Elbie Eiendomme CC t/a El Madre Properties v Ryton Estates (Pty) Ltd (51863/08) [2011] ZAGPPHC 58 (15 April 2011)

70 Reportability
Contract Law

Brief Summary

Contract — Agency — Mandate to sell property — Plaintiff claiming commission for sale of property based on alleged mandate — Dispute over existence of mandate and whether plaintiff was effective cause of sale — Evidence presented confirmed mandate was ceded to plaintiff and that plaintiff's efforts led to sale to government — Court found in favor of plaintiff, establishing both the existence of the mandate and the plaintiff as the effective cause of the sale.

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[2011] ZAGPPHC 58
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Elbie Eiendomme CC t/a El Madre Properties v Ryton Estates (Pty) Ltd (51863/08) [2011] ZAGPPHC 58 (15 April 2011)

REPORTABLE
IN THE HIGH COURT OF
SOUTH AFRICA
(NORTH GAUTENG HIGH
COURT, PRETORIA)
CASE NR: 51863/08
DATE: 15 APRIL 2011
In
the matter between:
ELBIE
EIENDOMME CC t/a EL MADRE
PROPERTIES
..........................................
PLAINTIFF
and
RYTON
ESTATES (PTY)
LTD
...............................................................................
DEFENDANT
JUDGMENT
Ranchod
J,
[1]
In this matter the plaintiff claims payment of R2 000, 000.00 plus
VAT from the defendant, together with interest and costs.
The claim
is based on contract, in terms of which the plaintiff was mandated to
market and sell the defendants property (a group
of properties
collectively called Ryton Estates (and referred to herein as 'the
property'). The property was sold in 2008.
[2]
Plaintiff is a close corporation trading under the name and style of
EL MADRE PROPERTIES, the sole member of which is Mr LB.
Odendaal.
Prior to the coming into existence of the plaintiff close
corporation, Odendaal had personally traded as EL MADRE PROPERTIES.

Before and after that, he was employed by REALTY 1 [ELK] White River
(which, not withstanding its name, in fact traded at Nelspruit).
[3]
The essential disputes between the parties are two-fold, firstly
whether the plaintiff had a mandate to market and sell the
property
and secondly, whether plaintiff was the effective cause of the sale
of the property.
[4]
Odendaal gave his evidence on commission because he was ill at the
time. The commission heard his evidence on 13 April and 7
June, 2010
and the transcript of the record of the commission was handed in at
Court on the first day of trial on 3 August, 2010
by the
Commissioner, Advocate G.D. Lubbe.
[5]
The defendant then requested that the matter stand down to the
following day to afford its legal representatives the opportunity
to
peruse the commission's transcript. The costs of the day were
reserved. I will revert to the costs issue presently.
[6]
A number of facts appear to be common cause or not in dispute: That
Odendaal is the only member of the plaintiff; During the
period
2000-2005 Odendaal was employed as an estate agent by Realty 1 until
he resigned at the end of 2005;
During 2006 Odendaal was
incapacitated by ill health and was therefore not active as an estate
agent for the entire year;
In
2007 Odendaal began trading as an estate agent again but this time
for his own account; In the same year -2007- the plaintiff
close
corporation was incorporated with Odendaal as the only member; During
the time when Odendaal was employed by Realty 1 (before
2007) two or
three Black Economic Empowerment ventures expressed interest in
buying the property but ultimately none of them came
to fruition;
After the period of inaction during 2006, in January 2007 a
co-employee of Odendaal at Realty 1, Mr Mark Flewin, introduced
one
Nick Elliot. Odendaal testified that Elliot had told him he was going
to buy the property together with the government;
The
property was ultimately sold to the South African Government, acting
through the Department of Land Affairs (DLA), in May, 2008;
Shortly
thereafter the property was transferred to the purchaser, in June,
2008.
THE
MANDATE
[7]
I turn then to the question of the mandate. The defendant disputes
that the plaintiff (or, for that matter, Odendaal personally)
had the
mandate to market and sell the property for defendant. It was put to
Odendaal that the mandate was given to Realty 1 at
a time when
Odendaal was in the former's employ. Odendaal confirmed that the
mandate was originally given to Realty 1 but that
during February,
2007 the mandate was confirmed as being between himself personally
and the defendant. In support of this contention,
Odendaal relies on
letters A and B to the particulars of claim. Letter A headed 'ELMADRE
EIENDOMME - PROPERTIES' reads as follows:
"7
Februarie 2007
MNR.
G. WATSON
RYTON
ESTATES
NGODWANA
FAKS
NO: 011 728 9005
IS: VERKOOP VAN RYTON
ESTATES - KOMMISSIE
HIERMEE WENS ONS U MEE TE
DEEL DAT DIE KOMMISSIE BETAALBAAR OP DIE BOGENOEMDE TRANSAKSIE R 2
000 000.00 (TWEE MILJOEN RAND) BTW
UITGESLUIT, SAL BELOOP SOOS MET U
BESPREEK.
WEEREENS
WIL ONS U BEDANK VIR U SAMEWERKING EN TYD WATU AAN ONS AFGESTAAN MET.
BYVOORBAAT DANKIE
(Signed)
LB ODENDAAL PRINSIPAAL"
Letter B headed 'RYTON
ESTATES (PTY) LTD' read as follows: "El Madre Eindomme Posbus
19711 Nelspruit
1200
Per Faks-013-7551613
8
Februarie 2007
Geagte
Mr Odendaal,
IS.
VERKOOP VAN RYTON ESTATES - KOMMISSIE
U
Skrywe van 1 Februarie 2007 verwys;
Let wel die kommissie op
begenoemde transaksie sal slegs aan betaal word as u maatskappy die
plaas verkoop.
Byvoorbaat dank,
(Signed)
Marc Watson Ryton
Estates"
[8]
Odendaal testified that when he resumed trading as an estate agent in
January, 2007 he had informed Mr Garry Watson, who was
a director of
the defendant of that fact. Mr Watson, he said, informed him that he
(Watson) wanted to have nothing to do with estate
agencies and other
persons and that he wanted him (Odendaal) to do his work.
[9]
Whilst I did not have the benefit of observing Odendaal when he was
testifying (his evidence having been taken on commission
by Adv.
Lubbe) a perusal of the record shows that he was an honest witness
and readily conceded, where necessary points, put to
him in
cross-examination. An aspect of his evidence that may be criticized
was that relating to the issue of VAT registration and
the issuing of
a VAT invoice and whether the transaction included or excluded VAT. I
do not think that even then he was being deliberately
dishonest. A
lengthy cross-examination took place on the VAT issue and whether the
VAT invoice was submitted to the conveyancing
attorney. I agree with
plaintiff's counsel that it is the proverbial red herring and does
not, in my view, affect the credibility
of Odendaal on the mandate
issue, nor for that matter as regards the question of who was the
effective cause of the sale of the
property.
[10]
In my view it is important to note that whatever may have preceded
it, the mandate in favour of EL MADRE PROPERTIES was confirmed
by the
letters A and B. The contents of these letters were not challenged;
nor was their authenticity. Importantly, such mandate
was confirmed
by Mr Watson, who testified for the defendant, in his own testimony.
In the light thereof, the whole question of
the mandate having
initially been given to Realty 1 is beside the point.
[11]
In my view, the existence of the mandate in 2007 was confirmed by
all the evidence. Odendaal testified that Watson wanted
the mandate
to follow him no matter where he went. This was not challenged
either. Odendaal created the plaintiff as a business
vehicle on the
advice of his accountant, Mr Dunn. Odendaal said the mandate was
ceded to the plaintiff which traded as EL MADRE
PROPERTIES. It was
argued by defence counsel that Dunn should have been called as a
witness by the plaintiff to testify on these
points. In my view, it
was not necessary to call Dunn to provide details of the mechanics by
which this was done. (Odendaal also
testified that it was a
requirement by the Estate Agencies regulator that a close corporation
or company must be utilised as a
vehicle through which an estate
agent must conduct his business.)
[12]
The defendant submitted that Odendaal testified that the mandate
given to Realty 1 was in fact the same mandate as the one
in terms of
which the plaintiff earned the commission in 2008 and that Odendaal
was not responsible for or involved in the termination
of the Realty
1 mandate.
[13]
The original instruction to Odendaal whilst he was still with Realty
1 came to naught; so too the efforts to conclude a sale
with a BEE
group and Golden Citrus Estates (previously TSB). In my view, the
letters A and B clearly indicate that it was the intention
and effect
of the mandate that EL MADRE PROPERTIES would continue efforts to
market the property. As I said, such continued mandate
was confirmed
by Watson in his testimony. The letters confirm the existence of the
mandate in favour of EL MADRE PROPERTIES. That
Odendaal was not
involved in or responsible for the termination of the mandate of
Realty 1 is in the circumstances not of consequence.
The letters, as
explained by and viewed against the background of the evidence of
Odendaal, Watson, Flewin and Elliot confirm that
EL MADRE PROPERTIES
was mandated by the defendant to find a purchaser at an agreed
commission.
[14]
I accept, on a balance of probabilities, Odendaal's evidence of the
mandate following him, in light of the letters A and B
as well as the
cession of the mandate to the plaintiff.
EFFECTIVE
CAUSE OF THE SALE
[15]
The principle that emerges from case law is that enquiries relating
to effective cause of a sale are factual and each case
must
accordingly be dealt with on its own unique set of facts. While
previous cases may be helpful they are not decisive because
generally
speaking, no two cases are identical on the facts. I turn then to the
facts of the case before me.
[16]
It is clear from the evidence that Odendaal put a considerable amount
of time and effort during 2003 in preparing a brochure
for the
purpose of marketing the property. He enlisted the help of several
individuals where necessary to properly value the property
and draw
up various tables. Odendaal says he incurred considerable amount of
travel expenses and the taking of photographs of the
property as
well.
[17]
Flewin testified that he introduced Elliot to Odendaal about three to
four years before the transfer to the government was
registered in
2008.
[18]
During the period 2004-2005 Elliot was instrumental in introducing
certain potential BEE purchasers. Two of three potential
purchasers
made offers which were put to Gary Watson of the defendant by
Odendaal but they could not secure the necessary finance
and, in any
event, Watson rejected the offers as being too low. A third group of
purchasers, says Odendaal, also did not qualify
to purchase the
property. Odendaal himself agreed with Watson that the two offers
that were made were too low.
[19]
Flewin said Elliot came back to him in early 2007 in connection with
the sale of the property. Odendaal had kept him informed
about
Elliot's negotiations with, this time, the Government as a potential
purchaser. (Elliot testified that he was a facilitator
of business
transactions and in this case his intention was to lease the property
from the Government if the latter would purchase
it.) Odendaal
arranged a meeting where Gary Watson, his son
Marc
Watson, Elliot and himself were present. Odendaal introduced Elliot
as a potential buyer and it was at this meeting that he
also informed
Gary Watson that he was now on his own and no longer with Realty 1.
Watson had responded, as stated earlier, by saying
he wanted to have
nothing to do with estate agencies or other persons and that Odendaal
shouid do his (Watson's) work as he had
all his information and that
he had done Watson's work properly until then.
[20]
Importantly, Odendaal's evidence is that Elliot had said he,
together with the Government ('in samewerking met die regering')

wanted to buy the property. Elliot testified that the project was
brought to him by Odendaal and they facilitated the sale of the

property to the government. Under cross-examination he said it was
Odendaal who introduced the property to him, that he was not
an agent
of the Government nor did he represent Ryton Estates. He also
confirmed under cross-examination that at the time of the
BEE
negotiations Odendaal was involved and that it was Odendaal (and
Flewin) who presented the project at the time at the premises
of
Realty 1. While Elliot could not recall whether he introduced
Odendaal to any Government officials he did recall that he received

the marketing brochure from Odendaal which he in turn passed on to
the Government. He had later passed on additional copies of
the
brochures from Odendaal to the Government. Odendaal testified that he
had several additional copies. Elliot also said because
the
Government wanted to make the farm workers shareholders in the farm
it must have interacted with Watson in 1999.
[21]
The essence of defendant's case as i understand it is that
Odendaal's interaction with Elliot was in the context of Elliot
as a
potential purchaser. That the Government ultimately purchased it was
due to its prior dealings with Watson in 1999. Furthermore,
it was
argued, Odendaal had no dealings whatsoever with the DLA or with the
transferring attorneys. Nor was he involved with contractual

negotiations and he had not even seen the contract of sale before he
issued summons and the defendant discovered it as part of
the
discovery procedure. Defendant further contends that even if it is
accepted for purposes of argument that had Elliot not been
introduced
to the defendant, the government would never have purchased the
property; the plaintiff is nevertheless not entitled
to the judgment
it seeks. The reason, so it was argued, is that the plaintiff bears
the onus of proving that its introduction was
the direct and
effective cause of the sale and the purchaser was induced to buy as a
result of his introduction. Accordingly, the
estate agent has to
prove that he was the causa causans and not the causa sine qua non,
in other words, that the agent was not
a cause but the case of the
sale. I was referred in this regard by defence counsel to AIDA REAL
ESTATE LTD v LIPSCHITZ 1971(3)
SA 871 at 873-874A where it was stated
as follows:
"The
duty of the estate agent, if he is to earn remuneration by way of
commission for selling property, is to introduce to
his principal
(the seller) a purchaser who is willing and financially able to buy
the property, and he earns the commission if
a sale is concluded with
that purchaser at the stipulated price or a price ultimately proven
to be acceptable to the seller. A
proviso has been added to the
effect that the introduction of the willing and able buyer must have
been the effective cause or
causa causans of the sale. If a new
factor intervenes causing or contributing to the conclusion of the
sale and the new factor
is not of the making of the agent, the final
decision depends on the result of a further enquiry - viz., did the
new factor outweigh
the effect of the introduction by being more than
or equally conducive to the bringing about of the sale as the
introduction was,
or was the introduction stilt overridingly
operative? Only in the latter instance is the commission said to have
been earned."
[22]
The initial interest by the Department of Land Affairs was in a
completely different context and for a different purpose altogether,

i.e. Labour Tenant Tenure and Reform. That had, as Mr Watson
conceded, nothing to do with the eventual sale. Moreover, the
evidence
of Mr Moloi was that nothing ever came of that, due to
financial constraints. There is, in my view no evidential basis for
the
suggestion that the Government was interested in Ryton Estates as
a buyer, as ultimately evidenced in the concluded agreement of
sale,
long before Odendaal became involved. Mr Moloi did not explain his
own position within the Department of Land Affairs save
for creating
and leaving the impression that he was concerned with the issue of
Labour Tenants and their problems. No other Government
official was
called to substantiate the propositions put in cross-examination with
a view to place a question mark over or undermining
the plaintiff's
evidence demonstrating that EL MADRE PROPERTIES was the effective
cause of the eventual transaction, being principally
the evidence of
Mr Elliot and Odendaal (as well as the corroborating testimony of Mr
Watson that it was the Government that subsequently
contacted him)
and also Mr Flewin; or to indicate that the involvement of EL MADRE
PROPERTIES was superfluous.
[23]
Given that a successful sale was concluded, the plaintiff's case does
not depend upon the details of the negotiations between
the purchaser
and the seller as contended for by defendant.
[24]
The sale transaction came about after Mr Watson was contacted much
later by the Government, as he himself confirmed. On the

probabilities, that fresh interest by the Government was due to the
efforts of EL MADRE PROPERTIES. That is the direct evidence
of Mr
Elliot. It was Odendaal who had originally introduced Mr Elliot to Mr
Watson and there can be no dispute that EL MADRE PROPERTIES
rekindled
the interest in or about 2007. In the light of the obviously
continuing mandate to EL MADRE PROPERTIES, as stated earlier
the fact
that Odendaal had originally been with Realty 1 is of no consequence
in this regard. The deal moved with Odendaal. The
defendant cannot
escape the consequence of the evidence of Mr Elliot. On a common
sense approach EL MADRE PROPERTIES did all that
was required of it. A
successful transaction ensued. On the evidence of Mr Elliot and Mr
Flewin (the latter in particular describing
the revival of interest
by Mr Elliot preceding the ultimate transaction), the chain of
causation between the input of EL MADRE
PROPERTIES and the ultimate
sale was never ruptured by any new or intervening cause. On that
evidence (of Mr Elliot as supported
by Odendaal and Mr Flewin) the
requisite nexus is inescapable. The plaintiff
referred
to WEBRANCHEK vLK JACOBS & CO LTD 1984(4) SA 671 (A) at 678-9
where it was held:
"It
was agreed therefore that 'effective cause' means something more than
that which causes in a mechanical sense. If I may
use a figure:
counsel were at one that if plaintiff brought about a super-saturated
solution and a stranger merely jarred it into
crystallization,
defendant could not lawfully withhold plaintiff's commission. That
admission immediately brings into play moral
causes and moral
effects, and it is difficult, if not impossible, to track and define
causation in such a transcendental field.
Accordingly a Judge who has
to try the issue must needs decide the matter by applying the common
sense standards and not according
to the notions in regard to the
operation of causation which 'might satisfy the metaphysician'
(Yorkshire Dale Steamship Co v Minister
of War Transport (1942, A.C.
(H.L.) 691, 706)). The distinction between the concepts causa sine
qua non and causa causans is not
as crisp and clear as the frequent
use of these phrases would suggest; they are relative concepts. Where
a causa sine qua non emerges
as the only known causative factor, one
is easily persuaded that it was also the causa causans;'
And
"It
stands to reason, therefore, that the cumulative importance of a
number of causes attributable to one agent may be such
that, although
each in itself might have been described as a causa sine qua non, the
sum of efforts of that agent may be said to
have been the effective
cause of the sale."
[25]
In my view the plaintiff falls within the ambit of such principles.
It was primarily the efforts of EL MADRE PROPERTIES that
lead to the
ultimate purchaser and the seller coming together. The defendant
criticizes the lack of involvement of EL MADRE PROPERTIES
in the
negotiations and the finalization of the ultimate contract. However,
it is no requisite that the agent be involved therein
or perhaps even
be aware thereof at the time (MANO ET MANO LTD v NATIONWIDE AIRLINES
(PTY) LTD AND OTHERS 2007(2) SA 512 (SCA)
par [13] at 517). Clearly,
no new cause ever intervened in this case. The efforts of EL MADRE
PROPRTIES were still overridingly
operative: the causa sine qua non
herein is indeed the causa causans. Defendant's quotation from LAWSA,
in which one purchaser
went out and found another of his own accord,
is not helpful as that is not the case here. It was apparent that it
was EL MADRE
PROPERTIES that initiated the efforts of Mr Elliot. Mr
Elliot was never a purchaser.
[26]
In the more recent case of KNIGHT FRANK SA (PTY) LTD v NACH
INTERNATIONAL INVESTMENTS (PTY) LTD 1999(3) SA 891 (W) the headnote

reads as follows:
"The
applicant applied for an order that the respondent pay to it an
amount owing as a result of the applicant's having complied
with a
mandate given to it by the respondent to sell the respondent's
property. The main issue in dispute was whether the applicant's

activities in fulfilling the mandate could be regarded as having been
the effective cause of the eventual sale of the property.
Prior
to the sale, the property had been leased by F (Pty) Ltd and the
lease agreement had conferred a right of first refusal in
favour of F
(Pty) Ltd. The applicant had been aware of both the lease agreement
and the right of first refusal conferred in terms
thereof when it had
concluded the mandate. The applicant had failed to effect the sale of
the property within the stipulated period
allowed for by the
exclusive mandate and the mandate had been extended, albeit that it
was no longer exclusive in character. Subsequently,
the applicant had
introduced a prospective purchaser to the property and submitted a
written offer to purchase to the respondent.
F (Pty) Ltd had been
advised of the offer to purchase and had exercised its right of first
refusal by appointing a nominee and
purchasing the property through
the nominee. Neither F (Pty) Ltd nor its nominee had at any stage
been introduced to the property
by the applicant. The respondent
submitted that, although the exercise of the right of first refusal
had been triggered by the
offer produced by the applicant, the
applicant had not been involved in the continuous relationship which
had existed between it
and F (Pty) Ltd which had led to F (Pty) Ltd
finally purchasing the property.
Held,
that knowledge was a circumstance which could change an assessment of
the effective cause of a sale. Both parties had had
knowledge of F
(Pty) Ltd's right of first refusal and that right had clearly
triggered F (Pty) Ltd into purchasing the property
through its
nominee. According to the evidence the sale had eventuated on the day
it had and at the price it had as a result of
the production of an
offer to purchase by the applicant. It was the production of the
offer, and therefore the activities of the
applicant, which had been
the effective cause of the particular sale. (At895J, 894D/E-E/F and
H-l)"
[27]
In MANO ET MANO Supra at 517-519, which the defendant in its written
submissions at least acknowledges is factually "vaguely"

similar to the present case, the SCA expressly distinguished the sale
of an aircraft (described as a consumer durable) from the
sale of
immoveable property and it is readily apparent that had that case
concerned immovable property the outcome would have been
different.
[28]
VAN ASWEGEN v DE CLERCQ 1960(4) SA 875 (A) at 880-1 is an important
decision on this point because it dealt with the removal
of financial
obstacles, not by a rival agent but by the purchaser himself and held
that in such a case the fact that another agent
assisted the
purchaser to implement a money-raising scheme which the purchaser had
propounded did not prevent the introduction
of the property by the
original agent from being the effective cause although the second
agent's part, 'although in a sense necessary,
(was) subordinate'. The
judgment continues: 'In the present case if the plaintiffs
introduction was still persisting in influencing
du Bruyn (the
purchaser) to proceed to the point of purchasing, it was not
prevented from being the effective cause of the sale
merely because
Niemann and Loubser (the other agents) helped to put through du
Bruyn's scheme for him.'
[29]
In EDWARDS v WYNBERG CLUB 1990(2) SA 429 (C) it was held (I quote
again from the headnote:
"Whether in a
particular case the estate agent's introduction of a person to the
'seller' of property can properly be said
to be the effective cause
of the sale must depend on the particular facts and circumstances of
the case. In a case where the eventual
purchaser is not the person
whom the agent has introduced, the agent's entitlement to commission
cannot depend solely on whether
the relation between the eventual
purchaser and the person introduced is such that the sale can be
regarded as virtually one to
the person whom the agent has
introduced. That this cannot be the decisive factor is evident from
the decision of the Appellate
Division in Nelson v Hirchhorn
1927 AD
190
in which the agent's claim for commission was upheld even though
the eventual purchaser was not the person whom the agent had
introduced,
but a party who became involved as a result of the
efforts of that person. There was no suggestion, nor could there have
been on
the facts of that case, that the sale to the eventual
purchaser could be regarded as being in substance a sale to the
person whom
the agent had introduced."
[30]
Much was made of the fact that the deed of sale states that no
commission is payable to anyone. This was inserted at the request
of
the purchaser. Apart from anything else, the plaintiff was not a
party to such agreement. The plaintiff was mandated by the
defendant,
not by the Government. From the latter's point of view there
certainly was no commission payable.
[31
] If the defendant had honestly believed that the plaintiff had had
absolutely nothing to do with this transaction (as it now
contends)
it is highly unlikely that an offer of an ex gratia settlement would
ever have been made to plaintiff. It is obvious
from the evidence of
Odendaal and Messrs Elliot and Flewin that EL MADRE PROPERTIES was
indeed actively involved in ensuring that
a deal was concluded, which
in the end, it was.
[32]
There remains the question of the reserved costs of the fist day of
trial. The standing down of the matter to the next day
was at the
request of the defendant. Its ostensible reason was that it did not
have the opportunity to peruse the transcribed record
of the evidence
taken on commission, a copy of which its legal representatives
received only on the morning of the trial. Further,
that there were
outstanding matters relating to security for costs and finally, the
pre-trail minute. There are no merits in the
reasons proffered. The
evidence taken on commission was akin to evidence being led in a
court. The parties invariably take notes
of the evidence led and,
unless there are cogent reasons (and I dare say that would be a very
rare occasion) a court would not
accede to a party's request for a
postponement on the grounds that it wishes to see if the recorded
evidence was properly transcribed.
The party concerned could peruse
the record outside of court time and bring to the attention of the
court any errors or omissions
it may find before judgment is given.
[33]
A further ground for requesting that the matter stand down was the
so-called outstanding matters relating to security for
costs.
However, counsel concedes in the written heads of argument relating
to the reserved costs that those outstanding matters
were already
resolved on the morning of the first day of trial. That could not be
a ground for requesting the matter to stand down
for an entire day.
[34]
The argument for a postponement on the grounds that the signed
pre-trial minute was presented by plaintiff's attorneys only
on the
previous Friday the 30
th
of July, 2010 is not understood.
The fact remains that at the commencement of trial the signed
pre-trail minute was available.
In the event, the wasted costs should
be borne by the defendant.
[35]
In view of the large amount involved, the importance of the matter
for the plaintiff and its alter ego Odendaal it was reasonable
and
prudent of the plaintiff to have instructed two counsel.
[36]
I make the following order:
1.
The defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff the sum of R2 000, 000.00
plus VAT.
2.
The defendant is ordered to pay interest on the aforesaid amount at
15.5% per annum from 29 May, 2008 to date of payment.
3.
The defendant is ordered to pay plaintiff's costs of suit including
the costs attendant upon the evidence on commission and the
costs of
two counsel where two counsel were employed and the reserved costs
pertaining to the standing down of the trial from 3
August, 2010 to 4
August, 2010.
N RANCHOD
JUDGE
OF THE NORTH GAUTENG HIGH COURT
Representation
for the applicant:
Counsel: Adv. BP. Geach
(S.C) Adv. Van Ryneveldt
Instructed
by Attorneys: Nell Kotze & Van Dyk - Pretoria
Representation
for the respondent:
Counsel:
Adv. J. Daniels
Instructed
by Attorneys: Eversheds - Co:Friedland Hart Solomon & Nicolson

...................................
-
Pretoria