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[2010] ZAGPPHC 191
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Bafana Bafana and Others v Commissioner for the South African Revenue Services and Others (59460/2009, 49806/2009) [2010] ZAGPPHC 191 (29 October 2010)
NOT
REPORTABLE
IN
THE HIGH COURT OF SOUTH AFRICA
NORTH
GAUTENG COURT,PRETORIA
CASE
No. 59460/2009
49806/2009
DATE:
29/10/2010
In
the matter between:
BAFANA
BAFANA
......................................................................................
First
Applicant
BAFANA
BAFANA LUCKY LINES STILFONTEIN
...............................
Second
Applicant
Gl
ENTERTAINMENT
CC
..........................................................................
Third
Applicant
JOAO
MIQUEL ROSHA
CALDEIRA
.......................................................
Fourth
Applicant
and
COMMISSIONER
FOR THE SOUTH AFRICAN
REVENUE
SERVICES
............................................................................
First
Respondent
B
MPOFU
NO
............................................................................................
Second
Respondent
T
MHLANGU
NO
......................................................................................
Third
Respondent
NORTH
WEST GAMBLING
BOARD
....................................................
Fourth
Respondent
CASINO
ASSOCIATION OF SOUTH AFRICA
....................................
Fifth
Respondent
SUN
INTERNATIONAL (SOUTH AFRICA) LTD
................................
Sixth
Respondent
PEERMONT
GLOBAL (NORTHWEST) PTY) LTD
............................
Seventh
Respondent
JUDGMENT
Van
der Byl, AJ:-
Introduction
[1]
In this matter the Applicants seek, in addition to the usual order of
costs, an order -
(a)
setting
aside the detentions and/or seizures by the First, Second and Third
Respondents, purportedly executed in terms of section
88 of the
Customs and Excise Act, 1964 ("
the
Act
"),
carried out at the various premises of the Applicants on 12 August
1009
(prayer
2);
(b)
ordering
the First, Second and Third Respondents to forthwith restore the
possession of the Applicants of the items so detained
or seized
(prayer
3).
[2]
Despite the vague reference in the Notice of Motion and the
Applicants' founding affidavit to
"items
.. detained or seized",
it
is, as is apparent from the Respondents' papers, clear that the
Second and Third Respondents, being officers charged with duties
relating to customs and excise as envisaged in the Act, on 12 August
2009. according to the Respondents, detained in terms of section
88(1
)(a) of the Act, 702 gambling machines of which 432 were removed and
taken to the State warehouse in Pretoria and the others
were sealed
and left under detention on the respective premises.
[3]
Although the issues in this matter fall within a relative narrow
compass, the matter has nevertheless a fairly long history
which
calls for an evaluation of the facts relevant to such issues.
Relevant
facts of the matter
[4]
I find it convenient to refer, because of some disputes between the
parties, beforehand to the facts set out in the answering
affidavits
filed by or on behalf of the Respondents.
[5]
On 24 July 2009 the Second and Third Respondents in the course of
their duties conducted in terms of section 4(4)(a) of the
Act
inspections at 10 gambling establishments in the North West Province
belonging to the one, the other or all of the Applicants.
Because
gambling machines are not manufactured in South Africa, they
requested the persons in charge of the establishments to produce
import documentation relating to the gambling machines found on the
premises, but they were unable to do so. They, however, promised
and
undertook to furnish such documentation within a few days.
I
need to mention that at the time of their visit to the premises the
Second and Third Respondents handed a letter dated 24 July
2009 to
the persons in charge in which it is stated that there is "a
reasonable
ground for believing that Customs related documentation or goods are
kept or stored'
at
their premises. Apart from citing the provisions of section 4(4)(a)
of the Act reference is also made to a
"section
4(8)(8A)(a)"
and
it is stated that detention under that section
"is
distinct from detention under section 88(1)(a)".
It
is apparent that there is no such section in the Act, but in so far
as it may have been intended to be a reference to section
4(8A), that
section is inapplicable to the situation in hand.
[6]
On 12 August 2009, when the documents requested were not forthcoming,
they again visited the premises and proceeded to detain
702 gambling
machines found on the premises of which, as I already indicated, 432
were removed to the State warehouse in Pretoria
as there were not
sufficient space on the trucks that had been commissioned to convey
the machines and directed the detention of
the remaining 270 machines
on the premises.
On
this occasion a similarly worded letter dated 12 August 2009 was
handed to the persons in charge of the premises.
In
a letter addressed to the Applicants the next day, it is indicated -
(a)
that
the inspection conducted the day before was effected in terms of
section 4(4)(a) of the Act:
(b)
that
the detention of the machines has, as appears from the detention
notices handed to them at the time, been effected in terms
of section
88(1 )(a), read with section 87(1) of the Act;
(c)
that
they are required to comply with the provisions of section 102(1),
read with section 4(4)(a), of the Act by providing proof
as to the
person from whom the goods were obtained, the place where and the
date on which the duty had been paid and so on:
(d)
that
failure to provide such proof may result in the matter being dealt
with in terms of the Act; and
(e)
that
the reference to section 4(8)(8A) of the Act in the respective
letters had been quoted in error and was withdrawn.
[7]
The Applicants, thereupon, together with two other persons, on 14
August 2009 launched an urgent application under Case No.
49802/2009
enrolled for 17 August 2009 seeking relief similar to the relief
claimed in this application.
As
in this application no distinction was drawn between the machines
that were still detained and those that were released.
[8]
The First Respondent had in the meantime conducted, with the
assistance of the North West Gambling Board, an investigation in
locating the relevant serial numbers on the machines and eventually
established that the machines, except for 28 of the machines,
were
older than five years so that the Applicants were, if regard is had
to section 102 of the Act, read with rule 101.01, not
obliged to
produce any documents in respect of those machines. A letter dated 14
August 2009 was, thereupon, addressed to the Applicants
in which they
were informed that 674 of the machines were for that reason released
from detention and will as from 17 August 2009
be returned to the
Applicants.
[9]
In view of these developments the Applicants decided to remove the
matter from the roll.
[10]
In order to return the machines which had been released the First
Respondent, thereupon, encountered a problem to return the
machines
as both the Gauteng and the North West gambling legislation, read
with section 9(1 )(a) of the National Gambling Act,
2004 (Act 7 of
2004), required the authorisation of the respective gambling boards
to transport the various gambling machines back
from Pretoria to the
North West Province.
[11]
As the First Respondent was unable to obtain such authorization it
was suggested to them through the State Attorney that the
Applicants
should themselves approach the respective boards for such
authorisation.
[12]
The Applicants, however, ignored the suggestion and instead on 21
August 2009 launched an urgent application under the same
case
number, set down for 25 August 2009, seeking an order to the effect -
(a)
that the First Respondent's notification of the release of the
machines dated 14 August 2009, on the basis or assumption that
the
First Respondent conceded unlawfulness of the detention of the
machines and that such notification constituted a settlement
agreement, be made an order of court; and
(b)
that the First Respondent be directed to immediately restore
possession of the machines that were no longer detained.
[13]
Although the First Respondent had no objection to
Annexure
B
being
made an order of court, he filed an affidavit to clarify that the
detention of the machines had not been unlawful and to explain
why
the machines that were released had not in the meantime been
returned.
[14]
On 25 August 2009, being the date on which the application was set
down, the North West Gambling Board and the Casino Association
of
South Africa launched applications to join as the Fourth and Fifth
Respondents which applications were granted by Phatudi J
and directed
them to file their answering affidavits before or on 15 September
2009.
[15]
On 15 September 2009 the North West Gambling Board filed its
answering affidavit in which it contended -
(a)
that
it had always been and was still common cause between the Board and
the Applicants that the Applicants' possession of the machines
in
question was at all times illegal as they do not possess, as provided
in the North West gambling legislation, the licences,
registrations
or authorizations authorizing such possession;
(b)
that
in litigation against the Board for a considerable period of time,
the Applicants challenged the validity of the legislation
in terms of
which their possession is unlawful, being a contention which appears
to have been turned down by Bertelsman J in
Ebrahim
and Another v Premier of the North West Province abd Others
under
Case No. 18175/07 and in which an application for leave to appeal to
the Constitutional Court was refused.
[16]
As a consequence of these developments the application was, at the
request of the Applicants, postponed
sine
die
and
had in the meantime been withdrawn by the Applicants.
[17]
The Applicants then on 25 September 2009 launched this application as
a matter of urgency under another case number against
the First,
Second and Third Respondents seeking on 6 October 2009 relief
identical to the relief that they claimed in the application
lodged
under Case No. 49806/09. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth and Seventh
Respondents applied for leave to intervene and was granted
such leave
on 7 October 2009. The matter was postponed
sine
die
and
the Fourth to the Seventh Respondents were ordered to file their
answering affidavits within 10 days of the order. Another application
for leave to appeal against the order granting the Fifth to Seventh
Respondents leave to intervene was refused and an application
to the
Supreme Court of Appeal for such leave was later abandoned. The Fifth
to the Seventh Respondents eventually filed their
answering
affidavits. The Applicants filed no replying affidavits. The
application then remained dormant.
[18]
The Fourth Respondent, the North West Gambling Board, then
enrolled the application launched on 14 August 2009 as well as
this
application for hearing. The Applicants, however, at the commencement
of the hearing of those applications withdrew the application
launched on 14 August 2009 and tendered the costs incurred by the
Respondents in respect of that application.
[19]
The hearing, thereupon, proceeded before me in respect of the
application launched on 25 September 2009.
The
Applicants' submissions
[20]
It is the Applicants' contention that this application is
"by
its very nature a spoliation application"
as
they were at all times in peaceful and undisturbed possession of the
items detained on 12 August 2009 and wrongfully deprived
of such
possession.
[21]
The Applicants, acknowledging the powers vested in the First
Respondent in, particularly, sections 4(4)(a), 87, 88(1 )(a) and
102
of the Act, contended that the First, Second and Third Respondents
acted
ultra
vires
those
powers and submitted that this application is in effect an indirect
review of the First Respondent's conduct.
[22]
In developing that submission it was contended on behalf of the
Applicants, relying on the decision in the case of
Commissioner
of SARS v Saleem 2008(3) SA 655 (SCA)
that
the Second and Third Respondents failed to exercise their powers
fairly and reasonably because of the fact,
inter
alia -
(a)
that
the letters addressed 24 July 2009 and 12 August 2009 were not
addressed to any of the Applicants or t heir managers and were
merely
in general addressed to as
"sit"
or
"madam";
(b)
that
although it is stated in the letters that there were
"reasonable
grounds for believing"
that
custom related documentation or goods are kept or stored on the
premises no attempt was made until the making of the founding
affidavit to provide the Applicants with any grounds for such belief;
(c)
that
the First, Second and Third Respondents did not inform the Applicants
what they wanted on the occasion of their visit on 24
July 2009 and
also failed to provide any ground for their reasonable belief in
their answering affidavit;
(d)
that
the letters contain a reference to detention in terms of section
4(8)(8A) of the Act and stated explicitly that such detention
is
distinct from detention under section 88(1 )(a) of the Act, but
nevertheless acted under that section and that the fact that
those
references were withdrawn in a letter dated 13 August 2009 is only
done after the fact;
(e)
that
it was only in the letter dated 13 August 2009, being after the
detentions had taken place, that the Applicants are called
upon to
comply with the provisions of section 102, read with section 4, of
the Act by providing proof of the person from whom the
goods were
obtained, etc;
(f)
that
section 102 of the Act can only be invoked if a person have
"dealt
in"
goods
whilst the Applicants did not
"deal
in"
the
goods;
(g)
that,
relying on the decision in the case of
Pretoria
Portland Cement Co. v Competition Commission and others 2003(2) SA
385 (SCA),
the
Second and Third Respondents, were on 12 August 2009 accompanied by
officers of the North West Gambling Board whilst in terms
of section
4(4)(b) of the Act they could have be accompanied only by an
assistant or a member of the police;
(h)
that
the Applicants are, relying on the decision in the case of
Sithonga
v Minister of Safety and Security 2008(1) SACR 376 (Tk),
entitled
to the return of their equipment notwithstanding allegations that
their possession of the equipment will, if returned,
be unlawful.
Relevant
legal principles
[23]
It is trite that in a spoliation application an applicant must comply
with two requirements, namely, firstly, peaceful and
undisturbed
possession and, secondly, wrongful deprivation of such possession
(LAWSA,
volume 11, para 342 at p. 304).
[24]
It has, however, been held that if an applicant goes further than
only to claim spoliatory relief, he or she in effect forces
an
investigation of the issues relevant to the further relief he claims.
Once he does this, the respondent's defence in regard
thereto has to
be considered and, if such a defence furnishes justification for the
respondent's possession, a court will not order
restoration of the
status
quo ante
(see:
Minister
of Agriculture & Agricultural Development v Segopolo
1992 (3) SA
967
(T) at 971B; Street Pole Ads Durban (Pty) Ltd and Another v
Ethekwini Municipality
[2008] ZAGPHC 33
;
2008 (5) SA 290
(SCA) at 295C, para [15]).
[25]
In this matter the Applicants indeed went further by attempting to
show, as contended, by way of a so-called
"indirect
review",
that
the First, Second and Third Respondents exceeded the powers conferred
upon officers charged with customs related matters and
have in my
opinion, therefore, opened the door not only to the First. Second and
Third Respondents to deal with the lawfulness
of their actions, but
also to the Fourth to the Seventh Respondents to deal with the
lawfulness of the Applicants' possession of
the machines in question.
[26]
In considering the contentions raised by the Respondents, the
principles enunciated in the decision in the case of
Plascon-Evans
Paints Ltd v Van Riebeeck Paints (Pty) Ltd
[1984] ZASCA 51
;
1984 (3) SA 623
(A) at
634E-635C
may,
of course, find application
[27]
This brings me lawfulness of the Respondents actions
Powers
vested in the First Respondentand officers charged with customs
related matters
[28]
In terms of section 4(4)(a) of the Act an officer employed on any
duty relating to customs and excise may for purposes of that
Act,
without previous notice, at any time enter any premises whatsoever
and to conduct at such premises any examination he or she
deems
necessary and require the production of documents that relate to
matters dealt with in that Act.
[29]
In terms of section 102 of the Act any person who,
inter
alia,
deals
in imported goods is required, upon demand by an officer, to produce
documentation relating to the importation of such goods.
[30]
In terms of section 88(1 )(a) of the Act an officer may detain any
goods at any place for the purpose of establishing whether
such goods
are liable to forfeiture under that Act.
[31]
Section 87 of the Act deals with the circumstances under which goods
will be liable to forfeiture. In terms of subsection (1)
of that
section any goods imported or otherwise dealt with contrary to the
provisions of the Act or in respect of which any offence
under the
Act has been committed shall be liable to forfeiture wheresoever and
in possession of whomsoever found.
[32]
In terms of section 101, read with Rule 101.01 made under the Act,
any person carrying on business is required to keep books,
documents
and accounts relating to,
inter
alia,
the
importation of any goods and to retain such books, documents and
accounts for a period of five years.
[33]
It is apparent from these provisions that any officer employed on
any duty
relating
to customs and excise is duly authorized -
(a)
to
enter at any time, with or without notice, any premises and to make
such enquiry as he or she deems necessary
(section
4(4)(a)(i)),
(b)
to
require, whilst on the premises, from any person the production then
and there of any document which is in terms of the Act required
to be
kept
(section
4(4)(a)(ii), read with section 101 and Rule 101.01),
(c)
to
detain any goods at any place for the purpose of establishing whether
such goods are liable to forfeiture under,
inter
alia,
section
87(!)
(section
88(1)(a)).
[34]
It is, as I have already indicated, the First, Second and Third
Respondents' case that they indeed at all times acted by virtue
of
the powers vested in them by these provisions.
[35]
The Applicants are. however, challenging by way of, as I have already
indicated, an
"indirect
review"
the
validity of their actions.
[36]
As was submitted by Mr. Donen SC who, together with Mr. Matebese,
appeared on behalf of the Fourth Respondent, the question
arises
whether in the circumstances the Applicants' application is, in so
far as it is contended that its application is a spoliation
application, not a misconception of what a
mandament
van spolie
is.
The underlying philosophy of the
mandament
is
"that
no one should resort to self-help in order to obtain or regain
possession"
(LAWSA,
Volume 11, p. 437, para 340)
Having
regard to the fact that there indeed exist statutory powers to take
actions such as those that the First, Second and Third
Respondents
have indeed taken, the question is whether it can be said that they
have taken the law into their own hands or whether
they resorted to
self-help. In my view they have in the circumstances where they acted
by virtue of statutory powers vested in
them not resorted to
self-help. I have in this regard been referred to the decision in the
case of
S
/7
/o
v
Naude
1929 AD 21
in
which the Court was concerned with a matter where the respondent has
summarily dismissed the appellant, a farm labourer, who
had a right
to graze his stock upon the respondent's farm. The appellant refused
to leave, whereupon, the respondent impounded
the appellant's stock
under the Pounds Ordinance, 1912, A spoliation application by the
appellant was unsuccessful. On appeal De
Villiers ACJ held at
26
as
follows:
"In
Nino Bonino v de Lange
(1906, T.S. 120)
INNES C.J stated the law in
the following terms: 'It is a fundamental principle that no man is
allowed to take the law into his
own hands: no one is permitted to
dispossess another forcibly or wrongfully and against his consent of
the possession of property,
whether movable or immovable.' That is
the principle in concise language as stated in all the books. The
appellant accuses the
respondent of a delict, and to succeed he must
therefore satisfy the Court not only that he was in possession at the
time of ejection
(which has not been denied), but also that instead
of invoking the proper machinery of the Court, the respondent took
the law into
his own hands and by force, or by other unlawful means,
wrongfully and unlawfully deprived him (the appellant) of possession
by
sending the cattle to the pound. This the appellant has failed to
establish, and is not in a position to establish. For by setting
the
machinery of the Pound Ordinance into motion the respondent cannot,
in any aspect of the matter, be said to have taken the
law into his
own hands. In sending the cattle to the pound he merely invoked the
aid of the law of the land in his dispute with
the appellant. If he
has unlawfully impounded the cattle, he is liable in damages to the
owner......and he would be so liable if,
when the issues in dispute
between the parties come to be tried, it is found that the cattle
were not trespassing, for according
to sec. 18 (1) of the Ordinance
only cattle found trespassing may be sent to the pound. The decision
made by himself that the cattle
were trespassing, and the fact of
acting upon that decision by sending the cattle to the pound, does
not constitute taking the
law into his own hands. The Pound Ordinance
does not provide any machinery to determine there and then whether or
not cattle are
trespassing, and the owner of the land must of
necessity, therefore, make Lip his mind whether they are or not,
taking the risk
of being mulcted in damages if he comes to a wrong
conclusion. But to hold that under such circumstances he is taking
the law into
his own hands would be to lay down the absurd
proposition that in every case where the owner of cattle, at the time
of trespass,
chooses to deny that the cattle are trespassing he would
be entitled to a mandament van spolie if his cattle are then
impounded.'.
(See
also:
Boompret
Inv (Pty) Ltd v Paardekraal Concession Store (Pty) Ltd
1990 (1) SA
347
(A)at 353B-C)
[37]
By analogy this is what occurred in this matter. The First, Second
and Third Respondents invoked the relevant provisions of
the Act in
detaining the machines in question and by having done that it cannot
be said that what occurred since 24 July 2009 until
the detention was
lifted that they took the law into their own hands.
[38]
In so far as it is contended that the Second and Third Respondents
acted
ultra
Wresthe
powers conferred upon them, the Applicants' remedy is to subject
their actions to review whereupon, if they succeed, the
question of
the return of the machines can be considered. This in itself poses a
practical problem for the Applicants. It would
appear that 419 of the
702 machines detained were removed from the premises of six persons
who were all applicants in the first
application launched on 13
August 2009. The question is accordingly which machines are to be
returned to which Applicant.
[39]
It accordingly follows that the Applicants approached the Court on
a wrong remedy in an application which does not contain
sufficient
facts and which seeks, if regard is had to the fact that the First
Respondent cannot transport the machines without
the prescribed
authorization, impossible relief.
[40]
I am in any event satisfied, applying the
Plascon-Evans
principle,
on the papers of the Respondents -
(a)
that
the Second and Third Respondents did duly and properly entered the
respective premises as they were empowered to do in terms
of section
4(4)(a)(i) so as to conduct an investigation as to whether customs
duty is payable or had been paid on the gambling
machines on the
premises;
(b)
that
they then and there requested the production of importation
documentation in respect of the machines on the premises;
(c)
that
the persons in charge were unable to produce any such documentation,
but promised to provide the necessary documentation within
a few
days;
(d)
that
when no documents were forthcoming they returned to the respective
premises and detained the machines, as authorized in terms
of section
88(1), so as to establish whether the machines are liable to
forfeiture under section 87(1).
[41]
On these facts I am satisfied that the Applicants were not
wrongfully or
unlawfully
dispossessed of the machines in question.
[42]
In view of the conclusion I have reached in this regard it is not
necessary to deal with the other issues raised on behalf
of the
Applicants.
[43]
In so far as I may be wrong in relation to those conclusions, I may
point out that the contents of the letters dated 24 July
2009 and 12
August 2009 do not in my opinion detract from the lawfulness of the
Respondents' actions.
The
contention that the letters contain an indication that there was a
reasonable ground for believing that customs related documents
or
goods are kept on the premises is not without any substance. It is
clearly stated in the Applicants' papers that because gambling
machines are not manufactured in South Africa and must accordingly be
imported, hence the request that documentation be produced
relating
to such importation and any duties paid thereon. This is in my
opinion clearly a reasonable ground for their belief. The
First
Respondent has indeed wide powers of inspection and I fail to see why
he should have any reasonable ground for believing
that documents or
goods are kept on any premises before exercising any of those powers
In so far as a reasonable belief is a prerequisite
for the exercise
of the powers vested in section 4(4)(a) I can see no reason why the
person concerned should be informed of the
grounds on which such
belief is based. There is accordingly also no reason why the contents
of the letters should detract from
the validity of the Respondents
actions. The incorrect references in the letters were in any event
corrected the next day. I am
in any event satisfied that the persons
in charge of the respective premises were duly informed of what was
expected from them.
I
am accordingly of the view that the
ultra
vires
argument
is without any foundation.
[44]
There are also two other issues which were dealt with in argument,
namely, whether an order can be granted for the return of
the
machines where the Applicant's possession of the machines is
unlawful.
As
far as the first of these issues is concerned there is the question
of impossibility by the First Respondent to return the machines
because of the fact that he is unable to obtain the necessary
authorization to convey the machines currently detained in the State
warehouse. Any order for the return of the machines will in the
circumstances be a mere
brutum
fulmen.
As
far as the second of these issues is concerned there is the fact that
the Applicants are not in law entitled to possess the machines.
On
behalf of the Applicants I have been referred to the decision in then
case of
Sithonga
v Minister of Safety and Minister of Safety and Security 2008(1) SACR
376 (Tk)
in
which it was held that the lawfulness of the applicant's possession
is irrelevant in spoliation proceedings which is a summary
remedy
aimed at restoring the applicant's possession and that it is not open
to a respondent to raise as a defence that the applicant's
possession
is illegal.
In
another unreported matter
Schoeman
v Chairperson of the North West Gambling
Board
in
Case No. 6/2005 in the Bophuthatswana Provincial Division in which an
interdict was claimed preventing the Gambling Board from
seizing and
removing gambling equipment in accordance with a warrant pending an
application to review and set aside the warrant.
The Court refused to
grant the interdict,
inter
alia,
because
the applicant was not entitled to to posses the machines in question
until he produces and appropriate licence.
I
am in respectful agreement with this decision, but having held that
the Applicants' remedy in this matter is not based on the
mandament
van spolie
the
decision in the
Sithonga
case
is
distinguishable from the circumstances in this matter.
[48]
In summary I am of the view -
(a)
that
the Applicants failed to establish the requirements of the
mandament
van spolie
because,
bearing in mind that the Second and Third Respondents invoked the
provisions of sections 4(4)(a) and 88(1 )(a) of the Act,
it cannot be
held that the First, Second and Third Respondents took the law into
their own hands;
(b)
that
I am in any event, applying the principles enunciated in
the
Plascon Evans case,
satisfied
that on the papers set out in the Respondents' papers together with
the undisputed facts set out in the Applicants' papers,
the First,
Second and Third Respondents were duly authorized in law to take the
actions they did.
In
the
result
the
application is dismissed
with
costs,
including the costs of two counsel.
P
C VAN DER BYL,AJ:-
ACTING
JUDGE OF THE HIGH COURT
ON
BEHALF OF THE APPLICANTS
ADV
N JAGGA
On
the instructions of:
HENK
WISSING ATTORNEYS
c/o
SHAPIRO & SHAPIRO
2
nd
Floor, Shapiro Chambers
20
Bureau Lane
PRETORIA
Ref:
A Shapiro/H0250
Tel:
(012)328 5847
ON
BEHALF OF THE FIRST, SECOND AND
THIRD
RESPONDENTS
ADV
E W DUNN SC
ADV
T KHATRI
On
the instructions of:
THE
STATE ATTORNEY
Bothongo
Heights
8
th
Floor
167
Andries Street
PRETORIA
Ref:
5030/09/Z30 (Mr. D C du Toit)
ON
BEHALF OF THE FOURTH RESPONDENT
ADV
M DONEN SC
ADVZ
MATEBESE
On
the instructions of:
L
MBANJWA INC
Suite
18/7A,
18
th
Floor
Sanlam
Centre corner of: Andries & Pretorius Streets
PRETORIA
Ref:
Mr. S S Mketsu
Tel:
(012) 322 4660
ON
BEHALF OF THE FIFTH, SIXTH AND SEVENTH
RESPONDENTS
WEBBER
WENTZEL