Enelon CC t/a Realnet Nilgers & Surround v Nortje and Others (17025/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 231 (20 April 2011)

80 Reportability

Brief Summary

Restraint of trade — Validity of restraint agreement — Applicant sought to enforce restraint of trade agreements against former employees who joined a competitor shortly after termination of employment — Respondents contended that the agreements were unenforceable due to the applicant's lack of a valid fidelity fund certificate during the period of the agreements — Court held that the restraint agreements were invalid as they were entered into without a requisite fidelity certificate, contravening the Estate Agency Affairs Act, rendering the applicant without locus standi to enforce the agreements.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


The proceedings took the form of an application in the North Gauteng High Court, Pretoria, in which the applicant sought urgent relief to enforce restraint of trade undertakings against two former employees. The applicant was Enelon CC t/a Realnet Nilgers & Surround, and the respondents were Marianne Nortje (first respondent) and Roberto Lopes Salvado (second respondent).


The applicant approached the court for condonation under Rule 6(12) (dispensing with ordinary forms and service periods) and for an order enforcing clause 8 of the relevant employment contract(s), which contained the restraint provisions. The application was instituted on 16 March 2011 and was determined by Legodi J, with judgment delivered on 20 April 2011 (the judgment records the hearing date as 19 April 2011).


The general subject-matter of the dispute concerned the alleged breach of a restraint of trade agreement by the respondents after they left the applicant’s employ to join a competing estate agency. A further, and ultimately dispositive, feature of the dispute concerned whether the applicant could enforce the restraint where the estate agency business was conducted without the required fidelity fund certificate under the Estate Agency Affairs Act 112 of 1976.


2. Material Facts


It was common cause that the applicant was the former employer of both respondents, who were employed as estate agents in early 2010. The first respondent commenced employment on or about 10 February 2010, and the second respondent on or about 3 March 2010.


It was also common cause that each respondent signed a restraint of trade agreement in terms of which, among other terms, they undertook not to compete with the applicant directly or indirectly for 12 months after termination of employment and not to operate within a 5 km radius during that period.


The respondents terminated their employment with the applicant on or about 24 February 2010. After termination, they joined a competitor estate agency, identified in the judgment as Property 100 Agency (also referred to as Property 100 Group in the context of branding on advertising boards). The applicant sent letters of demand reminding the respondents of their restraint undertakings.


A material factual issue for purposes of the outcome concerned the existence (or non-existence) of fidelity fund certificates for the relevant period. The judgment recorded that the applicant had a fidelity fund certificate for 2009, valid from 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2009, issued to the applicant’s sole member and deponent, Ms Fransiska Schutte. A further fidelity fund certificate for 2011 was issued on 9 February 2011 and was valid until 31 December 2011.


The decisive factual finding for the period in question was that the matter had to be dealt with on the basis that no fidelity fund certificate was ever issued for 2010 for the applicant and its sole member, and likewise that the respondents were not shown to have been issued fidelity fund certificates for that period. The applicant relied on annexures attached to its replying affidavit, including copies of application forms and proof of payment in relation to attempts to obtain certificates, but it did not produce proof that a 2010 certificate had in fact been issued. The court gave the applicant an opportunity to submit the certificate(s) by 1 April 2011, indicating that failing such production the matter would be dealt with as if no certificate had been issued; the applicant did not submit the certificate(s) by that date.


For the non-joinder issue, the applicant’s own version included that the respondents were actively engaged in estate agency activities for their new employer, including the placement of “For Sale” boards within the relevant radius bearing the new employer’s branding. The court treated these facts as demonstrating that the new employer had a material stake in the restraint enforcement sought.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal questions the court was required to determine were whether the restraint of trade agreement(s) could be enforced given the statutory prohibition on acting as an estate agent without a valid fidelity fund certificate, and whether the applicant had locus standi to enforce the restraint in the absence of such certification. This was framed expressly as a question of law, prompted by the court during argument, with reference to sections 26 and 34 of the Estate Agency Affairs Act 112 of 1976, and considered together with related provisions (including section 34A).


A further legal issue was whether the application was fatally defective for non-joinder because the respondents’ new employer (a competitor estate agency) had a direct and substantial interest in the relief sought. The court treated this as a procedural issue with potentially dispositive effect, independent of the merits of the restraint dispute.


Other defences were raised (including alleged overbreadth/unreasonableness of the restraint and an allegation that the respondents were unaware they were signing a restraint), but the court considered it unnecessary to decide them in light of its conclusions on locus standi/illegality and non-joinder. The dispute therefore primarily concerned questions of law and the application of statutory consequences to the established facts, rather than factual credibility disputes or a discretionary value judgment on reasonableness of the restraint.


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court’s reasoning proceeded from the statutory scheme under the Estate Agency Affairs Act 112 of 1976, especially the prohibition in section 26 that no person may perform any act as an estate agent unless a valid fidelity fund certificate has been issued to the relevant persons (including, in the case of a close corporation, the members referred to in the definition of “estate agent”, and to every person employed by the estate agent as an estate agent). The court also emphasised section 34, which criminalises non-compliance with the Act, and it considered the regulatory purpose of the Act, including the protection of the public and the maintenance of standards in the estate agency industry (with reference to the Board’s objects and the Act’s provisions dealing with sanctionable conduct and accounting obligations).


On the facts, the court treated the applicant’s reliance on application forms and proof of payments as insufficient to establish lawful entitlement to trade in 2010. It held that the mere fact that an application for a certificate was made did not guarantee issuance, and that there could be legitimate reasons (including regulatory or compliance issues) why a certificate might not be issued. The court observed that if the applicant believed the absence of a certificate was due to administrative oversight, it could have sought confirmation from the Board; it did not do so and instead advanced contentions suggesting administrative dysfunction at the Board.


Because the applicant did not produce a 2010 fidelity fund certificate despite being afforded an opportunity to do so, the court approached the matter on the basis that neither the applicant nor its sole member, nor the respondents, held the required certificates during 2010. The court rejected the submission that events prior to termination were immaterial, reasoning that the alleged breach derived from the restraint agreement itself, and the enforceability of that agreement depended on the circumstances in which it was concluded and the statutory framework governing estate agency activity.


The court regarded the restraint agreement(s) as having been concluded at a time when the applicant knew that the required fidelity certification was not in place. It held that the applicant was performing acts as an estate agent during the period and that such activity, without the requisite certificate, contravened section 26 and amounted to an offence under section 34. On that basis, the court concluded that the contract on which the applicant relied as its cause of action was “so tainted” by illegality that it should be treated as null and void from the start, and therefore not capable of enforcement.


In addition, the court considered the applicant’s stance that the onus of registration lay with the agents rather than the principal, and held that the applicant’s view was mistaken. The court reasoned that the employer/principal had statutory obligations in relation to ensuring that employed estate agents were properly certificated, not only under section 26 but also under section 34A, which restricts entitlement to remuneration arising from the performance of estate agency acts unless the relevant fidelity fund certificates are in place. The court’s reasoning treated the applicant’s non-compliance as aggravated by the fact that both the employed agents and the principal entity (or its controlling member) lacked valid certification for 2010.


Separately, on the issue of non-joinder, the court applied the principle that a party with a material interest in the relief sought should be joined. The court reasoned that restraint enforcement against the respondents would inevitably affect their new employer’s estate agency business, which depends on commission-earning activities conducted through its agents. The court referred to the applicant’s own evidence showing that the respondents were marketing properties for the new employer (including “For Sale” boards with the new employer’s branding). It concluded that the new employer had a material interest and that the failure to join it was justified as a ground to dispose of the application. The court indicated that even if it were wrong on the invalidity/unenforceability conclusion, the application still ought to fail on non-joinder without reaching the merits.


Given these conclusions, the court found it unnecessary to decide the remaining defences concerning overbreadth/unreasonableness of the restraint and the respondents’ allegation that they signed without reading and were unaware of the restraint’s nature.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court dismissed the application. The restraint of trade relief sought was refused.


The applicant was ordered to pay the costs of the application. The judgment records the order simply as dismissal “with costs”, and it did not grant the attorney-and-client scale costs that had been sought in the notice of motion.


Cases Cited


No case law citations were referenced in the judgment.


Legislation Cited


Estate Agency Affairs Act 112 of 1976, including sections 7, 16(1), 26, 29, 30, 34, and 34A.


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 6(12).


Held


The court held that the applicant failed to establish that it held a valid fidelity fund certificate for 2010, and the matter had to be dealt with on the basis that no such certificate existed for that period. Because the restraint of trade agreement(s) were concluded and relied upon in circumstances involving contravention of the statutory prohibition on rendering estate agency services without a valid fidelity fund certificate, the contract relied upon was treated as tainted by illegality and therefore null and void from inception, rendering it unenforceable.


The court further held that the respondents’ new employer had a material interest in the relief sought and should have been joined. The non-joinder constituted an independent basis upon which the application fell to be dismissed. As a result, the application was dismissed with costs, without determining other defences on the merits.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


A court may treat a contract as unenforceable where it is concluded and relied upon in circumstances that involve contravention of a statutory prohibition, particularly where the prohibited conduct constitutes an offence and the contract is relied upon as the cause of action.


Under the Estate Agency Affairs Act 112 of 1976, the performance of acts as an estate agent without a valid fidelity fund certificate is prohibited by section 26 and may attract criminal consequences under section 34. Compliance is not satisfied merely by submitting an application for a certificate; enforceability cannot be premised on speculation that a certificate should have been issued.


In the estate agency context, an employing principal cannot avoid the statutory implications of the fidelity fund certification regime by attributing responsibility solely to individual agents. The statutory framework, including the remuneration restriction in section 34A, reflects obligations and consequences linked to certification for both the estate agency business and those acting under it.


Where relief is sought that will directly affect the commercial activities of a third party (such as a new employer in restraint proceedings), that third party may have a direct and substantial interest requiring joinder. Failure to join such a party may justify dismissal of the application without determination of the substantive merits.

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[2011] ZAGPPHC 231
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Enelon CC t/a Realnet Nilgers & Surround v Nortje and Others (17025/11) [2011] ZAGPPHC 231 (20 April 2011)

IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH
GAUTENG HIGH COURT
(PRETORIA)
CASE NUMBER:
17025/11
DATE: 19 APRIL 2011
REPORTABLE
OF INTEREST TO OTHER
JUDGES
In
the matter between:
ENELON CC t/a
REALNET NILGERS
&
...........................................................................................
Applicant
SURROUND
and
MARIANNE
NORTJE
..............................................................................................................
First
Respondent
ROBERTO LOPES
SALVADO
...........................................................................................
Second
Respondent
JUDGMENT
LEGODI J,
1. A restraint of
trade agreement and trading as an estate agent without a fidelity
certificate had become the centre of a dispute
between the parties
before me.
2. The applicant is
the ex-employer of both the first and respondents.
3. The first and
second respondents were employed by the applicant as estate agents on
or about 10 February 2010 and 3 March 2010
respectively.
4. The two
respondents respectively signed a restraint of trade agreement in
terms whereof, amongst others, undertook not to compete
with the
applicant directly or indirectly for period of 12 months after
termination of their employment with the applicant and
not to operate
within 5 Km radius during the said period.
5. On or about 24
February 2010, the respondents terminated their employment with the
applicant. Subsequent thereto, they joined
the applicant’s
competitor (Property 100 Agency).
6. The applicant
caused letters of demand to be addressed to the respondents in terms
whereof the two were reminded of the terms
and conditions of the
restraint of trade agreement aforesaid.
7. On 16 March 11,
the present applicant was instituted in terms whereof the applicant
seeks for relief in Afrikaans as follows:
"1. Dat die
Agbare Hof kondonasie sal verleen in terme van reël 6(12) van
die reels van hierdie Agbare Hof en dat die
applikant afstand doen
vir die vereiste vortn en tydperke van betokening;
2. Dat klousule
agt van die dienskontrak soos gesluit tussen die eerste respondent en
tweede respondent en applikant afgedwing word
en dat respondent
verbied om teenstrydig met die bepalings van klousule agt op te tree.
Dienskontrak hierby aangeheg as aanhangsel
"
KVM1

3.
Dat die eerste en tweede respondent gesamentlik en afsonderlik beveel
word om die koste van hierdie aansoek op

n
skaal soos tussen prokureur en ele kliënt te betaal, die een
betaal die ander vrygestel te word.
4. Verdere en/or
alternatiewe regshulp”.
8. The application
was brought on the basis that the two respondents had breached the
restraint of trade agreements respectively
and in particular that the
respondents are operating within 5 km radius in direct competition
with the applicant contrary to the
provisions of clauses of the said
agreement.
9. For the purpose
of the order, I do not find it necessary to go into the details of
the provisions of clauses 8. It suffices to
mention that the 12
months period restraint after termination and the restraint within 5
km radius appeared to have prompted the
application.
10. Four defences
were identified and confirmed by counsel on behalf of the respondents
and can be summed up as follows:
10.1 That the
present employer of the respondents is an interested party and should
therefore have been joined in these proceedings,
10.2 That the relief
sought is unenforceable, having regard to its wide terms,
10.3 That the
respondents were not made aware that they were signing a restraint of
trade agreement,
10.4
That the applicant has no
locus
standi
to
bring the present application without a fidelity certificate having
been issued for the period 2010.
11.
For the purpose of the order I intend making hereunder, I shall deal
with two defences that had been raised and argued before
me. These
relate to non-joinder and
locus
standi.
The
latter issue was raised and prompted by the court during argument as
follows:
IS A RESTRAINT OF
TRADE AGREEMENT ENTERED INTO WITHOUT A FIDELITY CERTIFICATE VALID AND
ENFORCEABLE?
12. The issue raises
a question of law. Both parties were asked to deal with it,
especially in the light of the provisions of sections
26 and 34 of
Estate Agency Affairs Act, no. 112 of 1976 (hereinafter referred to
as the Act).
13. I find it
necessary to specifically quote the two sections:

26.
Prohibition of rendering of services as estate agent in certain
circumstances
-
No person shall
perform any act as an estate agent unless a valid fidelity fund
certificate has been issued to him or her and to
every person
employed by him or her as an estate agent and if such person is-
(a) a company, to
every director of that company, or
(b) a close
corporation to every member referred to in paragraph (b) of the
definition of “estate agent” of that corporation.
34. Offences
and Penalties -
Any person who
contravenes or fails to comply with any provision of this Act, or any
order or request or addressed hereunder, shall
be guilty of an
offence and liable on conviction to a fine not exceeding five
thousand rand or to imprisonment for a period not
exceeding five
years or to both such find and such imprisonment”.
14. I have had
difficulties in understanding counsel for the applicant on this
issue. It sounded like the first suggestion was that,
the applicant
did everything in its power to apply for the fidelity certificate.
Secondly, it wanted to attribute blame to the
Estate Agency Board for
not issuing such a fidelity certificate. Lastly, it sounded like the
applicant wanted to suggest that such
a certificate might be lying
somewhere in the offices of the Estate Board.
15. The fidelity
certificate under discussion relates to the period from January 2010
to the 31 December 2010. As a background,
during 2009, a fidelity
certificate under number 200910/556 was issued to Fransiska Schutte
Properties operating under the name
of Enelon CC. This certificate
was valid for the period 1 January 2009 to 31 December 2009.
Fransiska Scheutte is the deponent
to both the founding and replying
affidavits. She is the sole member of the applicant.
16.
On 9 February 2011, a fidelity certificate for 2011 was also issued
to Ms Fransiska Schutte and is valid until 31 December 2011.
17. With regard to
the fidelity certificate for the period 2010, the applicant in its
replying affidavit annexed the following:
17.1 a copy of
undated application form for the issue of a fidelity certificate in
respect of the second respondent and proof of
payment to the Estate
Board on 3 October 2010 in the amount of R364.90
17.2 a copy of
application form for the issue of fidelity certificate dated 1
February 2010 in respect of the first respondent,
17.3 a copy of
undated letter addressed to the Estate Agents Board in terms whereof
the Board was notified that the first respondent
had joined Realnet
Witzers & Surround with effect from 1 February 2010. In the
letter of 19 June 2009 addressed to the
Board, it was stated that the
applicant was trading as Realnet Witzers & Surround.
18. Counsel for the
applicant sought to argue that all the annexures referred to above,
should be seen as excusing the applicant
to have traded without a
fidelity certificate during 2010. He sought to blame the Board for
having failed to issue such certificates.
I do no think that this
could serve as an excuse for trading illegally in terms of sections
34 and 34A read together with section
26 of the Act.
18.1 Application for
a fidelity certificate is not a guarantee that such a certificate
would be issued. It might be that there are
outstanding issues
between the applicant and the Board. In terms of section 7, the
objects of the Board and having regard to the
public interest, is to
maintain and promote the standard of conduct of estate agents and to
regulate the activities of the estate
agents. Section 30 of the Act,
deals with conduct deserving of sanction by estate agents. In terms
of subsection (1), any estate
agent shall be guilty of conduct
deserving of sanction if he, amongst others:
(a)
(b) fails in
respect of any act performed by him as an estate agent to give a full
and proper explanation in writing, within 30
days of being called
upon in writing to do so, to any person having a material interest in
the performance of such act,
(c) fails to pay
any moneys due by him to the board or in respect of the fund within
one month after such moneys become due,
(d) fails to
furnish in writing within such period as the board may determine such
information as the board
may request in
writing and reasonably require in order to exercise its powers
properly under this Act,
(e) ...
(f) fails to
comply with any provision of section 28(8), 29 or 32, or contravenes
any provision of section 26, 32A(2)(a) or (b)
or 34B.”
19. Section 29 deals
with duty of estate agent to keep accounting records. Section 29 is
clearly intended at protecting the public
who places their funds or
moneys in the care of an estate agent. Existence of fidelity fund
certificate is to back up such a measure
of ensuring that the public
is protected. I am mention all these just to make the point that,
when an estate agent has applied
for the issue of a fidelity
certificate and it is not issued or the Board does not react thereto,
one cannot conclude that there
are no reasons for not issuing such a
certificate.
20. If the applicant
really believed that there are no such reasons, the least it could
have done was to get a confirmation from
the Board, for example, a
confirmation by the Board, that it was an oversight on its part not
to issue such a certificate. Instead
of seeking for such a
confirmation or an explanation why such a confirmation could not be
obtained, the applicant seems to have
contented itself with the
annexures to the replying affidavit referred to earlier in this
judgment, coupled with the contention
that the Board’s
administration is in a mess.
21. It was only at
the end of the discussion and submissions when the applicant sought
to obtain the certificate or certificates
from the Board. The
applicant was required to submit such a certificate before 1 April
2011. Failing which it was indicated that
this court will deal with
the matter as if such certificate was never issued. To date, the
applicant had failed and or neglected
to submit such a certificate.
The matter is therefore dealt with on the basis that no fidelity
certificate was ever issued for
the applicant and its sole members,
the first and second respondents for the period 2010. This then
brings me back to the issue
raised in paragraph 11 above.
22. Counsel for the
applicant suggested that, what had occurred before the respondents’
termination of their services and
therefore the alleged breach, is
immaterial. I understood this to suggest that the court must confine
itself only to the termination
and conduct of the respondents
subsequent to termination of their employment. In my view, the
applicant’s counsel fails to
take into consideration the source
of such a breach by or conduct of the respondents amounting to the
alleged breach.
23. The source of
such a breach is the restraint of trade agreements entered into
between the applicant and the first and second
respondents
respectively. Both these agreements were concluded when neither the
applicant nor its sole member Ms Schutte had a
fidelity certificate.
The fidelity certificate preceding the two agreements expired on 31
December 2009. By 10 February 2010 or
3 March 201 one would have
expected the applicant or its member to have long applied for the
fidelity certificate for the period
1 January to 31 December 2010.
24. Instead, the
first respondent having started working for the applicant on 1
February 2010 and the applicant having applied for
the issue of the
fidelity certificate for the first respondent on 1 February 2010, on
10 February 2010, it decided to conclude
restraint of trade
agreement. As it did so, it knew that neither itself nor the sole
member, Ms Schutte, or the first respondent
was having a fidelity
certificate.
25. The provision of
section 26 is clear. No person shall perform any act as estate agent,
unless a valid fidelity certificate has
been issued. It is not the
applicant’s case that for the period 1 January 2010 to 31
December 2010, it has not been performing
any act as an estate agent.
It is not the applicant’s case that since 1 February 2010 to 31
December 2010 the first respondent
had not been performing any such
act as an estate agent.
26. Such conduct
does not only deserve a sanction in terms of section 30, but it is
also an offence in terms of section 34 of the
Act. It is the contract
that was entered into without a valid fidelity certificate that the
applicant wishes to rely on as its
cause of action.
27. The contract is
so tainted, that it should be found to have been null and void from
the start. As to why the applicant decided
to conclude or enter into
the agreement on 10 February 201, is one thing I do not understand.
One would have expected the applicant
to wait for the issue of the
fidelity certificate before it entered into such an agreement, or to
ensure that it is obtained immediately
thereafter, not only for
itself, but also for the respondents.
28. There is another
issue which worries me. It looks like the applicant adopted the
attitude that it had no obligation to ensure
that the respondents
were having valid fidelity certificates before and or after the
conclusion of the respective restraint of
trade agreements. It
expresses itself as follows in this regard:

15
.
Die
onus om gerigestreer te word by die Estate Agency Affairs Board
(EAAB) berus op die agente self en nie op die prinsipaal nie.
Ek het
aansoek self aan die EAAB gestuur. Ek heg as bewys daarvan.
Aanhangsel “X2” en “X3” aan. Ek wil
weereen
op rekord plaas dat daar geen plig op die prinsipaal rus nie vir die
registrasie van agente nie. Ek het die aansoek uit
die goedheid van
my hart namens die Respondente gedoen. Die tweede Respondente erken
in paragraph 31 dat die applicant wel aansoek
gedoen het vir beide
die Respondente se registrasie
"
29. Of course, the
applicant is mistaken if it thought that it had no obligation in
ensuring that the respondents had valid fidelity
certificates before
they could perform any act as estate agents. This obligation should
be seen not only in terms of section 26,
but also in the light of the
fact that, the two respondents were employed by the applicant. Even
most importantly, in the light
of the provisions of section 34A. In
terms of subsection (1) hereof, no estate agent shall be entitled to
any remuneration or other
payment in respect of or arising from
performance of any act, referred to in subparagraph (i), (ii), (iii)
or (iv) of paragraph
(a) of the definition of “estate agent”,
unless at the time of the performance of the act a valid fidelity
fund certificate
has been issued to:
(a) such an estate
agent, and
(b) if such estate
agent is a company, to every director of such company or, if such
estate agent is a close corporation, to every
member referred to in
paragraph
(b) of the
definition of “estate agent” of such corporation.
30. In the present
case, the applicant would have been entitled to remuneration or other
payment raised by either the first or second
respondent or both of
them. Therefore, by virtue of section 34A, the applicant was obliged
to ensure that both respondents who
were facilitating a remuneration
or other payment to the applicant had fidelity certificate before
performing any act as estate
agents for the applicant.
31. The situation in
the present case was in my view worse. It was not only the estate
agents who were without the fidelity certificate,
but also the
principal or her corporation (the applicant). Therefore, not only
conduct amounting to an offence in terms of section
34, but also in
terms of section 34 A.
32.Before I conclude
on the issue and inasmuch as the applicant wishes to rely on payment
to the Board for its justification, firstly,
it failed to provide
such a proof that when it submitted the application form for the
issue of the fidelity certificate in respect
of the first respondent,
it paid for the required levy.
33. Section 16(1)
provides that every estate agent or prospective estate agent,
excluding an estate agent referred to in paragraph
(cA) of the
definition of “estate agent” in section 1, shall within
the prescribed period and in the prescribed manner,
apply to the
board for a fidelity fund certificate and such application shall be
accompanied by the levies referred to in section
9(l)(a) and the
contribution referred to in section 15. As I said, the applicant
failed to show this in respect of the first respondent.
34. As regard the
second respondent, there was an undated application for the issue of
the fidelity certificate for the period 2010.
There is then a
Standard Bank print out attached to the replying affidavit which
shows that an amount of R394.90 was paid on 3
October 2010, the
beneficiary being ID no. 460105 5077 086. In the application form the
same identity number is indicated as being
that of the second
respondent.
35. Inasmuch as the
payment of R364.90 is intended to be levies and contributions
referred to in section 16, one can therefore assume
that the
application for the issue of the fidelity certificate for 2010 in
respect of the second respondent was made during October
2010.
36. The result of
this is that, the second respondent had been unlawfully performing
acts as an estate agent without even having
applied for a fidelity
certificate for the period March 2010 until October 2010. Only in
October 2010 did the applicant apply for
such a certificate. By this
time, the second respondent was only left with two months for 2010.
Therefore, neither the second respondent
nor the applicant or its
member, were entitled to operate as estate agents and neither were
they allowed to receive remuneration
or other payment based on an act
performed as an estate agent by the first and or second respondent as
envisaged in section 34A.
37. It looks like
section 16 in its reference to “prospective estate agent”,
the legislature intended a situation like
in the present case. That
is, the one who is not in possession of a fidelity certificate, but
intends to perform acts as an estate
agent, could then apply as a
“prospective estate agent" for the issue of such a
certificate. This is what the applicant
could have done. But until
such time that the certificate is issued, the applicant be allowed to
enforce an agreement that was
concluded and terminated without such a
certificate.
NON-JOINDER
38. The applicant
wishes to dismiss this issue as being insignificant. That is, the
dispute between the applicant and the respondents
had nothing to do
with the respondents’ new employer.
39. Quite very often
in matters like this, the new employer is cited as a party to the
proceedings. The real issue is whether Property
100 Estate Agents
(the new employer) is having material interest in the proceedings.
40. Of course, it
does have and I do not intend wasting time on the issue. The essence
of an estate agent business is to earn a
commission. Depending on who
is the owner of an estate agency, those estate agents who are working
for the owner, further earns
their income from such commission. The
estate agency or the owner thereof is dependent on a commission in
respect of deals negotiated
and concluded by its or his estate
agents.
41. Shutting down on
the activities of such estate agents will of necessity have a bearing
on the owner of the estate agency or
the agency itself.
42. From the
applicant’s own version, the respondents seem already to be
actively selling houses or immovable properties on
behalf of the new
employer. For example, on pages 64 to 69 of the paginated papers,
reference is made in the founding affidavit
to “FOR SALE”
boards that had been fixed or exhibited by the first respondent at
different areas, within the 5 km radius.
All these boards show the
logo of the new employer, Property 100 Group.
43. To say the new
employer has no material interest in the present proceedings defeats
one’s sense of logic. If the relief
was to be granted, this
would have the effect that the boards will have to be removed and
therefore never replaced again or will
have to be replaced by another
estate agent from the new employer or another agency.
44. The non-joinder
issue should be found to be justified in the circumstances of the
present case. The issue is not much what defence
could be raised by
such a new employer. Once one finds that it does have material
interest in the proceedings to speculate on a
good or otherwise
defence would be dangerous. Therefore, even if one was to be wrong
with regard to the issue of invalidity and
unenforceability of the
restraint of trade agreement, the application ought to be disposed
off on the non-joinder issue, without
going into the merits of the
application.
45.
The other issue that was raised relates to the unenforceability of
the restraint of agreements resulting from its wide restraint
in
terms of clauses 8. Two issues were raised in this regards. That is,
the restraint is too wide that it will be impossible to
enforce and
that it is therefore unreasonable. Secondly, that inasmuch as the
applicant wishes to rely on a narrow consideration
of clause 8, on
the period, the 5 km radius and the actions complained of, it is not
permissible as it would amount to the rewriting
of the agreement for
the parties by severing other portions of the terms and conditions of
the agreement. As
I
said,
I do not find it necessary to venture into the dispute around this.
46. The other
defence relates to the respondents alleging that each signed the
agreement without reading it and therefore, they
were not aware that
they were agreeing to a restraint of trade. This has a bearing on
merits. The two issues dealt with above,
make it unnecessary to go
into this defence.
47. Consequently,
the application is hereby dismissed with costs.
M F LEGODI
JUDGE OF THE HIGH
COURT
FOR
THE APPLICANT
LINKY
SCHUTTE ATTORNEYS
150 Daffodil Street
Lynnwood Rigde
PRETORIA
Tel: 012 348 8584
Ref: J Fourie/LS1411
FOR
THE RESPONDENTS
THYS
CRONJE INC.
The Works, 258
Brooklyn Road
Menlopark,
PRETORIA
Ref: 012 362 4959
Ref: Chantelle vd
Heever LN0000