central question is whether the facts pleaded are sufficient to
sustain the element of wrongfulness which is a discrete
requirement
of a delictual claim. This approach was affirmed in
Fourway
Haulage SA (Pty) Ltd v SA National Road Agency Ltd
[2008] ZASCA 134
;
2009 2 SA 150
(SCA):
"The
proposition that a plaintiff claiming pure economic loss must allege
wrongfulness, and plead the facts relied upon to
support that
essential allegation, is in principle well founded. In fact, the
absence of such allegations may render the particulars
of claim
exciplable on the basis that no cause of action had been disclosed."
Per BRAND, JA at para 14.
[35]
As pointed out earlier in this judgment the legal principle regarding
liability for an act of omission causing pure economic
loss is
recognised and settled in our law.
[36]
The South African case law which recognises a duty of care on the
part of a bank all recognise the duty in the context of cheques
and
recognise a duty owed to a true owner of the cheques in issue. In
Indac Electronics (Pty) Ltd v Volkskas Bank
Ltd
1992 1 SA 783
(A)
the issue on
exception, was whether on the facts alleged a collecting banker owed
a legal duty not to act negligently. VIVIER, JA
said:
In
the case before us only the element of unlawfulness is presently in
issue: the exception has been taken solely on the ground
that the
facts alleged by the plaintiff do not give rise to a legal duty on
the part of the defendant not to act negligently so
that the
defendant's conduct as the collecting banker was consequently not
unlawful.
In
determining whether the defendant was under such duty not to act
negligently (for without this legal duty there can be no
unlawfulness)
the Court is required to exercise a value judgment
embracing all relevant facts and involving consideration of policy."
[37]
After evaluating various factors, VIVIER, JA said at 801A-D:
"On
the balance, the factors which I have mentioned above, in my view,
operate in favour of recognising the existence of a
legal duty on the
part of a collecting banker to the true owner of a lost or stolen
cheque to avoid causing him pure economic loss
by negligently dealing
with such cheque. However at the stage of deciding an exception a
final evaluation and balancing of the
relevant policy considerations
which have been mentioned above should not be undertaken. It is
sufficient for present purposes
to say, firstly, that
lex
Aquilia
does provide a basis upon which a
collecting banker may be held liable in negligence to the true owner
of a lost or stolen cheque,
and, secondly, that there are
considerations of policy and convenience in the present case which
prima facie
indicate
the existence of a legal duty on the part of a collecting banker to
prevent loss by negligently dealing with the cheque
in question. This
prima facie
indication
may be rebutted by the evidence which the defendant might lead at the
trial, duly tested and evaluated in the light of
any countervailing
evidence which might be led by the plaintiff. It cannot, therefore,
at this stage be found that the defendant's
conduct was not
unlawful."
[38]
It should be remembered that the
Indac
Electronic
case found there to be a
prima
facie
legal duty on the part of the
collecting banker to prevent loss. The case was only concerned with
the issue of wrongfulness and
no view was expressed on the standard
of care (the negligence issue). See the following cases that followed
thereafter:
Columbus Joint Venture v ABSA
Bank Ltd
2002 2 SA 1049
(SCA); Powell and Another v ABSA Bank t/a
Volkskas Bank
1998 3 SA 807
(SEC)
and
KwaMashu Bakery Ltd v Standard Bank of
South Africa Ltd
1995 1 SA 377
(D).
[39]
Inasmuch as the authorities referred to above with regard to the
legal duty of a banker towards the true owner of a lost or
stolen
cheque are clear and settled law in that regard, they do not provide
a complete answer to the present case which relate
to the opening of
a bank account and subsequent failure to monitor same. In the present
case policy decision and value judgment
will have to be embarked upon
to decide whether a legal duty in relation to opening and conduct of
a banking account exists.
[40]
The cases referred to above (even if they do not form a precedent
in
casu)
do not serve as a bar to the
extension of liability in novel duty situations. The challenge
remains to exercise a value judgment
embracing all relevant facts and
involving considerations of policy.
In
the
Commissioner, SARS and Another v ABSA
Bank Ltd and Another
2003 2 SA 98
(W)
(the
"SARS
case")
the Court stated that expert evidence of banking practice would be
desirable, especially where the legal duty contended
for is not
supported by precedent and the Court hearing the exception has no
evidence before it of that nature and extent of monitoring
procedures
(if any) ordinarily carried out in relation to customers' accounts
and what a prudent banker would or should have done
in the
circumstances.
In
regard to the existence of a legal duty on the part of a bank
relating to opening an account for a customer the Court in the
SARS
case stated the following:
"[37]
I will deal firstly with the existence of a legal duty on the part of
a bank relating to opening an account for a customer.
This is an area
that is, to an extent, 'covered by authority'. Liability based on a
failure to take precautions when an account
is opened has been
recognised. In the KwaMashu Bakery Ltd v Standard Bank of South
Africa Ltd COMBRINCK J said 'I now turn to deal
with the standard of
care in particular what steps the defendant ought to have taken to
discharge the duty of care. The question
is what reasonable,
practical and affordable measures would the reasonable, prudent
collecting banker have taken in order to have
prevented the harm
which resulted to the plaintiff...' In order to succeed in obtaining
the proceeds of his theft of a cheque the
thief has to open a bank
account with the collecting banker. This he normally does after the
theft of the cheque, the account
then being opened in the name as
close as possible to the named payee. As a first step towards the
protection of the true owner,
I think it could be expected of a
reasonable banker not to only satisfy himself of the identity of a
new client but also gather
sufficient information regarding such
client to enable him to establish whether the person is the person or
entity which he, she
or it purports to be. Checks could be made on
places of employment, address given, whereabouts of the next of kin,
etc before
accepting the person as a customer. This could in no way
impact on the hanking system or involve an unreasonable amount of
time
or cost."
[43]
It may be mentioned that the Court in the
KwaMashu Bakery
case
had the benefit of hearing evidence as the case went on trial and was
not decided at the exception stage like the present case.
The
relevance of this statement will appear later in my judgment.
[44]
After considering the relevant factors in
the case, the Court in the
SARS
case found that a legal duty exists on the
part of the second defendant to avoid causing plaintiff pure economic
loss by negligently
opening and maintaining the bank account. The
Court formulated its view as follows:
"[47]
I propose to adopt the approach in the
Indac
case to the issue of a legal duty. A
consideration of all the factors I have referred to, in my view
supports the existence of a
legal duty on the part of the second
defendant to avoid causing the plaintiffs pure economic loss by
negligently opening and maintaining
the Zamzar account. However the
exception stage is not the time for a final balancing and evaluation
of all the relevant policy
considerations "
[45]
I turn now to the policy decision and value judgment necessary to
decide whether a legal duty, both in relation to the opening
and the
conduct of the accounts, is established. I consider the following
considerations relevant to this case:
45.1
At the time of the incident the defendant had statutory duties under
the Financial Intelligence Centre Act no 38 of 2001 ("FICA")

to report a suspicion. Cruickshank opened bank accounts and
transferred large sums of money from one account to the other. The

transfer of funds into and out of accounts 459, 665, 707 and 933 in
the high volume aforesaid amounted to improper activity on
the
accounts which necessitated reporting in terms of FICA and enquiry to
Ovation Services and Ovation Nominees.
45.2In
the event that the defendant had complied with its obligations in
respect of the proper management and monitoring of all
the above
accounts it should have established that the activity of account 459
and 665 should have flagged internal risk procedures
in respect of
the high value and volume of the transactions that the accounts
should have been handled by ABSA Corporate instead
of a
private/business account at local branch level.
45.3
It is apparent from the application forms for the opening of the bank
accounts (which are annexed to the particulars of claim)
that same
were not properly filled in and accompanied by the necessary
documentation in accordance with the defendant's policies
and
protocols. This should have raised a suspicion for the defendant to
act.
45.4
Given the high prevalence of crime in South Africa, in particular
money laundering, society's notion of justice demands that
a bank
should not turn a blind eye to the possibility that a customer may be
using an account concluded with it for criminal purposes.
In casu
large sums of money (in millions) were juggled from one account to
the other and ultimately withdrawn in large sums either
in cash or
cheques. A bank should be vigilant where the transaction is out of
the ordinary.
[46]
When considering the existence of a legal duty on the part of a bank
(particularly a novel duty) evidence will ordinarily be
necessary to
appreciate fully considerations of policy and convenience. Evidence,
be it factual or expert in nature, will assist
the Court in
evaluating the effect on banking procedures that would be caused were
the legal duty to be recognised. I am unable
to make a finding at
this stage of an exception as to whether or not, for example, the
defendant follows procedures to monitor
accounts, the purpose of such
monitoring and what such monitoring (if any) indicates.
[47]
It is not possible without evidence to determine how great a burden
recognition of the legal duties contended for will place
upon banks.
At the exception stage the Court does not have the evidential or
factual material with which to reach any decision
on this aspect and
the factual material will be evaluated in the light of such evidence
as may be led at the trial.
It
is inappropriate to decide the issue of wrongfulness in this case on
exception because the issue is fact bound. See: Axiam Holdings
Ltd v
Deloitte & Touche
2006 1 SA 237
(SCA).
[48]
Upon consideration of the plaintiffs' particulars of claim as they
stand and further having taken note of the grounds of objection

raised by the defendant, I make a finding that the particulars of
claim do disclose a cause of action in that the element of
wrongfulness
has been
prima facie
established.
[49]
The defendant has furthermore raised an objection against the
plaintiffs' particulars of claim on the ground that they are
vague
and embarrassing.
[50]
A pleading may be attacked on the ground that it is vague and
embarrassing even though it discloses a cause of action or defence

but it is worded in such a way that the opposite party is prevented
from clearly understanding the case he or she is called upon
to meet.
It is, however, trite that an exception on the ground that the
pleading is vague and embarrassing will not normally be
upheld unless
it is clear that the opposite party would be prejudiced in his
defence or action as the case might be.
[51]
The particulars of claim in this matter have been set out in detail.
When such particulars of claim are read by a mind willing
to
understand, one comes to a conclusion that they clearly disclose that
the defendant owed a duty of care to Ovation Services
and Ovation
Nominees. The fact that it is further alleged that the defendant owed
a duty of care to the principals is neither here
nor there. There is
no reason in law nor logic why a legal duty cannot be owed both to
the principals and Ovation Services and
Ovation Nominees. The
objection on this ground can therefore not stand.
[52]
I
grant the
order in the following terms:
(a)The
objection is dismissed with costs including the costs of two counsel.
(b)
The amendment to the particulars of claim is allowed.
E.M.
MAKGOBA
JUDGE
OF THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT
24067-2010
HEARD
ON: 13 & 14 JUNE 2011
FOR
THE PLAINTIFF: C E PUCKRIN SC & M DEWRANCE
INSTRUCTED
BY: STRYDOM & BREDENKAMP INC
FOR
THE DEFENDANT: S A CILL1ERS SC & F SNYCKERS
INSTRUCTED
BY: EDWARD NATHAN SONNENBERGS