Fisher v Body Corporate Misty Bay (2012 (4) SA 215 (GNP)) [2011] ZAGPPHC 234; [2011] ZAGPPHC 56 (12 April 2011)

75 Reportability
Land and Property Law

Brief Summary

Spoliation — Restoration of possession — Applicant, a property owner within a managed residential complex, denied access due to alleged arrears in levies — Respondent, the Body Corporate, suspended applicant's access tag based on non-payment — Court held that such restriction amounted to spoliation, as it deprived the applicant of peaceful possession and use of his property — Urgent application granted for restoration of access and possession, with costs awarded against the respondent.

Comprehensive Summary

Summary of Judgment


1. Introduction


This matter concerned an urgent application on the motion roll in which the applicant sought relief in the form of a mandament van spolie. The proceedings were directed at restoring the applicant’s possession of, and access to, a residential unit situated in a sectional title scheme, after the respondent body corporate suspended the applicant’s access tag at the scheme’s security gate.


The parties were Arthur Churchill Fisher (the applicant), an owner of immovable property within the scheme, and The Body Corporate Misty Bay (the respondent), a body corporate registered and incorporated under the Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986, responsible for managing the residential village complex known as Misty Bay Village.


On 1 April 2011, the court granted an order in terms of prayers 1 to 3 of the notice of motion, including urgency under Uniform Rule 6(12), restoration of possession and access, and punitive costs on an attorney and client scale. The order was granted with an indication that reasons would follow. The present judgment, delivered on 12 April 2011, furnished the reasons and confirmed the earlier order.


The general subject-matter of the dispute was whether the respondent’s suspension of the applicant’s access disk (in the context of arrear levies) amounted to unlawful self-help constituting spoliation, and whether the respondent could justify restricting access to the scheme on the basis of its conduct rules or contractual provisions.


2. Material Facts


The respondent managed a residential village complex with controlled entry and exit through a security gate. The applicant owned Erf 4194, described in the relief as Unit B, Misty Bay Village, which was registered in his name on 4 December 2007. It was accepted that the applicant had been in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the house since 2007.


Owners in the complex were required to contract with the respondent and pay amounts described as rates and levies. It was alleged by the respondent that the applicant was in arrears in the amount of R4 208.25, and that he had defaulted on levy/rate payments. The court’s reasoning proceeded on the basis that the respondent relied on the alleged arrears as the justification for its conduct.


On 19 March 2011, the applicant attempted to enter the complex using his access disk at the security gate. The disk did not activate the boom, with the result that the applicant could not gain access in the ordinary manner. The respondent’s position in the answering affidavit was that, under its rules of conduct, it was entitled to suspend the access tags of owners who failed to pay monthly levies, and that the applicant’s failure to pay entitled it to suspend his tag pending payment.


During argument, the respondent sought to characterise the restriction as limited, contending that the applicant himself was not barred from entering, but that only access by vehicle was restricted. The court assessed the practical effect of the restriction and considered that deactivating vehicular access would compel the applicant to leave his vehicle at or outside the gate and proceed on foot or by alternative transport, thus interfering with the peaceful and undisturbed use associated with possession.


The respondent also referred to clauses in a standard agreement (including provisions reserving rights to disconnect electricity or take “any other action deemed necessary” following disregard of rules, and describing the purpose of levies and the consequence of “suspension of a service”). The court found that these clauses did not establish the specific entitlement asserted in the answering affidavit, namely a rule authorising suspension of access tags for levy non-payment.


3. Legal Issues


The central legal question was whether the respondent’s conduct in suspending/deactivating the applicant’s access disk, thereby preventing normal access through the security gate, amounted to spoliation requiring restoration by way of the mandament van spolie.


A related question was whether the respondent could justify the restriction on the basis of its asserted rules of conduct or contractual terms, or whether such conduct constituted impermissible self-help (taking the law into its own hands) regardless of any internal rule or agreement.


The dispute primarily concerned the application of established legal principles to the facts, in particular whether the interference with access in this context constituted a deprivation of possession (or an incident of possession) protected by the spoliation remedy. It also entailed an evaluative judgment regarding the practical effect of the restriction on the applicant’s possession and use of the property (and, to an extent, the use of his vehicle in relation to access).


4. Court’s Reasoning


The court approached the matter on the footing that spoliation is a robust and summary remedy aimed at restoring the status quo ante where a party has been unlawfully deprived of possession by another who has engaged in self-help. The emphasis in the court’s reasoning was on the principle that even where a party believes it has a right (for example, arising from alleged arrears or internal rules), it may not enforce that perceived right by unilateral acts that disturb another’s possession without due legal process.


In evaluating the respondent’s attempt to limit the dispute to vehicular access only, the court focused on the practical consequences of deactivating the access disk. The court considered that the applicant would be compelled to leave his vehicle at or outside the gate and proceed on foot or seek alternative transport, and that such interference meant the applicant no longer enjoyed peaceful and undisturbed possession and/or use in the ordinary sense. The court treated this as amounting to spoliation, rejecting any suggestion that the restriction fell outside the protection of the remedy.


The respondent’s reliance on its “rule of conduct” was not accepted as establishing a lawful entitlement to suspend access tags in the manner asserted. The court noted that the contractual clauses relied upon did not, on their wording, support the specific claimed power to suspend access tags for non-payment of levies. Importantly, the court reasoned that even if such a rule existed, it would not justify resort to spoliation-like conduct; the respondent would still not be entitled to “take the law into its own hands” and deprive the applicant of possession-related access without lawful process.


The court considered and distinguished De Beer v Zimbali Estate Management Association (Pty) Ltd and Another 2007 (3) SA 254 (NPD). In that matter, the issue was whether the applicant had possession of the whole estate merely because she had a disk allowing access, and the court found that the possession required for spoliation over the whole area had not been established. In the present matter, the court treated the dispute as concerning possession (and not merely convenience of access), and held that access required to retain possession or use of property falls within the protection afforded by the spoliation remedy. On that basis, limitation of access curtailing possession or use of the applicant’s house (and related incidents of use) was treated as spoliation.


On costs, the court linked the punitive order to the character of spoliation as a remedy that expresses disapproval of self-help. The court regarded the respondent’s continued insistence that it was entitled to deny the applicant access as a factor supporting an attorney and client costs order.


The court also recorded its view that it was unusual for the respondent to indicate an intention to appeal immediately after the order, before reasons had been furnished, and stated that the nature of the dispute and order did not warrant such an attitude. This observation did not alter the substantive relief but formed part of the court’s explanation of the context and its confirmation of the order.


5. Outcome and Relief


The court confirmed the order granted on 1 April 2011. The matter was heard as urgent in terms of Uniform Rule 6(12), with non-compliance with ordinary forms and service dispensed with.


The respondent was directed to restore the applicant’s possession of and access to the premises described as Unit B, Misty Bay Village. The respondent was also ordered to pay the costs of the application on the attorney and client scale.


The court noted that the relief granted corresponded to the prayers in the notice of motion, and recorded that the applicant did not seek to amend the notice of motion despite the discussion concerning access in relation to the applicant’s vehicle.


Cases Cited


De Beer v Zimbali Estate Management Association (Pty) Ltd and Another 2007 (3) SA 254 (NPD)


Legislation Cited


Sectional Titles Act 95 of 1986


Rules of Court Cited


Uniform Rules of Court, Rule 6(12)


Held


The court held that the respondent’s suspension/deactivation of the applicant’s access disk at the security gate, in circumstances where it curtailed the applicant’s ability to exercise peaceful and undisturbed possession and use of his property (and the ordinary incidents of access associated with that possession), amounted to spoliation.


The court held that the respondent could not justify its conduct by reliance on alleged arrear levies, asserted conduct rules, or contractual provisions, because a party is not permitted to resort to self-help in place of lawful process. The order restoring possession and access was therefore warranted, and the respondent’s conduct justified a punitive costs order.


LEGAL PRINCIPLES


The mandament van spolie is a summary and robust remedy directed at restoring the status quo by requiring restoration of possession that has been disturbed by unlawful self-help, without adjudicating the merits of the underlying entitlement.


A party who believes it has contractual or rule-based rights arising from another party’s non-compliance (including non-payment) is not thereby entitled to enforce those rights through unilateral deprivation of possession or incidents of possession; lawful process must be followed rather than taking the law into one’s own hands.


Where access is integral to maintaining possession or use of property, an interference with that access may constitute spoliation. The inquiry focuses on the effect of the conduct on peaceful and undisturbed possession and use, rather than on formal characterisations that attempt to minimise the deprivation (for example, by framing it as a restriction affecting only a vehicle).


A punitive costs order may be appropriate in spoliation matters to mark the court’s disapproval of self-help, particularly where the spoliator persists in asserting entitlement to the deprivation up to the hearing.

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[2011] ZAGPPHC 234
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Fisher v Body Corporate Misty Bay (2012 (4) SA 215 (GNP)) [2011] ZAGPPHC 234; [2011] ZAGPPHC 56 (12 April 2011)
REPORTABLE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH
GAUTENG HIGH COURT
Case
no.:20010/11
DATE:
12/04/2011
In
the matter between:
ARTHUR
CHURCHILL FISHER
…...............................................................................
Applicant
and
THE
BODY CORPORATE MISTY
BAY
......................................................................
Respondent
JUDGMENT
LEGODI
J,
1.
On the 1 April 2011, I made an order in terms of prayers 1, 2 and 3
of the notice of motion which reads as follows:
1.1
That the application be heard as one of urgency in terms of Rule
6(12) and that, strict compliance with the forms and services

provided for in the Rules of the above court be accordingly dispensed
with and that the matter be heard as one of urgency.
1.2
Restoring the applicant's possession of and access to the premises
more fully described as Unit B, Misty Body Village (the premises).
1.3
That the respondent pays the costs of this application on the
attorney and client scale".
2.
The order was made in an urgent motion roll. I indicated at the time
that reasons for the order would be given in due course.
3.
I now turn to give reasons for the order. Before that, it might be
necessary to give a brief background.
4.
The respondent is a corporate body duly registered and incorporated
in terms of the Sectional Tittles Act 95 of 1986 at Vaal
Marina,
Midvaal.
5.
It manages a residential village complex described as Misty Body
Village situated in Gauteng.
6.
The applicant owns Erf 4194 (hereinafter referred to as the house),
which falls within the village complex managed by the respondent.
The
house was registered in the names of the applicant on 4 December
2007.
7.
The applicant has been in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the
house since 2007. Access to the village complex and thus
to the
respective house is controlled at the main gate that leads in and out
of the village complex.
8.
All owners of the houses within the complex are required to enter
into a contract with the respondent in terms of which each
one of
them undertakes to pay a certain amount of money for rates and levies
to the respondent.
9.
The applicant is said to be in arrears in the amount of R4208.25. The
applicant is said to have defaulted in effecting payments
for such
levies and rates to the applicant.
10.
On 19 March 2011, the applicant attempted to gain access to the
scheme by using his access disk at the security gate. It did
not
activate the security boom and as a result he was unable to gain
access to the village complex.
11.
When this matter was argued on 1 April 2011, counsel for the
respondent argued to this effect: Firstly, that the applicant
as a
person was not barred from accessing the village complex. It was only
his car that was barred or that access was only restricted
when the
applicant is using his vehicle. Secondly, he contended that the
respondent was entitled to impose the restricted access
based on the
fact that, the applicant is in arrears in respect of rates and
levies.
12.
In the answering affidavit, the respondent raised the defence as
follows:
"8
AD PARAGRAPH 7
I
deny that the respondent unlawfully deprived the applicant of
possession of the premises by failing to grant the applicant access

to the common property. The common property is enjoyed by the 242
owners of the scheme and not to exclusion of all others.
In
terms of the Rule of Conduct of the Misty Body Corporate, the Body
Corporate is entitled to suspend the access tags of any owner
should
the owner fail to make payment of the monthly levy which levy is used
to maintain the common property.
The
applicant's failure to make payment of his arrear levies entitled the
respondent to suspend the applicant's tag, pending payment
of his
levy account."
13.
Clear from the quotation that the respondent takes the view that,
because of its rule of conduct, it is entitled to suspend
the access
tag of the applicant based on the latter's failure to make payment of
monthly levy.
14.
Of course, during argument counsel for the respondent wished to take
this point insofar as it related to the applicant's vehicle
only. He
however, found himself hard pressed to explain why "the
vehicle". Insofar as it might have been intended to
suggest that
such an action did not amount to spoliation, I must immediately
indicate it does.
15.
The restriction has the following effect. Assuming that the
applicant drives from his house to his place of employment, he
would
drive up to the security gate, then be forced to leave his vehicle
there, because the security boom is deactivated for the
applicant's
vehicle. This has the effect that, he had to stop and park his
vehicle at the gate and from there, exits the gate either
to look for
a public transport or to arrange for transport to proceed to his
place of employment.
16.
Similarly, assuming that the applicant comes from outside the village
complex driving his vehicle, because the security gate
boom insofar
as it relates to the applicant's vehicle cannot be activated, it
would mean that the applicant must leave his vehicle
outside the main
security gate and thereafter walk to his house.
17.
All of these suggest that the applicant could no longer have peaceful
and undisturbed possession and or use of his vehicle.
This is
spoliation.
18.
Coming back to the defence, counsel for the respondent referred me to
clauses 17.II and 19 of the standard agreement. They read
as follows
"1
7.1 The trustees operating on behalf of Body Corporate reserve the
right to disconnect and lock out electricity supply or
perform any
other action deemed necessary to any owner or tenant where the owner,
family or the owner tenant, friends or domestic
staff continue to
disregard these Rules and continue to do so after receiving written
notice in this regard.
19.The
purpose of a levy is to pay for electricity, effluent, maintenance,
employees, salaries, garden etc. Failure to pay these
accounts by the
Body Corporate simply results in suspension of a service for which
all suffer".
19.
It looks like I was referred to these clauses in search of a
justification for the statement that was made in paragraph 6 quoted

earlier in paragraph 12 of this judgment. The statement suggests the
existence of Rule of Conduct in terms of the respondent's
Rules,
which entitles the respondent to suspend the access tags of those
owners who fail to make payment of the monthly levies.
Of course, the
two clauses referred to above, make no reference to such a "rule
of conduct" for such entitlement, neither
anywhere in the
agreement. Even if it was in my view, the respondent would not have
been entitled to spoliation without due process
of the law. In other
words, it could not have taken the law into its own hands as it is
the case in the present case.
20.
The respondent for its action, sought also to rely on what was said
in the case of De Beer v Zimbali Estate Management Association
(PTY)
Ltd and Another
2007 (3) SA 254
NPD for its action.
21.
I do not understand what was said in De Beer's matter as supporting
the respondent's contention. An estate agent was residing
within a
complex managed and controlled by the respondent. She applied for
unrestricted access to the whole complex based on spoliation
as it
impedes on her ability to access other areas within the complex for
the purpose of viewing houses for sale. The issue was
raised as
follows in De Beer's case:
"Whether
the applicant had possession of the whole estate?"
22.
The contention to the question was that, she had a key or disc
allowing her access to the whole estate. That by giving her the
disc,
the respondents were in effect giving her possession of the whole
estate.
22.1
The court found that the applicant failed to establish the sort of
possession required for a mandament for the whole area of
the estate,
that is, for the remaining parts of the estate.
23.
In the instant case, it is the possession and not just access that is
in issue. Access that was required in De Beer's case was
in respect
of two parts of the beach estate. It was not aimed at retaining
possession or use.
24.
Access that is intended to retain possession or use of property
should be found to be protected under the principle of mandament
van
spolie. Therefore, any limitation of access that would curtail the
applicant's possession or use of the house and or motor
vehicle
should be found to amount to spoliation.
25.
Before I made the order on 1 April 2011, I enquired from the
applicant's counsel as to whether he had anything to suggest with

regard to the order as prayed for in paragraph 2 of the notice of
motion. I raised this in the light of the fact that, in the notice
of
motion, the applicant is not asking for unrestricted access, but
solely, for restoration of the applicant's possession and access
to
the house or Unit B Misty Bay Village. Secondly, I raised the issue
on the basis of the contention by the respondent's counsel.
As I
said, he sought to argue that the respondent was entitled to bar the
applicant's vehicle in and out of the main security gate.
26.
When I raised the issue as I did, one would have expected the
applicant's counsel to want to amend the notice of motion to reflect

the applicant's protection with regard to the possession and or use
of his vehicle in and out of the main gate. The applicant's
counsel
was adamant that the applicant did not as I understood him, want such
amendment. It is because of his persistence to the
prayers as set out
in the notice of motion that I made the order as prayed for in the
notice of motion.
27.
Lastly, in the order that was made on 1 April 2011, the respondent
was further ordered to pay the costs of the application
on an
attorney and client' scale.
28.
Spoliation is a robust remedy. It is intended to secure the status
quo, that is, to restore possession that was taken away by
an action
or conduct that amounted to one taking the law into his or her own
hands.
29.
It is a somewhat summary remedy, that is intended to express
displeasure at taking the law into one's hands. The displeasure
as I
see it could also be expressed in making a punitive order for costs.
In the present case, I have made such an order seen in
the light of
the respondent's insistence till up to the hearing of this matter
that it was entitled to deny the applicant's access
that was required
for both possession of his house and in a somewhat way of his motor
vehicle.
30.
Before I conclude, I may mention something which I found to have been
very strange. Immediately after the order was given on
1 April 2011,
counsel for the respondent stood up to say his instructions were to
appeal or to apply for leave to appeal.
31.
I found this to have been uncalled for. The least the respondent's
counsel could have done was to wait for reasons for the order
as one
would not expect a party to appeal or ask for leave to appeal before
reasons are furnished. The nature of the dispute and
order by this
court did not warrant such an attitude.
32.
Consequently, the order that was made on 1 April 2011, is hereby
confirmed.
M
F LEGODI
JUDGE
OF THE HIGH COURT
BICCARI
BOLLO MARIANO INC
ATTORNEYS
FOR THE APPLICANT
Unit
1 Parklands
229
Bronkhorst Street,
NIEUW
MUCKLENEUK
TEL:
011 622 3622
Ref:
Mr T Simon/cl/B04l32
ATTORENYS
FOR THE RESPONDENT
8A
BRADFORD ROAD,
BEDFORDVIEW
TEL:
011 453 0125
Ref: