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[2011] ZAGPPHC 87
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Kruse v City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (19422/08) [2011] ZAGPPHC 87 (13 April 2011)
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH
GAUTENG DIVISION, PRETORIA
CASE:19422/08
DATE:13/04/2011
MARIA
M
KRUSE
............................................................................................
First APPLICANT
ALETTA
MM KRUSE
N.O.
..........................................................................
Second
APPLICANT
MARTHA
E C BEZUIDENHOUT
N.O.
...........................................................
Third APPLICANT
HESTER
ISABELLA
LOTZ
..........................................................................
Fourth APPLICANT
V
CITY
OFTSHWANE METROPOLITAN MUNICIPALITY
.............................
First
RESPONDENT
THERESA
MARIE
ROSSOUW
.............................................................
Second RESPONDENT
CATHARINA
MARIA
FROELING
..............................................................
Third RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT
MABUSEJ:
[1]
This is a review launched in terms of the provisions of Rule 53 of
the Uniform Rules of Court in conjunction with sections 6
and 8 of
the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 20oo("PAJA").
It is aimed at reviewing and setting aside the
decision of the First
Respondent to approve the Second Respondent's building plans in
respect of a certain structure within the
Second respondent's
property.
RELIEF SOUGHT:
[2]
In this review, the Applicants seek the following order:
"i.That
the first respondent's decision, taken on 27 March 2008 in which the
First Respondent approved the Second Respondent's
building pians
should be reviewed and rescinded. 2. That the first and second
respondents should be ordered, jointly and severally,
to pay the
costs of this application."
The
order sought above constitutes part A of an application that
initially consisted also of parts B and C. In this matter this
court
is concerned only with the relief sought under part A of the
application. This application is opposed by the Respondents.
[3]
THE PARTIES:
3.1
The First Applicant is a practising medical doctor of 185 Lys Street,
Rietondale, Pretoria. She approaches this court in this
review
application firstly in her personal capacity and secondly in her
capacity as a co-trustee of the Bezuidenhout Family Trust("BF
Trust").
3.2
The Second Applicant is a pensioner of 185B Lys Street, Rietondale
Pretoria. She approaches this court in her capacity only
as a
Co-Trustee of the Alec Kruse Family Trust("AKF Trust").
3.3
The Third Applicant is also a pensioner but stays at 187 Lys Street,
Rietondale, Pretoria. She has locus standi in this application
by
reason of the fact that, together with the First Applicant, she is a
co-trustee in the Bezuidenhout Family Trust("BF Trust").
3.4 The Fourth and last
Applicant is a teacher who resides at 7A Cerbeveba Street, Aeon Park,
Vereeniging. She approaches this
court for the remedy sought in her
capacity, together with the First and Third Applicants, as a
co-trustee of the Bezuidenhout
Family Trust("BF Trust").
3-5- The trustees of BF
Trust have been properly appointed as such by the office of the
Master of the High Court in Pretoria under
Trust No. 2383/94. The
said appointment was done on 14 October 2002 under letters of
authority of an even date. The locus standi
of the co-trustees of BF
Trust is accordingly not in dispute.
3.6 The First Respondent
is the City of Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality with legal
personality of 227 Andries Street, Pretoria.
The Second Respondent is
a medical doctor of 187 Lys Street, Rietondale, Pretoria. The Third
and last Respondent is a medical doctor
of 183 Lys Street,
Rietondale, Pretoria. The Third Respondent is the owner of the
remaining portion of Erf 482. No relief is sought
against her.
[4]
THE PROPERTIES:
4.1 It is only apposite
at this stage to describe the situation of the properties involved in
this application. The position of
the relevant properties and how
they impact on the disputed servitude is aptly captured in annexure
"K2" by Frederik
Daniel Van Niekerk ("Van Niekerk"),
a duly admitted and practising conveyancer of Menlopark, Pretoria.
First and foremost,
it is clearthat the applicants, in their personal
and representative capacities, are owners of two adjoining properties
in Rietondale.
4.2 I will proceed to
describe the layout of the properties from Lys Street where the
entrance to the disputed way is located. The
Remaining Portion of Erf
482, the property that belongs to the Third Respondent, is situated
to the right hand side of the via
that is in dispute. Across this via
and to the left hand side of the entrance, is the Remaining Portion 4
of Erf 13, which is the
property of Theresa Marie Rossouw, the Third
Respondent. At the end of this via, there are two entrances. The
right entrance leads
to Portion 4 of Erf 482. This is the property
owned by M.M. Kruse, the First Applicant, while the left entrance or
gate leads to
Portion 6 of Erf 13, consisting of Portion 1 and
Portion 2. Portion 1 of Portion 6 of Erf 13 belongs to AKF Trust
while Portion
2 of Portion 6 of Erf 13 belongs to BF Trust. The
layout of the properties, the disputed passage and the ownership of
the properties
as set out by Van Niekerk in Annexure "K2"
re not in dispute.
4.3 For the purpose of
convenience, I will refer to this stretch of land which constitutes
the servitude as "a passage".
Van Niekerk has
longitudinally divided the passage into two halves. The one half of
the passage that runs from Lys Street alongside
of the Third
Respondent's property up to the entrance that leads to the First
Respondent's property and another one-half runs alongside
the second
Respondent's property that leads to the entrance of Portion 6 of Erf
13. Both these halves constitute the passage. This
passage
constitutes the servitude over the Third and Second
Respondents'properties in favour of Portion 4 of Erf 482 and Portion
6 of Erf 13.
THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND
[5]
During March 2008 the Second Respondent notified the Applicants that
the
First
Respondent had approved her building plans for the erection of a
double garage on portion 6 of Erf 13. The said garage would
be
located very close to the boundary of the servitude and in that
manner access to this garage would only be through the Applicants'
servitude. The Applicants only became aware of the First Respondent's
approval of the Second Respondent's building plans after
the Second
Respondent had sought their consent to the plans and they had
refused.
[6]
The Second Respondent never made the building plans available to them
for inspection before she submitted them to the First
Respondent for
its approval. The Second Respondent's attorney promised to let them
have insight into the said plans but never fulfilled
his promise.
However, the First Respondent allowed their architect, one Mr. Kal
Rofahil("Rofahil") on 11 April 2008 to
have insight into
the Second Respondent's building plans. The relevant file relating to
the application of approval of the Second
Respondent's building plans
was made available to Rofahil and in it he saw the First Respondent's
approval of the said building
plans which took place on 27 March
2008.
[7]
On further inspection he discovered that the reference number of the
said building plan was RE3/3269/07; that the said plans
showed the
contemplated building included a motor garage; that the motor garage
would be located against the southern border of
the remainder of
portion 4/13 and against the eastern side border of the servitude
area of the said portion. While the Remaining
Portion 4/13 already
had access to Lys Street from the street front, the building plan
showed a contemplated second access to the
motor garage through the
servitude next to the northern border of portion 4/482 and the
Remaining Portion 6/13. Fourthly, the length
of the motor garage was
more than 7.5 metres. The relevant building plans showed the existing
building in respect of which there
was no plan approved by the First
Respondent.
WHY THE APPLICANTS SEEK
THE ORDER:
[8]
The Applicants felt aggrieved by the First Respondent's approval of
the Second Respondent's building plans. They oppose the
decision of
the First Respondent to approve the said building plans on three
grounds firstly, that the value of their properties
will be
drastically reduced by the approval of the building plans; secondly,
that the First Respondent's approval of the Second
Respondent's
building plans was irregular and illegal on the grounds that the
First Respondent had disregarded the provisions of
section 7 of the
National Building Regulations and Basic Standards Act 103 of
I977("the Act"). The said section provides
as follows:
"
7(1X3) If local authority, having considered recommendation referred
to in section 6 (i)(a)
(a) is satisfied that the
application in question complies with the requirements of this Act
and any other applicable law, it shall
grant its approval in respect
thereof;
(b) (i) is not
satisfied; or
(ii) is satisfied that
the building to which the application in question reiates-
(aa)
is to be erected in such manner or will be of such nature or
appearance that-
(aaa)
the area in which it is to be erected will probably or in fact be
disfigured thereby;
(bbb)
it will probably or in fact be unsightly or objectionable;
(ccc)
it will probably or in fact derogate from the value of adjoining or
neighbouring properties;
(bb) will probably or in fact be
dangerous to life or property, such local authority shall refuse to
grant its approval in respect
thereof and give written reasons for
such refusal."
[9]
Thirdly the Applicants contend that it was not very clear from the
building plans themselves as to who had approved them on
behalf of
the First Respondent and what authority or delegation or otherwise
did such a person have. In the circumstances, the
applicants
challenge the authority of the person who approved the Second
Respondent's plans. The Applicants' challenge of the authority
of
such a person who the approved the Second Respondent's plans is
anchored on the provisions of the section 28 (4) of the Act.
The said
section provides as follows:
"Any local authority
may in writing delegate any power conferred upon it by or under this
Act, other than a power referred
to in section 5, to any committee
appointed by it or to any person in its employ, but the delegation of
any such power shall not
prevent the exercise thereof by such local
authority itself".
[10]
Section 5 itself deals with the appointment of a building control
officer by the local authority. According to its provisions
it is the
duty of the local authority to appoint a building control officer.
The local authority may not delegate its powers to
appoint a building
control officer, whose powers are circumscribed in section 6 of the
Act. The said section 6 provides as follows:
"6 (1) A building
control officer shall-
(a)
make recommendations to the local authority in question, regarding
any plans, specifications, documents and information submitted
to
such local authority in accordance with section 4(3); among others.
[11]
Relying on the provisions of section 6(i)(a) of the Act, among
others, the applicants state that:
"Nadat
die bouplan deeglik nagegaan is, en gesirkuleer is na die relivante
beamptes van die plaaslike owerheid se onderskeie
departemente, kan
sodanige aanbeveling 00k deur die boubeampte, die boubeheerargitek op
die hoofplan nasiener gemaak word. Laasgenoemde
persone bevoegheid om
so aanbeveling te maak is egter onderworpe daaraan die magte van die
boubeheerbeampte skriftelik na hulle
gedelegeer is".
They
contend therefore that a building officer, the building control
officer and the chief plan examiner's authority to make
recommendations
as contained in section 6(i)(a) should be delegated
in writing.
[12]
The applicants case is, in particular, that the recommendations for
the approval of the second respondents building plans were,
contrary
to the provisions of section 6 (i)(a) of Act, done by the chief plan
examiner. They challenge the chief plan examiner's
authority to make
recommendations in respect of the Second Respondent's building plans
on two grounds, firstly that he did not
have the necessary
qualification to approve the building plans and secondly that he did
not have necessary authority to approve
such plans.
[13]
According to the First Respondent, the Second Respondent's plans were
inspected by one H W Schoeman("Schoeman"),
a building
inspector on 4 January 2008. Subsequently on 25 January 2008 the
building plans were recommended for approval by one
Magagula, the
chief plan examiner, whose job description was approved by the
Strategic Executive Officer ("SEO") in terms
of the
authority granted to him. The said Strategic Executive Officer,
according to the First Respondent, has the necessary authority
to
delegate certain tasks to the said Magagula.
[14]
The plans were approved by Marandela, the First Respondent's plan
examiner. It is the First Respondent's case that the said
Marandela
had been properly authorised to approve the said plan, in absence of
any further submission from the applicant the court
will accept that
the plans were properly approved by someone who was qualified to do
so.
[15]
The Applicants contend that the First Respondent should, in terms of
the provisions of Sec. 7(1 )(b)(ii)(cc) of the said Act,
have refused
to approve the Second Respondent's Building Plans on the following
grounds; the said decision of the First Respondent
as contemplated in
terms of the provisions of section 6(2)(a)(l) PAJA was taken without
any proper observation of the provisions
of section 6(2)(b) of Paja;
the decision was arbitrary as envisaged by section 6(2)(e)(io) of
Paja; and it is not rationally connected
to the purpose for which
section 7(i)(b) of the Act was designed or the information before the
First Respondent's Building Control
Officer as envisaged in Sec.
6(2)(f) of Paja.
[16]
Of course as the review was aimed at challenging the decision of the
First Respondent, it is clear that the Second Respondent,
apart from
relying on the First Respondent's view and affidavit, would have
nothing to say about the grounds on which the Applicants
seek to
challenge the First Respondent's decision. In the first Place, Modise
Reginald Maimane, who deposed to the First Respondent's
answering
affidavit, denied that the value of the Applicants' properties would
be diminished as a result of the First Respondent's
approval of the
Second Respondent's building plans. He noted that the Applicants have
not provided any valuation of their properties
prior to the approval
of the building plans nor did they subsequently obtain the value of
their properties after such approval.
According to the First
Respondent, in the absence of proof of the value of the Applicants'
properties before and after the approval
of the Second Respondent's
building plans, nothing prevented the First Respondent from approving
such plans. The Applicants have
not filed any replying affidavit and
the court is not in a position to establish their reaction to this
allegation. The court will
accept that the correct procedure would,
in the circumstances, have been for the Applicants to do an impact
study and to establish,
by obtaining valuations of their properties,
how the values of their properties would be affected.
[17]
The First Respondent denied that its decision to approve the Second
Respondent's building plans was unauthorised. It denied
furthermore
that it failed to observe any material conditions; that it took an
arbitrary decision or that its decision was not
rationally connected
to the purpose for which the said section was designed. It contends
that the First Respondent's official made
a proper evaluation of the
plans the Second Respondent had submitted and, having properly
considered all the relevant aspects,
which included the aesthetical
value and the possible impact on the value on the adjacent
properties, took a decision to approve
the plans.
[18]
The Applicants contend that in view of the fact that the First
Respondent's decision will affect the value of their properties,
the
First Respondent should have notified them of its contemplated
decision in terms of the provisions of section 4(3) of Paja
or the
First Respondent should have notified the Applicants of the Second
Respondent's applications and have accordingly sought
their reaction
to the approval of such plans. The said Sec. 4(3) provides as
follows:
"4.3 If an
administrator decides to follow a notice and comment procedure, the
administrator must -
(a)
take appropriate steps to communicate the administrator's action to
those likely to be materially and adversely affected by
it and call
for comments from them;
(b)
consider comments received;
(c)
decide whether or not to take the administrative action, with or
without changes; and
(d)
comply with the procedures to be followed in connection with notice
and comment procedures, as prescribed."
[19]
On the contrary, apart from denying that the value of the Applicants'
properties was diminished, the First Respondent denies
furthermore
that it was necessary for it to give the Applicant any notice of a
decision it had contemplated taking or any notice
of the Second
Respondent's application of approval of her building plans. In Watele
vs City of Cope Town and Others 2008(6) SA129
at pi45 paragraph 31)
the court stated as follows:
"(31)
On a proper construction of s 3, the applicant's claim to a hearing
can only succeed if he establishes that the decision
to approve the
building plans materially and adversely affected his rights or
legitimate expectations. The parties involved In
the application for
the approval were the respondents and the City. The applicant was not
a party to that process nor was entitled
to be involved. The building
plans in question were drawn at the instance of the respondents who
wanted to erect a four- storey
block of flats on there own property.
The granting of the approval could not, by itself, affect the
applicant's rights".
It
will be recalled, by way of digression, that the plans in casu
involved, according to the Applicants, a motor garage or carport,
according to the First and Second Respondents. In the premises it
would appear that the Applicant's attack of the First respondent's
approval of the Second respondent's building plans is unsustainable.
Furthermore the First Respondent denies that the decision
that it
took was procedurally unfair.
[20]
The Applicants contend that notwithstanding the fact that the
contemplated motor garage falls partly within the building
restrictions
area border on the southern rear border building or the
western side border is in contravention of Sec. 15A of the Scheme.
The
Applicants contend so on the following basis:
20.1
The Second Respondent's property, R4/13, measures 1137m
2
,
according to the deed of servitudes K6277/93. According to Table B1
of the Scheme, which constitutes part of clause 15A (1), the
rear
border building line is 3.oom. This interval includes the building
restriction line on the southern border of the property
in which the
Second Respondent may not build unless he complies with the
exemptions of Clause i5A(2)(d) of the Scheme. On face
value, the
exemptions have not been complied with and in that regard the
Applicants contend that it is for the First and Second
Respondents to
prove that the exemptions have been complied with.
The
same situation, so contend the Applicants, applies in respect of the
Second Respondent's western side border building line.
According to
the said Table Bi the building line restriction on the Second
Respondent's property on the western side of Erf 4/13
is 2.5 m. This
is the area from the western border of the property which the Second
Respondent must maintain and within which she
may not put up any
structure.
20.2
These allegations by the Applicants are denied by the First
Respondent who contends, in the first place, that the structure
depicted in the Second Respondent's building plans is a carport and
not a motor garage, as stated by the Applicants. Secondly,
the First
Respondent denies that the said carport is subject to any building
restrictions. According to the First Respondent, the
aforementioned
carport may, in terms of clause 15A (2) (d), be erected even within
any portion of the building restricted area.
20.3
It is, in my view, important to look at the provisions of the said
clause 15A (2) (d). It provides as follows:
"(2)
Ondanks die bepalings van subklousule 1 of enige verondening - Die
mag 'n enkelverdieping Garage; motordak of skuiling,
asgoedkamer,
privaat swembad, kleedkamer vir 'n private swembad, tennisbaan,
muurbalbaan, of pakkamer op enige gedeelte van die
boubeperkingsgebied anders dan waar sodanige strukture aanliggend aan
'n straatgrens is, opgerig word."
20.4
Counsel for the First Respondent argued that the First Respondent's
contention that the structure which constitutes the subject
of the
decision is a carport or "motordak" has not been
challenged. In the premises it will appear that the court should
accept that the relevant structure is a carport and that a carport is
exempted from complying with the building restrictions. In
a letter
dated 23 April 2008 and entitled REDES VIR GOEDKEURING, the building
control officer referred to the relevant structure
as "motorafdak
/ skuWng". Counsel for the Respondents argued that the relevant
structure is not a garage but a carport.
He argued, and I accept his
argument, that in terms of the provisions of Clause 15A (2) (d) a
carport may, subject to the following
conditions, be approved. "Met
dien verstande dat:
i.
Die posisie daarvan n/e die aantrekiikhe'td van aangrensendeeiendom
of eiendomme benadeel nie;
ii.
Die hoogte daarvan nie 3.8 meter moet oorskry nie;
iii.
"Die buitevJak van die grensmuur daarvan van suursteen moet
wees,
tensy die eienaar of eienaar's van die aangrensende eiendom
of eiendomme skrifteiik tot 'n aiternatiewe duursame afwerking
inwiUig;
iv.
Die afstand tussen die hoofgeboue en sodanige ander gebou aan die
hand van 2.2Smeter is; "15.8.90/27081/3603”
iiv.
"Enige motordak/skuiiing wat aan die hoofgebou is of wat op
enige ander grens as 'n straat grens gebou is aan twee kante
heeltemal oop moet wees en die iengte daarvan nie 7.5 meter moet
oorskry nie.
viii.
"Dat dit op of direk teenaan die aangrensende ten minste 1 meter
van die erf moet opgerig word.
I
find that there is no merit in the argument by counsel for the
Applicants that the structure in question is a motor garage.
20.5
With regard to the Applicant's contention that the First and Second
Respondents should prove that they have complied with the
exemptions
as set out in sub-clause 15A (2) (d), the First and Second
Respondent's attitude is that the applicants have misconstrued
the
law with regard to the duty to prove. It was argued on the
respondents' behalf that, in terms of the law, no duty rests on
them
to prove that they have complied with the aforementioned exemptions.
They contend, which is quite correct in my view, that
the Applicants,
having launched this review application, have the onus to show that
the First Respondent has not complied with
the exemptions. It is the
principle of our law that he who asserts, and not he who denies,
proves. See Pillay v Krishna and Another
1946 AD 946
at p. 952.
Accordingly I accept the First Respondent's view that the onus to
satisfy the court that the First Respondent has not
complied with the
said exemptions rests on the Applicants and not the First Respondent.
[21]
Having regard to the Second Respondent's motor garage as shown on the
building plans, so contend the Applicants, the First
Respondent's
decision to approve the Second Respondent's building plans was
unlawful in as much as it was done contrary to the
said Scheme. It is
contrary to the provisions of Sections 6(2)(a)(l),(b), (c),(d),(e),
(VI) and (f) of PAJA.
[22]
The motor garage is, contrary to the provisions of clause 15 A (2)
(d) (vi) of the Scheme, longer than the prescribed length
of 7.5
metres. This allegation is denied by the Respondents who contend, on
the contrary, that the length of the carport complies
with the
provisions of clause 15A (2)(d)(vi) of the Pretoria Town Planning
Scheme. According to the first respondent, the carport
allows proper
access for any vehicle that utilises the servitude to gain access
into the Second Respondent's property. The respondent's
contend
furthermore that the length of the shelter is 6.7 metres and its
width is 6.9 metres
[23]
If the First Respondent approved the Second Respondent's building
plans in terms of clause 15A of the Scheme, the First Respondent
should have notified the applicants and offered them an opportunity
to present their views. They opine that in view of the fact
the First
Respondent approved the Second Respondent's building plans without
notifying and giving them an opportunity to hear them
first, such a
procedure was unfair to the applicant and contrary the dictates of
section 6 (2) (c) of PAJA.
[24]
The First Respondent has also challenged the application on a point
of procedure on the grounds firstly, that the written authority
of
AKF Trust issued by the Master of the High court was not attached to
the application. In the absence of such a document the
second
Applicant has not established her locus standi. In the premises the
First Respondent is not in any position to admit that
the Second
Applicant was so authorised to represent FAK Trust in this
application.
[25]
The Second Respondent also took a similar view that, until such time
as the Trustees of AKF of Trust had produced letters of
authority
issued by the Master of the High Court in terms of section 6 of the
Trust Property Act 57 1988, the trustees do not have
the authority to
represent AKF Trust. On this basis the second respondent denied that
the trustees of AKF Trust have been duly
authorised to bring the
current application.
[26]
The First Respondent's second string to its bow was that the trustee
had not attached any resolution. On the basis of the failure
by the
trustees to annex a resolution authorising her to bring this
application to her papers, the First Respondent denies that
the
Second Applicant has any authority to represent AKF Trust.
[27]
Finally the applicants have launched an appeal against the decision
of the First Respondent. This appeal was launched on 11
April 2008 in
terms of the provisions of section 9 (0(c) of the Act read with
regulation 9
of the
Review Board Regulations. The
purpose of the
letter dated 11 April 2008 by the applicants' attorneys to the Review
Board was clear. The said letter stated that:
"This letter serves
as a Notice of Appeal in terms of section 9 of the Act, read together
with Regulation 9 of the Regulations,
against a decision the City of
Tshwane Metropolitan Municipality (CTMM) to approve building plans
under reference number RE3/3/269/07
("the building plans")
for certain additions and/or alterations to the Dwelling/House
situated on Portion 4 of Erf 13,
Rietondale Pretoria "(the
subject property) ".
[28]
Save for the fact that the said letter did not refer to Fourth
Respondent, it is clear that the attorney who wrote the said
letter
was acting for the Applicants. Applicants have nowhere in their
application referred to the appeal nor have explained what
happened
to the appeal. What is clear however is that the said appeal was
noted before the applicants launched their application
on the 16
April 2008.
[29]
It was argued on behalf of the First Respondent that the provisions
of PAJA require of the applicants to exhaust other internal
remedies
provided for in the said Act. Section 7(2)(a) PAJA provides as
follows:
"7(2)(q) Subject to
paragraph (c) no court or tribunal shall review an administrative
action in terms of this Act unless internal
remedy provided in any
other law has first been exhausted".
[30]
At the time the applicants launched the current application, they had
already noted the said appeal but had in that respect
not exhausted
the internal remedies as enjoined by section 9 of the Act. The said
section provides as follows.
"(9)0) Any person
who
(a)
feels aggrieved by the refusal of a local authority to grant
approval referred to in section 7 respect of the erection of a
building;
(b)
feels aggrieved by any notice of prohibition referred to in section
10; or
(c)
disputes the interpretation or application by a local authority of
any national building regulation or any other building regulation
or
by- law, may, within the period, in the manner and upon payment the
fees prescribed by regulation, appealed a review board."
[31]
According to PAJA, the applicants should first have exhausted the
internal remedies provided for by section 9 of the Act and
should
have done so to the conclusion of the appeal before launching this
application.
I
am satisfied both on the merits and respect of procedure that the
applicants have not made a good case and that the application
cannot
succeed.
Accordingly I make the
following order:
1. The application to
review and set aside the decision of the First Respondent of 27 March
2008 is hereby dismissed with costs.
2.
The applicants are hereby ordered to pay the cost of this
application, the one paying and the others to be absorbed.
P. M. MABUSE
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
Appearances:
Applicant's
Attorneys: Roestoffand Kruse
Applicant's
Counsel: Adv. SJ du Plessis SC
Respondent's
Attorneys: Moduka More; Venn & Muller
Respondent's
Counsel: Adv. T. Strydom
Date
Heard: 26 July 2010
Date
of Judgment: 13 ApriI 2011